JUDGMENT : 1. This petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India is filed by the petitioner – original plaintiff against an order dated 10.01.2020 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedbad (Rural) in Special Civil Suit No. 22 of 2020. By the said order, the learned trial Judge was pleased to reject the suit under O.7 R.11(c) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) for want of sufficient Court fees. 2. Abbreviated facts of the case are that the petitioner – plaintiff filed a suit before the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedbad (Rural) for specific performance, cancellation of registered sale deed and permanent injunction. On presentation of the plaint and after due verification of the same, the learned trial Judge, vide order dated 25.10.2019 directed the petitioner – plaintiff to pay separate Court fees for the aforesaid prayers made by him in the suit, within seven days. Subsequently, the suit came to be registered as Special Civil Suit No. 22 of 2020, however, since the petitioner – plaintiff did not pay the Court fees as directed vide order dated 25.10.2019, the learned trial Judge rejected the suit under O.7 R.11(c) of the CPC vide impugned order dated 10.01.2020. Grieved by the same, the petitioner is before this Court. 3. Heard, Mr. Rohan Amin learned advocate for Mr. Jigar Gadhavi, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Harnish Shah for Mr. Nehal Shah, learned advocate for the respondent No. 7. Though served, none is present for the rest. 4. The learned advocate for the petitioner, with all vehemence at his command, submitted that the petitioner – plaintiff has paid maximum Court fees i.e. Rs.75,000/-, as provided under the Schedule to the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004 (herein after referred to as “the Court fees Act”) and accordingly, the order passed by the learned Court below is patently illegal and erroneous. He submitted that the learned trial Judge ought to have directed to register the suit at first instance and proceeded to decide the same but it is not the case and by the order impugned, has rejected the same, which is illegal and bad in the eye of law. He submitted that the petitioner – plaintiff is not heard on this count and hence, the impugned order also suffers from the vices of the principles of natural justice. He submitted that the petitioner – plaintiff is not heard on this count and hence, the impugned order also suffers from the vices of the principles of natural justice. It is submitted that the learned trial Judge could have get evaluated the Court fees prior to rejection of the suit, which is not the case herein and accordingly, has erred in coming to the conclusion that the suit is required to be rejected for want or proper Court fees. Thus, making above submissions, he requested to set aside the impugned order and to allow the present petition by directing the learned trial Judge to decide the suit in accordance with law. 4.1 In support, the learned advocate for the petitioner has relied upon following decisions: (i) Special Civil Application No. 15653 of 2016 dated 19.09.2016. (ii) Amreli Municipality v. Inspecting Officer, 1994 (0) AIJEL-HC 200556 (iii) State of Gujarat v. K. L. Patel, 2005 (0) AIJEL-HC 214319. 5. Per contra, Mr. Harnish Shah, learned advocate for the respondent No. 7, has heavily resisted the present petition and submitted that the petitioner – plaintiff, for his prayers in the suit, has paid the aggregate Court fees, but not in accordance with the prayers made in the suit. He submitted that separate Court fees is required to be paid for the prayer qua specific performance of the agreement to sell and the prayer qua cancellation of the sale deed, however, the petitioner – plaintiff has not paid Court fees accordingly and hence, the learned trial Judge has rightly rejected the suit by the impugned order, which requires no interference at the hands of this Court and eventually, it is requested to dismiss the present petition. 6. Regard being had to the submissions made and considering the papers available on record, it appears that the petitioner had, for purchase of the suit property, effected agreement to sell with the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein and paid part sale consideration. However, prior to execution of the sale deed, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 sold the suit property to the respondent Nos. 5 and 6, who in turn sold the same to the respondent No. 7 herein and thereby, denied to respect the agreement to sell. Hence, the petitioner – plaintiff filed the suit for cancellation of the sale deed as well as for specific performance of the agreement to sell. 1 and 2 sold the suit property to the respondent Nos. 5 and 6, who in turn sold the same to the respondent No. 7 herein and thereby, denied to respect the agreement to sell. Hence, the petitioner – plaintiff filed the suit for cancellation of the sale deed as well as for specific performance of the agreement to sell. In the said suit, the petitioner – plaintiff paid the aggregate Court fees of Rs.75,000/-, however, the learned trial Judge rejected the suit under O.7 R.11(c) of the CPC by the impugned order dated 10.01.2020 on the count that separate Court fees is required to be paid for the prayers made therein. 6.1 In this regard, if the definition of “decree”, as provided in Section 2(2) of the CPC is referred to, it speaks thus: “decree” means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 144, but shall not include — (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation.—A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final.” 6.2 Thus, the decree includes rejection of plaint also. In the case on hand the plaint is rejected under O.7 R. 11(c) of the CPC and as per the provisions of Section 96, “save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court”. Indisputably, the petitioner – plaintiff has come to this Court without resorting to the efficacious remedy available to him under the law. Indisputably, the petitioner – plaintiff has come to this Court without resorting to the efficacious remedy available to him under the law. 6.3 At this juncture, it would be apt to refer to a decision of the Apex Court in Union of India (UOI) and Others v. Guwahati Carbon Ltd., MANU/SC/1256/2012, wherein, the Court has observed as under: “10. A Bench of three learned judges of this Court, in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa MANU/SC/0317/1983 : (1983) 2 SCC 433 (See (1983) 53 STC 315 , 321 (SC)), held: 11. ...The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of .… 11. In other words, existence of an adequate alternate remedy is a factor to 1; be considered by the writ court before exercising its writ jurisdiction (See Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board MANU/SC/0005/1950 : (1950) SCR 566). 6.4 Furthermore, the Apex Court in a recent decision in Puri Investments v. Young Friends and Co. and Others, MANU/ SC/0290/2022 has observed as under: “13. There was no perversity in the order of the Appellate Tribunal on the basis of which the High Court could have interfered. In our view, the High Court tested the legality of the order of the Tribunal through the lens of an appellate body and not as a supervisory Court in adjudicating the application under Article 227 of the Considering. This is impermissible. The finding of the High Court that the appellate forum’s decision was perverse and the manner in which such finding was arrived at was itself perverse.” 6.5 Thus, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be given a shape of appeal in disguise. 7. Thus, when efficacious remedy is available, it should be exhausted first. In the case on hand, as said earlier, decree includes rejection of plaint for which, remedy lies under Section 96 of the CPC, which the petitioner ought to have resorted first, but not, for the reason best known to the petitioner. 7. Thus, when efficacious remedy is available, it should be exhausted first. In the case on hand, as said earlier, decree includes rejection of plaint for which, remedy lies under Section 96 of the CPC, which the petitioner ought to have resorted first, but not, for the reason best known to the petitioner. Accordingly, the Court deems it proper to entertain this petition in view of efficacious remedy available to the petitioner under the law. 8. In the backdrop as aforesaid, the petition fails and is dismissed accordingly. 8.1 It is made clear that the Court has not gone into the merits of the case and if the petitioner so chooses to resort to the remedy available to him under the law, the learned Court concerned shall decide the case of the petitioner, on its own merits, without being influenced by this order.