JUDGMENT : 1. By way of filing this appeal, appellant-National Highways Authority of India (for short 'NHAI') has invoked the appellate jurisdiction of High Court within scope of Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short "Act of 1996"), assailing the dismissal of their objections under Section 34 of Act of 1996 by the Additional District Judge vide order dated 25.11.2017 and appellant is also assailing the arbitration award dated 03.12.2014 passed in case No.78/2011 by the District Collector, Jaipur who was sole nominated arbitrator by the Central Government under Section 3-G of the National Highways Act, 1956 (for short "Act of 1956") to determine the amount of compensation of land in question of respondent Nos.1 and 2, sought to be acquired under the Act of 1956. 2. The basic issue raised by the NHAI in present appeal is that the compensation of the acquired land admeasuring 2786 Sq.Mtrs. of respondent Nos.1 and 2, as assessed by the Arbitrator applying the commercial rate by treating the nature of land as of commercial, is not correct because land in question is recorded as agricultural land in the revenue record and was never converted for commercial use, as such the compensation should have been assessed according to the DLC rate of agricultural land. 3. The factual matrix as culled out from the record are that Government of India issued notification dated 05.02.2008 under Section 3-A of the National Highways Act, 1956 (for short 'NHA Act') to acquire the land of various persons for the purpose of widening the National Highway No.8 from Gurgaon-Kotputli-Jaipur and thereafter declaration under Section 3-D of Act of 1956 was issued on 05.02.2009. An area of 2786 Sq.Mtrs of the land belonging to respondent Nos.1 and 2 of Khasara No.646 and 655 situated at Mauja Lada Ka Bas, Tehsil Kotputli, District Jaipur also came under such acquisition proceeding, which were recorded as agricultural land in Revenue Record, despite passing the conversion order on 08.10.2002. The competent authority determined the compensation by applying the then DLC rate of agricultural land, although the respondent Nos.1 and 2 claimed for assessing the compensation by applying the commercial rate. The competent authority determined the compensation by applying the then DLC rate of agricultural land, although the respondent Nos.1 and 2 claimed for assessing the compensation by applying the commercial rate. According to respondent Nos.1 and 2, their lands have been converted from agricultural to commercial vide order dated 08.10.2002 being No.Revenue-18 B(4) 2002/H/11950 passed by District Collector, much prior to issuance of notification dated 05.02.2008 under Section 3-A of Act of 1956. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 refused to accept the determined compensation by Competent Authority and claimed the higher compensation at the rate of commercial, therefore for determination of compensation, central government appointed the District Collector, Jaipur as sole Arbitrator to hear and decide the claim of respondent Nos.1 and 2 under Section 3-G (5) of the Act of 1956. The Arbitrator after hearing both parties had passed its award dated 03.12.2014 determining the compensation of acquired land of respondent Nos.1 and 2 at the commercial rate as applicable at the time of acquisition. the Arbitrator placed reliance upon the order of conversion dated 08.10.2002. The Arbitrator, in its award dated 03.12.2014 has clearly observed that the land under acquisition of respondent Nos.1 and 2 has already been converted from agricultural to commercial vide order dated 08.10.2002 and the copy of conversion order was also sent to Tehsildar Kotputli, Jaipur to make entries in revenue record but the conversion order could not enter into the revenue record and for which respondent Nos. 1 and 2 may not be held guilty or negligent in any way. The arbitrator has held that once the land in question of respondent Nos.1 and 2 have been converted into commercial land, they are entitled to get the compensation according to commercial rate and not according to DLC of agricultural land. Thus, Arbitrator has assessed the total compensation Rs. 2,53,06723/- payable to respondent Nos.1 and 2 in lieu of acquisition of their land. 4. After passing the arbitral award dated 03.12.2014, the NHAI moved an application for setting aside the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act of 1956 before the District Judge, Jaipur, which was later on transferred to the Additional District Judge No.3, Jaipur. 2,53,06723/- payable to respondent Nos.1 and 2 in lieu of acquisition of their land. 4. After passing the arbitral award dated 03.12.2014, the NHAI moved an application for setting aside the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act of 1956 before the District Judge, Jaipur, which was later on transferred to the Additional District Judge No.3, Jaipur. The NHAI raised two objections (i) the dates of publication of notification under Sections 3-A & 3-G of the Act of 1956 are incorrect, (ii) the lands in question is recorded as agricultural land in the revenue record, therefore, the same may not be treated as converted land to the nature of commercial and as such the compensation award for the land in question and the rates of commercial is against law. Learned Additional District Judge examined both objections within the scope of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and held that similar points have already been raised by the appellant and considered by the Arbitrator in its award dated 03.12.2014, therefore, such objections do not fall within the scope of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and as such the Court declined to set aside the arbitration award and accordingly dismissed the application vide order dated 25.11.2017. The NHAI has assailed order dated 25.11.2017, by way of present appeal. 5. Counsel for appellant-NHAI has argued that conversion order dated 08.10.2002, whereby the land in question was allowed to be converted from agricultural land to use for non-agricultural purpose, was passed under the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Conversion of Agricultural Land for Non-agricultural Purposes in Rural Areas), Rules 1992. Learned counsel argued that this conversion order itself does not reflect that the lands of respondent Nos.1 and 2 were converted for use of commercial purposes, therefore, the assessment of compensation of lands in question at the commercial rate is wholly arbitrary and not sustainable in law. Learned counsel argued that Arbitrator committed error in not appreciating the conversion order dated 08.10.2002 in its true spirit as such the arbitral award dated 03.12.2014 deserves to be set aside within the scope of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The learned Additional District Judge committed jurisdictional error in dismissing the application filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, therefore, the same deserves to be allowed and arbitral award be set aside. 6. The learned Additional District Judge committed jurisdictional error in dismissing the application filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, therefore, the same deserves to be allowed and arbitral award be set aside. 6. Heard learned Senior Counsel for appellant and perused the arbitral award dated 03.12.2014 as also the impugned order dated 25.11.2017 and the conversion order dated 08.10.2002. 7. It is needless to iterate that the scope of appeal under Section 37 of the Act of 1996, against the order passed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 may not be expanded and stretched beyond the scope of interference with the arbitral award within the contours of Section 34 (2), 2-A and 3 of the Act of 1996. It is settled proposition of law that if any case falls within the four corners of any of the grounds as mentioned under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the Court has jurisdiction either to set aside or to interfere with the abritral award. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in catena of judgments has considered and propounded as to when and under which circumstances, scope of Section34 can be invoked to set aside or to interfere with the arbitral award. Few of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are as under:- (i) In the case of Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. Versus General Electric Co. reported in [1994 supp 1 SCC 644], it was held that an arbitral award can be set aside if it is contrary to (a) fundamental policy of Indian Law or (b) the interest of India, or (c) justice or morality. (ii) In the case of ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. reported in (2003) 5 SCC 705 , the Supreme Court added the word "patent illegality" to the above referred three grounds to set aside the award and also held that if the arbitral award is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks conscience of the Court, same can be interfered. (iii) In the case of DDA v. R.S. Sharma and Co. (iii) In the case of DDA v. R.S. Sharma and Co. reported in (2008) 13 SCC 80 , it was held that an award can be interfered with by the Court under Section 34 of the Act when it is contrary to:- (a) substantive provisions of law; or (b) provisions of the 1996 Act; or (c) against the terms of the respective contract; or (d) patently illegal; or (e) prejudicial to the rights of the parties. (iv) in the case of ONGC Ltd. v. Wester Geco International Ltd. reported in (2014) 9 SCC 263 , while expanding the Fundamental Policy of India, the Supreme Court observed that the award of arbitral tribunal is open to challenge when the Arbitrator fail to draw an inference which ought to be drawn or if they had drawn an inference which on the face of it is untenable resulting in miscarriage of justice. The Court has power to modify the offending part of the award in case it is severable from the rest. (v) in the case of Associate Builders v. DDA reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court comprehensively dealt with the scope of Section 34 and have propounded that lack of judicial approach, violation of principles of natural justice, perversity and patent illegality are identified grounds for interference with an award of Arbitrator. Further, following restrictions on exercise of powers of Court under Section 34 have also been propounded:- (a) The Court under Section 34 (2) of the Act, does not act as a Court of appeal while applying the ground of "public policy" to an arbitral award and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. (b) A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the sole judge of the quantity and quality of the evidence. (c) Insufficiently of evidence cannot be a ground for interference by the court. Re-examination of the facts to find out whether a different decision can be arrived at is impermissible under Section 34 (2) of the Act. (d) An award can be set aside only if it shocks the conscience of the court. (e) Illegality must go to the root of the matter and cannot be of a trivial nature for interference by a court. (d) An award can be set aside only if it shocks the conscience of the court. (e) Illegality must go to the root of the matter and cannot be of a trivial nature for interference by a court. A reasonable construction of the terms of the contract by the arbitrator cannot be interfered with by the court. Error of construction is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. Hence, no interference is warranted. (f) If there are two possible interpretations of the terms of the contract, the arbitrator's interpretation has to be accepted and the court under Section 34 cannot substitute its opinion over the arbitrator's view. (vii) In the case of Madhya Pradesh Power General Company Ltd. & Anr. v. Ansaldo Energia SPA and Anr. reported in (2018) 16 SCC 661 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed "Public Policy" under Section 34 of the Act and reiterated the principles of law for interference with the arbitral award under Section 34 as enunciated in the above judgments. 8. In the light of principles of law set out hereinabove, the appeal is being considered on merits as hereunder. 9. It may be noted that in relation to the conversion order dated 08.10.2002, stand of NHAI was different before the Arbitrator and before the Court of Additional District Judge, than the stand taken by the NHAI in the present appeal before this Court. As a matter of fact, it transpires that before the Arbitrator and before the Court of Additional District Judge, NHAI sought to brush aside the conversion order stating that since there is no entry of said conversion order in the revenue record, therefore, the same cannot be relied upon and the nature of land be treated as agricultural as recorded in the revenue record. 10. 10. Now the NHAI, in the present appeal and before this Court has itself relied upon the conversion order dated 08.10.2002 stating that although few part of land of Khasra No.646 and 655 was converted to use from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes under the Rules of 1992, but the conversion order shows that the Government levied the rate of conversion at the rate of residential use and not at the rate of commercial use, therefore, on the basis of the said conversion order, the nature of land in question can not be treated to be converted from agricultural to commercial purposes but at the most it can be inferred by such conversion order that the agricultural land was allowed to be used and converted for residential purposes only. Such change of stand of NHAI and its endevour to make out a new case before this Court at the stage of appeal is not permissible. However, this Court deems it just and proper for the better administration of justice and to prevent failure of justice to either of the parties, to consider the conversion order itself on merits. 11. A perusal of the conversion order dated 08.10.2002 shows that by this order the lands in question of Khasra Nos.646 and 655, an area of 0.27 Hectare and 0.03 Hectare respectively of both Khasras, were allowed to be converted to use for non- agricultural purposes. It is clearly mentioned in Clause 10 of the conversion order that according to the circular dated 30.05.2002 of the Revenue Department lands have been converted beyond 75 meters from center of road on either side. The NHAI, in the memo of appeal has also referred one circular dated 24.02.2005 issued by the Government of Rajasthan Public Works Department, as per this circular dated 24.02.2005, referred by the NHAI itself, the agricultural land situated along National Highways in Rajasthan shall be converted for the purpose of commercial use, beyond 75 meters from center of road on either side and for the purpose of residential use and fuel pump station, it can be converted beyond 40 meters from center of road on either side. Thus, according to circular dated 24.02.2005 also, if the agricultural land is required to be converted for use of commercial purposes other than fuel pump Station and buildings then it must be beyond 75 meters from center of road on either side. Thus, according to circular dated 24.02.2005 also, if the agricultural land is required to be converted for use of commercial purposes other than fuel pump Station and buildings then it must be beyond 75 meters from center of road on either side. In the present case it is clear by Clause (10) of the conversion order dated 08.10.2002 that the land in question has been converted beyond 75 meters from center of road on either side. Thus, conversion order dated 08.10.2002 does not travel in contravention to the circular of the Government of Rajasthan dated 24.02.2005, rather the conversion order stands in conformity with the Government Circular referred by the NHAI. If the conversion order is considered in the light of circular dated 24.02.2005, it is clear that the lands in question have been converted (for non-agricultural purposes) beyond 75 meters from the center of road on either side and therefore, it is apparently clear that the converted land was allowed to be use for commercial purposes. If in the order of conversion, rates of conversion is mentioned at the rate of residential use, the same may not be taken as a conclusive evidence to hold that conversion was not allowed for commercial use but other relevant factors are also required to be considered as discussed above. That apart, the arbitration award itself reflects that respondent Nos.1 and 2 claimed that they were using lands in question after the conversion order dated 08.10.2002 for the commercial purposes of hotel and there commercial building structure was standing on land in question. 12. It is clear from the arbitration award that the commercial rate of the lands in question at the time of acquisition which was Rs.27,000/- per meter. The land Acquisition Officer (Competent Authority), assessed the compensation applying the DLC rate of agricultural lands at the rate of Rs.474/- per meter, although respondent Nos.1 and 2 claimed much higher compensation but the Arbitrator has determined the compensation by applying the DLC rates of commercial land and in addition to such amount of compensation, the compensation for the construction available on lands in question as also 10% compensation for loss of right of enjoyment under Section 3G(2), and 9% interest per annum, as per Section 3H(5) of the Act of 1956 has also been computed. Thus, Arbitrator acted well within its jurisdiction while determining the compensation of lands in question in lieu of acquisition and the compensation determined by the Arbitrator is perfectly in accordance with law and also according to the applicable rates as prevailing at the relevant point of time. The assessment of compensation has been made within parameters of law. The award of the Arbitrator can not be said to be vitiated by any patent illegality appearing on the face of award nor can be said to be in conflict with the public policy of India nor can be said to be in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian Law. 13. Thus after taking into consideration the aforementioned proposition of law and also the entire factual matrix of case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the arbitral award dated 03.12.2014 does not call for any interference within the scope of the provisions of Sections 34 (2), (2 A) and 3 of the Act of 1996 as also within any of the grounds as propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments referred hereinabove. The determination of compensation of the land in question by applying the commercial rate can not be said to suffer from any patent illegality. 14. The upshot of aforesaid discussion is that the learned Additional District Judge has not committed any jurisdictional error in not setting aside the arbitral award dated 03.12.2014 and accordingly the impugned order dated 25.11.2007 does not call for any interference in the present appeal. The arbitral award dated 03.12.2014 deserves to be sustained. Consequently, the appeal filed by National Highways Authority India is dismissed. There is no order as to cost. 15. All pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.