JUDGMENT 1. Heard Mr. A Bhowmik, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as Mr. D Bhattacharjee, learned GA assisted by Mr. S Saha, learned counsel, Mr. P Saha, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, District & Sessions Judge, West Tripura Judicial District [WP(C) 303 of 2021] and Ms P Dhar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2. Despite due notice from this court, none appears for the respondents No. 3, 4 & 5. 2. All the writ petitioners appeared in the selection test (comprised of written test and viva voce) in response to the recruitment advertisement under No. F.R.CELL/DJ/W/2015/ (Main)/4314 dated 24.4.2015 issued by the District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala and after the written test, all the writ petitioners were called upon to appear in the viva voce test. There is no dispute that all the writ petitioners were zero out of twenty five marks allotted for the interview (viva voce). The writ petitioners have asserted that they would have been successful if their performance in the interview were properly assessed by the interview board. 3. It has been asserted by Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that awarding zero is not only illogical but is also absurd. Even though the petitioners appeared and participated in the interview but they were not interviewed and assessed. 4. However, this contention has been quite squarely disputed by the respondents. Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel has categorically contended that the similar dispute has been appreciated and decided by this court firstly in Jakir Miah v. District and Sessions Judge, West Tripura Judicial District & Ors (Judgment dated 11.02.2020 delivered in WP(C)894/2018) along with another writ petition. 5. In the said judgment, this court had occasion to observe that how marks were distributed is not available from the records of the interview. It is not denied that the petitioners have participated in the said proceeding. It is, however, accepted that some marks were allotted on the basis of the qualification. If that is so, it is really absurd how the petitioners can secure zero in the interview. Even the respondents No. 3, 4 & 5 have not stated the method they had followed in the interview. It is really strange that no method has been recorded anywhere in the records, even not in the sheet where they had given marks. If that is so, it is really absurd how the petitioners can secure zero in the interview. Even the respondents No. 3, 4 & 5 have not stated the method they had followed in the interview. It is really strange that no method has been recorded anywhere in the records, even not in the sheet where they had given marks. From one of the sheets, it appears that there were two aspects against which the marks were allotted and from another sheet, used by one of the interviewers, it surfaces that there were three aspects. It appears that the interviewers have given marks without following any uniform procedure. 6. Having returned this observation, the respondent No.1 was directed to take a fresh interview of the petitioners and after appreciating their performance in the interview board, if they may come within the merit zone they should be appointed, but they will not get any retrospective appointment. Following Jakir Miah (supra), this court has passed several other decisions with similar directions. 7. In Subangkari Podder v. District and Sessions Judge, West Tripura Judicial District & Ors. (Judgment dated 24.07.2020 delivered in WP(C) 196/2020) along with another writ petition, this court having endorsed the view in Jakir Miah (supra) has directed the respondent No.1 as follows: (i) The respondents shall constitute a fresh interview committee which would comprise of the same level (but not necessarily the same judicial officers) of officers as in the original interview committee and take a fresh interview of both the petitioners. (ii) This shall be done within a period of four months from today. (iii) On the basis of the marks that may be allotted pursuant to such fresh interviews and the marks scored by the petitioners in the written examination, if they deserve selection against Un-reserved quota of candidates, they shall be appointed to the said post. (iv) Such appointments shall be prospective and shall carry no benefits of the past period. (v) Entire exercise shall be completed within a period of four months from today. 8. The similar observation has been returned in Sri Sudip Nath Bhowmik v. The District & Sessions Judge & Ors. (see order dated 13.1.2021 delivered in WP©662/2020) along with some other writ petitions. 9. Mr. (v) Entire exercise shall be completed within a period of four months from today. 8. The similar observation has been returned in Sri Sudip Nath Bhowmik v. The District & Sessions Judge & Ors. (see order dated 13.1.2021 delivered in WP©662/2020) along with some other writ petitions. 9. Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel has further submitted that the official respondents have raised the issue of delay and laches in the reply filed in all the writ petitions. The writ petitions have been filed in the year 2021 and the result of the selection test was known to the petitioners in the year 2018. Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel has submitted that there is no set rules by prescribing limitation for filing the writ petition. 10. In the present case, primarily, Mr. Bhowmik has submitted that the petitioners were intercepted by the pandemic and they were delayed for about one and half years. That apart, when there is a general observation about the interview process, the petitioners are also entitled to get the justice and their demand for justice cannot be defeated by raising the objection for filing of the writ petition in a belated stage. 11. In support of his contention, Mr. Bhowmik has pressed the decision of the apex court in Shiv Dass v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2007) 9 SCC 274 where the apex court has inter alia observed having relied on a prevision decision of that court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal reported in (1986) 4 SCC 566 that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 12. It has been further observed in Shiv Dass (supra) that in a number of cases the apex court has observed that the representation would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay. In K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore, reported in AIR 1967 SC 993 it has been laid down by the apex court that filing the representation cannot be used as a mechanism for explanation of delay. In K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore, reported in AIR 1967 SC 993 it has been laid down by the apex court that filing the representation cannot be used as a mechanism for explanation of delay. This court could not pursue itself how those decisions are relevant for the petitioners in explaining the delay. 13. However, Mr. Bhowmik has pressed another decision of the apex court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. Maharastra Industrial Development Corporation & Ors., reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353 , where the apex court has enunciated the position of law as regards the limitation so far the writ petitions are concerned: 14. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have in fact emerged by delay on the part of the petitioners. (Vide Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports [ (1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769 ], Collector (LA) v. Katiji [ (1987) 2 SCC 107 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 172 : AIR 1987 SC 1353 ], Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur [ (1992) 2 SCC 598 : AIR 1993 SC 802 ], Dayal Singh v. Union of India [ (2003) 2 SCC 593 : AIR 2003 SC 1140 ] and Shankara Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar [ (2011) 5 SCC 607 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 56 : AIR 2011 SC 2161 ].) 14. The crux of the above decision is that the High Court may exercise its discretion but discretion must be exercised judicially and reasonably. Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar [ (2011) 5 SCC 607 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 56 : AIR 2011 SC 2161 ].) 14. The crux of the above decision is that the High Court may exercise its discretion but discretion must be exercised judicially and reasonably. It has been also observed that illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. 15. Mr. D Bhattacharjee, learned GA and Mr. P Saha, learned counsel appearing for the District & Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in different cases have endorsed the objection raised by the respondent No.2 in respect of delay and laches. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned GA was categorical to state that a fresh process for appointment against the vacancies in the post of peon/orderly/Guard etc. borne in the Group-D category had commenced from 05.04.2021 in pursuance to the advertisement under No. F.2(17)(b)- DJ/N/DMN/2021/2035 (Annexure-H to the reply filed by the respondent No.1). 16. Mr. Bhattachajree, learned GA has submitted that the challenge in the writ petition has become stale and the petitioners cannot be put in an advantageous position over the persons who would be participating in terms of the advertisement dated 05.04.2021. Hence, not only on the ground of delay and laches but also on the ground of the disadvantage and dislocation that would be created if the writ petitions are entertained and the direction is given by this court for holding fresh interview. 17. Ms P Dhar, learned counsel appearing for the High Court-respondents has submitted that the petitioners were indolent inasmuch as the cause that they are canvassing in these writ petitions arose in the year 2018. They were comfortably with the outcome of the selection test till 2020 when this court had decided for the first time that the process is not satisfactory. Even, thereafter, they have taken a year more to approach this court. Such indolence should not be waived by this court. Ms Dhar, learned counsel has submitted that the unending process may not be approved by this court as that will allow cavil and contribute to multiplication of vexing litigations. 18. In support thereof, Ms Dhar has relied on a decision of the apex court in Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Ram Gopal reported in 2020 SCC online SC 101. 18. In support thereof, Ms Dhar has relied on a decision of the apex court in Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Ram Gopal reported in 2020 SCC online SC 101. The apex court in Ram Gopal (supra) has observed that the prolonged delay of many years ought not have been overlooked or condoned. It has been observed that even a civil suit challenging termination of services, if filed by the Respondent, [the writ petitioners] would have undoubtedly been barred by limitation in 1990. 19. In a similar situation, where the appellant belatedly challenged the promotion of his junior(s), the apex court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1975) 1 SCC 152 , held as follows: '2. ... if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have approached the Court even in the year 1957, after the two representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. ... In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957, cannot be reproduced now. ...It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters......' 20. Ms Dhar, learned counsel has also made a specific reference to Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India reported in (2012) 7 SCC 610 where the apex court, while considering the claim of the candidates, despite being higher in merit, exercised their right to parity, much after those who though lower in merit, but for belatedly exercising their right, the apex court observed as follows: '27. ...it becomes an obligation to take into consideration the balance of justice or injustice in entertaining the petition or declining it on the ground of delay and laches. It is a matter of great significance that at one point of time equity that existed in favour of one melts into total insignificance and paves the path of extinction with the passage of time.' 21. But in the same judgment i.e. Ram Gopal (Supra), the apex court having relied upon State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 has observed that the normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so, would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 22. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by the apex court, from time to time, postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. However, the litmus test in extending similar benefits would be that the judgment is in rem. 23. In Aravind Kumar Srivastava (supra), it has been emphatically observed by the apex court how to determine that the judgment is in rem or not is to follow whether the judgment is with intention to give relief to all similarly situated persons, irrespective of whether they have approached the court or not. Having such pronouncement on the board, the obligation is cast upon the authorities itself to extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularization, etc. 24. Having such pronouncement on the board, the obligation is cast upon the authorities itself to extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularization, etc. 24. On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence. The law as regards the delay is well enunciated in those decisions. 25. Having appreciated the rival contentions as raised by the learned counsel, this court is of the view that the observation of this court in Jakir Miah (supra) particularly in para 7 is in rem inasmuch as, it is observing on the process to be followed in viva voce. But true it is that the petitioners failed to discharge their obligation in explaining the delay but the issue of the pandemic and demands of justice, if balanced together, the delay and laches, as is manifest on the face of the records, can be waived. Accordingly, it is ordered. The preliminary objection, as raised, stands rejected. 26. As the petitioners are situated in the same background, they are also entitled to the reliefs as provided in a series of decision passed by this court starting from Jakir Miah (supra) to Sudip Nath Bhowmik (supra). Accordingly, it is ordered. The preliminary objection, as raised, stands rejected. 26. As the petitioners are situated in the same background, they are also entitled to the reliefs as provided in a series of decision passed by this court starting from Jakir Miah (supra) to Sudip Nath Bhowmik (supra). As such, all the writ petitions are disposed of with the following reliefs: (i) The respondents shall constitute a fresh interview committee which would comprise of the same level (but not necessarily the same judicial officers) of officers as in the original interview committee and take a fresh interview of the petitioners; (ii) This shall be done within a period of four months from today; (iii) On the basis of the marks that may be allotted pursuant to such fresh interviews and the marks scored by the petitioners in the written examination, if they deserve selection, they shall be appointed to the said post on the existing or next available vacancies; (iv) Such appointments shall be prospective and shall carry no benefits of the past period; (v) Entire exercise shall be completed within a period of four months from today. 27. Before parting with the records, this court would observe that in view of the decision in Ram Gopal (Supra) as from the date of the publication of the result of the selection test three years have elapsed no further action by any person who appeared in the interview shall not ordinarily be entertained. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.