Jarnail Singh, S/o Sh. Banarsi Dass v. State Of Himachal Pradesh
2022-07-21
CHANDER BHUSAN BAROWALIA, TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : Brief facts leading to the instant case are that online bids were invited for “SRMO roads and drains in HPSIDC Industrial area, Baddi and Extension area Baddi, District Solan, (SH- recarpeting of roads, construction of RCC culverts and repair of drains)”. The online bids were to be submitted from 8.4.2022 to 18.4.2022 and thereafter the technical bid was to be opened on 19.4.2022. 2. The technical bid was opened on 19.4.2022 and 4 bids were received, which included bid(s) of the petitioner as well as respondents No. 4 and 5. The technical evaluation committee of the respondent-HPSIDC thereafter scrutinized the documents and found that two bidders i.e. respondents No. 4 and 5 were ineligible because the registration of respondent No.4 had expired, whereas it was established that respondent No.5 had not executed similar type of work of minimum amount not less than 40% of estimated cost in last five years. 3. However, on 20.5.2022 the respondent No.4 submitted a certificate issued by the Superintending Engineer, D-III, HPPWD, Shimla before the competent authority of the HPSIDC and claimed that he was entitled to submit the tender as his enlistment documents were in order and would be renewed after enlistment committee’s meeting. In order to avoid any adverse situation and litigation, it is claimed that the HPSIDC sought clarification from Engineer- in-Chief, HPPWD on 21.5.2022. 4. On learning about the developments, on 23.5.2022 the petitioner submitted a letter to the Superintending Engineer of the HPSIDC stating therein that as per clause 11 of part 2 of HPSIDC bid document, the contractor enlistment was required to be seen on the date of opening of the bid and since respondent No.4 had no licence at the time of bid, therefore, he was ineligible to participate in the tender. 5. Immediately on the next date, HPSIDC received the clarification from Engineer-in-Chief, HPPWD and in terms thereof, respondent No.4 was stated to be eligible to participate in the tender and his bid was required to be technically evaluated as his application for renewal was in order, therefore, his enlistment was to be considered to be renewed again w.e.f. 1.4.2022 to 31.3.2027. 6.
6. It is after clarification received from the HPPWD, that the tender evaluation committee took a decision to avoid any controversy and litigation; and cancelled and recalled the tender constraining the petitioner to file the instant petition for grant of the following substantive reliefs: i. that the writ of certiorari may be issued against the respondents by directing them to quash the impugned cancellation order dated 26.5.2022 as Annexure P-5. ii. that the writ of mandamus be issued against the respondents by directing them to conclude the tender process by strictly following the rules and guidelines. iii. that the writ of mandamus be issued against the respondents by directing them to open the financial bid as already stated in their technical evaluation summary. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material placed on record. 8. It is not in dispute that the tender of the petitioner was not only in order, but the petitioner had duly qualified after the technical evaluation for being awarded the same. It is further not in dispute that as on the date of the submission of the technical bid, registration of respondent No.4 had already expired and the same could have been renewed only as per the procedure and could not have been deemed to be renewed on the basis of the letter issued by the HPPWD, that too, solely on the basis that the application for renewal, as submitted, was in order, more particularly, when the tender had been invited by respondent-HPSIDC and not by the HPPWD. That apart, in case the respondent-HPSIDC intended to consider the bid of those candidates, whose registration had lapsed and was pending renewal, then a specific clause to this effect ought to be there in the advertisement itself. Here, the respondent-HPSIDC otherwise had no such intent or else it would have not sought the clarification from the Engineer-in-Chief, HPPWD. 9. Thus, tested on the anvil of the legitimate expectation, as observed above, the petitioner was not only eligible, but was found to be the sole bidder, who had qualified for the award of tender and therefore, not only, in all probabilities, but as a matter of right, the petitioner was entitled to the award of the tender.
9. Thus, tested on the anvil of the legitimate expectation, as observed above, the petitioner was not only eligible, but was found to be the sole bidder, who had qualified for the award of tender and therefore, not only, in all probabilities, but as a matter of right, the petitioner was entitled to the award of the tender. There was no occasion for the HPSIDC to have sought clarification from the HPPWD regarding eligibility of respondent No.4, whose licence, admittedly on the date of opening of the bid, had expired. 10. Additionally, merely because the Engineer-in- Chief, HPPWD found the application for renewal of the respondent No.4 in order would not make respondent No.4 per se eligible, especially when his licence had still not been renewed even on the date of opening of bid as required under clause 11 of the bid document relating to Technical Qualification Criteria (TQC), which reads as under:- “11. Contractor Enlistment:- Eligible bidder shall mean a Registered Govt. Contractor of HPPWD/CPWD/I&PH, HIMUDA and other Govt. Agency/organization in appropriate class and discipline, with valid contractor enlistment on the date of opening of bid. Proof to be uploaded as PDF”. 11. It is more than settled that if a public authority so conducts itself as to create a legitimate expectation that a certain course will be followed, it would often be unfair if the authority was permitted to follow a different course to the detriment of one who entertained the expectation, particularly if he acted on it. … The doctrine of legitimate expectation is rooted in fairness. This was so observed by Lord Justice of Appeal, Thomas Bingham, in R. V. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte M.F.K. Underwriting Agents Ltd. 1990 1 WLR 1545. 12. Another facet of denial of legitimate expectations was underscored by Court of Appeal of England and Wales in the seminal case of R v. North and East Devon Health Authority Ex p. Coughlan, (2001) QB 213, where the Court preferred to use abuse of power as one of the criteria for testing whether a public body could resile from a prima facie legitimate expectation. In the Court’s opinion, if the government authority induced an expectation, which was substantive, the upsetting of that expectation, through departure from the expected course of action in the absence of compelling public interest, would be so unfair, that it would amount to abuse of power.
In the Court’s opinion, if the government authority induced an expectation, which was substantive, the upsetting of that expectation, through departure from the expected course of action in the absence of compelling public interest, would be so unfair, that it would amount to abuse of power. That is precisely discernible in the decision of the respondents in the instant case. 13. Both the aforesaid decision have been cited with approval by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a very recent case, State of Bihar vs. Shyama Nandan Mishra, 2022 (7) SCALE 432. 14. Thus, what can be deduced from the aforesaid exposition of law is that where the substantive legitimate expectation is not ultra vires of the power of the authority and the court is in a position to protect it, the State cannot be allowed to change course and belie the legitimate expectation of the petitioner. Certainty and Fairness are necessary concomitants of Government’s action and the official- respondents, in our opinion, have failed to keep their commitment by the impugned decision, which is required to be interdicted by this court. 15. Before parting, it needs to be clarified that the mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen may not, by itself, be a distinct enforceable right, however failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary. The requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non- arbitrariness, which is a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise be the legitimate expectation of the claimant. It is the bona fide decision of the public authority reached in a manner, which should satisfy the requirement of non- arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. 16. The principle of fairness has an important place in the law of judicial review and unfairness in the purported exercise of a power can be such that it is an abuse or excess of power. The court should interfere where discretionary power is not exercised reasonably and in good faith.
16. The principle of fairness has an important place in the law of judicial review and unfairness in the purported exercise of a power can be such that it is an abuse or excess of power. The court should interfere where discretionary power is not exercised reasonably and in good faith. (Refer: X. vs. Registrar General, High Court of Madhya Pradesh & anr., 2022(3) SCALE 99 ) 17. In view of the aforesaid discussions and for the reasons stated hereinabove, the instant petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 26.5.2022, (Annexure P-5), whereby the tender in question has been ordered to be withdrawn/cancelled for technical reasons, is quashed and set aside. 18. Consequently, the official respondents are directed to award the tender in question to the petitioner. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. The parties are left to bear their own costs.