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2022 DIGILAW 3940 (MAD)

R. Kannan v. The Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Chennai

2022-12-16

N.ANAND VENKATESH, P.N.PRAKASH

body2022
ORDER : 1. This is a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) to quash the proceedings as well as the charges framed against the petitioner/A-5 in C.C. No. 14 of 2018, which is pending on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge (Special Court constituted under Section 43(1) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act), 2002, Chennai (in short “the Special Court”). 2. The necessary facts which are relevant to deal with this quash petition are as under: 2.1. The company named National Medicines Private Limited was sanctioned with cash credit facility of Rs. 6.25 crores. Out of the sanctioned amount, a pay order was issued for Rs. 4.25 crores to the Standard Chartered Bank, for the taking over of the existing liability of the above said company. The petitioner/A-5 was working as the Chief Manager during the relevant point of time at Union Bank of India and he was part of the team, which sanctioned and released the loan amount. 2.2. A written complaint was given by the Deputy General Manager of Union Bank of India alleging perpetration of criminal activities in the sanction and disbursement of credit facility to the above said company. Based on the same, an FIR came to be registered by the CBI, BS&FC, Bangalore, in R.C. No. 8/E/2008-CBI/BS&FC on 25.09.2008, against the petitioner and others, for various offences under the IPC and under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 2.3. The CBI took up the investigation and on completion of the investigation, a final report was filed under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. before the XI Additional Special Court for CBI Cases, Chennai and the same was taken on file in C.C. No. 45 of 2009. It was brought to the notice of this Court that the petitioner was convicted and sentenced along with the other accused persons and aggrieved by the same, an appeal was filed by the petitioner/A-5 and the same is pending. 2.4. It was brought to the notice of this Court that the petitioner was convicted and sentenced along with the other accused persons and aggrieved by the same, an appeal was filed by the petitioner/A-5 and the same is pending. 2.4. The respondent filed a complaint under Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “the PML Act”) before the Special Court, as against five accused persons, for the alleged offence under Section 3 of the PML Act, which is punishable under Section 4 of the PML Act and consequently to confiscate the property involved in money-laundering in terms of Sub-Section 5 of Section 8 of the PML Act. The petitioner has been arrayed as A-5 in this complaint. 3. The specific allegations made against the petitioner in the complaint are extracted hereunder, for proper appreciation: “10.6. Shri R. Kannan, the then Chief Manager of Union Bank of India, Mount Road Branch, Chennai in pursuance of a criminal conspiracy had actually connived with Shri M. Kamalchand Jain and Shri Anuraag Jain in the aforesaid criminal acts and by abetting their motive to fraudulently secure sanction and disbursement of credit facilities from the Union Bank of India, by misrepresentation of lack of perfect title on the subject immovable property with NMPL and by defying the directions of the Hon'ble High Court of Madras to maintain status quo, had actually involved in the process of deriving cash credit facility amounting to Rs. 6.25 crores upon creation of collateral security on the aforesaid immovable property. Thus, the funds so derived and diverted to the accounts of the group entities and loan accounts held with various banks to the extent of Rs. 5.05 crores, including the repayments to the home loan availed for acquiring of the aforesaid immovable property as elucidated above are the “proceeds of crime” as defined under Section 2(1)(u) of PMLA and hence the endeavour of Shri R. Kannan in causing sanction of cash credit facility amounting to Rs. 5.05 crores, including the repayments to the home loan availed for acquiring of the aforesaid immovable property as elucidated above are the “proceeds of crime” as defined under Section 2(1)(u) of PMLA and hence the endeavour of Shri R. Kannan in causing sanction of cash credit facility amounting to Rs. 6.25 crores to NMPL thereby rendering Shri M. Kamalchand Jain and Shri Anuraag Jain to recuperate the said immovable property smeared with the taint of “proceeds of crime” and to arrogate its worth by devious means by projecting the same as validly held by NMPL so as to disguise its nature is an activity typical of actually involving in the process of projection of the “proceeds of crime” as untainted. Therefore, it could be deduced that Shri R. Kannan by causing sanction of the cash credit facility amounting to Rs. 6.25 crores upon fraudulent creation of collateral security on the aforesaid immovable property has actually involved himself in the process or activity of deriving the “proceeds of crime” and it projection as untainted.” 4. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no offence has been made out under Section 3 of the PML Act, qua A-5 since no proceeds of crime has been generated by him as specified under Section 2(1)(u) of the PML Act. Hence, the learned counsel contended that the criminal complaint and the charges framed as against the petitioner, are not legally sustainable and hence, the proceedings must be quashed insofar as the petitioner/A-5 is concerned. 5. Per contra, the learned Special Public Prosecutor, after explaining the entire facts of the case, submitted that the petitioner, by sanctioning credit facility amounting to Rs. 6.25 crores upon fraudulent creation of collateral security on an immovable property, has involved in the process or activity of deriving the proceeds of crime and its projection as untainted; in view of the same, whatever defence is available to the petitioner, can only be put forth during the course of the trial and there are absolutely no grounds to quash the proceedings. Hence, the learned Special Public Prosecutor sought for the dismissal of this quash petition. 6. Hence, the learned Special Public Prosecutor sought for the dismissal of this quash petition. 6. The learned Special Public Prosecutor, in order to substantiate his submissions, relied upon the following judgments: (a) Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Others vs. Union of India and Others, 2022 SCC Online SC 929 (b) Priti Saraf and Another vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Another, 2021 SCC Online SC 206 7. We carefully considered the submissions made on either side and the materials available on record. 8. To appreciate the rival contentions, it is first necessary to set out the definition of the offence of “money-laundering” contained in Section 3 of the PML Act, which is as under: “Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. Explanation: For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that: (i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely: (a) concealment; or (b) possession; or (c) acquisition; or (d) use; or (e) projecting as untainted property; or (f) claiming as untainted property, in any manner whatsoever; (ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.” The expression “proceeds of crime” is the core of the offence of money-laundering. The expression is defined in Section 2(1)(u) of the PML Act, as under: “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad. Explanation: For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.” The scope of this definition came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal (supra). The Supreme Court observed that every crime property need not be termed as proceeds of crime, but the converse may be true. It was observed that only such property which is derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence can be regarded as proceeds of crime. For, the expression “derived or obtained” is indicative of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence already accomplished. 9. The Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal (supra), has dealt with the term proceeds of crime and it has been held as follows: “251. The “proceeds of crime” being the core of the ingredients constituting the offence of money-laundering, that expression needs to be construed strictly. In that, all properties recovered or attached by the investigating agency in connection with the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence under the general law cannot be regarded as proceeds of crime. There may be cases where the property involved in the commission of scheduled offence attached by the investigating agency dealing with that offence, cannot be wholly or partly regarded as proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) of the 2002 Act - so long as the whole or some portion of the property has been derived or obtained by any person “as a result of” criminal activity relating to the stated scheduled offence. To be proceeds of crime, therefore, the property must be derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, “as a result of” criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. To put it differently, the vehicle used in commission of scheduled offence may be attached as property in the concerned case (crime), it may still not be proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) of the 2002 Act. To put it differently, the vehicle used in commission of scheduled offence may be attached as property in the concerned case (crime), it may still not be proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) of the 2002 Act. Similarly, possession of unaccounted property acquired by legal means may be actionable for tax violation and yet, will not be regarded as proceeds of crime unless the concerned tax legislation prescribes such violation as an offence and such offence is included in the Schedule of the 2002 Act. For being regarded as proceeds of crime, the property associated with the scheduled offence must have been derived or obtained by a person “as a result of” criminal activity relating to the concerned scheduled offence. This distinction must be borne in mind while reckoning any property referred to in the scheduled offence as proceeds of crime for the purpose of the 2002 Act. Dealing with proceeds of crime by way of any process or activity constitutes offence of money-laundering under Section 3 of the Act. 252. Be it noted that the definition clause includes any property derived or obtained “indirectly” as well. This would include property derived or obtained from the sale proceeds or in a given case in lieu of or in exchange of the “property” which had been directly derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. In the context of Explanation added in 2019 to the definition of expression “proceeds of crime” it would inevitably include other property which may not have been derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. As noticed from the definition, it essentially refers to “any property” including abroad derived or obtained directly or indirectly. The Explanation added in 2019 in no way travels beyond that intent of tracking and reaching upto the property derived or obtained directly or indirectly as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. Therefore, the Explanation is in the nature of clarification and not to increase the width of the main definition “proceeds of crime.” The definition of “property” also contains Explanation which is for the removal of doubts and to clarify that the term property includes property of any kind used in the commission of an offence under the 2002 Act or any of the scheduled offences. In the earlier part of this judgment, we have already noted that every crime property need not be termed as proceeds of crime but the converse may be true. Additionally, some other property is purchased or derived from the proceeds of crime even such subsequently acquired property must be regarded as tainted property and actionable under the Act. For, it would become property for the purpose of taking action under the 2002 Act which is being used in the commission of offence of money-laundering. Such purposive interpretation would be necessary to uphold the purposes and objects for enactment of 2002 Act. 253. Tersely put, it is only such property which is derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence can be regarded as proceeds of crime. The authorities under the 2002 Act cannot resort to action against any person for money-laundering on an assumption that the property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless the same is registered with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before the competent forum. For, the expression “derived or obtained” is indicative of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence already accomplished. Similarly, in the event the person named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a Court of competent jurisdiction owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or because of quashing of the criminal case (scheduled offence) against him/her, there can be no action for money-laundering against such a person or person claiming through him in relation to the property linked to the stated scheduled offence. This interpretation alone can be countenanced on the basis of the provisions of the 2002 Act, in particular Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 3. Taking any other view would be rewriting of these provisions and disregarding the express language of definition clause “proceeds of crime” as it obtains as of now. 280. We may also note that argument that removing the necessity of projection from the definition will render the predicate offence and money-laundering indistinguishable. This, in our view, is ill founded and fallacious. This plea cannot hold water for the simple reason that the scheduled offences in the 2002 Act as it stands (amended up to date) are independent criminal acts. We may also note that argument that removing the necessity of projection from the definition will render the predicate offence and money-laundering indistinguishable. This, in our view, is ill founded and fallacious. This plea cannot hold water for the simple reason that the scheduled offences in the 2002 Act as it stands (amended up to date) are independent criminal acts. It is only when money is generated as a result of such acts that the 2002 Act steps in as soon as proceeds of crime are involved in any process or activity. Dealing with such proceeds of crime can be in any form - being process or activity. Thus, even assisting in the process or activity is a part of the crime of money-laundering. We must keep in mind that for being liable to suffer legal consequences of ones action of indulging in the process or activity, is sufficient and not only upon projection of the ill-gotten money as untainted money. Many members of a crime syndicate could then simply keep the money with them for years to come, the hands of the law in such a situation cannot be bound and stopped from proceeding against such person, if information of such illegitimate monies is revealed even from an unknown source. 281. The next question is: whether the offence under Section 3 is a standalone offence? Indeed, it is dependent on the wrongful and illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. Nevertheless, it is concerning the process or activity connected with such property, which constitutes offence of money-laundering. The property must qualify the definition of “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u) of the 2002 Act. As observed earlier, all or whole of the crime property linked to scheduled offence need not be regarded as proceeds of crime, but all properties qualifying the definition of “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u) will necessarily be crime properties. Indeed, in the event of acquittal of the person concerned or being absolved from allegation of criminal activity relating to scheduled offence, and if it is established in the court of law that the crime property in the concerned case has been rightfully owned and possessed by him, such a property by no stretch of imagination can be termed as crime property and ex-consequenti proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) as it stands today. On the other hand, in the trial in connection with the scheduled offence, the Court would be obliged to direct return of such property as belonging to him. It would be then paradoxical to still regard such property as proceeds of crime despite such adjudication by a Court of competent jurisdiction. It is well within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court trying the scheduled offence to pronounce on that matter. 282. Be it noted that the authority of the Authorised Officer under the 2002 Act to prosecute any person for offence of money-laundering gets triggered only if there exists proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) of the 2002 Act and further it is involved in any process or activity. Not even in a case of existence of undisclosed income and irrespective of its volume, the definition of “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u) will get attracted, unless the property has been derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It is possible that in a given case after the discovery of huge volume of undisclosed property, the authorised officer may be advised to send information to the jurisdictional police (under Section 66(2) of the 2002 Act) for registration of a scheduled offence contemporaneously, including for further investigation in a pending case, if any. On receipt of such information, the jurisdictional police would be obliged to register the case by way of FIR if it is a cognizable offence or as a non-cognizable offence (NC case), as the case may be. If the offence so reported is a scheduled offence, only in that eventuality, the property recovered by the authorised officer would partake the colour of proceeds of crime under Section 2(1)(u) of the 2002 Act, enabling him to take further action under the Act in that regard. 283. Even though, the 2002 Act is a complete Code in itself, it is only in respect of matters connected with offence of money-laundering, and for that, existence of proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) of the Act is quintessential. Absent existence of proceeds of crime, as aforesaid, the authorities under the 2002 Act cannot step in or initiate any prosecution. 284. Absent existence of proceeds of crime, as aforesaid, the authorities under the 2002 Act cannot step in or initiate any prosecution. 284. In other words, the Authority under the 2002 Act, is to prosecute a person for offence of money-laundering only if it has reason to believe, which is required to be recorded in writing that the person is in possession of “proceeds of crime.” Only if that belief is further supported by tangible and credible evidence indicative of involvement of the person concerned in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, action under the Act can be taken forward for attachment and confiscation of proceeds of crime and until vesting thereof in the Central Government, such process initiated would be a standalone process. 467. In light of the above analysis, we now proceed to summarise our conclusion on seminal points in issue in the following terms: (v)(a)........... (b) Independent of the above, we are clearly of the view that the expression “and” occurring in Section 3 has to be construed as “or” to give full play to the said provision so as to include “every” process or activity indulged into by anyone. Projecting or claiming the property as untainted property would constitute an offence of money-laundering on its own, being an independent process or activity.” 10. Prior to the decision in Vijay Madanlal (supra), the scope of Section 2(1)(u) was considered by a two judge bench in Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1 . Adverting to the definition of proceeds of crime and the ingredients of the offence of money-laundering under Section 3 of the PML Act, the Court observed: “Section 3, therefore, contains all the aforesaid ingredients, and before somebody can be adjudged as guilty under the said provision, the said person must not only be involved in any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime, but must also project or claim it as being untainted property.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the requirement of the offence, in terms of the law laid down in Nikesh Tarachand (supra), was: (a) The commission of a scheduled offence/criminal activity (predicate offence). (b) Such offence or criminal activity has generated proceeds of crime. (c) The proceeds of crime derived or obtained by the accused person as a result of a criminal activity relating to the stated schedule offence is projected as untainted property. 11. (b) Such offence or criminal activity has generated proceeds of crime. (c) The proceeds of crime derived or obtained by the accused person as a result of a criminal activity relating to the stated schedule offence is projected as untainted property. 11. The decision in Nikesh Tarachand (supra), was prior to the amendment to Section 3 by the Finance Act (Act 23 of 2019). Vide the said amendment, an explanation has now been added to Section 3. The import of the explanation came up for consideration in Vijay Madanlal (supra), wherein, it was observed that the expression “and” occurring before the words “projecting or claiming it as untainted property” in Section 3 must be construed as “or” in the light of the explanation. The Supreme Court has observed thus: “The expression “proceeds of crime and projecting” was substituted by expression “proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming.” We are not so much concerned with this change introduced vide Act 2 of 2013. In other words, the provision as it stood prior to amendment vide Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 remained as it is. Upon breaking-up of this provision, it would clearly indicate that - it is an offence of money-laundering, in the event of direct or indirect attempt to indulge or knowingly assist or being knowingly party or being actually involved in “any process or activity” connected with the proceeds of crime. The latter part of the provision is only an elaboration of the different process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, such as its concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it to be as untainted property. This position stands clarified by way of Explanation inserted in 2019. If the argument of the petitioners is to be accepted, that projecting or claiming the property as untainted property is the quintessential ingredient of the offence of money-laundering, that would whittle down the sweep of Section 3.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the requirement of projecting the proceedings of crime as untainted property may be one of the modes by which the offence is committed and is no longer a sine qua non for constituting the offence of money-laundering under Section 3 of the PML Act. 12. In the case on hand, the proceeds of crime is the sum of Rs. 12. In the case on hand, the proceeds of crime is the sum of Rs. 6.25 crores that was sanctioned to A-1 on the basis of the alleged fraudulent approvals granted by the petitioner. The question, therefore, is whether the role played by the petitioner would be sufficient to rope him in as an accused for the alleged commission of an offence of money-laundering under Section 3 of the PML Act. 13. As stated supra, the predicate offence against the petitioner is that he fraudulently sanctioned and disbursed the loan. The loan is, therefore, the proceeds of crime. It is necessary to notice that the scope of Section 3 is wide enough to cover all persons who “directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.” It is clear that even a person who knowingly assists in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime would also be caught within the net of Section 3. In the case on hand, on a reading of the complaint, the allegation is that, but for the role played by the petitioner, the loans could not have been sanctioned and disbursed to A-1. Prima facie, these allegations would attract Section 3 of the PML Act. We are fortified in coming to this conclusion in the light of a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Directorate of Enforcement vs. Padmanabhan Kishore, 2022 SCC Online SC 1490, wherein, it was observed as under: “14. The further question to be answered is: whether the role played by respondent could come within the purview of Section 3 of the PML Act? 15. Said Section 3 states, inter-alia, that whoever knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. It is true that so long as the amount is in the hands of a bribe giver, and till it does not get impressed with the requisite intent and is actually handed over as a bribe, it would definitely be untainted money. If the money is handed over without such intent, it would be a mere entrustment. It is true that so long as the amount is in the hands of a bribe giver, and till it does not get impressed with the requisite intent and is actually handed over as a bribe, it would definitely be untainted money. If the money is handed over without such intent, it would be a mere entrustment. If it is thereafter appropriated by the public servant, the offence would be of misappropriation or species thereof but certainly not of bribe. The crucial part therefore is the requisite intent to hand over the amount as bribe and normally such intent must necessarily be antecedent or prior to the moment the amount is handed over. Thus, the requisite intent would always be at the core before the amount is handed over. Such intent having been entertained well before the amount is actually handed over, the person concerned would certainly be involved in the process or activity connected with “proceeds of crime” including inter-alia, the aspects of possession or acquisition thereof. By handing over money with the intent of giving bribe, such person will be assisting or will knowingly be a party to an activity connected with the proceeds of crime. Without such active participation on part of the person concerned, the money would not assume the character of being proceeds of crime. The relevant expressions from Section 3 of the PML Act are thus wide enough to cover the role played by such person.” 14. At the risk of repetition, the case set up in paragraph 10.6 of the complaint is that, A-5 had sanctioned and disbursed the credit facilities/loan. But, for the alleged active participation and assistance of the petitioner/A-5 the money so disbursed would not have assumed the character of proceeds of crime. Consequently, it cannot be said that the alleged role played by the petitioner does not come within the net of the definition of proceeds of crime under Section 3 of the PML Act. 15. It is true that a Division Bench of this Court, in which, one of us (PNPJ) was a member, in R. Chandrasekaran vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Crl. O.P. Nos. 26898 and 26902 of 2017 decided on 20.01.2022 and N. Raveendranatha Reddy vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Crl. 15. It is true that a Division Bench of this Court, in which, one of us (PNPJ) was a member, in R. Chandrasekaran vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Crl. O.P. Nos. 26898 and 26902 of 2017 decided on 20.01.2022 and N. Raveendranatha Reddy vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Crl. O.P. No. 29533 of 2015 decided on 27.01.2022, had taken a view different from the one taken in the instant case and had quashed the prosecutions against bank managers, by relying upon the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Nikesh Tarachand (supra). However, Nikesh Tarachand (supra), has been overruled by Vijay Madanlal (supra). That apart, in Padmanabhan Kishore (supra), the Supreme Court has reversed the quashment of a prosecution by a Division Bench of this Court, in which, one of us (PNPJ) was a member, by holding that if the accused had, in any manner, involved in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, he cannot escape from the net of Section 3 read with Section 4 of the PML Act. In the light of the above march of law, we are afraid that we cannot quash the instant prosecution. 16. In the light of the above discussion and also the legal position deduced from the judgment of the Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal (supra), we do not find any ground to interfere with the criminal prosecution of the petitioner/A-5. In the result, this Criminal Original Petition is dismissed. It is made clear that the observations made supra, are confined for the purposes of the disposal of this petition. Connected Miscellaneous Petition stands closed.