JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. 2. This petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is filed by the petitioner – original plaintiff against an order dated 17.12.2015, passed below application Exh. 35 in Regular Civil Suit No. 124 of 2014 by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Khambhalia. By the said application, the petitioner – plaintiff had prayed for to measure and mark the land belonging to the petitioner – plaintiff through the DILR, which came to be rejected by the aforesaid order. 3. Heard, learned advocate Mr. P. M. Lakhani for the petitioner – plaintiff and learned advocate Mr. Krunal Vyas for the respondent. 3.1 The learned advocate for the petitioner, with all vehemence at his command, submitted that the impugned order is contrary to law and the facts and record of the case. He submitted that the learned trial Judge has passed the impugned order without application of mind and in mechanical manner inasmuch as, the measurement, which was sought to be done by way of the application in question was necessary so as to arrive at just conclusion and to get the actual measurement. Further, the petitioner – plaintiff was also ready and willing to pay the requisite fees for the same and in the circumstances, the learned trial Judge ought to have allowed the application. He submitted that no justifiable reasons have been assigned for by the learned trial Judge for arriving to such a conclusion. Accordingly, it is urged that this petition may be allowed in the interest of justice and quash and set aside the impugned order by allowing the application Exh. 35. 4. On the other hand, the learned advocate for the respondent, while heavily opposing the present petition, submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge being just and proper, requires no interference. He firstly submitted that this petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India itself is not maintainable inasmuch as in the catena of decision, the Apex Court has held that powers under these, should be exercised sparingly and not casually. He further submitted that even otherwise, earlier, the petitioner had preferred such an application, whereby, DILR was appointed vide order dated 19.01.2015 and measurement was carried out and report was also submitted and accordingly, as such there is no need to order same exercise again. He further submitted that even otherwise, earlier, the petitioner had preferred such an application, whereby, DILR was appointed vide order dated 19.01.2015 and measurement was carried out and report was also submitted and accordingly, as such there is no need to order same exercise again. Moreover, he submitted that the petitioner – plaintiff has not joined the DILR as party before the trial Court nor before this Court and therefore also, this petition is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary party. Thus, making above submissions, it is requested to dismiss the present petition. 5. Regard being had to the submissions made and considering the averments made so also, perusing the material placed on record, it appears that the petitioner – plaintiff had, by way of the application Exh. 35 sought for appointment of DILR and to measure the land and mark boundaries. The said application came to be rejected by way of impugned order and hence, the grieved petitioner is before this Court challenging the said order. In this regard, at the outset, it would be worthwhile to refer to a decision of the Apex Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 , wherein, the Court has considered in detail the scope of interference by this Court to hold and observe that Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court Suo motu as a custodian of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power would be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. The observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, read as under: “57. Articles 226 and 227 stand on substantially different footing. As noted above, prior to the Constitution, the Chartered High Courts as also the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council could issue prerogative writs in exercise of their original jurisdiction. [See 1986 (suppl.) SCC 401 at page 469)]. 58. However, after the Constitution every High Court has been conferred with the power to issue writs under Article 226 and these are original proceeding. [State of U.P. and others vs. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj - AIR 1963 SC 946 , page 951]. 59. The jurisdiction under Article 227 on the other hand is not original nor is it appellate. 58. However, after the Constitution every High Court has been conferred with the power to issue writs under Article 226 and these are original proceeding. [State of U.P. and others vs. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj - AIR 1963 SC 946 , page 951]. 59. The jurisdiction under Article 227 on the other hand is not original nor is it appellate. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred under Articles 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. 60. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article 226, High Court normally annuls or quashes an order or proceeding but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court, apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior tribunal should have made. {See Surya Dev Rai (supra), para 25 page 690 and also the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and others - [ AIR 1955 SC 233 , para 20 page 243]}. 61. Jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their fundamental rights or other statutory rights. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by the High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the State. In certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution can be claimed ex-debito justicia or as a matter of right. But in cases where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 227, such exercise is entirely discretionary and no person can claim it as a matter of right. From an order of a Single Judge passed under Article 226, a Letters Patent Appeal or an intra Court Appeal is maintainable. But no such appeal is maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge of a High Court in exercise of power under Article 227. In almost all High Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. But no such appeal is maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge of a High Court in exercise of power under Article 227. In almost all High Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. No such rule appears to have been framed for exercise of High Court's power under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise entirely in the domain of the discretion of High Court. 62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L.Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 5.1 Thus, exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should be with a view to keep the tribunals / Courts within the bounds of their authority, to ensure that law is followed by tribunals / Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and/or when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. In exercise of its power of superintendence, High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. In exercise of its power of superintendence, High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. 5.2 Adverting to the facts of the present in the said backdrop, indisputably, earlier also, such an application with the same relief, was preferred by the petitioner - plaintiff and DILR was appointed, land was measured and report of the DILR was also placed on record. It is the case of the petitioner - plaintiff that there is manipulation in the earlier report prepared and submitted by the DILR. Nonetheless, if the finding of the learned trial Judge in that regard is referred to in the impugned order, it is categorically mentioned by the learned trial Judge that, “the plaintiff has not put any evidence to show that report of court commissioner submitted at exh-30 was manipulated”. The learned trial Judge has further mentioned that, “Moreover, the plaintiff has not shown any genuine reason to do local inspection again”. Thus, there are specific findings recorded by the learned trial Judge. As referred to herein above, the petition is filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India and the scope is very scant. Considering the impugned order vis-a-vis the facts and circumstances of the case, in the considered opinion of this Court, there appears no error, much less an error apparent on the face of it, which requires interference at the hands of this Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 5.3 The Apex Court in a recent decision in Puri Investments v. Young Friends and Co. and Others, MANU/SC/0290/2022 has observed as under: “13. There was no perversity in the order of the Appellate Tribunal on the basis of which the High Court could have interfered. In our view, the High Court tested the legality of the order of the Tribunal through the lens of an appellate body and not as a supervisory Court in adjudicating the application under Article 227 of the Considering. This is impermissible. In our view, the High Court tested the legality of the order of the Tribunal through the lens of an appellate body and not as a supervisory Court in adjudicating the application under Article 227 of the Considering. This is impermissible. The finding of the High Court that the appellate forum’s decision was perverse and the manner in which such finding was arrived at was itself perverse.” 5.4 Thus, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be given a shape of appeal in disguise. 6. For the aforesaid reasons and observations, this petition fails and is dismissed accordingly. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.