ORDER : 1. Challenge in this revision petition is the order that is rendered by the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Khammam in I.A.No.1842 of 2013 in I.A.No.996 of 2007 in O.S.No.240 of 2004, dated 11.02.2016. 2. Heard the submission of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the respondent. 3. A perusal of the entire material that is produced before this Court reveals and discloses the following factual scenario:- The revision petitioner filed a suit in O.S.No.240 of 2004 for specific performance of contract. The said suit was dismissed for default on 02.11.2005. Subsequently, the revision petitioner/plaintiff moved an Interlocutory Application seeking the Court to set-aside the said dismissal order. Since the said application was not filed within the prescribed period of limitation, another application vide I.A.No.996 of 2007 was filed seeking the Court to condone the delay in filing the said petition for restoration of the suit. I.A.No.996 of 2007 was also dismissed for default as the revision petitioner failed to deposit the required process for service of notice upon the respondent. Later, the revision petitioner moved another application for restoration of the said Interlocutory Application i.e. I.A.No.996 of 2007. Even the said application was not filed within time and therefore, he moved another Interlocutory Application i.e. I.A.No.1842 of 2013 to condone the delay of 1736 days in filing the said application for restoration of I.A.No.996 of 2007. The Court of Senior Civil Judge, Khammam, vide order dated 11.02.2016, dismissed the said application. Aggrieved by the same, the revision petitioner is before this Court. 4. Making his submission that the Court below ought to have condoned the delay and that it ought not to have adopted a stringent approach, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the revision petitioner was not aware that the suit was dismissed for default and he came to know about the said fact after considerable period and therefore, he filed an application to condone the delay in filing restoration petition, but due to his misfortune, the said application was also dismissed for default and then he moved an application for restoring the said application and as there was delay, he filed I.A.No.1842 of 2013 to condone the delay of 1736 days. But the said delay was not condoned and thereby, the revision petitioner was put to irreparable loss and hardship. But the said delay was not condoned and thereby, the revision petitioner was put to irreparable loss and hardship. Proceeding with his submission and emphasizing that the Court was under an obligation to condone the delay and that the cases have to be disposed of on merits but not on technical grounds, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case between N. BALAKRISHNAN Vs. M. KRISHNAMURTHY, AIR 1998 Supreme Court 3222, wherein the Hon’ble Court at Paras 10 to 13 of the order held as follows:- “10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux o time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis Mum (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” u/s.5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari and Others and The State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipalilty and Others. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when Courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the Court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 5. Basing on the above decision, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner contends that the law of limitation is not meant to destroy the rights of the parties and hence proper remedy ought to have been granted by the trial Court. 6. On the other hand, stating that no sufficient reason is accorded for such inordinate delay and from the beginning, the revision petitioner was not pursuing the matter diligently and the same is evident by the material available on record, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that when the delay is inordinate and when the explanation afforded is found untenable and false, the Court should not condone the delay. The learned counsel for the respondent in this regard relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case between ESHA BHATTACHARJEE Vs. MANAGING COMMITTEE Of RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY AND OTHERS, (2013) 12 SCC 649 wherein discussing the entire gamut of the law of limitation and the various rulings of the Courts in that regard, the Hon’ble Apex Court at Paras 21 & 22 held as under:- “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1 (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2(ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5(v) Lack of bonafides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the Courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8 (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9 (ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9 (ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10 (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the Courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1(a)An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2(b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3(c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4(d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 7. 22.4(d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 7. In the affidavit filed in support of the application that is filed to condone the delay, the revision petitioner contended that the suit filed by him was dismissed for default and thereafter, he filed an application to restore the said suit and as there was delay, he filed an application vide I.A.No.996 of 2007 to condone the delay in filing the restoration petition, but the said petition was dismissed due to non-deposit of process and he was not aware about the dismissal of those petitions and he was under an impression that the suit is pending and further, he believed the words of the respondent/defendant that he would execute the registered sale deed and later when he approached his counsel, he came to know about the dismissal of the said petitions and thus, delay occurred. 8. When the revision petitioner himself contends that he moved an application for restoration of the suit that was dismissed for default and that the said application was moved along with an application to condone the delay, this Court does not understand how he can again contend that he was under an impression that the suit is pending. It is the revision petitioner who has filed the suit. Therefore, it is for him to pursue the said suit diligently. Having filed the suit against the respondent/defendant, he takes a plea that he believed the words of respondent/defendant that he would execute registered sale deed and therefore, he did not pursue the matter. These reasons, that too for condoning the inordinate delay of ‘1736’ days in filing application for restoration of another condone delay petition, appears most unjustifiable. These reasons cannot be termed to be sufficient cause or convincing grounds for condonation. 9. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Khammam, did not err in dismissing the said application as the reasons are neither tenable nor convincing. Much less, as earlier stated, they will not fall within the realm of the term “sufficient cause” for condoning the said inordinate delay of ‘1736’ days. 10. A party who approaches the Court of law for a particular relief, is expected to be diligent in pursing the matter. Much less, as earlier stated, they will not fall within the realm of the term “sufficient cause” for condoning the said inordinate delay of ‘1736’ days. 10. A party who approaches the Court of law for a particular relief, is expected to be diligent in pursing the matter. When lakhs of cases are pending before the Courts in the country, the attitude of the parties like that of the revision petitioner would add more burden and can be compared adding fuel to the fire. Further, the litigation becomes unending to the opposite party, besides creating hardship and mental trauma. 11. The dictum of law is that the delay if inordinate, should not be condoned by adopting casual or liberal approach. Courts are not expected to condone the delay in the following circumstances:- 1. When the reason urged is found to be concocted. 2. When the party who seeks for condonation of delay is found to be thoroughly negligent. 3. In case condonation of inordinate delay leads to substantial injustice to the opposite party due to the subsequent events. 4. The inordinate delay, if condoned, results in unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The list is illustrative and not exhaustive. 12. Legislatively fixed period of time shall always be adhered to as the same rests on the salutary maxim “Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium” which means “in the interest of the State that there should be a limit to litigation.” 13. Thus the resultant finding of this Court is that the revision petition lacks merits and therefore deserves to be dismissed. 14. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed without costs. 15. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.