JUDGMENT : The instant petition is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing order dated 20.10.2012 passed in Execution Case No. 8(A)/2000 by which the petition filed on behalf of original petitioner-judgment debtor dated 07.05.2012 under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has been rejected. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition read as under: One Moris Kujur had filed a suit for eviction of the suit property against the original petitioner being Eviction Title Suit No. 45 of 1997, which was decreed in favour of said Moris Kujur on 31.07.2000. Thereafter, said Moris Kujur filed an application for execution of said decree being Execution Case No. 8(A)/2000. However, appeal, arising out of the eviction suit being Title Appeal No. 48/2000 was dismissed vide order dated 03.08.2002 Subsequently, the said Moris Kujur died on 23.12.2002 and his wife predeceased him, leaving behind no son or daughter but number of relatives. It is the case of the petitioner that the present respondent, without making the legal heirs of late Moris Kujur a party filed a Probate case, being Probate Case No. 65/2003 and on the strength of forged Will got a probate granted in his favour on 11.05.2005 and on the strength of said probate, he got himself substituted in place of late Moris Kujur in Execution Case No. 8A/2000 vide order dated 04.09.2008. According to petitioner-judgment debtor, he being the close relative of late Moris Kujur, after his death became his legal heir and as such the decree become un-executable, but, the present respondent who was having no relation with the deceased Moris Kujur on the strength of forged Will got a probate granted in his favour without making the legal heirs of Moris Kujur a party in the proceeding, as such the judgment passed in the Probate Case is not having binding effect on the petitioner or his legal heir(s). However, immediately after knowing the fact that the respondent-Rajan Khalkho had been substituted in place of late Moris Kujur, he filed a petition on 07.05.2012 before the learned Court below under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure stating therein that if the instant execution case is allowed to proceed at the instance of respondent, it shall be nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court as until the substitution of Moris Kujur is not made in accordance with law, the instant execution case may be stayed. The respondent appeared and filed rejoinder dated 25.07.2012 to the petition filed by the petitioner. The Executing Court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner vide order dated 20.10.2012, against which, the petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the order impugned dated 20.10.2012 suffers from patent illegality since the executing Court has not appreciated the fact that the order dated 04.09.2008, by which the respondent has been substituted, since is based upon the forged Will passed in Probate Case No. 65 of 2003 and as such the aforesaid substitution petition ought not to have been allowed by the executing Court. According to learned counsel for the petitioners having not recalled order dated 04.09.2008, before proper substitution of the legal heirs of the late Moris Kujur, the execution proceeding ought not to have been allowed to proceed but the executing Court without appreciating that aspect of the matter, has rejected the petition for recall of order dated 04.09.2008, therefore, the same is not sustainable in the eye of law. 4. While, on the other hand, Mr. 4. While, on the other hand, Mr. Vibhor Mayank, learned counsel for the respondent has defended the order passed by the Executing Court on the ground that since the respondent has been substituted vide order dated 04.09.2008 passed by the Executing Court, on contest, on the basis of order passed by the Probate Court in Probate Case No. 65/2003 but without assailing the said order before the higher forum and merely filing petition for its recall before the same Court cannot be said to be proper steps on behalf of petitioner, reason being that, once the respondent has been substituted by an order passed by the executing Court, the same cannot be allowed to be questioned by the petitioner merely on the ground of Will being forged one. Further, the order passed by the Probate Court in Probate Case No. 65/2003 has also not been questioned by the writ petitioner since nothing has been brought on record in this regard. According to learned counsel, on these backdrops the executing Court since has rejected the petition filed by the petitioner which cannot be said to be an error rather the order of rejection for recall of order dated 04.09.2008 is proper taking into consideration the fact that the Execution Case is of the year 2000 and in one way or the other the Execution Proceeding is considered to be kept at hold by filing such type of frivolous petition. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also finding recorded in the impugned order. 6. This Court, before going into legality and propriety of the impugned order, deems it fit and proper to refer certain undisputed fact, as under: A suit for eviction was filed by one Moris Kujur against the original petitioner being Eviction Title Suit No. 45 of 1997, which was decreed in favour of said Moris Kujur on 31.07.2000. Pursuant thereto, the decree-holder, Moris Kujur, filed an application for execution of said decree being Execution Case No. 8(A)/2000. However, against the order and decree passed in Title Eviction Suit No. 45 of 1997, the petitioner preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 48/2000, which was dismissed vide order dated 03.08.2002 affirming the order passed in Title (E) Suit No. 45 of 1997. In the meantime, the original decree-holder, Moris Kujur died on 23.12.2002. However, against the order and decree passed in Title Eviction Suit No. 45 of 1997, the petitioner preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 48/2000, which was dismissed vide order dated 03.08.2002 affirming the order passed in Title (E) Suit No. 45 of 1997. In the meantime, the original decree-holder, Moris Kujur died on 23.12.2002. The wife of the decree-holder pre-deceased him leaving behind no son or daughter, but, as per the pleadings made in the writ petition he left behind some of the relatives. The respondent filed substitution petition claiming himself to be the legal heir on the basis of execution of last Will dated 15th July, 1998 of Moris Kujur which subsequently was probated in Probate Case No. 65 of 2003 wherein judgment was passed on 11.05.2005 and accordingly, certificate of Probate of will was granted under Section 289 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, as would be evident from Annexure A to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent. The Executing Court, on contest, after perusal of the documents available as also considering the deposition of witnesses made in course of enquiry, allowed the substitution petition vide order dated 04.09.2008 holding the respondent entitled to be substituted in place of deceased Moris Kujur. Accordingly, it was ordered that Rajan Khalko, the respondent herein be substituted in place of deceased-decree holder, late Moris Kujur. The respondent -Rajan Khalko was further directed to substitute his name in the cause title of execution petition within a week. It further appears that the petitioner thereafter filed an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was registered as Misc. Case No. 29 of 2010, which was dismissed for non-prosecution vide order dated 19.01.2011. However, a revision petition being Civil Revision No. 14 of 2002 against the order dated 03.08.2002 passed in Title Appeal No. 48 of 2000 under Section 15 of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1915, was also filed which was dismissed vide order dated 01.04.2002 The petitioner thereafter filed petition on 07.05.2012 under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to recall order dated 04.09.2008 and for stay of execution proceeding on the ground that Will which was probate is based upon forged documents. The aforesaid petition was responded stating inter alia that order dated 04.09.2008 by which the respondent was substituted was never challenged before the higher forum and as such at this stage when the order by which the respondent has been substituted vide order dated 04.09.2008, questioning the said order by filing recall petition of order dated 04.09.2008, is nothing but to delay the execution proceeding. The executing Court, after hearing the parties at length and on perusing the documents available before it, vide order dated 20.10.2012 rejected the aforesaid petition and issued a writ of D.P and subsequently directed the decree holder to take steps for deposit of costs and deputation of a Magistrate for the maintenance of law and order at the time of execution of the Writ of DP. 7. The main ground of questioning order dated 20.10.2012 is that the order by which the respondent was substituted i.e. 04.09.2008 is bad in law since it was passed on the basis of forged Will, probated in Probate Case No. 65 of 2003 vide order dated 11.05.2005. 8. In the backdrop of these facts and discussions made hereinabove, the question which requires to be answered by this Court while exercising power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is as to: “Whether the plea which is being raised on behalf of petitioner, i.e. the respondent was substituted on the basis of forged Will, can be accepted by this Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?” 9. This Court, in order to answer the issue, deems it fit and proper to refer certain the judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court regarding the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This Court, in order to answer the issue, deems it fit and proper to refer certain the judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court regarding the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ] has been pleased to laid down therein regarding the scope of Article 227 which relates to the supervisory powers of High Courts and by taking aid of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Full bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee reported in AIR 1951 Calcutta 193 wherein it has been laid down that Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not vest the High Court with limit less power which may be exercised at the court's discretion to remove the hardship of particular decisions. The power of superintendence it confers is a power of a known and well recognized character and should be exercised on those judicial principles which give it its character. In general words, the high court's power of superintendence is a power to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of the authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. The power of superintendence is not to be exercised unless there has been; (a)an unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in a court or tribunal; or (b)gross abuse of jurisdiction; or (c)an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in courts or tribunals. Further in the aforesaid judgment Hon'ble Apex Court has taken aid of a judgment rendered in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala v. Phiroz N. Bhatena reported in (1991) 3 SCC 141 wherein it has been laid down that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227, the high court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to. Hon'ble Apex Court has made it clear that except to this limited extent the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of facts. Hon'ble Apex Court has made it clear that except to this limited extent the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of facts. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further taken note of this aspect in the judgment rendered in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani v. Pratapsingh Mohansingh Pardeshi, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576 wherein it has been laid down that the High Court under Article 227 cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice. It has been laid down at paragraph 47 of the aforesaid judgment that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is not original nor is it appellate. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred under Article 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article 226 the high court normal annuls or quashes an order or proceeding but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the high court, apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior tribunal should have made. It has further been laid down regarding the powers to be exercised by the high court under Article 227 of the constitution of India. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence, can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it within the bounds of its authority, in order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested with them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. Apart from that, high court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. In exercise of its power of superintendence high court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In exercise of its power of superintendence high court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. It is, thus, evident that the Court exercising power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has got very limited power and the same can only be exercised if there is any patent error on the face of record. 10. This Court is now proceeding to examine as to whether there is error on the face of impugned order dated 20.10.2012. Admittedly, the respondent was substituted vide order dated 04.09.2008, on contest, as would appear from Annexure B appended to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent. But the aforesaid order was never challenged by any of the contesting party or the original petitioner before the higher forum. However, a petition under Section 47 being Misc. Case No. 29 of 2010 was filed, which was dismissed for non-prosecution vide order dated 19.01.2011. The petitioner thereafter filed petition on 07.05.2012 under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Execution Case No. 8(A)/2000, to recall order dated 04.09.2008 and for stay of execution proceeding, which was rejected vide order dated 20.10.2012, which according to considered view of this Court suffers from no error, reason being that, once the order has been passed by the Executing Court substituting the respondent considering him to be legal heir of Original decree holder, Moris Kujur, on the basis of order passed in probate case being Probate Case No. 65 of 2003, which was never questioned by any of the party stating to be aggrieved by the same and once order dated 04.09.2008 by which the respondent has been substituted, has been accepted by the parties since no appeal was preferred before the higher forum; filing an application for recall of order dated 04.09.2008 before the Executing Court is nothing but it is considered to be a frivolous petition to delay the proceeding. 11. 11. The executing Court has got no power to recall order dated 04.09.2008 and if at all the petitioner was aggrieved, he ought to have challenged order dated 04.09.2008 before the higher forum but having not done so rather filing an application for recall of order dated 04.09.2008 before the Executing Court cannot be considered to be appropriate step on behalf of petitioner, rather, the same appears to be frivolous petition for the purpose of delaying the executing proceeding. Further, the order passed in Probate Case No. 65 of 2003 dated 11.05.2005 has also not been questioned by the petitioner as nothing has been brought on record in this regard and once the order passed in probate case has been accepted, the petitioner in the matter of eviction where the decree has been passed in favour of original decree holder, namely, Moris Kujur, wherein subsequently the respondent has been substituted, the same has to be executed by the executing Court strictly in terms of the decree, which has been affirmed in appeal also. In this regard, it requires to refer herein the jurisdiction of the executing Court, as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman [ (1970) 1 SCC 670 ], wherein it has been held that a Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree between the parties or their representatives; it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Likewise, while answering the issue ‘whether the executing court can go behind such a decree’, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bhawarlal Bhandari Vs. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprises [ (1999) 1 SCC 558 ] reiterating the view as has been taken in the case of Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman (supra), at paragraph 9 held as under: Points (i) & (ii) 9. The award dated 17-4-1985 was filed in the Court on 23-3-1989 by the arbitrator and the Court proceeded to deal with the question whether the award should be made the rule of the court or not. Notice was issued by the Court to the respondent to show cause as to why this award should not be made the rule of the court. There is no dispute that this notice was served on the respondent. Notice was issued by the Court to the respondent to show cause as to why this award should not be made the rule of the court. There is no dispute that this notice was served on the respondent. Despite such service of notice, for reasons best known to the respondent, it did not think it fit to contest the proceedings nor did it file any objection under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. In the result, the Court passed an award decree on 2-6-1989 on account of the absence of any contest by the judgment-debtor. It is true that this award decree was sought to be executed years thereafter. But the said delay on the part of the decree-holder in executing the decree within the permissible period for limitation in execution of such decree cannot give any sustainable right to the judgment-debtor to challenge the execution proceedings on that ground. The contention of Shri Javali, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent that the award was a mock one and was not intended to be enforced cannot be sustained as that stage has gone for the respondent. In execution proceedings, such a contention requiring the executing court to go behind the decree cannot be sustained. The question whether the award decree was filed by the arbitrator on his own or not was a mixed question of law and fact. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment itself has noted that if the award was filed by the arbitrator suo motu, then the award decree cannot be said to be barred by limitation but if, on the other hand, the award was filed by the arbitrator at the instance of the appellant-decree-holder, then the question of limitation would arise. The aforesaid observation of the Division Bench itself indicates that this is a mixed question of law and fact. That was an issue to be raised before the award was made a rule of the court. But such a plea can never make the decree a nullity especially when the respondent for reasons best known to it did not think it fit to file objections under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. It is well settled that the executing court cannot go behind the decree unless it is shown that it is passed by a court having inherent lack of jurisdiction, which would make it a nullity. It is well settled that the executing court cannot go behind the decree unless it is shown that it is passed by a court having inherent lack of jurisdiction, which would make it a nullity. In the case of Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey [ AIR 1964 SC 907 : (1964) 1 SCR 495 ] a Bench of four learned Judges of this Court speaking through Mudholkar, J. observed that when the question of limitation was not raised before the trial court or before the High Court, it could not be raised for the first time before this Court even in the hierarchy of proceedings arising from the suit when such question of limitation raised before the Court was not a pure question of law but was a mixed question of law and fact. In the case of Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman [ (1970) 1 SCC 670 : (1971) 1 SCR 66 ] J.C. Shah, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench of this Court made the following pertinent observation in connection with the jurisdiction of the executing court, when called upon to execute the decree and on the question as to under what circumstances the executing court can go behind the decree sought to be executed. The observation at SCR p. 68 of the Report deserves to be extracted in extenso: (SCC pp. 672-73, paras 6-7) “6. A court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree: between the parties or their representatives it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. 7.When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. 7.When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record: where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. In Jnanendra Mohan Bhaduri v. Rabindra Nath Chakravarti [(1932) 60 IA 71 : AIR 1933 PC 61 ] the Judicial Committee held that where a decree was passed upon an award made under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, an objection in the course of the execution proceeding that the decree was made without jurisdiction, since under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, there is no provision for making a decree upon an award, was competent. That was a case in which the decree was on the face of the record without jurisdiction.” Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with the issue of powers of executing court, in the case of Rameshwar Dass Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & Anr [ (1996) 5 SCC 728 held that it cannot go beyond the order or decree under execution. The relevant paragraph of the judgment is quoted hereunder as: “4. It is a well-settled legal position that an executing court cannot travel beyond the order or decree under execution. It gets jurisdiction only to execute the order in accordance with the procedure laid down under Order 21 CPC. In view of the fact that it is a money claim, what was to be computed is the arrears of the salary, gratuity and pension after computation of his promotional benefits in accordance with the service law. It gets jurisdiction only to execute the order in accordance with the procedure laid down under Order 21 CPC. In view of the fact that it is a money claim, what was to be computed is the arrears of the salary, gratuity and pension after computation of his promotional benefits in accordance with the service law. That having been done and the court having decided the entitlement of the decree-holder in a sum of Rs 1,97,000 and odd, the question that arises is whether the executing court could step out and grant a decree for interest which was not part of the decree for execution on the ground of delay in payment or for unreasonable stand taken in execution? In our view, the executing court has exceeded its jurisdiction and the order is one without jurisdiction and is thereby a void order. It is true that the High Court normally exercises its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC but once it is held that the executing court has exceeded its jurisdiction, it is but the duty of the High Court to correct the same. Therefore, we do not find any illegality in the order passed by the High Court in interfering with and setting aside the order directing payment of interest.” It further requires to refer herein the jurisdiction of the executing Court, as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Brakewel Automotive Components (India) v. P.R. Selvam Alagappan reported in (2017) 5 SCC 371 wherein their lordships of Hon'ble Apex Court have laid down at paragraph 21 that Section 47 of the Code mandates determination by an executing court, questions arising between the parties or their representatives relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and does not contemplate any adjudication beyond the same. A decree of court of law being sacrosanct in nature, the execution thereof ought not to be thwarted on mere asking and on untenable and purported grounds having no bearing on the validity or the executability thereof. A decree of court of law being sacrosanct in nature, the execution thereof ought not to be thwarted on mere asking and on untenable and purported grounds having no bearing on the validity or the executability thereof. At paragraph, the Hon’ble Apex Court, taking note of the judgment rendered in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman [ (1970) 1 SCC 670 ], their Lordships have held that Judicial precedents to the effect that the purview of scrutiny under Section 47 of the Code qua a decree is limited to objections to its executability on the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness are plethoric. It is evident from the observation made by Hon'ble Apex Court in those paragraphs as referred herein above that the purview of scrutiny under Section 47 of the Code qua a decree is limited to objections to its executability on the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness are plethoric. A Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a Court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. At paragraph 23 of the said judgment it has been laid down by taking aid of the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University, reported in (2001) 6 SCC 534 laying therein that exercise of power under Section 47 of the Code is microscopic and lies in a very narrow inspection hole and an executing court can allow objection to the executability of the decree if it is found that the same is void ab initio and is a nullity, apart from the ground that it is not capable of execution under the law, either because the same was passed in ignorance of such provision of law or the law was promulgated making a decree unexecutable after its passing. It is thus evident from the aforesaid judicial pronouncement so far jurisdiction of the executing Court is concerned, that the Executing Court is supposed to execute the decree as per the decree/judgment and the executing Court cannot deviate from the decree. Herein, the decree of eviction has also been affirmed by the appellate forum and, therefore, the executing Court has no jurisdiction to deviate from the order passed in Title Eviction Suit, being confirmed in Title Eviction Appeal by entertaining such frivolous application and considering the same the petition was rejected which cannot be said to error on the part of the executing Court. 12. This Court, on the basis of discussion made herein above, is of the considered view that it is not a case where the power conferred to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is liable to be exercised since no error on the face of order has been pointed out by the petitioner. 13. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is dismissed. 14. In consequence thereof, the interim order of stay granted by this Court vide order dated 21.04.2013 stands vacated. 15. Before parting with the order, this Court deems it fit and proper to make reference of the order passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rahul S Sah vs. Jinendra Kumar Ganjhi & Ors. reported in AIR 2021 SC 2161 wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has directed all Courts dealing suits and execution proceedings to mandatorily follow directions as contained in the judgment. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of judgment are reproduced herein below: 41. reported in AIR 2021 SC 2161 wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has directed all Courts dealing suits and execution proceedings to mandatorily follow directions as contained in the judgment. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of judgment are reproduced herein below: 41. Having regard to the above background, wherein there is urgent need to reduce delays in the execution proceedings we deem it appropriate to issue few directions to do complete justice. These directions are in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 read with Article 141 and Article 144 of the Constitution of India in larger public interest to subserve the process of justice so as to bring to an end the unnecessary ordeal of litigation faced by parties awaiting fruits of decree and in larger perspective affecting the faith of the litigants in the process of law. 42. All courts dealing with suits and execution proceedings shall mandatorily follow the below mentioned directions: 42.1. In suits relating to delivery of possession, the court must examine the parties to the suit under Order 10 in relation to third-party interest and further exercise the power under Order 11 Rule 14 asking parties to disclose and produce documents, upon oath, which are in possession of the parties including declaration pertaining to third-party interest in such properties. 42.2. In appropriate cases, where the possession is not in dispute and not a question of fact for adjudication before the court, the court may appoint Commissioner to assess the accurate description and status of the property. 42.3. After examination of parties under Order 10 or production of documents under Order 11 or receipt of Commission report, the court must add all necessary or proper parties to the suit, so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and also make such joinder of cause of action in the same suit. 42.4. Under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC, a Court Receiver can be appointed to monitor the status of the property in question as custodia legis for proper adjudication of the matter. 42.5. The court must, before passing the decree, pertaining to delivery of possession of a property ensure that the decree is unambiguous so as to not only contain clear description of the property but also having regard to the status of the property. 42.6. 42.5. The court must, before passing the decree, pertaining to delivery of possession of a property ensure that the decree is unambiguous so as to not only contain clear description of the property but also having regard to the status of the property. 42.6. In a money suit, the court must invariably resort to Order 21 Rule 11, ensuring immediate execution of decree for payment of money on oral application. 42.7. In a suit for payment of money, before settlement of issues, the defendant may be required to disclose his assets on oath, to the extent that he is being made liable in a suit. The court may further, at any stage, in appropriate cases during the pendency of suit, using powers under Section 151 CPC, demand security to ensure satisfaction of any decree. 42.8. The court exercising jurisdiction under Section 47 or under Order 21 CPC, must not issue notice on an application of third party claiming rights in a mechanical manner. Further, the court should refrain from entertaining any such application(s) that has already been considered by the court while adjudicating the suit or which raises any such issue which otherwise could have been raised and determined during adjudication of suit if due diligence was exercised by the applicant. 42.9. The court should allow taking of evidence during the execution proceedings only in exceptional and rare cases where the question of fact could not be decided by resorting to any other expeditious method like appointment of Commissioner or calling for electronic materials including photographs or video with affidavits. 42.10. The court must in appropriate cases where it finds the objection or resistance or claim to be frivolous or mala fide, resort to sub-rule (2) of Rule 98 of Order 21 as well as grant compensatory costs in accordance with Section 35-A. 42.11. Under Section 60 CPC the term “… in name of the judgment-debtor or by another person in trust for him or on his behalf” should be read liberally to incorporate any other person from whom he may have the ability to derive share, profit or property. 42.12. The executing court must dispose of the execution proceedings within six months from the date of filing, which may be extended only by recording reasons in writing for such delay. 42.14. 42.12. The executing court must dispose of the execution proceedings within six months from the date of filing, which may be extended only by recording reasons in writing for such delay. 42.14. The Judicial Academies must prepare manuals and ensure continuous training through appropriate mediums to the court personnel/staff executing the warrants, carrying out attachment and sale and any other official duties for executing orders issued by the executing courts. 43. We further direct all the High Courts to reconsider and update all the Rules relating to execution of decrees, made under exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 122 CPC, within one year of the date of this order. The High Courts must ensure that the Rules are in consonance with CPC and the above directions, with an endeavour to expedite the process of execution with the use of information technology tools. Until such time these Rules are brought into existence, the above directions shall remain enforceable. 16. Herein, admittedly, the execution case is of the year 2000 and since we are in the year 2022, therefore, it warrants to this Court to direct the executing Court to proceed with the matter and execute the decree within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 17. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the executing court forthwith.