ORDER : 1. This acquittal appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State against the impugned judgment dated 30.06.2005 passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge & Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Raipur (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case No. 17/2002 whereby the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondent of the charges under Sections 7 & 13 (1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 2. Brief facts of the case are that at the time of incident i.e. on 19.12.2001, respondent was posted as Patwari, Patwari Halka No. 2/47 in Village- Rawa, Tehsil & District- Dhamtari (C.G.). Being a public servant, he demanded a sum of Rs.5000/- from the complainant for mutation of his land, thereafter, complainant filed complaint against the respondent before Lokayukta, Raipur, C.G. On the basis of said complaint, Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, Raipur constituted a trap team and after preliminary proceeding, trap team went with the complainant. Complainant gave a sum of Rs.5000/- to respondent and trap team caught him red-handed. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the respondent and charges were framed as mentioned above. 3. So as to hold the accused/respondent guilty, the prosecution has examined as many as 9 witnesses and statement of the accused/respondent was also recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which he denied the charges levelled against him and pleaded his innocence and false implication in the case. Respondent/accused has also examined 5 witnesses in his defence and filed D1-D3 documents. 4. After appreciating oral and documentary evidence, trial court has acquitted the respondent of the charges under Sections 7 & 13 (1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Hence, this appeal filed by the appellant/State. 5. Shri Ali Asgar, Deputy Advocate General would submit that the learned trial Court has erred in not assessing the prosecution story. In this case, respondent/accused was caught red-handed but the learned trial Court did not appreciate this fact and passed erroneous judgment. Learned trial Court has erred in disbelieving the punch witnesses who were responsible officers and narrated according to the prosecution allegations of demand of illegal gratification. Punch witnesses are independent witnesses who have got no interest of prosecution of defence and they were not biased against the complainant or the accused/respondent but the learned trial Court did not believe the prosecution witnesses. Punch witnesses are independent witnesses who have got no interest of prosecution of defence and they were not biased against the complainant or the accused/respondent but the learned trial Court did not believe the prosecution witnesses. The defence witnesses are interested witnesses and there were material omissions and contradictions in their statements but the learned trial Court believing in such defence witnesses acquitted the respondent. Learned trial Court on minor omissions and contradictions has passed the judgment of acquittal which are against the law as well as the facts of the case, therefore, judgment passed by the learned trial Court is liable to be set aside. 6. Mr. Harshwardhan Parghania, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned judgment and submits that the learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondent of the aforesaid charges, as there is no evidence available on record which can prove the guilt of the accused/respondent. In corruption cases, prosecution is duty bound to prove demand of accused beyond all reasonable doubt, but in this case, prosecution has utterly failed to prove its case, therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. In support of his argument, he has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of V. Sejappa v. State by Police Inspector Lokayukta, Chitradurga passed in (2016) 12 SCC 150 , B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. passed in (2014) 13 SCC 55 & N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu passed in (2021) 3 SCC 687 : 2021 SCC Online SC 53. 7. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. Before the learned trial Court, it is not disputed that at the time of incident, respondent was posted as Patwari. Respondent- Chandra Kumar Sinha has admitted this fact in question No.1 of his statement that he was posted as patwari at Village- Rawa, District- Dhamtari, C.G. He has also admitted in question No.5 of his statement that complainant- Jagrit Ram Sahu took copy of Rin-pustika from him. Except the statement recorded in questions No.1 & 5, he denied all the allegations levelled against him. Learned trial Court found in para 52 of the judgment that the tainted notes were not recovered from the possession of the respondent and as per memo ex. P/13, note was recovered near the stairs of house No. B11, Panchvati Colony. 9. Except the statement recorded in questions No.1 & 5, he denied all the allegations levelled against him. Learned trial Court found in para 52 of the judgment that the tainted notes were not recovered from the possession of the respondent and as per memo ex. P/13, note was recovered near the stairs of house No. B11, Panchvati Colony. 9. Complainant- Jagrit Ram Sahu (P.W.-1) has stated in para 10 of his statement that note was not recovered from the possession of the accused as it was recovered near the stairs. In this case, except Jagrit Ram Sahu (P.W.-1), there is no other witness of the demand and as per prosecution witnesses, note was recovered from the possession of respondent. 10. Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. passed in (2014) 13 SCC 55 has held in para 9 as under:- “9.…...Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.” 11. The learned trial Court also found that prosecution has failed to prove demand and acceptance beyond reasonable doubt. 12. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Murlidhar alias Gidda & Another v. State of Karnataka passed in (2014) 5 SCC 730 has held in paras 11 & 12 as under:- 11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh V. State [ AIR 1952 SC 52 : 1952 Cri LJ 331] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed: (AIR p.54, para 7) “7...... the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.” 12. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following:- (I) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court; (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal; (iii) Thought, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and reevaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court. 13. Applying the aforesaid legal proposition in the present case as well, it is clear that the findings recorded by the learned Special Judge acquitting the respondent from the offence punishable under Sections 7 & 13 (1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is based on material available on record. 13. Applying the aforesaid legal proposition in the present case as well, it is clear that the findings recorded by the learned Special Judge acquitting the respondent from the offence punishable under Sections 7 & 13 (1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is based on material available on record. This Court finds no illegality in the order impugned acquitting the respondent, particularly when there is a settled legal position that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the judgment of acquittal, even otherwise, the prosecution has utterly failed in proving its case beyond all reasonable doubt and the trial Court is fully justified in recording the finding of acquittal, which is based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record. 14. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal is hereby dismissed.