JUDGMENT : MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed seeking a direction for the respondents to release the pension of the petitioner along with interest as well as to quash and set aside the communications dated 8.10.2021 and 20.10.2021 holding them to be unwarranted. 2. The facts in brief are that despite petitioner's retirement from the post of Lecturer (Pate Vetan) in Sanskrit Education w.e.f. 31.10.2020 on attaining the age of superannuation, he has not been paid pension. Vide communications impugned dated 8.10.2021 and 20.10.2021, he has been asked to apply for leave for the period from 4.5.2017 to 3.10.2017 to enable him to get the pension. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the year 2017, the petitioner was promoted under the Rajasthan Sanskrit Education State and Subordinate Service (School Branch) Rules, 2015 and was directed to join at the new place of posting with warning that in case of failure to join, selection scale would be suspended and action would be taken under point no. 18 under memorandum of Finance dated 31.12.2009. He submitted that the aforesaid action was challenged by him by way of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6504/2017 wherein, vide interim order dated 4.5.2017, status quo was directed to be maintained. Learned counsel submitted that when the petitioner was not allowed to join and no salary for the period from 4.5.2017 to 3.10.2017 was paid to him, he moved an interim application no. 37432/2017 whereupon, this Court has, vide its order dated 13.9.2017, directed the State-respondents to release monthly salary as per schedule. He, on the strength of aforesaid orders, submitted that he is not required to apply for grant of leave for the period from 4.5.2017 to 3.10.2017 and hence, the respondents may be directed to release his pension with interest without requiring him to seek leave for the aforesaid period. 4. He submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, he cannot be relegated to the alternative remedy available to him under the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1976 (for short ‘the Act of 1976’). 4. He submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, he cannot be relegated to the alternative remedy available to him under the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1976 (for short ‘the Act of 1976’). He relied upon the following judgments to buttress his submission: (1) T.K. Rangarajan vs. Government of T.N. and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 581 (2) Har Devi Asnani vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, (2011) 14 SCC 160 (3) Ramraj Gurjar vs. RSRTC and Others, 2008 WLC (Raj.) UC 485 (4) Sumati Nath Jain vs. State of U.P. and Others, MANU/UP/0099/2016 5. Heard the learned counsel and perused the record. The Act of 1976 provides as under: “2.(c) “Government Servant” means a person who is or has been a member of a Civil Service or who holds or has held a Civil post under the Government of Rajasthan and includes any such person on foreign Service or whose services are temporarily placed at the disposal of a local or other authority and also any person in the service of a local or other authority whose services have been temporarily placed at the disposal of the State Government or a person in service on a contract or a person who has retired from the Government service elsewhere and is re-employed under the Government of Rajasthan, but does not include a person in the Civil Service of the Indian Union or a State Government serving on deputation in Rajasthan who will continue to be governed by the rules applicable to such person. (d) xxx xxx xxx (e) xxx xxx xxx (f) “Service matter” means any one or more than one of the following matters relating to a Government servant: (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) xxx xxx xxx (iii) xxx xxx xxx (iv) xxx xxx xxx (v) An order denying or varying pay, allowances, pension and other service conditions to the disadvantage of a Government servant, otherwise than as a penalty. (vi) xxx xxx xxx (vii) Withholding the pension or denying the maximum pension otherwise than as the penalty.” 6. The aforesaid provisions leave no room for doubt that the petitioner has got a statutory alternative and efficacious remedy before the learned Tribunal constituted under the Act of 1976 for redressal of his grievance, i.e. for payment of pension. 7. (vi) xxx xxx xxx (vii) Withholding the pension or denying the maximum pension otherwise than as the penalty.” 6. The aforesaid provisions leave no room for doubt that the petitioner has got a statutory alternative and efficacious remedy before the learned Tribunal constituted under the Act of 1976 for redressal of his grievance, i.e. for payment of pension. 7. A coordinate bench of this Court has, vide its order dated 6.4.2018 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6642/2018, Richpal Singh vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, held as under: “The State-respondents with a view to provide an independent forum for decision in service matters and in order to stop flood of litigation in Civil Courts by way of suits and the High Court or Supreme Court by way of writ petition; has enacted the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunals) Act, 1976 (for short, the ‘Act of 1976’) which received the assent of the President on 7th May, 1976. For an alternative remedy before the forum provided under the Act of 1976, is available to the petitioner before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur. Hence, this Court is not inclined to exercise extraordinary original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner ought to have availed of the remedy before the alternative forum first.” 8. Another coordinate bench of this Court has, vide its judgment dated 9.4.2003 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 957/2003 in Om Prakash Leela vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, held as under: “9. In the present writ petition notices were issued on 6.3.2003. The interim order was also granted on the same day. The respondents immediately in response to the notice, raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition and pressed it first without entering into the merit of the case. Therefore, while issuance of notice by this court itself cannot be a ground for entertaining the writ petition, particularly when, this court has taken a view that when effective alternate remedy is available then that must be exhausted first. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the legality of the order can be seen by this court as the matter has been decided by this court in earlier writ petition is also available to the petitioner before the Service Appellate Tribunal. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the legality of the order can be seen by this court as the matter has been decided by this court in earlier writ petition is also available to the petitioner before the Service Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, I am not inclined to entertain the writ petition in view of the fact that there are large number of cases in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the statutory remedy, if available, it should not be permitted to bye pass even in cases where no interim relief can be granted by the statutory authority hearing the appeal or revision. In these circumstances, the present writ petition of the petitioner is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed.” 9. A Full Bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court has, in case of Chandrama Singh vs. Managing Director, U.P. Cooperative Union, Lucknow and Others, 1991 (2) UPLBEC 898 while deciding a reference, held as under: “4. Ordinarily, remedy of reference, envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, is an adequate and efficacious remedy available to a person aggrieved by an illegal retrenchment. Of course, the aggrieved person can always prove that, on the facts and circumstances of his case, the remedy is neither adequate nor efficacious. But, unless he discharges the onus of proving that the remedy of reference is either inadequate or inefficacious he should pursue the remedy of reference under the Industrial Disputes Act. At this juncture, it would be pertinent to emphasis that it would not be enough for the person pleading inadequacy or inefficacy of the relief of reference under the Industrial Disputes Acts to make merely a bald statement that remedy of reference is either inadequate or inefficacious. It is imperative for him to clearly plead, demonstrate and prove as to how and in what manner the remedy of reference is inadequate or inefficacious, and in the absence of requisite pleading and material in support thereof it would not be permissible for him to raise the plea of inadequacy or inefficacy of the remedy of reference under the Industrial Disputes Acts. 5. Now, on the question of discretion of the High Court to decline to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where an appropriate, adequate and efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner. 5. Now, on the question of discretion of the High Court to decline to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where an appropriate, adequate and efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner. In its decision rendered by a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges, presided by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer, in K.K. Srivastava vs. Bhupendra Kumar Jain, MANU/SC/0207/1977 : AIR 1977 SC 1703 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed thus (at p. 1704 of AIR): “It is well settled law that while Article 226 of the Constitution confers a wide power on the High Court there are equally well settled limitations which this Court has repeatedly pointed out on the exercise of such power. One of them which is relevant for the present case is that where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy the Court should keep its hand off...... Obviously, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has authoritatively and firmly ruled that where appropriate or equally efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner the High Court must not entertain a writ petition under Article 26 of the Constitution of India. No doubt in the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court pointed out that it did not go to the extent of stating that if there were exceptional or extraordinary circumstances the High Court should still refuse to entertain a writ petition. The Hon'ble Supreme Court purported to carve out an exception to the normal practice observed by the High Courts in relegating the petitioner to the alternative remedy available to him, the exception being existence of exceptional or extraordinary circumstances.” 6. Referring to its decision in the case of K.K. Srivastava (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in its decision, rendered by a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges, in the case of Bar Council of Delhi vs. Surjeet Singh, MANU/SC/0286/1980 : AIR 1980 SC 1612 , pointed out that “If the alternative remedy fully covers the challenge......then that remedy and that remedy alone must be resorted to......” The Hon'ble Court observed that “if the nature of the grounds of the challenge......are such that the alternative remedy is no remedy in the eye of law to cover the challenge, or in any event, is not adequate and efficacious remedy, then the remedy of writ petition.....is still available....” 7. The principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India that where a statute provides a complete machinery for obtaining a relief against the order passed by the authorities the petitioner should not be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in its decision in the case of Gujarat University vs. N.U. Rajguru, MANU/SC/0380/1987 : AIR 1988 SC 66 wherein it referred to and relied upon the case of Sri. K.K. Srivastava (supra). Delivering the judgment of the court his Lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.N. Singh observed as follows (at p. 70 of AIR 1988): “We do not consider it necessary to burden the judgment by referring to decisions of this Court laying down the principle that where a statute provides a complete machinery for obtaining relief against the orders passed by the authorities a petitioner cannot be permitted to abandon that machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution......” 8. Having regard to the above noticed decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, it is ruled that where a complete machinery/remedy for obtaining relief is provided in statute and such machinery and remedy fully covers the grievance of the petitioner then, unless extraordinary or exceptional circumstances exist or the machinery/remedy does not cover the grievance of the petitioner or the machinery or remedy is demonstrated and proved by the petitioner to be inadequate or inefficacious, the petitioner has to be relegated to the alternative remedy and the Court should not entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redresssal of the grievance by the petitioner. 13. On the pleadings contained in the instant petition the petitioner should not be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner had complained violation of the provision of Section 25-I of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and for redressal of his grievance an adequate and efficacious remedy of reference under the provisions of Section 10 of the said Act itself exists. The petitioner has neither pleaded nor proved the said remedy to be inadequate or inefficacious. The petitioner had complained violation of the provision of Section 25-I of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and for redressal of his grievance an adequate and efficacious remedy of reference under the provisions of Section 10 of the said Act itself exists. The petitioner has neither pleaded nor proved the said remedy to be inadequate or inefficacious. He has also not demonstrated the existence of any exceptional on extraordinary circumstances to permit him to bypass the alternative remedy available to him under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy to the petitioner.” 10. Now, this Court considers the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel in support of his submissions. 11. In Sumati Nath Jain (supra), a division bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court was pleased to held the writ petition maintainable despite availability of alternative remedy on account of existence of exceptional situation such as the additional duty to the extent of eight times over the initial stamp duty paid on the instrument, was levied, the proceeding taken against the petitioner being without jurisdiction and violative of the procedure prescribed under the Act. 12. In case of Har Devi Asnani (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that where the demand of additional stamp duty was so exorbitant so as to enter into the realm of arbitrariness or where it is based on extraneous consideration, it is open for the High court to enter into merits of the case if it is satisfied that the allegation is correct. 13. In case of T.K. Rangarajan (supra), their Lordships have held as under: “5. At the outset, it is to be reiterated that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court is empowered to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to meet unprecedented extraordinary situation having no parallel. It is equally true that extraordinary powers are required to be sparingly used. The facts of the present case reveal that this was most extraordinary case, which called for interference by the High Court, as the State Government had dismissed about two lacs employees for going on strike. 10. There cannot be any doubt that the aforesaid judgment of larger Bench is binding on this Court and we respectfully agree with the same. The facts of the present case reveal that this was most extraordinary case, which called for interference by the High Court, as the State Government had dismissed about two lacs employees for going on strike. 10. There cannot be any doubt that the aforesaid judgment of larger Bench is binding on this Court and we respectfully agree with the same. However, in a case like this, if thousands of employees are directed to approach the Administrative Tribunal, the Tribunal would not be in a position to render justice to the cause. Hence, as stated earlier because of very exceptional circumstance that arose in the present case, there was no justifiable reason for the High Court not to entertain the petitions on the ground of alternative remedy provided under the statute.” 14. In case of Ramraj Gurjar (supra), a division bench of this court was pleased to hold as under: “6. An alternative remedy available to a litigant is not an absolute bar for invocation of High Prerogative writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. More so, the Constitution does not hesitate in invoking extraordinary jurisdiction where an order passed by the State or its functionary or an agency or instrumentality of the State is found to be in utter disregard and flagrant violation of principles of natural justice. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, if the petitioner did not avail of the mechanism provided by the Industrial Disputes Act by raising an industrial dispute with regard to his termination, in our view, it cannot be held to have disentitled the petitioner from invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this court. The Single Judge failed to appreciate and consider peculiar fact situation of the case, particularly, that the order of termination dated 17th February, 2007 has been passed without holding any enquiry and on its face that order appears to be not in accord with law.” 15. The legal position which emerges from perusal of the aforesaid judgments is that the self imposed restriction of not exercising writ jurisdiction in case of availability of alternative remedy can be waived by the writ court in appropriate cases involving exceptional or extraordinary circumstances. The legal position which emerges from perusal of the aforesaid judgments is that the self imposed restriction of not exercising writ jurisdiction in case of availability of alternative remedy can be waived by the writ court in appropriate cases involving exceptional or extraordinary circumstances. Now, this Court examines as to whether the facts of the case involve any such exceptional or extraordinary circumstance so as to warrant its entertainment by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. The learned counsel has admitted availability of alternative remedy before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal for grant of pension; but, he contended that the same is not efficacious. However, he could not satisfy this Court as to how the alternative remedy is not efficacious. Even in the writ petition also, there is not a whisper of averment as to why the petitioner has chosen to avail the writ jurisdiction instead of statutory alternative remedy available under the Act of 1976. 17. A Full Bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court has, in case of Chandrama Singh (supra), held as under: “At this juncture, it would be pertinent to emphasis that it would not be enough for the person pleading inadequacy or inefficacy of the relief of reference under the Industrial Disputes Acts to make merely a bald statement that remedy of reference is either inadequate or inefficacious. It is imperative for him to clearly plead, demonstrate and prove as to how and in what manner the remedy of reference is inadequate or inefficacious, and in the absence of requisite pleading and material in support thereof it would not be permissible for him to raise the plea of inadequacy or inefficacy of the remedy of reference under the Industrial Disputes Acts.” 18. He also relied upon the interim orders of this Court dated 4.5.2017 and 13.9.2017 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6504/2017 to argue that only this Court can interpret its true import while considering his case for grant of pension and hence, he should not be relegated to the alternative remedy. This Court is not satisfied from the aforesaid submission. The effect and impact of the interim orders of this Court can always be appreciated by the learned Tribunal. 19. Even otherwise also, it is trite law that interim orders always merge in the final order and looses significance if not made absolute; fully or partly. This Court is not satisfied from the aforesaid submission. The effect and impact of the interim orders of this Court can always be appreciated by the learned Tribunal. 19. Even otherwise also, it is trite law that interim orders always merge in the final order and looses significance if not made absolute; fully or partly. The petitioner has not disclosed the fate of the writ petition no. 6504/2017 wherein these interim orders were passed. 20. The Hon'ble Apex court has, in the case of Kalabharati Advertising vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, MANU/SC/0674/2010, was pleased to held as under: “15. No litigant can derive any benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a Court of Law, as the interim order always merges into the final order to be passed in the case and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter blame the Court. The fact that the case is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, or the party withdrew the writ petition, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim “Actus Curiae neminem gravabit” which means that the act of the Court shall prejudice no-one, becomes applicable in such a case. In such a situation the Court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the Court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised, as the institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by the delayed action of the Court. [Vide: Dr. A.R. Sircar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, 1993 Supp. (2) SCC 734, Shiv Shanker and Others vs. Board of Directors, Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Another, MANU/SC/1088/1995 : 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 726, The Committee of Management, Arya Inter College, Arya Nagar, Kanpur and Another vs. Sree Kumar Tiwary and Another, MANU/SC/0796/1997 : AIR 1997 SC 3071 , GTC Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India and Others, MANU/SC/0189/1998 : AIR 1998 SC 1566 and Jaipur Municipal Corporation vs. C.L. Mishra, MANU/SC/2511/2005 : (2005) 8 SCC 423 ]. 16. (2) SCC 726, The Committee of Management, Arya Inter College, Arya Nagar, Kanpur and Another vs. Sree Kumar Tiwary and Another, MANU/SC/0796/1997 : AIR 1997 SC 3071 , GTC Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India and Others, MANU/SC/0189/1998 : AIR 1998 SC 1566 and Jaipur Municipal Corporation vs. C.L. Mishra, MANU/SC/2511/2005 : (2005) 8 SCC 423 ]. 16. In Ram Krishna Verma and Others vs. State of U.P. and Others, MANU/SC/0496/1992 : AIR 1992 SC 1888 , this Court examined the issue while placing reliance upon its earlier judgment in Grindlays Bank Limited vs. Income Tax Officer, Calcutta and Others, MANU/SC/0276/1980 : AIR 1980 SC 656 and held that no person can suffer from the act of the Court and in case an interim order has been passed and the petitioner takes advantage thereof, and ultimately the petition stands dismissed, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralized. 17. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke and Others vs. Pune Municipal Corporation and Another, MANU/SC/0673/1995 : (1995) 3 SCC 33 .” 21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this court is not satisfied that it is a fit case in which it should exercise its writ jurisdiction despite availability of statutory alternative and efficacious remedy to the petitioner. The writ petition is dismissed accordingly with liberty to the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy for redressal of his grievances.