JUDGMENT : VINOD CHATTERJI KOUL, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the Order dated 7th March, 2022, passed by Principal District Judge, Pulwama (for short “Trial Court”) on an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and for setting aside the same. 2. I have heard learned counsel for parties and considered the matter. 3. Perusal of file reveals that a civil suit has been filed by appellant before the Trial Court, claiming therein that in the year 1997-98, he purchased the land situate at Village Lalpora, Tral, Pulwama, from its owners/defendants and paid them the full and final sale consideration amount. According to plaintiff, he continued to be in possession of land in question. It is stated by appellant/plaintiff that a sale deed was executed by defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant no. 4. He sought following reliefs: (i) By a decree declaration the sale deed dated 03.02.2012 registered by the Sub Registrar Tral on 05.03.2012, as also the power of attorney allegedly executed by the defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant no. 4 on 01.04.2010, registered by Sub-Registrar, 2nd Addl. Munsiff, Jammu, on 16.04.2010 may kindly be declared as null and void viz-a-viz the rights of the plaintiff in respect of lands measuring 05 kanals 8.1/2 marlas and 136 Sq. ft. under Survey Nos. 2326/767 (1 kanal 11 marlas), 2324/768 (3 kanals 2.1/2 marlas), 1823/671/769 (11½ m), 1826/761/769 min (3.1/2 m) situate in village Lalpora Tral. (ii) Further the defendant no. 1 may kindly be commanded to perform the obligation created under an agreement to sell executed by her along with other co-sharers namely Jankinath Bhat, Dwarkanath Bhat, Vedlal Bhat, Shadilal on 27.06.1998 in favour of the plaintiff with respect to the suit properties. (iii) By a further decree of permanent injunction the defendants may kindly be restrained from causing any interference into the peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the plaintiff and or evicting the plaintiff from the suit properties any illegal methods. 4. (iii) By a further decree of permanent injunction the defendants may kindly be restrained from causing any interference into the peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the plaintiff and or evicting the plaintiff from the suit properties any illegal methods. 4. Written statement was filed by defendants, raising therein the preliminary objections qua maintainability of the suit, including that necessary parties have not been made party to the suit, and the court lacks jurisdiction in view of provisions of J&K Migrant Immovable (Preservation, Protection and Restraint on Distress Sales) Act, 1997 (for short ‘Act of 1997’) and that suit property was in the custody of defendant no. 7 right from the date of enforcement of the Act of 1997 and that defendants 2 and 3 purchased the suit land through a duly executed sale deed by defendant no. 1 in their favour after obtaining the required permission from the government. 5. The Trial Court, in view of pleadings of the parties, in terms of order dated 23rd September 2017, framed following issues: (1) Whether defendant no. 1 along with other co-sharers, namely, Jankinath, Veilal and Shailal executed an agreement to sell dated 27.06.1998 in favour of plaintiff with respect to the suit property? (2) Whether the agreement to sell dated 17.06.1998 is binding on the defendant no. 1 with respect to her share in the suit property? (3) Whether sale deed dated 03.12.2012 registered by Sub-Registrar, Tral, on 05.03.2012 and power of attorney dated 01.04.2010 registered by Sub-Registrar, 2nd Additional Munsiff, Jammu, on 16.04.2020 executed by defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant no. 4 are liable to be declared null and void and inoperative upon the right of the plaintiff? (4) Whether plaintiff is entitled to decree of specific performance of contract as prayed for? (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree of declaration and permanent injunction as prayed for? (6) Whether the suit of the plaintiff is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? (7) Whether the suit of the plaintiff is hit by provision of Jammu and Kashmir Migrant Immovable (Preservation, Protection and Restraint on Distress Sales) Act, 1997, and civil Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter? (8) Relief. It is imperative to mention here, as is also gatherable from afore-quoted issues, that the issues had been framed by the Trial Court taking into account and consideration the pleadings of the parties. 6. (8) Relief. It is imperative to mention here, as is also gatherable from afore-quoted issues, that the issues had been framed by the Trial Court taking into account and consideration the pleadings of the parties. 6. Before the Trial Court, defendants 1 and 4/respondents filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC seeking rejection of plaint of plaintiff/appellant as they maintained that suit was hit by provisions of Section 8 of the Act of 1997 inasmuch as formal eviction order dated 15th May, 2018 was issued by District Magistrate, Pulwama, under section 5 of the Act of 1997 and that aforesaid order was upheld by Financial Commissioner (Revenue) J&K and confirmed by this Court. Appellant/plaintiff filed his objections to the application of defendants. Given rival contentions of both the parties, the Trial Court has, vide order impugned held that plaint of appellant/plaintiff is barred by law as being hit by Section 8 of the Act of 1997 and, after holding so, has dismissed the Suit in terms of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. Hence this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for appellant has stated that the Trial Court wrongly resorted to provisions of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC as the Trial Court had to read the plaint and averments projected therein and not to look at any averment made in written statement or subsequent applications filed by defendants 1 to 4, more particularly when those provisions are not attracted at all to the present case and to this extent he has cited a judgments passed in Saleem Bhai vs. State of Maharashtra, 2003 (1) SCC 557 , Mayor (H.K. Ltd.) vs. Owners and Parties Vessel M.V. Purchun and Others, AIR 2006 SC 1828 , Shri Krishna Singh vs. Mathoora, (1981) 4 SCC 421 , Gh. Rasool Parray vs. Suhail Wahid Malik, 2007 (3) JKJ 385 , to contend that Trial Court has landed in great error by relying upon the application filed by defendants 1 to 4 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 8. Rasool Parray vs. Suhail Wahid Malik, 2007 (3) JKJ 385 , to contend that Trial Court has landed in great error by relying upon the application filed by defendants 1 to 4 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 8. Further submission of learned counsel for appellant is that suit land was purchased by plaintiff from defendants 1 and 5 and agreement to sell was executed and plaintiff was put into the possession of suit land, but subsequently defendants 2 to 4 are stated to have purchased the suit land in terms of sale deed, which plaintiff challenged before the Trial Court, and that in the meantime, District Magistrate directed plaintiff to hand over possession to defendants 2 to 4. The order of District Magistrate, it is next averred, was challenged before this Court, but plaintiff was directed to approach Financial Commissioner (Revenue) in view of provisions of Act of 1997. It is also stated by learned counsel for appellant that Financial Commissioner dismissed the plea of appellant on the point of limitation, so plaintiff again approached this Court but petition was dismissed, which was challenged before the Division Bench, which also dismissed the petition, but the civil suit before the Trial Court was pending. According to learned counsel notwithstanding above fact-situation, the suit would have proceeded. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents/defendants has strenuously averred that suit land was under the custody of District Magistrate-defendant no. 7/respondent no. 7 in terms of provisions of Act of 1997 and therefore, defendants 2 and 3, who purchased the suit land after following and complying all the prerequisites conditioned in the Act of 1997, Rules and Regulations made thereunder, applied for delivery of suit land. He also asserts that suit of appellant/plaintiff was/is hit by Act of 1997, Rules and Regulations made thereunder and as a consequence of which, the Trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit in terms of order impugned. He has, inter-alia, relied upon Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyaanji Bhanusali (Gajra) (D) through LRs. and Others, 2020 SAR (Civ) 793 : 2020 (4) JKJ 101 (SC), Basharat Ahmad Soi vs. State of J&K, 2017 (3) JKJ 702 and Ab. Rahim Yatoo vs. Custodian General and Others, 2008 (2) JKJ 273 . 10. He has, inter-alia, relied upon Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyaanji Bhanusali (Gajra) (D) through LRs. and Others, 2020 SAR (Civ) 793 : 2020 (4) JKJ 101 (SC), Basharat Ahmad Soi vs. State of J&K, 2017 (3) JKJ 702 and Ab. Rahim Yatoo vs. Custodian General and Others, 2008 (2) JKJ 273 . 10. In the above backdrop and taking into consideration the rival contentions of the parties, it would be, at the first instance, apt to reproduce Order VII Rule 11 CPC hereunder: “11. Rejection of plaint. The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action. (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so. (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so. (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. (e) where it is not filed in duplicate. (f) where the plaintiff failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 9: Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature form correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.” A plaint can be dismissed if it does not disclose cause of action as is envisioned in Rule 11(a) of Order VII CPC. Likewise, a plaint can be rejected under Rule 11(d) if the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. 11. Contention of learned counsel for appellant is that the suit of plaintiff/appellant does not appear from the averments made in the plaint that the it is barred by any law. This contention of learned counsel for appellant is misconceived. 11. Contention of learned counsel for appellant is that the suit of plaintiff/appellant does not appear from the averments made in the plaint that the it is barred by any law. This contention of learned counsel for appellant is misconceived. Perusal of the suit filed by appellant/plaintiff the Trial Court, would unequivocally show that appellant admits and mentions that the suit property belongs to a person, who is a migrant. Subsequently, appellant claims to have executed a document, that according to him was Agreement to Sell. Such a document, in law, has no force or impetus in presence of a registered Sale Deed. The suit land was a migrant property. Mere assertion of plaintiff/appellant will not change the factual aspect of the matter that the property in question belongs to migrants. So, provisions of the Act of 1997, Rules and Regulations made thereunder, shall and are applicable in letter and spirit to land in question. The Trial Court in this regard has given reference to various provisions of the Act of 1997, including Sections 4, 5 and 6 thereof. 12. It would also be added here that land in question, as is gatherable from perusal of the file, is a migrant property as provided under the Act of 1997, and Rules and Regulations made thereunder and, therefore, has been rightly and correctly dealt with by the Trial Court under and in terms of the Act of 1997. 13. The Act of 1997, it is imperative to mention here, has been enacted aiming at providing for preservation, protection and restraint on distress sales of immovable property of migrants. Sub-Section (e) of Section 2 of the Act of 1997 says that “Migrant” means any person, who has migrated from Kashmir Valley or any other part of Jammu and Kashmir after 1st November, 1989 and is registered as such with the Relief Commissioner and includes a person who has not been so registered on the ground of his being in service of the Government in any moving office, or having left the Valley or any other part of the State, in pursuit of occupation or vocation or otherwise, and is possessed of immovable property at the place from where he has migrated but is unable to ordinarily reside there due to the disturbed conditions. 14. 14. Sub-Section (i) of Section 2 of the Act of 1997 says: “Unauthorized Occupant” means any person who has encroached upon or taken possession of any immovable property of a migrant without his written consent and authority of law.” 15. If a person, as is coming forth from bare reading of Section 2(i), encroaches upon a migrant property or takes possession thereof without written consent of a migrant, such a person is to be taken and treated as unauthorized occupant. 16. Section 4 of the Act of 1997 is worth to be gone through, which, for ready reference, is reproduced hereunder: “4. Custody of immovable property: (1) Within 30 days from the commencement of this Act, the District Magistrate shall take over the possession of immovable property, belonging to Migrants, falling within his territorial jurisdiction and shall, on the expiry of said period of 30 days, be deemed to have the custody of such immovable property. (2) The District Magistrate shall take all such steps as may be necessary for preservation and protection of such property: Provided that possession of such property shall not be handed over to one save with the express consent of the migrant in writing.” 17. Section 4, thus, envisages that District Magistrate shall take over possession of migrant property within 30 days from commencement of Act of 1997. It further goes to provide that even if possession of migrant property is not taken over by District Magistrate within 30 days from commencement of the Act of 1997, District Magistrate, after expiry of 30 days, shall be deemed to have custody of migrant property. District Magistrate is required to take all such steps as may be necessary for preservation and protection of migrant property. Even migrant property shall not be handed over to any person unless there is express. In that view of matter, if a person is in occupation of any migrant property without there being a written consent from migrant, such a person is to be treated as an unauthorized occupant and is to be removed therefrom and appellant/plaintiff is no exception thereto. These provisions are squarely applicable to case in hand. In that view of matter, if a person is in occupation of any migrant property without there being a written consent from migrant, such a person is to be treated as an unauthorized occupant and is to be removed therefrom and appellant/plaintiff is no exception thereto. These provisions are squarely applicable to case in hand. Qua Section 3 and 4 of the Act, a Division Bench of this Court in a judgment dated 17th August, 2021, passed in Letters Patent Appeal, bearing LPA No. 16/2021 titled Manzoor Ahmad Mir and Another vs. Union Territory of J&K and Others, 2021 (5) JKJ 315 has said that conjoint reading of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1997 would reveal that once District Magistrate becomes custodia legis of any property, belonging to migrant, no one is free to alienate the same without the previous permission of the Revenue and Relief Minister and that any alienation, if made, without such permission or in contravention of the Act, the same shall be null and void. Not only this, the Division Bench has also observed in Manzoor Ahmad Mir (supra) that it is not necessary that a person in possession of the immovable property of migrant ought to be in illegal or unauthorized possession as neither Section 3 nor Section 4 contemplates about the nature of the possession rather provides that District Magistrate shall take over possession of immovable property belonging to migrants meaning thereby that immovable properties belonging to migrants shall be deemed to be in possession of District Magistrate irrespective of the nature of possession of any person other than the migrant himself. 18. Again, if a person, unauthorizedly occupying migrant property, fails or refuses to surrender its possession, force is to be used by competent authority as is so envisaged in Section 5 of the Act of 1997. For implementation of the Act of 1997, competent authority, as is mentioned in Section 6, can take such steps and force, which in its opinion is necessary. If there is a written complaint by a migrant, competent authority can take or cause to be taken such steps and use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary for eviction from or delivery of possession of migrant property. If there is a written complaint by a migrant, competent authority can take or cause to be taken such steps and use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary for eviction from or delivery of possession of migrant property. Not only this, if there is written complaint made by migrant, it shall be lawful for competent authority to enter upon migrant property and make survey including measurement and do any other act which may be necessary for carrying out the purposes of the Act of 1997. 19. The provision of the Act of 1997 is self-contained Code and it provides how to conduct the proceedings and remedy to the person. In terms of Section 7 of the Act, an aggrieved person can question the order passed under the Act of 1997 by filing an appeal. 20. Rule 5 of J&K Migrant Rules stipulates grant of permission for alienation of migrant property. It would be apt to reproduce Rule 5 hereunder: “Grant of permission to the alienation of the property The Prescribed Authority, after taking into consideration all the facts mentioned in the application and reports made in this behalf as also after making such enquiry as it considers necessary, may grant permission in Form-3 subject to the following conditions, namely: (a) that the alienation shall be in favour of permanent resident of the State. (b) that the property which matter of alienation is owned by intending aliener free from all encumbrances. (c) the prevalent market rate in respect of the property to be alienated will be determined by a revenue officer not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner in consultation with Executive Engineer of the Public Works Department having jurisdiction in the area. (d) the possession of the property shall be handed over to the alienees after it is released by the District Magistrate concerned. Thus, Rule 5, quoted above, envisions that prescribed authority, after taking into account all the facts indicated in the application and reports made in this regard as also after making such enquiry as it considers necessary, may grant permission and one of the conditions as spelt out in clause (d) are that possession of the property shall be handed over to the alienees after it is released by District Magistrate concerned. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Basharat Ahmad Sofi (supra) has held that till the alienee receives possession of property, it is deemed to continue in the custody and possession of District Magistrate and it is duty of District Magistrate to ensure that property is handed over to the alienee of the migrant after permission is granted and the same is released by District Magistrate concerned. In such circumstances, the instant appeal is devoid of any merit. Taking into account above discourse, judgments cited by learned counsel for appellant do not render any aid and assistance to the case of appellant. 21. In the above backdrop, when order impugned is looked into from all angles, it does not warrant or call for any interference inasmuch as it has been passed comprehensively and in a lucid manner, touching all facets of the matter as were required to be undertaken and squared off. The Trial Court has rightly held that plaint of appellant/plaintiff is barred by provisions of Section 8 of the Act of 1997 and as a consequence of which dismissed the plaint in terms of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. 22. In view of above, the instant appeal is without any merit and is accordingly dismissed. Interim direction, if any, shall stand vacated. 23. Copy be sent down along with the Trial Court record.