ORDER : With consent of the parties, hearing of the matter has been done through video conferencing and there is no complaint whatsoever regarding audio and visual quality. 2. The instant intra-court appeal, preferred under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 25.11.2013 passed by Learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 7829 of 2012 whereby and whereunder order dated 01.07.2008, by which pension of the petitioner was withheld, has been quashed and set aside. 3. The brief facts of the case, as per pleadings made in the writ petition, which require to be enumerated reads as hereunder : The petitioner retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.01.1998 from the post of Accountant from Palamau Treasury. It is the case of writ petitioner that although after retirement, he was getting pension, but, since in a criminal case being R.C. Case No. 4(A) of 2001, he was convicted vide order dated 21.11.2005, against which, he preferred appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 1425 of 2005, his pension was withheld vide order date 01.07.2008. Being aggrieved, the petitioner approached this Court invoking writ jurisdiction of this Court conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by filing writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 7829 of 2012. The learned Single Judge, considering the submissions advanced on behalf of parties and taking into consideration the provision of Rule 43(a) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules, quashed impugned order dated 01.07.2008, which is the subject matter of present intra-court appeal. 4. The appellants-State has taken the plea that there is no error in passing order dated 01.07.2008. Further submission has been made, referring to the provision as contained in Rule 43(a) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules, that it contains no stipulation to issue show cause notice to the pensioner before taking any adverse decision, but the learned Single Judge without appreciating the aforesaid fact has quashed impugned order dated 01.07.2008, therefore, the same is not sustainable in the eye of law. 5. None appears for the respondent-writ petitioner. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by learned Single Judge. 7. 5. None appears for the respondent-writ petitioner. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by learned Single Judge. 7. The core issue, which was the subject matter before the learned Single Judge, is as to whether before initiating proceeding to take action in exercise of power conferred under Rule 43(a) of the Jharkhand Pension Rule, is it required to issue show cause notice? 8. The learned Single Judge answered the said issue in favour of petitioner holding therein that there is requirement to issue show cause notice if any decision is being taken by the State in terms of provision as contained under Rule 43(a) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules, reason being that, once the pension is being granted and is being decided to be withheld, the same since has got civil consequence, the cardinal principle of natural justice is required to be followed. 9. This Court in order to answer the aforesaid issue, deems it fit and proper to refer Rule 43 of the Jharkhand Pension Rules, which reads under as: 43(a). Future good conduct is an implied condition of every grant of pension. The Provincial Government reserve to themselves the right of withholding or withdrawing a pension or any part of it, if the pensioner is convicted of serious crime or be guilty of grave misconduct. The decision of the Provincial Government on any question of withholding or withdrawing the whole or any part of a pension under this rule, shall be final and conclusive. The decision of the Provincial Government on any question of withholding or withdrawing the whole or any part of a pension under this rule, shall be final and conclusive. 43(b) The State Government further reserve to themselves the right of withholding or withdrawing a pension or any part of it, whether permanently or for specified period, and the right of ordering the recovery from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government if the pensioner is found in departmental or judicial proceeding to have been guilty of grave misconduct; or to have caused pecuniary loss to Government by misconduct or negligence, during his service including service rendered on re-employment after retirement: Provided that- (a) Such departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government Servant was on duty either before retirement or during re-employment; (i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the State Government; (ii) shall be in respect of an event which took place not more than four years before the institution of such proceedings; and (iii) shall be conducted by such authority and at such place or places as the State Govt. may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to proceedings on which an order of dismissal from service may be made; (b) Judicial proceedings, if not instituted while the Govt. servant was on duty either before retirement or during re-employment shall have been instituted in accordance with Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (a); and (c) the Bihar Public Service Commission, shall be consulted before final orders are passed. 43(c) Where any departmental or judicial proceeding is instituted or continued against an officer/employee who has retired on attaining the age of compulsory retirement or otherwise, he shall be sanctioned by the Government which instituted such proceeding, during the period commencing from the date of his retirement to the date on which, upon conclusion of such proceeding final orders are passed, a 10 provisional pension not exceeding the maximum pension which would have been admissible on the basis of his qualifying service upto the date of retirement, or if he was under suspension on the date of retirement, upto the date immediately preceding the date on which he was placed under suspension, but no gratuity or death-cum-retirement gratuity shall be paid to him until the conclusion of such proceedings and the issue of final orders thereon.” 10. It is evident from the impugned order dated 01.07.2008 that no specific reference of provision of Rule 43(a) has been made rather reference of provision of Rule 43 has been made. The applicable Pension Rule as contained under Rule 43(a) to deal with different situation for the purpose of withholding pension on the ground is - if the future good conduct of the pensioner is not found to be good. The second provision is Rule 43(b) contains a provision to withhold pension full or part of it. If there is finding of misconduct either in departmental or judicial proceeding, subject to certain conditions as provided in the proviso contained therein; and recently the third provision has been inserted as Rule 43(c) to deal with such situation for withholding the pension full or its part, even in case of pendency of departmental proceeding. The impugned order dated 01.07.2008 has been passed keeping into consideration the fact about the conviction in the criminal case which is subsequent to superannuation of the writ petitioner and as such, it will be construed to be in exercise of power conferred under Rule 43(a) of the Pension Rules. 11. It is not in dispute that if in any provision of law, there is no reference of observance of principle of natural justice before passing any stigmatic order or an order which is going to adversely affect the party, even then, the principle of natural justice is required to be followed, being a cardinal principle to be observed before taking any adverse decision against the party. 12. Before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vrs. Union of India and Anr., [ (1978) 1 SCC 248 ], similar issue fell for consideration with respect to vires of the provision of Section 10(3) of the Indian Passport Act on the ground that before impounding the passport, the principle of natural justice has not been followed. The plea was taken that under the provision of Section 10(3) of the Indian Passport Act, there is no provision to issue show cause notice and as such, there cannot be said to be any illegality committed by the authority in impounding the passport without observing the principle of natural justice. The plea was taken that under the provision of Section 10(3) of the Indian Passport Act, there is no provision to issue show cause notice and as such, there cannot be said to be any illegality committed by the authority in impounding the passport without observing the principle of natural justice. The provision of Section 10(3) was questioned on the ground that when any adverse decision is to be taken, the cardinal principle of natural justice is to be observed but the aforesaid provision having not been referred in the provision of Section 10 of the Indian Passport Act, therefore, it may be declared as ultra vires. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, however, refused to hold the provision of Section 10 of the Indian Passport Act ultra vires, but, it has been laid down that even if there is no provision to issue show cause notice contained in the punitive provision, then also principle of natural justice, being cardinal in nature, has to be observed. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph of the said judgment is being referred hereinbelow:- “9. We may commence the discussion of this question with a few general observations to emphasise the increasing importance of natural justice in the field of administrative law. Natural justice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action. Lord Morris of Borth-yGest spoke of this rule in eloquent terms in his address before the Bentham Club: “We can, I think, take pride in what has been done in recent periods and particularly in the field of administrative law by invoking and by applying these principles which we broadly classify under the designation of natural justice. Many testing problems as to their application yet re-remain to be solved. But I affirm that the area of administrative action is but one area in which the principles are to be deployed. Nor are they to be invoked only when procedural failures are shown. Does natural justice qualify to be described as a „majestic? conception? I believe it does. Is it just a rhetorical but vague phrase which 8 can be employed, when needed, to give a gloss of assurance? I believe that it is very much more. Nor are they to be invoked only when procedural failures are shown. Does natural justice qualify to be described as a „majestic? conception? I believe it does. Is it just a rhetorical but vague phrase which 8 can be employed, when needed, to give a gloss of assurance? I believe that it is very much more. If it can be summarised as being fair-play in action — who could wish that it would ever be out of action? It denotes that the law is not only to be guided by reason and by logic but that its purpose will not be fulfilled; it lacks more exalted inspiration. And then again, in his speech in the House of Lords in Wiseman v. Borneman, the learned Law Lord said in words of inspired felicity: “... that the conception of natural justice should at all stages guide those who discharge judicial functions is not merely an acceptable but is an essential part of the philosophy of the law. We often speak of the rules of natural justice. But there is nothing rigid or mechanical about them. What they comprehend has been analysed and described in many authorities. But any analysis must bring into relief rather their spirit and their inspiration than any precision of definition or precision as to application. We do not search for prescriptions which will lay down exactly what must, in various divergent situations, be done. The principles and procedures are to be applied which, in any particular situation or set of circumstances, are right and just and fair. Natural justice, it has been said, is only „fair play in action?. Nor do we wait for directions from Parliament. The common law has abundant riches : there may we find what Byles, J., called „the justice of the common law? ”. Thus, the soul of natural justice is “fair-play in action” and that is why it has received the widest recognition throughout the democratic world. In the United States, the right to an administrative hearing is regarded as essential requirement of fundamental fairness. And in England too it has been held that “fair-play in action” demands that before any prejudicial or adverse action is taken against a person, he must be given an opportunity to be heard. In the United States, the right to an administrative hearing is regarded as essential requirement of fundamental fairness. And in England too it has been held that “fair-play in action” demands that before any prejudicial or adverse action is taken against a person, he must be given an opportunity to be heard. The rule was stated by Lord Denning, MR in these terms in Schmidt v. Secretary of State or Home Affairs — “where a public officer has power to deprive a person of his liberty or his property, the general principle is that it has not to be done without his being given an opportunity of being heard and of making representations on his own behalf”. The same rule also prevails in other Commonwealth countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It has even gained access to the United Nations (vide American Journal of International Law, Vol. 67, p. 9 479). Magarry, J., describes natural justice “as a distillate of due process of law” (vide Fontaine v. Chastarton). It is the quintessence of the process of justice inspired and guided by “fair-play in action”. If we look at the speeches of the various Law Lords in Wiseman case it will be seen that each one of them asked the question “whether in the particular circumstances of the case, the Tribunal acted unfairly so that it could be said that their procedure did not match with what justice demanded”, or, was the procedure adopted by the Tribunal “in all the circumstances unfair?” The test adopted by every Law Lord was whether the procedure followed was fair in all the circumstances and “fair-play in action” required that an opportunity should be given to the taxpayer “to see and reply to the counter-statement of the Commissioners” before reaching the conclusion that “there is a prima facie case against him”. The inquiry must, therefore, always be: does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected?” 13. Thus, it is evident from the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vrs. Union of India and Anr. The inquiry must, therefore, always be: does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected?” 13. Thus, it is evident from the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vrs. Union of India and Anr. (supra) that even if there is no reference for punitive provision about observing the principle of natural justice, then also, it has mandatorily been observed and hence, if the provision of Rule 43(a) of the Pension Rules does not contain any stipulation about observance of principle of natural justice, since its consequence is going to adversely affect the party and as such, it was incumbent upon the authority to provide an opportunity of hearing to the party and as such, it cannot be said that since there is no stipulation made in the provision of Rule 43(a) of the Pension Rules, observance of principle of natural justice is not required. Therefore, the contention/ground agitated by the appellant/State cannot be said to be acceptable and accordingly, rejected. 14. Further, the judgment passed in L.P.A. No.479 of 2016 by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Department of Finance Vrs. Ram Sewak Sahu and Ors has been placed before us, which was disposed of vide order dated 20.02.2020, wherein, also while dealing with the similar issue as to whether the principle of natural justice in exercising the power as conferred under the provision of Rule 43(a) of the Pension Rules is required to be followed or not, has been considered, wherein it has been answered that before resorting to the provision of Rule 43(a) of the Pension Rules, it is incumbent upon the authority to provide an opportunity of hearing to the party by issuing appropriate notice in this regard. 15. The similar issue fell for consideration before this Court in L.P.A. No. 500 of 2019 [State of Jharkhand through Secretary, Department of Finance, Govt. of Jharkhand & Anr. Vs. Kamla Devi & Ors], which was disposed of vide order dated 19.10.2020 in which also it has been held that before resorting to provision as contained under Rule 43 (a) of the Pension Rule for withholding the pension on the ground of conviction, the cardinal principal of natural justice is required to be followed. 16. of Jharkhand & Anr. Vs. Kamla Devi & Ors], which was disposed of vide order dated 19.10.2020 in which also it has been held that before resorting to provision as contained under Rule 43 (a) of the Pension Rule for withholding the pension on the ground of conviction, the cardinal principal of natural justice is required to be followed. 16. Further consideration has been made about applicability of Rule 43 of the Pension Rule which stipulates to take action considering the future good conduct of the pensioner, meaning whereby, in course of getting pension if any misconduct is being committed then the pension can be withheld in exercise of power conferred under Rule 43(a) of the Pension Rule. 17. As such, according to our considered view, the learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter, has came to a correct decision of quashing the impugned order dated 01.07.2008 for want of adherence of principle of natural justice, hence, the same requires no interference by this Court. 18. This Court has considered this aspect of the matter and considering the fact that writ petitioner had committed an offence while he was in service and after superannuation the pensionary benefit has been granted therefore, the conduct upon which order of conviction has been passed being committed in past and not in future and therefore, withholding of pension in exercise of power conferred under Rule 43(a) of the Pension Rule cannot be allowed to be exercised. The matter would have been different if in course of getting pension any misconduct had been committed then certainly rule 43(a) can well be applicable for withholding pension. 19. In this regard, the relevant paragraph of the judgment rendered in State of Jharkhand through Secretary, Department of Finance, Govt. of Jharkhand & Anr. Vs. Kamla Devi & Ors (supra) is quoted hereunder as: “Thus, it is evident from the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Hon?ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrs.. Maneka Gandhi Vrs. Union of India and Anr. of Jharkhand & Anr. Vs. Kamla Devi & Ors (supra) is quoted hereunder as: “Thus, it is evident from the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Hon?ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrs.. Maneka Gandhi Vrs. Union of India and Anr. (supra) that even if there is no reference for punitive provision about observing the principle of natural justice, then also, it has mandatorily been observed and hence, if the provision of Rule 43(a) of the Pension Rules does not contain any stipulation about observance of principle of natural justice, since its consequence is going to adversely affect the party and as such, it was incumbent upon the authority to provide an opportunity of hearing to the party and as such, it cannot be said that since there is no stipulation made in the provision of Rule 43(a) of the Pension Rules, there is no question of observance of principle of natural justice, hence, the contention/ground agitated by the appellant/State cannot be said to be acceptable and accordingly, rejected.” 20. The order dated 01.07.2008 was passed when the writ petitioner superannuated from service and was getting pension. It is not in dispute that the writ petitioner had committed an offence while he was in service and as such it cannot be said that the conviction is based upon his future conduct rather it is based upon the past conduct of the petitioner and, therefore passing order dated 01.07.2008 in purported exercise of power conferred under rule 43(a) of the Pension Rule cannot be said to be justified decision on the part of the respondents-authorities. 21. The learned Single Judge after taking into facts in entirety, as discussion made herein above and considering the implication of Rule 43(a) of the Pension Rule, which is only for the future conduct of the pensioner, has quashed the impugned order dated 01.07.2008 withholding the pension of the petitioner, which according to our considered cannot be said to suffer from error. 22. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is dismissed.