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2022 DIGILAW 3928 (MAD)

J. Shanthi v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court

2022-12-15

MOHAMMED SHAFFIQ, S.VAIDYANATHAN

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. Earlier, the appellant/writ petitioner approached this Court by filing Writ Petition in W.P.No.4690 of 2010, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records pertaining to I.D.No.154 of 2006 and quash the award dated 23.12.2008 passed therein by the first respondent and further direct the second respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with back-wages, continuity of service and all other attendant benefits. 2. The above said Writ Petition was dismissed on 04.04.2012 by the learned Single Judge holding as follows: "4. .... The Labour Court concurred with the finding of the enquiry officer that the petitioner committed irregularity and she is also equally responsible for issuing of jewel loan without verifying the genuineness of the jewel pledged and that too issuing the appraisal receipt after the payment of loan. It is held by the Labour Court that the petitioner had not disputed the irregularity committed by her. Based on the material evidence and considering the report of the enquiry officer marked as Ex.R-8 and the explanation given by the petitioner, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry was conducted in a proper way, the explanation of the petitioner was considered and the evidence of Management witness was taken into consideration for holding the petitioner guilty of issuing wrong jewel appraisal certificates in respect of jewel loan. The Labour Court based on the evidence on record clearly came to the conclusion that there was no material evidence placed by the delinquent to relieve her from the liability of issuing false certificates without verifying the genuineness of the jewel which was the basis for issuing the jewel loan. Therefore, it justified the order of dismissal. 5. In support of the writ petition, except the Labour Court award, no other material is placed by the petitioner. No evidence or document was let in on behalf of the petitioner before the Labour Court. None of the documents which are relied upon during domestic enquiry has been relied upon by the petitioner in support of the writ petition to prove the plea taken that there is violation of principles of natural justice. In the absence of any material oral or documentary to support the case of the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the award of the Labour Court. 6. In the absence of any material oral or documentary to support the case of the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the award of the Labour Court. 6. The petitioner's counsel only plea is that the petitioner acted on instruction of the superior and that plea is not supported by material. 7. Finding no merits, this Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs." 3. Aggrieved by the above order of dismissal passed by the learned Single Judge in the said Writ Petition, the appellant/writ petitioner has preferred Writ Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, in W.A.S.R.No.135334 of 2022, but with delay of 3564 days in filing the same, resulting in filing of C.M.P.No.21398 of 2022 to condone the said delay. 4. Since the delay is very huge, this Court, even without issuing notice to the respondents, is of the view that the enormous delay should not be condoned. 5. The main ground for the delay urged by the writ petitioner in filing the Writ Appeal is that she was suffering from spinal cord problems and was immobile for ten years. It is alleged by her in the affidavit filed in support of the condone delay petition that she was in rest till August 2022 as per the Physician's advise. In March 2020, it is stated by her that she was suffering from Covid-19 and only recently, she had recovered from health issues. She further stated that in view of change of Advocate, the petitioner could not file the appeal in time. In the process of getting order copy and change of Advocate, coupled with the above said health problems, she has not filed the Writ Appeal in time, resulting in filing of C.M.P.No.21398 of 2022 before this Court. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner, while reiterating the facts, pleaded this Court to condone the delay of 3564 days in preferring the present Writ Appeal. 7. This Court perused the entire materials available on record, and as the delay is prodigious, this Court has taken up the Writ Appeal even at the threshold stage, i.e. in S.R. Stage, and dispenses with the notice to the second respondent/Management, as the notice is unnecessary, since this Court feels that the writ petitioner is not entitled to the relief in the condone-delay stage itself. 8. 8. Furthermore, except the medical issues and health problems, coupled with change of Advocate, the petitioner has not stated any valid and acceptable reason for condoning the delay to the satisfaction of this Court. 9. In the above back-drop, this Court is of the view that the delay should not be condoned. 10. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to notice a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1998 (7) SCC 123 (N.Balakrishnan Vs. M.Krishnamurthy) dealing with the condonation of delay, and the relevant portion of the said decision of the Apex Court is extracted hereunder: "9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory ....." 11. From the above decision of the Supreme Court, it is crystal clear that irrespective of the number of days delay (huge or long range of delay), the fact that has to be considered is as to whether the litigant has explained the cause for the delay to the satisfaction of the Court. 12. In the case on hand, even though the delay is huge, no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming from the petitioner. 13. Though the condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court, and also taking into account the stand of the other side, the petitioner must be vigilant in approaching the Court, that too at the stage of appeal without there being even one day delay in preferring the appeal. 14. In the case on hand, the appellant/writ petitioner did not explain the delay to the utmost satisfaction of the Court. Moreover, the length of delay is no matter, but acceptability of the explanation is the core point even for entertaining any appeal. 15. Similarly, in yet another decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2016 (16) SCC 565 (Shanti Devi Vs. Moreover, the length of delay is no matter, but acceptability of the explanation is the core point even for entertaining any appeal. 15. Similarly, in yet another decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2016 (16) SCC 565 (Shanti Devi Vs. Kaushaliya Devi), the Apex Court observed that in the absence of any sufficient reason shown by the party before Court to get the huge delay condoned, the delay is not excusable. 16. In the present case, the delay is inordinate and hence, this Court cannot entertain the matter casually or in a mechanical manner without there being proper explanation to the satisfaction of the Court. 17. In another decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2008 (8) SCC 321 = MANU/SC/7894/2008 (Perumon Bhgvatby Devaswom Vs. Bhargavi Amma), the Apex Court held that the decisive factor in condonation of dealy is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. The Supreme Court in this case, added that the words "sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation" should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the type of case. The words "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona-fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant. The Supreme Court also held that the extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a Court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. This decision in Perumon Bhagavathy case (supra) has also been followed with approval by equi-Bench of the Apex Court in Katari Suryanarayana Vs. Koppisetti Subba Rao, reported in AIR 2009 SC 2907 = MANU/SC/0545/2009. The Supreme Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom (supra) also went on to hold that the requirement of law is that the application for condoning the delay cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. 18. In the case before us, the reason assigned by the appellant/writ petitioner in filing the Writ Appeal, is neither reasonable nor satisfactory. 19. 18. In the case before us, the reason assigned by the appellant/writ petitioner in filing the Writ Appeal, is neither reasonable nor satisfactory. 19. In the light of the above principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it is now useful to notice Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which reads as follows: "Section 5: Extension of prescribed period in certain cases— Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." 20. Thus, Section 5 of the Limitation Act mandates valid reason to be assigned by a litigant. 21. As observed by the Supreme Court in umpteen number of decisions that the discretion is vested in the Court to admit an appeal after expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, provided the appellant shows "sufficient cause" for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed time. 22. Even way back in 1997, the Apex Court went on to hold in the decision reported in 1997 (7) SCC 566 =MANU/SC/1296/1997 (P.K.Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala) that the Court should record any satisfaction that the explanation for the delay was either reasonable or satisfactory, which is an essential pre-requisite to condone the delay. 23. As the delay is inordinate, i.e. 3564 days in preferring the present Writ Appeal, this Court is not traversing into the merits of the case. 24. Furthermore, in another decision of the Apex Court reported in 2010 (8) SCC 685 = MANU/SC/0487/2010 (Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and others), the Supreme Court also dealt with the aspect of delay and reiterated that there should be sufficient cause for condoning the delay. 25. In the above scenario, it is apposite to point out that even if the delay is enormous, and only if there is any justifiable ground, the delay has to be condoned. Jagdish Singh and others), the Supreme Court also dealt with the aspect of delay and reiterated that there should be sufficient cause for condoning the delay. 25. In the above scenario, it is apposite to point out that even if the delay is enormous, and only if there is any justifiable ground, the delay has to be condoned. Assuming that the delay is very small and the reasons are not germane, this Court cannot condone the same in the facts of a case. 26. In a decision of a Division Bench of this Court, in which, one of us (S.Vaidyanathan, J) was a member to the Bench, in MANU/TN/0876/2018 (M/s.Ruskin Sea Foods Limited Vs. M/s.Evergreen Sea Foods Pvt. Ltd.), this Court dismissed the condone-delay-petition (765 days delay in preferring the appeal therein) and the relevant paragraph of the same reads as follows: "32. Ordinarily, the 'Condonation of Delay' is a matter of discretion to be exercised by the Concerned Court. Also, it is true that the length and breadth of delay is not relevant, but the acceptance of explanation can only be a relevant criterion for the concerned Court to deal with/condone the aspect of 'Condonation of Delay'. However, in this regard, the Petitioner/concerned litigant is to offer/ascribe sufficient reasons or project sufficient cause or good cause to condone the delay with a view to enable the Concerned Court to take a liberal view with a view to secure the ends of justice." 27. It is to be noted that the Court, in exercising discretion, particularly in the condone-delay-petitions, has to not only see the conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to inaction or negligence, but also to find that the delay should not be huge. It is the basic phenomenon that the fundamental principles should weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the principles laid down by Courts cannot be given a go-by without taking liberal approach. There is a trend now-a-days that the delay is not taken in a serious manner. 28. In the case on hand, no plausible/acceptable/satisfactory explanation is forthcoming from the appellant/writ petitioner, for the huge delay of 3564 days in filing the Writ Appeal. Though each and every day's delay should be explained to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court should exercise its discretion more cautiously with circumspection. 28. In the case on hand, no plausible/acceptable/satisfactory explanation is forthcoming from the appellant/writ petitioner, for the huge delay of 3564 days in filing the Writ Appeal. Though each and every day's delay should be explained to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court should exercise its discretion more cautiously with circumspection. The appellant herein has not made out a case for condoning the delay of 3564 days in filing the appeal. 29. Keeping in mind the above principles laid down by the Apex Court and also the Division Bench decision of this Court, in a catena of decisions, more particularly, the ones cited and discussed above, we are of the view that the present C.M.P.No.21398 of 2022 is liable to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. Resultantly, W.A.S.R.No.135334 of 2022 shall stand rejected in-limine. There shall be no order as to costs.