JUDGMENT : 1. This Appeal is filed by the appellant under Section 378(1)(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 against the judgment and order dated 15.06.2006 passed by the learned Special Judge, Dahod in Special Atrocity Case No.4 of 2006 whereby the learned Special Judge has acquitted the respondents – original accused from the charges levelled against them for the offences under Sections 452, 427, 504, 506(2) and 114 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘the IPC’) and under sections 3(1)(10) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 (the Atrocity Act’). 2. The prosecution case, in nutshell, is that on 13.12.2004, when complainant Narsinhbhai Manabhai Bhabhor was at his workplace, the respondent No.1, who resided on the first floor of the work place, threw garbage and dirty water from above, from which dirty water was fall on complainant. Therefore, complainant has scolded Shirinben. After that, respondent No.1 – Shirinben and her son respondent No.2 – Mustufa abused the complainant in filthy language relating to his caste and insulted the complainant in public. 2.1. It is further the case of the prosecution that after abusing the complainant, respondent No.3 – Mustafa has caught hold of shirt of the complainant and torn off the shirt and respondent No.3 - Mahejbin has pushed away the complainant and administered a threat to cause fracture to his legs. Because of such incident, complainant filed a complaint before the Dahod Town Police Station, which was registered as C.R. No. I – 197 of 2004 for the offences punishable under Sections 452, 427, 504, 506(2) and 114 of Indian Penal Code and under sections 3(1)(10) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989. 2.3. Pursuant to the FIR, investigation started and chargesheet has been filed. As the case was triable by the Special Court, the case was committed to the Special Court, Dahod and the same was numbered as Special Case No.4 of 2006. 2.4. The Special Court, after appreciating the evidence on record, acquitted the respondents herein – original accused. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgement and order of acquittal, present appeal has been filed by the appellant – State. 3. Heard learned APP Mr. R. C. Kodekar for the appellant – State being prosecuting agency and learned advocate Mr.M. A. Kharadi for the respondents – original accused. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgement and order of acquittal, present appeal has been filed by the appellant – State. 3. Heard learned APP Mr. R. C. Kodekar for the appellant – State being prosecuting agency and learned advocate Mr.M. A. Kharadi for the respondents – original accused. Perused the evidence on record so also the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 3.1 Learned APP Mr.R.C. Kodekar for the appellant State has vehemently argued that the Special Court has not properly appreciated oral as well as documentary evidence on record of the case and thereby, committed an error in acquitting the respondents – accused. 3.2 It is also argued by Mr.Kodekar that the prosecution has proved that the respondent has intentionally insulted the complainant against his caste to humiliate him in public and torn off his shirt, and also threatened him to cause fracture to his legs. 3.3 It is further argued that so far as the evidence of complainant is concerned, he has fully supported the complaint at Exh.10. As such the trial court committed an error in holding that evidence of the complainant is not corroborating with the complaint at Exh.10. 3.4 It is further argued that the trial court has erred in not believing the evidence of the prosecution witness Saifuddin Yusufali Kaydwavala, which is at Exh.16, wherein such witness has stated that on the date of incident, he was out for some personal work. However, on his arrival, he saw that all the three accused persons had entered in the shop and giving filthy abuses to the complainant and on inquiry from the complainant, the complainant narrated him the whole incident. Thus, as per the evidence of this prosecution witness, he has fully supported the case of the prosecution and version of the complainant. However, the trial Court has hold that this witness was not present at the time of incident and therefore, his evidence is hearsay evidence and as such, no reliance can be placed on such witness. 3.5 It is further submitted that the trial Court has also erred in holding that though incident has taken place at about 5:30 hrs on 13.12.2004, complaint was lodged on 14.12.2004 at about 12:30 hrs. i.e. after a delay of 19 hours and therefore, complaint is filed, at belated stage. Making above submissions, it is requested to allow the present appeal. 4. i.e. after a delay of 19 hours and therefore, complaint is filed, at belated stage. Making above submissions, it is requested to allow the present appeal. 4. All the accused – respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein are represented by learned advocate Mr. M. A. Kharadi. 4.1 Learned Advocate Mr. M. A. Kharadi for the respondents has vehemently submitted that there is hardly any substance in the submissions of learned APP. He has submitted that complaint was lodged after delay of 19 hours. Though complainant could have immediately went to the police station to lodge a complaint, he has waited for 19 hours and there is no explanation for lodging a complaint at such belated stage. 4.2 Learned advocate Mr. Kharadi has further submitted that, though it is the case of the prosecution that there is an independent witness namely - Saifuddin Yusufali Kaydwavala, his version cannot be believed because he was not present at the time of incident and he is only heresay witness. It is also submitted that this witness - Saifuddin Yusufali Kaydwavala is tenant in property of accused persons and there is animosity between them, which is also admitted by this Saifuddin Yusufali Kaydwavala and therefore, his version cannot be believed. 4.3 Learned advocate Mr. Kharadi has also submitted that, in fact, because of animosity between prosecution witness - Saifuddin Yusufali Kaydwavala and accused persons, complaint was lodged by the complainant, since complainant was working in the shop of prosecution witness and at his instance only complaint was filed to harass the accused. Making above submissions, he has requested to dismiss the present appeal. 5. On perusal of the record, it appears that incident was happened in public place, on the main road and other shops are also there adjoining to the shop where complainant was serving, although there is no other independent witness except Saifuddin Yusufali Kaydwavala. Moreover, evidence of such witness cannot be considered, since he was not present at the time of alleged incident. It is also admitted fact that there was animosity between this prosecution witness and the accused. Therefore, probabilities are there that such prosecution witness - Saifuddin Yusufali Kaydwavala with the help of the complainant, who was working in his shop, wrongly involved the accused in the offence, so as to harass them. As such, the evidence of the complainant appears to be unnatural, inconsistent and not trustworthy. Therefore, probabilities are there that such prosecution witness - Saifuddin Yusufali Kaydwavala with the help of the complainant, who was working in his shop, wrongly involved the accused in the offence, so as to harass them. As such, the evidence of the complainant appears to be unnatural, inconsistent and not trustworthy. 5.1 As per the case of the complainant, all the accused had abused him and threatened him and used filthy language and insulted him in public, however, no other independent witness has been examined by the prosecution in support of the case of the complainant. 5.3 Thus, there is only oral evidence of the complainant himself, which also suffers from infirmities, as stated hereinabove. No other evidence has been brought on record to bring home the case of the prosecution. Considering the overall evidence on record, the possibility of false implication of the respondents – original accused cannot be ruled out. 5.4 After appreciating the entire evidence on record, the Special Court has acquitted the accused from all the charges leveled against them by giving benefit of doubt. 6. It may be noted that as per the settled legal position, when two views are possible, the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless for the special reasons. A beneficial reference of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan versus Ram Niwas reported in (2010) 15 SCC 463 be made in this regard. In the said case, it has been observed as under:- “6. This Court has held in Kalyan v. State of U.P., (2001) 9 SCC 632 : “8. The settled position of law on the powers to be exercised by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal is that though the High Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is passed, it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused persons, as envisaged under the criminal jurisprudence prevalent in our country is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court. Normally the views of the trial court, as to the credibility of the witnesses, must be given proper weight and consideration because the trial court is supposed to have watched the demeanour and conduct of the witness and is in a better position to appreciate their testimony. The High Court should be slow in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by the trial court. In Kali Ram V. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808 , this Court observed that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The Court further observed: "27. It is no doubt true that wrongful acquittals are undesirable and shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system, much worse, however, is the wrongful conviction of an innocent person. The consequences of the conviction of an innocent person are far more serious and its reverberations cannot but be felt in a civilised society. Suppose an innocent person is convicted of the offence of murder and is hanged, nothing further can undo the mischief for the wrong resulting from the unmerited conviction is irretrievable. To take another instance, if an innocent person is sent to jail and undergoes the sentence, the scars left by the miscarriage of justice cannot be erased by any subsequent act of expiration. Not many persons undergoing the pangs of wrongful conviction are fortunate like Dreyfus to have an Emile Zola to champion their cause and succeed in getting the verdict of guilt annulled. All this highlights the importance of ensuring, as far as possible, that there should be no wrongful conviction of an innocent person. Not many persons undergoing the pangs of wrongful conviction are fortunate like Dreyfus to have an Emile Zola to champion their cause and succeed in getting the verdict of guilt annulled. All this highlights the importance of ensuring, as far as possible, that there should be no wrongful conviction of an innocent person. Some risk of the conviction of the innocent, of course, is always there in any system of the administration of criminal justice Such a risk can be minimised but not ruled out altogether It may in this connection be apposite to refer to the following observations of Sir Carleton Alien quoted on page 157 of "The Proof of Guilt" by Glanville Williams, second edition: "I dare say some sentimentalists would assent to the proposition that it is better that a thousand, or even a million, guilty persons should escape than that one innocent person should suffer; but no responsible and practical person would accept such a view. For it is obvious that if our ratio is extended indefinitely, there comes a point when the whole system of justice has broken down and society is in a state of chaos." 28. The fact that there has to be clear evidence of the guilt of the accused and that in the absence of that it is not possible to record a finding of his guilt was stressed by this Court in the case of Shivaji Sahebrao, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , as is clear from the following observations: "Certainly it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely, may be guilty before a court, can be convicted and the mental distinction between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure considerations." “9. The High Court while dealing with the appeals against the order of acquittal must keep in mind the following propositions laid down by this Court, namely, (i) the slowness of the appellate court to disturb a finding of fact; (ii) the noninterference with the order of acquittal where it is indeed only a case of taking a view different from the one taken by the High Court." 6.1. In Arulvelu and another versus State reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206, the Supreme Court after discussing the earlier judgments, observed in para No. 36 as under: “36. In Arulvelu and another versus State reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206, the Supreme Court after discussing the earlier judgments, observed in para No. 36 as under: “36. Careful scrutiny of all these judgments lead to the definite conclusion that the appellate court should be very slow in setting aside a judgment of acquittal particularly in a case where two views are possible. The trial court judgment can not be set aside because the appellate court's view is more probable. The appellate court would not be justified in setting aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding on marshaling the entire evidence on record that the judgment of the trial court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in law.” 7. In that view of the matter, the judgment and order dated 15.06.2006 passed by the learned Special Judge, Dahod in Special Atrocity Case No.4 of 2006 is hereby confirmed. The Criminal Appeal being devoid of merits, is dismissed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. Record and Proceedings, if called for returned back to the trial Court forthwith.