ORDER : 1. This appeal has been preferred by the Petitioner/State against the impugned judgment of dated 05.10.1999, whereby the respondents herein have been acquitted from the charges punishable under Sections 419, 420, 467 & 471 of the IPC by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dongargarh (M.P.) (Now Chhattisgarh), in Criminal Case No. 124/1993. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 08.08.1991, respondent Vimla Bai from Village Sendri obtained loan of Rs. 6,000/­ from Seva Sahkari Samiti, Dongargarh Branch under the I.R.D.B. Plan for the purpose of purchasing Bullock­cart with oxen impersonating herself as Name Bai belonging to the Tribal community. Respondent Ramdas is husband of respondent Vimla Bai and it is found that he along with other respondents forged the documents in the name of Namebai. Thereafter, Harishchandra, Vice­Chairman of Seva Sahkari Samiti, Thakurtola (PW­1) made a written complaint to the Thana Inspector, Bortalab regarding the same. After completion of investigation, charge­sheet was filed and charges were framed under Sections 420 & 471 of IPC against the respondent Ramdas, under Sections 419 & 420 of IPC against the respondent Vimla Bai and under Sections 467 & 471 of IPC against the other respondents/accused. 3. In order to bring home the guilt of the respondents/accused, prosecution has examined as many as 9 witnesses. Statement of the respondents herein were also recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. wherein they denied guilt. 4. The learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, acquitted the respondents from the aforesaid charges against which the appeal has been preferred. 5. Mr. Lalit Jangde, learned State counsel would submit that the judgment passed by the Court below is erroneous, illegal and bad in law as the trial Court failed to see that the said loan was got sanctioned in the name of Namebai and a witness Kotwar (PW­4) has specifically stated that the photograph posted on the application was not of Nembai. Learned Court below further failed to see that the report of handwriting expert is a public document and the court has ample power to summon a witness but the learned trial Court did not appreciate this fact. As the Court below has failed to appreciate the material available on record in its true perspective, the finding and conclusions drawn by the Court below are liable to be dismissed. 6. As the Court below has failed to appreciate the material available on record in its true perspective, the finding and conclusions drawn by the Court below are liable to be dismissed. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents supported the impugned judgment and submitted that there is no documentary evidence available on record which can prove the guilt of respondents. As such, learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondents from the aforesaid charges, therefore, this appeal is liable to be dismissed. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance in the matter of Murlidhar alias Gidda & Another Vs. State of Karnataka passed in (2014) 5 SCC 730 . 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. The previous order sheets of this case show that during the pendency of this appeal, respondents No. 4 & 5 namely Heeralal and Limbaji respectively, are died. So, this appeal in respect of both the respondents is abated. 9. Before the trial Court, complainant Harishchandra (PW­1) admitted his signature on FIR and as well as on written complaint. He stated that he was suffering from ill­health last year due to which he has the problem of oblivion, therefore, he was unable to narrate the matter in detail, he did not state anything against the respondents. Ramlal (PW­2) stated in para 4 that on the loan documents the photograph was affixed of Vimla Bai and not of Namebai which is contradiction as per the prosecution case. Further Sevak (PW­5) stated in his statement that he saw the picture of Namebai for the first time in the Court. Learned trial Court found that prosecution has not examined hand­writing expert and failed to prove this fact that those thumb impressions and signature was of Vimlabai and Ramdas. Prosecution has also not examined Investigating Officer before the trial Court, thus, learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence found that prosecution has failed to prove his case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. 10. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Murlidhar alias Gidda & Another Vs. State of Karnataka passed in (2014) 5 SCC 730 . held in paras 11 ­12 as under:­ 11. 10. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Murlidhar alias Gidda & Another Vs. State of Karnataka passed in (2014) 5 SCC 730 . held in paras 11 ­12 as under:­ 11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh, Surajpal Singh V. State, AIR 1952 SC 52 : 1952 Cri LJ 331 while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed: (AIR p.54, para 7) “7... the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trail court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.” 12. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following:­ (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court; (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal; (iii) Thought, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re­evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court. 11. The findings recorded by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate acquitting the respondents from the offence punishable under Sections 419, 420, 467 & 471 of IPC is based on material available on record. This Court finds no illegality in the order impugned acquitting the respondents particularly when there is a settled legal position that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the judgment of acquittal, even otherwise, the prosecution thus has utterly failed in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court has fully justified in recording the finding of acquittal which is based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record. 12. Accordingly, the appeal is hereby dismissed.