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2022 DIGILAW 397 (GAU)

Singta Techi Tara S/o Shri Tabing Techi Tara v. State of A. P.

2022-04-18

ROBIN PHUKAN

body2022
JUDGMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. 1. Legality, propriety and correctness of order dated 10.05.2021, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seppa in Seppa P.S. Case No. 34/12, corresponding to G.R. Case No. 37/12, registered under Section 420/468 IPC, is put to challenge in this revision petition, under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. 1973, by the petitioner- Shri Singta Techi Tara. 2. It is to be noted here that vide impugned order, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seppa, has summoned the petitioner-Singta Techi Tara, as an accused to stand trial along with rest of the accused under Section 420/468 of the IPC. 3. The factual background leading to filing of the present petition is briefly state as under: “On 23.04.2012, the then Deputy Commissioner, Seppa, East Kameng District, filed one FIR with the Officer In-Charge, Seppa, to the effect that one Shri Dilip Tachang has deposited 3(three) numbers of cheque in State Bank of India (SBI), Seppa, by forging his nature and also the signature of Shri T.G. Khrime. Upon the said FIR, the Officer In-Charge, Seppa P.S. registered a case being Seppa P.S. Case No. 34/12, under Section 420/468 IPC and investigated the same. The investigation culminated in submission of Charge-sheet against Shri Dilip Tachang to stand trial in the Court under Section 420/468 IPC. Shri Dilip Tachang and Shri Tacho Tachang, accordingly, appeared before the Court of Learned CJM, Seppa and the learned CJM, Seppa has framed charge against both the accused under Section 420/468 IPC and on being read and explained over, both the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges. Thereafter, the learned Court below, has examined the prosecution witnesses and after closing the prosecution evidence the learned Court below, has examined the accused persons under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In his statement, under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the accused Shri Tacho Tachang, has stated that because of some liabilities, Shri Singta Techi Tara, has to repay a loan and in the said loan Tacho Tachang was the guarantor. Thereafter, on the prayer being made by the learned Addl. P.P. and also considering the evidence of PW-7 and the statement of accused Shri Tacho Tachang, under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the learned Court below has summoned Shri Singta Techi Tara, as an accused. Thereafter, on the prayer being made by the learned Addl. P.P. and also considering the evidence of PW-7 and the statement of accused Shri Tacho Tachang, under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the learned Court below has summoned Shri Singta Techi Tara, as an accused. Though, the learned Court below has not specifically stated about the Sections, under which he has exercised jurisdiction, yet, it appears that the learned Court below has exercised the jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C.” 4. Being highly aggrieved by the order dated 10.05.2021, the petitioner, approached this court by preferring the present petition on the ground that: (1) The evidences, upon which the learned Court below had relied upon to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is not sufficient. (2) The statement of an accused, under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be considered as a substantive piece of evidence and beside there is no materials to corroborate the same. (3) And assuming that the petitioner has some liabilities to repay a loan yet, the same has nothing to do with forging of signature of the Deputy Commissioner, Seppa, in cheque leaves; Therefore, it is contended to set aside the impugned order passed by the learned Court below. 5. Heard Mr. B. Picha, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. G. Tadoh, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State respondents. 6. Mr. B. Picha, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Court below has committed manifest error in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Mr. B. Picha, further submits that the evidence upon which the learned Court below has relied upon to invoke its jurisdiction is totally insufficient and that the statement of co-accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot read as evidence and there is no materials on record to corroborate the same. Mr. Picha, therefore, contended to set aside the impugned order. 7. On the other hand, Mr. G. Tado, learned Addl. PP for the State respondents, has vehemently opposed the submission so advanced by Mr. Picha. It is submitted that the learned Court below has rightly applied its discretion and summoned the petitioner as an accused and as such no interference of this Court is called for. 8. Having heard the submissions of learned Advocate of both sides, I carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record. 9. Picha. It is submitted that the learned Court below has rightly applied its discretion and summoned the petitioner as an accused and as such no interference of this Court is called for. 8. Having heard the submissions of learned Advocate of both sides, I carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record. 9. It appears that while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C. the learned Court below has mainly relied upon the evidences of PW-7 and also the statement of accused Shri Tacho Tachang, recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. 10. A perusal of the evidence of PW-7, Shri Tana Naya, reveals that in cross-examination, he stated that he heard that one Singta Techi Tara, who was actually involved, though, he has not uttered a single word against Shri Singta Techi Tara, in his examination-in-chief. But, neither the prosecution side nor the defense side failed to elicit from whom he heard that it was Shri Singta Techi Tara, who was actually involved in the offence. The evidence so adduced by PW-7 appears to be hearsay and since the person, from whom he has heard about the same is not examined herein this case either by the prosecution or by the defense side, the evidence of PW-7, cannot be relied upon. 11. On the other hand, in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. accused Shri Tacho Tachang stated that Shri Singta Techi, was the Headmaster of Lal Bahadur Shashtri Vidya Niketan-II, Seppa, and Shri Singta Techi, approached him for a sum of Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees Thirty Thousand only) as he got one work of supplying school belts and he did manage the said amount to Shri Singta Techi by obtaining a loan from one women group of Naharlagun @ 10% interest per month. 30,000/- (Rupees Thirty Thousand only) as he got one work of supplying school belts and he did manage the said amount to Shri Singta Techi by obtaining a loan from one women group of Naharlagun @ 10% interest per month. But, even after lapse of 1 year Shri Singta Techi, did not returned the amount and then the women group approached him and then he informed about the same to Shri Singta Techi, who requested him to provide his account number and he did provide SBI account number of Shri Dilip Tasang, which he used and thereafter, also Shri Singta Techi, kept delaying payment and one day Shri Tana Naya, called him over telephone and asked him if he has deposited cheque in the account as there was summon from Police in connection with that account and then he realized that it was the handy work of Shri Singta Techi, then he lodged the FIR against him. He also stated that Shri Singta Techi was involved in said forgery case which is allegedly committed against Gyadi Party. 12. Now, it is to be seen whether the aforesaid statement of the accused Shri Tacho Tachang and the evidence of PW-7 are sufficient to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner. 13. A Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Hardeep Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2014 (3) SCC 92 , in paragraph No. 105 has held that: “Power under Section 319 is a discretionary and extra ordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Session Judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the Court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner.” 14. Further in paragraph No. 106 of the said case Hon’ble Apex Court has held that: “Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the Court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of him complicity. Further in paragraph No. 106 of the said case Hon’ble Apex Court has held that: “Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the Court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of him complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima-facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes un-rebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the Court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The purpose of providing if “it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence” is clear from the words “for which such person could be tried together with the accused.” The words used are not “for which such person could be convicted.” There is, therefore, no scope for the Court acting under Section 319 Cr.P.C to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused.” 15. Again, in the case of Jogendra Yadav vs. State of Bihar and Another, (2015) 9 SCC 244 , Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paragraph no. 9 and 10, held that: “Moreover it is settled that the extraordinary power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised only if very strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the Court.” It is also held that: “The standard of proof employed for summoning a person as an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is higher than the standard of proof employed for framing a charge against an accused.” 16. Here in this case, it has already been indicated in the forgoing paragraphs that the evidence of PW-7 is hearsay, and the same is not admissible, being the person from whom he heard about the incident has not been examined either by the prosecution side or by the defense side. Moreover, the statement of accused Shri Tacho Tachang, under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be read as evidence. Besides, there is also no material on record to corroborate the same. 17. Moreover, the statement of accused Shri Tacho Tachang, under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be read as evidence. Besides, there is also no material on record to corroborate the same. 17. Thus, the evidence of PW-7 and the statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. of accused Tacho Tachang, upon which the learned Court below has relied upon to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and summoned the petitioner as an accused are not of required standard, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case law discussed hereinabove. 18. Thus, it transpires that the learned Court below has failed to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C. in its proper perspective. From the materials on record it cannot be said very strong and cogent evidence occurs against the petitioner. And as such the order, impugned in this petition, has failed to withstand the test of legality, propriety and correctness. 19. In the result the impugned order stands set aside. The petition is accordingly allowed. The parties have to bear their own costs.