JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant herein under Section 374(2) of the CrPC is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 30.11.2012 passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar, in Sessions Trial No.69/2012, by which the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge has convicted the appellant for offence under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and further sentenced to fine of Rs.1000/­, in default of payment of fine to further undergo additional imprisonment for six months under Section 302 of the IPC and RI for 3 years and further sentenced to fine of Rs.200/­, in default of payment of fine to further undergo additional imprisonment for six months under Section 201 of the IPC. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on the eve of Ganesh Chaturthi on 06.12.2011 between 12.30 a.m. to 1 p.m. at village Darra, the appellant assaulted Santram by kitchen knife, by which Santram suffered serious injury and succumbed to death, thereby the appellant committed the offence under Section 302 of the IPC and also caused disappearance of evidence and thereby committed the offence under Section 201 of the IPC. It is further case of the prosecution that on 6.9.2011 Sadhram (PW­5) reported the matter to Police Outpost­Girodhpuri, Police Station­Bilaigarh that his brother Santram was found dead, who was lastly seen at about 12 o'clock on the same night in drunken condition with Pancham, Pancham tried to take Santram to his house, but he could not walk and thereby he tried to sit and sleep near Mahamaya Chowk beside Lord Ganesh Murti, where his daughter Sushila (PW­4) came and tried to administer some water to Santram, but Santram was not willing to go home and told his daughter Suhsila (PW­4) that he would sleep there only. At that time, Santram's mobile was missing, Sushila (PW­4) went in search of his mobile, but when she returned, she saw that Santram sustained injury and blood was oozing all over his neck. Sushila immediately rushed to her mother and told that her father Santram sustained injuries over his neck, then her mother Ketbai (PW­11) reached to the spot and found her husband Santram dead. Merg was registered vide Ex.P­7 and FIR was registered vide Ex.P­20. Inquest was conducted over dead body of deceased vide Ex.P­18. Sushila immediately rushed to her mother and told that her father Santram sustained injuries over his neck, then her mother Ketbai (PW­11) reached to the spot and found her husband Santram dead. Merg was registered vide Ex.P­7 and FIR was registered vide Ex.P­20. Inquest was conducted over dead body of deceased vide Ex.P­18. Spot map was prepared by patwari vide Ex.P­1. Investigating officer also prepared spot map vide Ex.P­21. Dead body of deceased Santram was sent for postmortem to Community Health Center, Bilaigarh where Dr.Chain Singh (PW­3) conducted postmortem vide Ex.P­3 and opined that cause of death was haemorrhage due to lacerated wound on the neck and death was homicidal in nature. Pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.P­8, knife was seized from him vide Ex.P­9. Bloodstained soil and plain soil were also recovered from the spot vide Ex.P­11. Bloodstained shirt and full paint of the appellant were also seized vide Ex.P­13. Seized articles were sent for FSL examination, but FSL report has not been brought on record by the prosecution. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC and after due investigation, the appellant was charge­sheeted before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaigarh, who in turn, committed the case to the Court of Second Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar for trial. The accused / appellant abjured the guilt and entered into defence. 3. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and exhibited 32 documents Exs.P­1 to P­27. Statement of the accused/appellant under Section 313 of the CrPC was recorded in which he denied guilt. The accused examined none in his defence, but produced one document i.e. statement of Susheela (Ex.D­1) in his support. 4. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 30.11.2012 convicted the appellant for offence under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC and sentenced him for the period as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment, against which, this criminal appeal has been preferred. 5. 4. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 30.11.2012 convicted the appellant for offence under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC and sentenced him for the period as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment, against which, this criminal appeal has been preferred. 5. Mr.Hemant Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that only on the basis of statement of Sadhram (PW­5) who had seen the appellant immediately after the incident and thereafter he had absconded to Delhi, which is relevant fact under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, as such, only on the basis of subsequent conduct under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, conviction cannot be recorded and as such, it is liable to be set­aside. 6. On the other hand, Mr.Sudeep Verma, learned Deputy Government Advocate for the respondent/State, would support the impugned judgment and submit that the appellant has rightly been convicted for the aforesaid offences and as such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned appearing for the parties and considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. There is no dispute that death of deceased Santram was homicidal in nature. The appellant has been convicted by the trial Court on the basis of finding recorded that Sadhram (PW­5) has seen the appellant immediately after the incident where dead body of Santram was lying and further, investigating officer U.K. Bhoi (PW­13) has stated that immediately after the incident, the appellant had absconded to Delhi and thereby proceeded to convict the appellant. The appellant has been convicted by the trial Court on the basis of finding recorded that Sadhram (PW­5) has seen the appellant immediately after the incident where dead body of Santram was lying and further, investigating officer U.K. Bhoi (PW­13) has stated that immediately after the incident, the appellant had absconded to Delhi and thereby proceeded to convict the appellant. The trial Court has recorded the following finding:­ ^^28- Ádj.k esa dksbZ p'enhn lk{kh ugha gS dsoy vŒlkŒ&5 lk/kjke dgrk gS fd mlus ?kVuk LFky ij tgka larjke dh yk'k iM+h gqbZ Fkh ogka ls lansgkLin fLFkfr esa vkjksih dks Hkkxrs gq, ns[kk FkkA vkjksih ds vf/koDrk dk ;g Hkh rdZ jgk gS fd ?kVuk fnukad dks larjke dks iapjke ?kVuk LFky ls ysdj x;k Fkk] tgka ukpk gks jgk FkkA vkjksih ds vf/koDrk }kjk ;g Hkh dgk x;k gS fd dqN vU; yksxksa }kjk Hkh vkjksih dks /kedh nh x;h Fkh ftuls vkjksih dh nq'euh FkhA vŒlkŒ&13 ;wŒdsŒ HkksbZ }kjk ;g dgk x;k gS fd ?kVuk ds igys vkSj ?kVuk fnukad dks vkjksih xkao esa gh Fkk vkSj vkjksih larjke dh e`R;q gksus ds rqajr ckn fnYyh Hkkx x;k Fkk] 'kadk ds vk/kkj ij mlls iwNrkN dh x;h Fkh] mlus viuk vijk/k Lohdkj fd;k FkkA bl lk{kh }kjk dgk x;k gS fd vkjksih ds fnYyh Hkkx tkus dk mYys[k ds'k Mk;jh esa gSA vkjksih dk d`R; vkjksih ds i'pk~r vkpj.k dks n'kkZrk gS tks /kkjk 8 Hkkjrh; lk{; vf/kfu;e ds varxZr lqlaxr gSA** 9. Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act states as under:­ “8. Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct.—Any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact. The conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit or proceeding, in reference to such suit or proceeding, or in reference to any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto.” 10. The Indian Evidence Act intends to make only those statements admissible which are the essential complement of acts done or refused to be done, so that the act itself or the omission to act acquires a special significance as a ground for inference with respect to the issues in the case under trial. Section 8 of the Evidence Act deals with mainly three aspects: (1) A fact which shows or constitutes a motive for any fact in issue or relevant fact. (2) The acts constituting preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact. (3) The conduct of the person either previous or subsequent to the offence. 11. The Supreme Court in the matter of Anant Chintaman Lagu v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 500 while considering the conduct of the accused has held that conduct which destroys the presumption of innocence can alone be considered as material and observed as under:­ “15....A criminal trial, of course, is not an enquiry into the conduct of an accused for any purpose other than to determine whether he is guilty of the offence charged. In this connection, that piece of conduct can be held to be incriminatory which has no reasonable explanation except on the hypothesis that he is guilty. Conduct which destroys the presumption of innocence can alone be considered as material. The contention of the appellant, briefly, is that the medical evidence is inconclusive, and that his conduct is explainable on hypotheses other than his guilt.” 12. The Supreme Court in the mater of Prakash Mahadeo Godse v. State of Maharashtra, 1969 (3) SCC 741 has refused to attach much significance to abscondent evidence and held as under:­ “12. The fact that the appellant ran away and hid himself when people tried to catch hold of him does not lead to a firm conclusion that he behaved in that manner because he had a guilty mind. Even most innocent persons when suspected of grave crimes are likely to evade their arrest. The instinct of self-preservation is uppermost in the mind of an ordinary man. The courts have refused to attach much significance to abscondent evidence.” 13. The Supreme Court in the matter of Datar Singh v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 1193 has held that prosecution cannot benefit from merely suspicious circumstances that the accused did not surrender or was not traceable for nearly one year. The courts have refused to attach much significance to abscondent evidence.” 13. The Supreme Court in the matter of Datar Singh v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 1193 has held that prosecution cannot benefit from merely suspicious circumstances that the accused did not surrender or was not traceable for nearly one year. 14. The Supreme Court in the matter of Vikramjit Singh alias Vicky v. State of Punjab, (2006) 12 SCC 306 has held that conduct of an accused must have nexus with the crime committed. It must form part of the evidence as regards his conduct either preceding, during or after commission of the offence as envisaged under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was observed as under:­ “17.......Conduct of an accused must have nexus with the crime committed. It must form part of the evidence as regards his conduct either preceding, during or after commission of the offence as envisaged under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. No such inference was drawn, nor in the fact situation obtaining herein such an inference could be drawn. Whether any obstacles were put or were not found to have been placed on road by the attackers is also a question which would be of not much significance as no such evidence was brought on record. If some persons stand on the road, the same may itself be sufficient for a driver to stop his vehicle. In any event, it does not appear that such a question was even put to the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 15. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of Section 8 of the Evidence Act and aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court in Anant Chintaman Lagu (supra), Prakash Mahadeo Godse (supra), Datar Singh (supra) and Vikramjit Singh (supra), it is quite vivid that the trial Court has only relied upon the subsequent conduct of the accused/appellant running from the place of incident and remained absconded after the date of offence to connect him with the offence in question and there is no other piece of evidence on record to connect him with the offence in question. 16. 16. It is well­settled law that the circumstances which according to the prosecution lead to proof of the guilt against the accused must be put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 of the CrPC. In the instant case, it has not been done. 17. The Supreme Court in Vikramjit Singh (supra) relying upon Tara Singh v. State, AIR 1951 SC 441 has held as under:­ “23. It is now a well­settled principle of law that the circumstances which according to the prosecution lead to proof of the guilt against the accused must be put to him in his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was not done.” 18. In that view of the matter, only on the basis of alleged subsequent conduct of the appellant and furthermore, subsequent conduct of the appellant has not been put to him in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC and moreover, statement of Sadhram (PW­5) who had seen the appellant absconding from the spot in suspicious condition does not inspire confidence because he has not seen the actual incident and only seen the accused absconding from the spot, but he did not lodge any report as his conduct (PW­5) was unnatural, as such, only on the basis of alleged conduct of the appellant, he cannot be convicted for offence under Section 302 of the IPC. 19. For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the conviction so recorded and the sentence so awarded to the appellant by the trial Court vide impugned judgment dated 30.11.2012. The appellant is acquitted of the charges under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC. He is on bail. He need not surrender. However, his bail bonds shall remain in force for a period of six months in view of the provision contained in Section 437A of the CrPC. 20. The criminal appeal is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove.