JUDGMENT : 1. In the present writ petition the petitioner has assailed the order dated 05.11.2003, passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Vadodara City, dismissing the petitioner from the service as well as the orders passed in the Appeal and Revision Application i.e. dated 26.12.2003 and dated 12.01.2006 respectively. 2. The brief facts are as under. 2.1 The petitioner was serving as a Police Constable with the respondents since 1984. On 15.03.1990, the petitioner was suspended from service in view of the serious charges of theft of various motorcycles and selling them. The petitioner was served with a charge-sheet on 12.01.1994, inter alia for the charges that he had stolen motorcycles, which are mentioned therein by using duplicate keys and selling them by replacing them by duplicate number plates. The petitioner did not reply to the charge-sheet for the reason that the documents, as demanded by him, were not supplied. 2.2 Simultaneously, criminal complaints were also registered against the petitioner being Criminal Cases Nos.1808 of 1990, 1809 of 1990, 1769 of 1990, 1790 of 1990 and 1791 of 1990. The petitioner was acquitted in the criminal offences, which were registered for the offence under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 2.3 Thereafter, it appears that in view of the departmental proceedings, the petitioner has been dismissed from service by the impugned order dated 05.11.2003, which was subsequently confirmed in the appeal as well as in the revision application, filed by the petitioner. 3. Learned advocate Mr.Upadyay, appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned orders are required to be quashed and set aside, as the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal charges, which are based on the similar facts. It is submitted that though the judgment of acquittal was pointed out before the disciplinary authority as well as before the inquiry officer, the same have not been considered in its true perspective and, therefore, the impugned orders are required to be quashed and set aside. He has submitted that a lenient view may be taken against the petitioner, looking to the fact that he is retiring in the year 2022. He has submitted that a lenient view may be taken against the petitioner, looking to the fact that he is retiring in the year 2022. It is also submitted by him that some of the witnesses have not supported the case of the respondent department and hence, the inquiry officer has fallen in error in appreciating the deposition of such witnesses and the charges are proved against the petitioner only by placing reliance on the statements of some of the witnesses, who have been deposed against him. Thus, it is submitted that the impugned orders may be set aside. No further submission is advanced. 4. Per contra, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr.Rohan Shah, has submitted that the departmental proceedings are conducting after following the statutory rules of the Bombay Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1956, after affording full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and the cross-examination of the petitioner was also done by the disciplinary authority. It is submitted by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that it is not the case of the petitioner that any of the statutory provisions have been violated while holding the departmental proceedings. He has submitted that merely the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal proceedings, the same would not be ipso facto render the disciplinary proceedings as void since the standard of proof in the departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings, is different. Learned Assistant Government Pleader has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Dalbir Singh, AIR 2021 SC 4504 . Thus, he has submitted that the writ petition may not be entertained. 5. I have heard the learned advocates for respective parties to the lis. I have also perused the relevant documents as pointed out by the learned advocates for the respective parties. 6. The facts which are established from the record are that the petitioner was working as a Police Constable under the respondents and he was issued a charge-sheet inter alia alleging that he was involved in the theft of various motorcycles and used to sell them by affixing fallacious number plates and thus, it was alleged that he was negligent and his conduct was unbecoming of a police officer. It was also alleged that such conduct of the petitioner would result into loss of confidence in police. It was also alleged that such conduct of the petitioner would result into loss of confidence in police. A detailed departmental inquiry was held against the petitioner and various witnesses were examined in the departmental inquiry. The petitioner was afforded full opportunity of hearing in the proceedings and the inquiry officer, after examining the witnesses, has held the charges as proved. From the statement of witnesses, it was proved that the petitioner used to replace the original number plates of the vehicles by duplicate number. The petitioner was also given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. It is not alleged that the departmental proceedings were held in violation of any statutory rules or the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of hearing. The primary contention raised by the petitioner is that he was acquitted from the criminal offence, which is premised on the similar facts. This Court has also perused the impugned orders and the disciplinary proceedings. After referring to the judgment of acquittal, the disciplinary authority has categorically stated that the acquittal would not have any effect on the outcome of the departmental proceedings since the witnesses have supported the charges levelled against the petitioner. The dismissal order, which was challenged in the appeal and revision, has been confirmed by the authorities. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Dalbir Singh (supra), whereby the Supreme Court, while examining the issue of departmental proceedings vis-a-vis acquittal in criminal proceedings, has held thus : "22. This Court in Union of India & Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran had laid down the broad parameters for the exercise of jurisdiction of judicial review. The Court held as under: "12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience." 23. In another Judgment reported as B.C Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors., it was held that the power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. The Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. The Court is to examine as to whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. This Court held as under:- "12. The Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. The Court is to examine as to whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. This Court held as under:- "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [ (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38 ] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued." 24. This Court in Management of Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Coimbatore) Limited v. M. Chandrasekaran held that in exercise of power of judicial review, the Labour Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction in reappreciating the evidence adduced before the enquiry officer and in substituting his own judgment to that of the disciplinary authority. It was not a case of no legal evidence. The question as to decision of the disciplinary authority of dismissing the respondent is just and proper could be assailed by the respondent in appropriate proceedings. Considering the fact that there was adequate material produced in the departmental enquiry evidencing that fatal accident was caused by the respondent while driving the vehicle on duty, the burden to prove that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence was on the respondent. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur squarely applies to the fact situation. The Court held as under: "11. The respondent on the other hand contends that the Commissioner has applied the well-settled legal position that there can be no presumption of misconduct by the employees. That, charge must be proved by the Department during the inquiry. Non-examination of the material witnesses such as eyewitnesses present on the spot, conductor and passengers, travelling on the same bus was fatal. For, it entails in not substantiating the charges against the respondent and failure to discharge the initial onus resting on the Department to prove the charge as framed. Non-examination of the material witnesses such as eyewitnesses present on the spot, conductor and passengers, travelling on the same bus was fatal. For, it entails in not substantiating the charges against the respondent and failure to discharge the initial onus resting on the Department to prove the charge as framed. According to the respondent, no fault can be found with the tangible reasons recorded by the Commissioner as noticed by the Single Judge (reproduced above); and resultantly, the conclusion of the Commissioner of not according approval to the order of dismissal is just and proper. It is submitted that the Single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent and issuing direction to the appellant to reinstate him with back wages and continuity of service and all attendant benefits accrued to him." 25. This Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia & Ors. held that the degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond reasonable doubt", he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of "preponderance of probability". It was held as under: "11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond reasonable doubt", he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of "preponderance of probability". Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside ." (Emphasis Supplied) 26. This Court in Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. NOIDA & Ors. held that the criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public, whereas, the departmental inquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It was held as under: "11. A bare perusal of the order which has been quoted in its totality goes to show that the same is not based on any rational foundation. The conceptual difference between a departmental inquiry and criminal proceedings has not been kept in view. Even orders passed by the executive have to be tested on the touchstone of reasonableness. [See Tata Cellular v. Union of India [ (1994) 6 SCC 651 ] and Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh [ (2004) 2 SCC 130 ]. The conceptual difference between a departmental inquiry and criminal proceedings has not been kept in view. Even orders passed by the executive have to be tested on the touchstone of reasonableness. [See Tata Cellular v. Union of India [ (1994) 6 SCC 651 ] and Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh [ (2004) 2 SCC 130 ]. The conceptual difference between departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings have been highlighted by this Court in several cases. Reference may be made to Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. T. Srinivas [ (2004) 7 SCC 442 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1011], Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Sarvesh Berry [ (2005) 10 SCC 471 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1605] and Uttaranchal RTC v. Mansaram Nainwal [ (2006) 6 SCC 366 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1341] . "8. ... The purpose of departmental inquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offense for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental inquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in the criminal cases against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental inquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offense generally implies infringement of public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When the trial for a criminal offense is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offense as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [in short 'the Evidence Act']. The converse is the case of departmental inquiry. When the trial for a criminal offense is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offense as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [in short 'the Evidence Act']. The converse is the case of departmental inquiry. The inquiry in a departmental proceeding relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. ... Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental inquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defense at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances." 29. The burden of proof in the departmental proceedings is not of beyond reasonable doubt as is the principle in the criminal trial but probabilities of the misconduct. The delinquent such as the writ petitioner could examine himself to rebut the allegations of misconduct including use of personal weapon. In fact, the reliance of the writ petitioner is upon a communication dated 1.5.2014 made to the Commandant through the inquiry officer. He has stated that he has not fired on higher officers and that he was out of camp at the alleged time of incident. Therefore, a false case has been made against him. His further stand is that it was a terrorist attack and terrorists have fired on the Camp. None of the departmental witnesses have been even suggested about any terrorist attack or that the writ petitioner was out of camp. Constable D.K. Mishra had immobilized the writ petitioner whereas all other witnesses have seen the writ petitioner being immobilized and being removed to quarter guard. PW-5 Brij Kishore Singh deposed that 3-4 soldiers had taken the Self-Loading Rifle (S.L.R.) of the writ petitioner in their possession. Therefore, the allegations in the chargesheet dated 25.2.2013 that the writ petitioner has fired from the official weapon is a reliable finding returned by the Departmental Authorities on the basis of evidence placed before them. It is not a case of no evidence, which alone would warrant interference by the High Court in exercise of power of judicial review. Therefore, the allegations in the chargesheet dated 25.2.2013 that the writ petitioner has fired from the official weapon is a reliable finding returned by the Departmental Authorities on the basis of evidence placed before them. It is not a case of no evidence, which alone would warrant interference by the High Court in exercise of power of judicial review. It is not the case of the writ petitioner that there was any infraction of any rule or regulations or the violation of the principles of natural justice. The best available evidence had been produced by the appellants in the course of enquiry conducted after long lapse of time." 7. The Supreme Court while referring to the judgment in case of Noida entrepreneurs Association v. Noida and others, (2007) 10 SCC 385 in the afore-noted judgment has been held that the purpose of departmental inquiry and the prosecution are different and have distinguished aspects. The criminal prosecution is under offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public, whereas the departmental inquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It is also held that the criminal trial is conducted, is conducted as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and conversely in case of departmental inquiry, the standard of proof depends upon preponderence and probabilities. It is also observed that the inquiry in departmental proceedings relates to the conduct of breach of duty of the delinquent official for punishing for his misconduct which are defined under the relevant statute and rules. As noted hereinabove, it disciplinary authority has considered the acquittal of the petitioner in criminal cases and it is specifically observed that the witnesses in the departmental proceedings have supported the case of the department. 8. In the recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Maharasthra State Road Transport Corporation v. Dilip Uttam Jayabhay, AIR 2022 SC 238 while examining a similar has held thus: "10.4 Even from the judgment and order passed by the criminal court it appears that the criminal court acquitted the respondent based on the hostility of the witnesses; the evidence led by the interested witnesses; lacuna in examination of the investigating officer; panch for the spot panchnama of the incident, etc. Therefore, criminal court held that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary in the departmental proceedings the misconduct of driving the vehicle rashly and negligently which caused accident and due to which four persons died has been established and proved. As per the cardinal principle of law an acquittal in a criminal trial has no bearing or relevance on the disciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are different and the proceedings operate in different fields and with different objectives. Therefore, the Industrial Court has erred in giving much stress on the acquittal of the respondent by the criminal court." Thus, the Apex Court has held that "As per the cardinal principle of law an acquittal in a criminal trial has no bearing or relevance on the disciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are different and the proceedings operate in different fields and with different objectives". In the case before the Apex Court, the acquittal was not considered because the same was based on the witnesses have turned hostile and the evidence led by the interested witnesses, etc. In the present case, also the petitioner has been acquitted on similar grounds. Hence, merely because he has been acquitted in criminal case, the findings of the disciplinary proceedings which is premised on independent witnesses cannot get diluted. 9. The Supreme Court has also rendered decision in case of Union of India versus P. Gunashekhar, (2015) 2 SCC 610 , wherein prescribed the following parameters: "13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience." Thus, it is directed by the Apex Court that the High Court shall not re-appreciate the evidence, interfere with conclusion in inquiry in the case the same has been conducted in accordance with law or go into adequacy or reliability of the evidence and cannot interfere even if there is some legal evidence on which findings is based and correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be. It is also held that the High Court cannot examine the proportionality of the punishment unless it unless it shock its conscience. The petitioner, who was serving as a Police Constable in a disciplined force was not expected to indulge in grave and serious misconduct of stealing and selling the motorcycles. In the instant case, this Court does not find that the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate to the misconduct. 10. Similar view has been taken in the case of State of Karnataka and other v. N. Gangaraj, (2015) 2 SCC 610 , wherein the High Court has held that the scope of judicial review is only confined to decision making process. It is held that in case the disciplinary authority has admitted the finding of the inquiry officer finding the delinquent guilty of misconduct, which is confirmed in appeal, the Tribunal and High Court cannot interfere with the findings of facts recorded by re-appreciating evidence, as if they are appellate authority. 11. In the present case, as noted hereinabove, the entire case of the petitioner is premised on acquittal which cannot ipso facto result in diluting the order of punishment. It is not the case of the petitioner that the respondents have totally ignored his acquittal. After considering the acquittal of the petitioner, the disciplinary authority has exercised its discretion as per the service rules, and has thought appropriate to impose the punishment of dismissal looking to the proved serious misconduct. 12. Hence, the writ petition fails. Rule discharged.