ORDER : Prayer: Writ Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for a writ of certiorari calling for the records relating to the proceedings in order dated 04.09.2019 passed in Complaint Nos.SMF/MUM/68, 67 & 66/2009 on the file of the first respondent and quash the same. 1. These writ petitions are filed challenging the order dated 04.09.2019 passed by the 1st respondent in Complaint Nos.SMF/MUM/68, 67 & 66 /2009. 2. M/s. United India Insurance Company Limited is the petitioner [herein will be referred to as 'Insurance Company'] and both second respondents are close relatives. The second respondent had taken three separate standard fire and special perils policy from the petitioner's office at Dindigul as against the building and stocks at Deepam Urea Godown, Meenakshi Chettinayakkanpatty bypass road, Dindigul. While so on 05.08.2006 fire broke out in the said godown and cotton bales got damaged. In this connection a case in Crime No. 186 of 2006 was registered in Thadikombu Police Station. Subsequently the second respondent made separate claim to the Insurance Company that the fire broke out due to short circuit. Based on the claim made by the second respondent, the Insurance Company conducted a survey by the Surveyor, who had also filed his report. Further, according to the report of the Investigator dated 20.07.2007, there were certain irregularities in the claim made by the second respondent. Moreover, there was no electricity connection to the said godown and the fire did not break out due to electricity short circuit. Therefore the Insurance company rejected the claim of the second respondent. Subsequently the second respondent filed three separate complaints in respect of those policies before the first respondent District Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum, South Mumbai arraying the petitioner Insurance Company's Mumbai Office as respondent for the relief of compensation together with interest. Though the entire cause of action arose at Dindigul, the first respondent proceeded with the complaints and passed ex-parte order and based on the ex-parte order and directed the Insurance Company to pay laksh of rupees as compenasation, without even assigning a single reason. The second respondent also filed execution application against the petitioner's office at Mumbai. Therefore the petitioner Insurance Company has approached this Court by way of these writ petitions. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the insurance policy was issued by the Divisional Officer at Dindigul. The second respondent also filed execution application against the petitioner's office at Mumbai. Therefore the petitioner Insurance Company has approached this Court by way of these writ petitions. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the insurance policy was issued by the Divisional Officer at Dindigul. Payment of premium, storage of insured goods, the place of accident and place of claim all these had happened only at Dindigul. When the entire cause of action arose at Dinidgul, the Consumer Forum at Dindigul alone has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The learned Counsel further submits that the second respondent has preferred complaint before the District Forum at Mumbai, which also issued summons to the petitioner's Mumbai Office. The Mumbai office also sent summons to the Office at Chennai. However, the summon was issued in Marathi. As per Section 28 of CPC, the interstate summon should be issued either in Hindi or in English. The issuance of summon in Marathi itself amounts to denial of natural justice and therefore, on the ground of denial of natural justice, these writ petitions are filed as against the orders of the first respondent Consumer Forum. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the following judgments in support of his contention: (i) Sonic Surgical vs. National Insurance Company Limited, (2010) 1 SCC 136 (ii) T.S. Krishnamoorthy vs. Mercury Chemicals, 1997 (1) CTC 507 (iii) Navin Chandra N. Majithia vs. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 7 SCC 640 5. The learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 submits that the petitioner has alternative remedy of filing appeal under the Consumer Protection Act and merely because they have not filed the appeal, they cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Further, the petitioner can file a writ petition only before the High Court of Judicature at Mumbai and this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain these writ petitions. The first respondent based on the materials placed before it has rightly passed the order. Now the claim is pending before the execution Court and these writ petitions have been filed only in order to avoid and to delay the payment. 6. Heard the learned Counsel on either side and perused the materials placed on record. 7. The first respondent based on the materials placed before it has rightly passed the order. Now the claim is pending before the execution Court and these writ petitions have been filed only in order to avoid and to delay the payment. 6. Heard the learned Counsel on either side and perused the materials placed on record. 7. It is relevant to refer to Section 11 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, which confers jurisdiction in respect of District Forum and the same is extracted as under: “11. Jurisdiction of the District Forum (2) A complaint shall be instituted in a District Forum within the local limits of whose jurisdiction: (a) the opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides or [carries on business, or has a branch office or] personally works for gain. (b) any of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides, or 1[carries on business or has a branch office, or personally works for gain: PROVIDED that in such case either the permission of the District Forum is given, or the opposite parties who do not reside, or [carry on business or have a branch office, or personally work for gain, as the case may be, acquiesce in such institution; or the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.” 8. The Supreme Court in Sonic Surgical vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. 2010 (1) SCC 136 held that the branch office under the act would not mean any branch office but the branch office where the cause of action arose and further it has held that if the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is accepted, it will mean that even if a cause of action has arisen in Ambala, then too the complainant can file a claim petition even in Tamil Nadu or Gauhati or anywhere in India where a branch office of the insurance company is situated. We cannot agree with this contention. It will lead to absurd consequences and lead to bench hunting. 9. We cannot agree with this contention. It will lead to absurd consequences and lead to bench hunting. 9. As per Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, summoning and enforcing the attendance of any defendant should be in terms of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the same is extracted as under, for better appreciation: “13. (4) For the purposes of this section, the District Forum shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely: (i) the summoning and enforcing attendance of any defendant or witness and examining the witness on oath. (ii) the discovery and production of any document or other material object producible as evidence. (iii) the reception of evidence on affidavits. (iv) the requisitioning of the report of the concerned analysis or test from the appropriate laboratory or from any other relevant source. (v) issuing of any commission for the examination of any witness. (vi) any other matter which may be prescribed.” 10. Section 28 CPC mandates the party to send the summons in English as the other party is in another state, which reads as follows: “28. Service of summons where defendant resides in another State: (1) A summons may be sent for service in another State to such Court and in such manner as may be prescribed by rules in force in that State. (2) The Court to which such summons is sent shall, upon receipt thereof, proceed as if it had been issued by such Court and shall then return the summons to the Court of issue together with the record (if any) of its proceedings with regard thereto. (3) Where the language of the summons sent for service in another State is different from the language of the record referred to in sub-section (2), a translation of the record: (a) in Hindi, where the language of the Court issuing the summons is Hindi. (b) in Hindi or English where the language of such record is other than Hindi or English, shall also be sent together with the record sent under that sub-section.” 11. (b) in Hindi or English where the language of such record is other than Hindi or English, shall also be sent together with the record sent under that sub-section.” 11. It is pertinent to mention here that after the 15th and 42nd amendments of the Constitution on 5.10.1963 18.12.1976 the writ jurisdiction of High Courts was expanded through Article 226(2) which reads as follows: “Art. 226. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.” 12. A Three Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254 , has elaborated the concept of “cause of action” under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the jurisdiction of a High Court in detail and held that keeping in view the expressions used in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter. Therefore, to invoke writ jurisdiction of this Court, it is enough to prove that a part or a small fraction of the cause of action arose within the ambit of this Court. 13. The judgment has further discussed what does constitute a “cause of action” as follows: “16. In Union of India vs. Adani Exports Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC 567 it was held that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition it must disclose that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do constitute a cause so as to empower the Court to decide the dispute and the entire or a part of it arose within its jurisdiction. 18. The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. 18. The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the Court.” 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has iterated that it is the discretion of the petitioner to choose his forum when the cause of action arises at two different places and the relevant portion reads as follows: “25. The said decision is an authority for the proposition that the place from where an appellate order or a revisional order is passed may give rise to a part of cause of action although the original order was at a place outside the said area. When a part of the cause of action arises within one or the other High Court, it will be for the petitioner to choose his forum. 27. When an order, however, is passed by a court or tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority.” 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Navinchandra N. Majitha vs. State of Maharastra, 2000 (7) SCC 640 has held that the object of the amendment by inserting Clause (2) in the Article was to supercede the decision of the Supreme Court in Election Commission Vs Saka Venkata Subba Rao (Supra) and to restore the view held by the High Courts in the decision cited above. Thus the power of conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 could as well be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which “the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.” Judicial pronouncements have accorded almost a uniform interpretation to the said compendious expression even prior to the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution as to mean, the bunble of facts which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court.” 16. The cause of action for the complaints arose at Dindigul, however, the complaints were filed before the first respondent at Mumbai and the first respondent has also passd orders without any proper notice to the petitioner Insurance Company as required under the law and in view of the same and applying the dictum laid down in the above cited judgments, the impugned orders cannot be sustained under law. 17. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. However, the second respondent is at liberty to approach the appropriate forum. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.