ORDER : CMP(M) Nos. 827/2021 & 850/2021 in CMP (M) No.385/2020 A short, but an interesting controversy has arisen in this case. 2. The Union of India has filed the review petitions against the judgment dated 24.8.2017 passed by this Court in RFA No. 265/2005 and RFA No. 266/2005. These review petitions were filed on 7.9.2019, but remained under objections and were formally registered after removing the objections on 19.6.2020. However, after the judgment had been rendered in the aforesaid RFAs but before the review petitions could be filed, respondent No.1 Laxmi Nand in RFA No. 265/2005 died on 27.6.2018. This fact, according to the applicant/petitioner, came to its notice only when the legal representatives of the deceased respondent Laxmi Nand filed an application for release of the amount on 30.4.2021. It is thereafter that the petitioner/applicant has filed the instant applications for bringing on record the legal representatives of deceased respondent Laxmi Nand after condoning the delay in filing the same. 3. According to the applicant, the application for bringing on record the legal representatives of respondent No.1 Laxmi Nand is within time if the period is computed and calculated from the date of knowledge. 4. The legal representative of the respondent has contested the applications by filing reply(ies), wherein it has been averred that the applications without making a proper prayer for setting aside abatement are not competent and maintainable and therefore, the proposed legal representatives of the deceased respondent cannot be brought on record. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material place on record. 6. Order XXII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, the Code) applies to cases of the death of defendants, who died during the proceedings and not in respect, who died prior to the institution of the proceedings. On the other hand, Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code reads as under:- “10. 6. Order XXII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, the Code) applies to cases of the death of defendants, who died during the proceedings and not in respect, who died prior to the institution of the proceedings. On the other hand, Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code reads as under:- “10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.—(1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just. (2) Court may strike out or add parties.—The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. (3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent. (4) Where defendant added, plaint to be amended.- Where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant. (5) Subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (XV of 1877), section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons. 7. (5) Subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (XV of 1877), section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons. 7. Order I Rule 10(5) of the Code states that subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (XV of 1877), section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons, whereas Section 22 of the Indian Limitation Act, which has now been substituted by Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides as follows:- 21. Effect of substituting or adding new plaintiff or defendant. - (1) Where after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party: Provided that where the court is satisfied that the omission to include a new plaintiff or defendant was due to a mistake made in good faith it may direct that the suit as regards such plaintiff or defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date. (2) Nothing in Sub-section (1) shall apply to a case where a party is added or substituted owing to assignment or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit or where a plaintiff is made a defendant or a defendant is made a plaintiff. 8. Section 21 of the Limitation Act clearly provides that where, after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party; provided that where the court is satisfied that the omission to include a new plaintiff or defendant was due to a mistake made in good faith, it may direct that the suit as regards such plaintiff or defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date. 9. The discretion has been given to the Court to implead the a new party by virtue of proviso to Section 21 of the Limitation Act if the court is satisfied that the omission to include such person was due to bona fide mistake and not deliberate one. 10. 9. The discretion has been given to the Court to implead the a new party by virtue of proviso to Section 21 of the Limitation Act if the court is satisfied that the omission to include such person was due to bona fide mistake and not deliberate one. 10. This aspect was considered by the Hon’ble supreme Court in Karuppaswamy & ors. vs. C. Ramurthy, AIR 1993 SC 2324 , wherein a case was instituted by the plaintiff against a sole defendant within period of limitation, but the summons were returned with the endorsement that the defendant had died 6 weeks prior to filing of the suit. The application was filed by the plaintiff under order XXII Rule 4 of the code after expiry of limitation period for impleading the LRs of the deceased. The reply to the application was filed by legal heirs sought to be impleaded, wherein it was stated that the suit against a dead person was non est. The High Court held that LRs were required to be impleaded in the suit and the application was deemed to have been filed on the date of filing of the original plaint and as such within period of limitation. It is apt to reproduce relevant observations contained in paras 5, 9 and 12, which read as under:- 5. A comparative reading of the proviso to Sub-section (1) shows that its addition has made all the difference. It is also clear that the proviso has appeared to permit correction of errors which have been committed due to a mistake made in good faith but only when the court permits correction of such mistake. In that event its effect is not to begin from the date on which the application for the purpose was made, or from the date of permission but from the date of the suit, deeming it to have been correctly instituted on an earlier date than the date of making the application. In that event its effect is not to begin from the date on which the application for the purpose was made, or from the date of permission but from the date of the suit, deeming it to have been correctly instituted on an earlier date than the date of making the application. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act is obviously in line with the spirit and thought of some other provisions in Part III of the Act such as Section 14 providing exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction, when computing the period of limitation for any suit, and Section 17(1) providing a different period of Limitation starting when discovering - a fraud or mistake instead of the commission of fraud or mistake. While invoking the beneficent proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act an averment that a mistake was made in good faith by impleading a dead defendant in the suit should be made and the court must on proof be satisfied that the motion to include the right defendant by substitution or addition was just and proper, the mistake having occurred in good faith. The court's satisfaction alone breaths life in the suit. 9. Thus in our opinion the course set out in Munshi's case (supra) is attracted to the instant case since the High Court has found that the plaintiff-respondent had acted in good faith and had committed mistake in that frame of mind. Munshi's case, in our view, should clear the way in favour of the plaintiff- respondent, ending in dismissal of this appeal. 12. On the above analysis, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the decision of the High Court was correct for the reasoning it advanced as well as for the effort we have made in refurbishing that view in the processual rehearing. As a result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs. 11. The judgment in Karuppaswamy’s case in turn was followed in Pankajbhai Rameshbhai Zalavadiya vs. Jethabhai Kalabhai Zalavadiya, 2018 AIR (SC) 490. 12. As a result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs. 11. The judgment in Karuppaswamy’s case in turn was followed in Pankajbhai Rameshbhai Zalavadiya vs. Jethabhai Kalabhai Zalavadiya, 2018 AIR (SC) 490. 12. As a matter of fact, both the aforesaid judgments have been relied upon by the petitioner to contend that the application for substituting the LRs of the sole respondent are deemed to be within time on the strength of the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgments. 13. The learned counsel for the non- applicant/respondent would however argue that the suit proceeded in favour or against a dead person is a nullity and once that be so, further question that whether there were any bona fides in filing of the suit against the a dead person cannot be gone into. In support of such contention, a number of judgments have been cited, however I would like to refer to few of them. 14. In Gurnam Singh vs. Gurbachan Kaur, 2017 (13) SCC 414 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when LRs of deceased litigant have not been brought on record within 90 days, then such proceedings stand abated in the petition against a dead person and rendered such petition nullity. 15. Earlier to this, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Chandrasekharan & ors. vs. S. Kanakarajan & ors., 2007 (5) SCC 669 held that an appeal would abate automatically unless the heirs and legal representatives of a deceased plaintiffs or defendants are brought on record within the period specified in the Code of Civil Procedure. 16. Order XXII Rule 10(A) of the Code reads as under:- “10A. Duty of pleader to communicate to Court death of a party.— Whenever a pleader appearing for a party to the suit comes to know of the death of that party, he shall inform the Court about it, and the Court shall there upon give notice of such death to the other party, and, for this purpose, the contract between the pleader and the deceased party shall be deemed to subsist.” 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Jesaya (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Sub Collector and another (2004) 13 SCC 431 held that under the aforesaid Rule it is obligatory on the pleader of the deceased to inform the court and other side about the factum of death of a party. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Jesaya (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Sub Collector and another (2004) 13 SCC 431 held that under the aforesaid Rule it is obligatory on the pleader of the deceased to inform the court and other side about the factum of death of a party. It shall be apposite to refer to para 4 of the judgment, which reads as under:- 4. Though the arguments are attractive one must also keep in mind Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is obligatory on the pleader of a deceased to inform the court and the other side about the factum of death of a party. In this case we find that no intimation was given to the court or to the other side that the first respondent had died. On the contrary a counsel appeared on behalf of the deceased person and argued the matter. It is clear that the attempt was to see whether a favourable order could be obtained. It is clear that the intention was that if the order went against them, then thereafter this would be made a ground for having that order set aside. This is in effect an attempt to take not just the other side but also the court for a ride. These sort of tactics must not be permitted to prevail. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere. The appeal stands dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 18. Likewise, in Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur vs. Gokul Narain, 1996 (4) SCC 178 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that under Order 22 Rule 10A CPC, whenever a pleader appearing for a party to the suit comes to the knowledge of the death of the party, he has to inform about it and the court thereupon gives notice of such death to the other party and for this purpose the contract between the pleader and the deceased party is deemed to subsist. It is apt to reproduce para 4 of the judgment, which reads as under:- It is stated in the written arguments of the counsel or the respondents that the District Judge by order dated May 27, 1995 brought the legal representatives of the first respondent on record. It is apt to reproduce para 4 of the judgment, which reads as under:- It is stated in the written arguments of the counsel or the respondents that the District Judge by order dated May 27, 1995 brought the legal representatives of the first respondent on record. When application came to be filed in the District Court on May 5, 1995 to the knowledge of the counsel or the appellant, it was ordered on May 27, 1995. The application for substitution is barred by limitation. The special leave petition had abated and, therefore, appeal is not maintainable. We find no force in the contention. Under Order 22, Rule 10A, CPC, whenever a pleader appearing for a party to the suit comes to the knowledge of the death of the party, he has to inform about it and the court thereupon gives notice of such death to the other party and for this purpose the contract between the pleader and the deceased party is deemed to subsist. It would, therefore, be clear that though the legal representatives have been brought on record in the executing Court on May 27, 1995 pending proceedings in this Court, since the counsel for the appellant did not have had the information, on coming to know of the death after dasti service was taken out, immediately application under Order 22, Rule 4, CPC came to be filed within 30 days of the date of the knowledge. Accordingly, there is no abatement of the appeal. The State is not expected to keep watch over the survival of the respondent and lapse of counsel to intimate to the counsel appearing in this Court cannot be construed to be knowledge of death. Even if it is assumed that abatement was caused, since application was filed under Order 22, Rule 4, CPC within 30 days from the date of the knowledge there is no delay in making the application to bring the legal representatives on record in this Appeal. There is, hence, no abatement by reason of the death of the respondent. The application to bring the legal representatives is accordingly ordered. 19. There is, hence, no abatement by reason of the death of the respondent. The application to bring the legal representatives is accordingly ordered. 19. The Madras High Court while dealing with a case of C. Manoharan vs. C.V. Subramaniam & Ors., 2006 (4) SCC MLJ 898, after taking into consideration the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of P. Jesaya (supra) has held that the decree passed against the death person cannot be treated as nullity rather it can be construed as nullity. 20. Similar reiteration of law can be found in judgment passed by Rajasthan High Court in Jarnail Singh vs. Saudagar Singh, 2003 3 RCR (civ.) 625, 2015(1) Kerala Law Journal 732, 1929 Calcutta 529, 1982 Andhra Pradesh 281, 2008 (8) SCC 521 (paras 14, 15, 16 and 17) 21. In contrast to the view taken by the High Courts referred to above, this Court, including this Bench, has consistently held that it is well settled that a decree in favour or against a dead person is a nullity. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the judgments rendered by this Court in Sher Singh and others Vs. Raghu Ram and others, 1981 S.L.C. 25; Ram Rakha and others Vs. Brahma Nand and others 1994 (Supp) S.L.C. 29; Jagdish Vs. Ram Karan and others 2002(1) Current Law Journal (H.P.) 232, referred in Dewana and another Vs. Gian Chand Malhotra and others, Latest HLJ 2011 (HP) 1420 and also judgments in Jaswant Singh Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, 2015(2) Shim.L.C. 674 ; Jagan Nath and others Vs. Ishwari Devi, 1988 (2) Shim.L.C 273 ; Karam Chand and others Vs. Bakshi Ram and others, 2002(1) Shim. L.C. 9; Gurnam Singh (dead) by legal representatives and others Vs. Gurbachan Kaur (dead), (2017) 13 SCC 414 , referred in Tara Wati and others Vs. Suman & others, Latest HLJ 2018(HP) 1046. 22. As would be noticed from the aforesaid discussion so far, probably it is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karuppaswamy’s case (supra) that alone deals with the case where the sole defendant had died prior to filing of the suit and yet the Hon’ble Supreme Court invoked a concept of “good faith” and allowed the application. 23. 22. As would be noticed from the aforesaid discussion so far, probably it is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karuppaswamy’s case (supra) that alone deals with the case where the sole defendant had died prior to filing of the suit and yet the Hon’ble Supreme Court invoked a concept of “good faith” and allowed the application. 23. The judgment in Karuppaswamy’s case (supra), in turn, as observed above, was relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its later judgment in Pankajbhai Rameshbhai Zalavadiya’s case (supra). The facts therein were that the appellant filed a suit on 24.6.2008 to set aside the sale deed executed in March 1995 in respect of the land purchased by defendant No.7. On the date of filing of the suit, defendant No.7 was already dead and upon report of the process server to this effect, the trial court on 31.3.2009 ordered that the suit had abated against defendant No.7. Initially, the appellant filed an application under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code for bringing on record the legal representatives of deceased defendant No.7, however the trial court rejected the said application. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code for impleading legal representatives, but the same was also dismissed. This order was unsuccessfully challenged before the High Court and thereafter the matter travelled to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, where it was held as under:- “5. The only question which is to be decided in this appeal is, whether the legal representatives of one of the defendants can be impleaded under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code where such defendant expired prior to the filing of the suit, particularly when the application filed by the plaintiff to bring the legal representatives of the deceased on record under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code was dismissed earlier as not maintainable. 6. The bare reading of Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code makes it clear that Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code applies only in the case where the death of one of the several defendants or the sole defendant occurs during the subsistence of the suit. If one of the defendants has expired prior to the filing of the suit, the legal representatives of such deceased defendant cannot be brought on record in the suit under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code. If one of the defendants has expired prior to the filing of the suit, the legal representatives of such deceased defendant cannot be brought on record in the suit under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to note the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 and Sections 151 & 153 of the Code, which read thus: “Order 1 Rule 10: Suit in name of wrong plaintiff. – 1. Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court things just. 2. Court may strike out or add parties.- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. 3. No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent. 4. Where defendant added, plaint to be amended.- where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant. 5. Subject to the provisions of the India Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons. 5. Subject to the provisions of the India Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons. Section 151: Saving of inherent powers of Court - Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Section 153: General power to amend – The Court may at any time, and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it may think fit, amend any defect or error in any proceeding in a suit; and all necessary amendments shall be made for the purpose of determining the real question or issue raised by or depending on such proceeding. 8. Merely because the earlier application filed by the appellant under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code was dismissed on 09.09.2009 as not maintainable, it will not prohibit the plaintiff from filing another application, which is maintainable in law. There was no adjudication of the application to bring legal representatives on record on merits by virtue of the order dated 09.09.2009. On the other hand, the earlier application filed under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code was dismissed by the trial Court as not maintainable, inasmuch as defendant no. 7 had died prior to the filing of the suit and that Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code comes into the picture only when a party dies during the pendency of the suit. The only course open to the appellant in law was to file an application for impleadment to bring on record the legal representatives of deceased defendant no. 7 under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code. Hence, the order passed by the trial Court on the application filed under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code, dated 09.09.2009, will not act as res-judicata. 9. Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code enables the Court to add any person as a party at any stage of the proceedings, if the person whose presence in Court is necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. 9. Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code enables the Court to add any person as a party at any stage of the proceedings, if the person whose presence in Court is necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. Avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings is also one of the objects of the said provision. Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code empowers the Court to substitute a party in the suit who is a wrong person with a right person. If the Court is satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and also that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in controversy to substitute a party in the suit, it may direct it to be done. When the Court finds that in the absence of the persons sought to be impleaded as a party to the suit, the controversy raised in the suit cannot be effectively and completely settled, the Court would do justice by impleading such persons. Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code gives wide discretion to the Court to deal with such a situation which may result in prejudicing the interests of the affected party if not impleaded in the suit, and where the impleadment of the said party is necessary and vital for the decision of the suit. 12. This Court in the case of Karuppaswamy and Ors. vs. C. Ramamurthy, 1993 (4) SCC 41 has permitted the plaintiff to modify the application filed by him under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code to make it an application under the provisions of Sections 151 and 153 of the Code. In the said matter also the suit was filed against a dead person. This Court proceeded further to conclude that the plaintiff has shown good faith as contemplated under Section 21(1) of Limitation Act and hence the impleadment of the legal representatives/heirs must date back to the date of the presentation of the plaint. In the said matter, it was observed thus: “4. A comparative reading of the proviso to Sub-section (1) shows that its addition has made all the difference. In the said matter, it was observed thus: “4. A comparative reading of the proviso to Sub-section (1) shows that its addition has made all the difference. It is also clear that the proviso has appeared to permit correction of errors which have been committed due to a mistake made in good faith but only when the court permits correction of such mistake. In that event its effect is not to begin from the date on which the application for the purpose was made, or from the date of permission but from the date of the suit, deeming it to have been correctly instituted on an earlier date than the date of making the application. The proviso to Sub- section (1) of Section 21 of the Act is obviously in line with the spirit and thought of some other provisions in Part III of the Act such as Section 14 providing exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction, when computing the period of limitation for any suit, and Section 17(1) providing a different period of Limitation starting when discovering a fraud or mistake instead of the commission of fraud or mistake. While invoking the beneficent proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act an averment that a mistake was made in good faith by impleading a dead defendant in the suit should be made and the court must on proof be satisfied that the motion to include the right defendant by substitution or addition was just and proper, the mistake having occurred in good faith. The court's satisfaction alone breaths life in the suit. 5. It is noteworthy that the trial court did not attribute any neglect or contumacy to the conduct of the plaintiff- respondent. It was rather observed that the plaintiff could have known the date of the death of the first defendant only by the counter filed to IA 265 of 1975. Normally, if he had known about the date of death of the defendant, he would have filed the suit in the first instance against his heirs and legal representatives. It was rather observed that the plaintiff could have known the date of the death of the first defendant only by the counter filed to IA 265 of 1975. Normally, if he had known about the date of death of the defendant, he would have filed the suit in the first instance against his heirs and legal representatives. The trial court has also opined that the plaintiff was ignorant as to such death and that is why he filed IA 265 of 1975 under Order 22 Rule 4 of C.P.C. The High Court too has recorded a finding that there was nothing to show that the plaintiff was aware of the death of the first defendant and yet knowing well about it, he would persist in filing the suit against a dead person. In conclusion, the learned Single Judge held that since plaintiff respondent had taken prompt action it clearly showed that he had acted in good faith. Thus the High Court made out a case for invoking the proviso to Sub- section (1) of Section 21 of the Act in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. Sequally, the High Court found no difficulty in allowing IA 785 of 1975 permitting change of the provision whereunder IA 265 of 1975 was filed and in allowing IA 265 of 1975 ordering the suit against the heirs and legal representatives of defendant 1 to be dating back to 14.11.74, the date on which the plaint was originally presented.” 14. In the matter on hand, since the purchaser of the suit property, i.e., defendant no.7 has expired prior to the filing of the suit, his legal representatives ought to have been arrayed as parties in the suit while presenting the plaint. As such impleadment was not made at the time of filing of the plaint in view of the fact that the plaintiff did not know about the death of the purchaser, he cannot be non-suited merely because of his ignorance of the said fact. To do justice between the parties and as the legal representatives of the purchaser of the suit property are necessary parties, they have to be impleaded under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code, inasmuch as the application under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code was not maintainable. To do justice between the parties and as the legal representatives of the purchaser of the suit property are necessary parties, they have to be impleaded under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code, inasmuch as the application under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code was not maintainable. As mentioned supra, it is only if a defendant dies during the pendency of the suit that the provisions of Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code can be invoked. Since one of the defendants i.e. defendant No.7 has expired prior to the filing of the suit, there is no legal impediment in impleading the legal representatives of the deceased defendant No.7 under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code, for the simple reason that the plaintiff in any case could have instituted a fresh suit against these legal representatives on the date he moved an application for making them parties, subject of course to the law of limitation. Normally, if the plaintiff had known about the death of one of the defendants at the time of institution of the suit, he would have filed a suit in the first instance against his heirs or legal representatives. The difficulty that the High Court experienced in granting the application filed by the plaintiff under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code discloses, with great respect, a hyper- technical approach which may result in the miscarriage of justice. As the heirs of the deceased defendant no.7 were the persons with vital interest in the outcome of the suit, such applications have to be approached keeping in mind that the Courts are meant to do substantial justice between the parties and that technical rules or procedures should not be given precedence over doing substantial justice. Undoubtedly, justice according to the law does not merely mean technical justice but means that law is to be administered to advance justice. 24. Thus, what can be taken to be settled is that there is no bar for filing the application under order 1 Rule 10 of the Code even when the application under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code has been dismissed or otherwise is not maintainable. 24. Thus, what can be taken to be settled is that there is no bar for filing the application under order 1 Rule 10 of the Code even when the application under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code has been dismissed or otherwise is not maintainable. The legal heirs of the deceased person in such matters can be added in the array of parties under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code read with Section 151; subject to the plea of limitation as contemplated under Order VII Rule 6 of the Code and Section 21 of the Limitation Act. 25. A party can always show good faith by moving an application for bringing on record the legal representatives of a deceased party, when even the suit has been filed against a dead person as per ratio of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karuppaswamy’s case (supra). 26. What is required to be determined by the Court is whether the mistake was made in a good faith by impleading a dead party and the Court must, on proof, be satisfied that the motion to include the right party (respondent) by substitution or addition was just and proper as the mistake had occurred in a good faith. The court's satisfaction alone breaths life in the suit. 27. As repeatedly held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise on technical grounds, but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 28. Even in terms of the judgment, as held in Karuppaswamy’s case (supra) thereafter reiterated in Pankajbhai Rameshbhai Zalavadiya’s case, the application of the instant kind has to be decided keeping in mind that the courts are meant to do substantial justice between the parties and that technical rules or procedures should not be given precedence over doing substantial justice. Justice according to the law does not merely mean technical justice, but means that law is to be administered to advance justice. 29. Apart from what has been observed above, it needs to be noticed and even clarified that in none of the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 including the one’s delivered by this Court the ratio of the judgment(s) in Karuppaswamy’s case or for that matter Pankajbhai Rameshbhai Zalavadiya’s case has been adverted to or even discussed. Apart from what has been observed above, it needs to be noticed and even clarified that in none of the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 including the one’s delivered by this Court the ratio of the judgment(s) in Karuppaswamy’s case or for that matter Pankajbhai Rameshbhai Zalavadiya’s case has been adverted to or even discussed. Majority of these judgments have been delivered prior to Pankajbhai Rameshbhai Zalavadiya’s case. 30. Adverting to the facts of the case, it has specifically been stated in the application for bringing on record the legal representatives of deceased respondent No.1 Laxmi Nand that the factum of the death of the respondent Laxmi Nand came to its notice only on 30.4.2021 when the application for release of the amount was filed on his behalf through his legal representative. 31. The respondent/non-applicant has not denied the aforesaid contention and the only plea raised is that the respondent had died in the year 2018 whereas the present application was filed only in the year 2021 after the main petition stood abated. 32. It also needs to be noticed that in the reply to the application under Section 5 being CMP(M) No. 850/2021 it has been averred that the delay in filing of the application being CMP (M) No. 827/2021 is deliberate and intentional, but the respondent/non-applicant could not substantiate such plea. 33. Tested on the anvil of the exposition of law, as referred to above, it needs to be noticed that the application for bringing on record the legal representatives of deceased respondent Laxmi Nand has been filed by the applicant- Union of India on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be reviewed) and some leeway should be made in its favour, especially in the matters relating to the death of the opposite party, that too, after the decision of the case. 34. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No.1, Laxmi Nand, as mentioned in para 2 of CMP(M) No. 827/2021 are ordered to be brought on record, after condoning the delay. 35. The applications are allowed in the aforesaid terms.