JUDGMENT : 1. This petition under Section 482 read with Section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has been preferred by the petitioners, namely, Shri Pallab Das & Shri Biplab Das, for quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 24.01.2018, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sankardev Nagar, Hojai, and further proceedings of the C.R. Case No. 157/2016, pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sankardev Nagar, Hojai. It is to be mentioned here that vide the impugned order, dated 24.01.2018, the learned Court below had taken cognizance of the offence under Sections 120(B)/500/211 of the Indian Penal Code and issued summons against the petitioners. 2. The factual background leading to filing of the present petition is adumbrated herein below: “On 11.06.2012, one Smti Anjana Roy lodged an FIR alleging inter alia amongst others that the respondent No. 1, taking advantage of the misunderstanding between her and her husband, which lead to the atmosphere of separation between them, used to maintain love affairs with her, under the false promise of marrying her and maintained illicit relationship with her and even misappropriated her golden ornaments and thereby cheated her. It is also alleged in the F.I.R. that the respondent No. 2 had forcibly raped her several times in an isolated room and also threatened her with dire consequences if she divulge the occurrence to the police. Upon receipt of the aforesaid F.I.R., the Officer-In-Charge, Hojai Police Station registered the case, being Hojai P.S. Case No. 169/12, under Sections 493/376/506/420/34 of the Indian Penal Code, and started investigation which culminated in submission of Charge-Sheet against the respondent No. 2-Shri Ramakrishna Ghosh. The learned SDJM, Hojai, thereafter, committed the case, being G.R. Case No. 758/2012, to the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC, Nagaon, which was registered as Sessions Case No. 180(N)/2013 and, accordingly, on 26.06.2013, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC, Nagaon, framed charges against the respondent No. 2-Shri Ramakrishna Ghose under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. Subsequently, on 20.05.2015, evidences were led before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC, Nagaon, by the victim-Smti Anjana Roy and her husband, Shri Shamal Ray, wherein, it has been stated that the F.I.R. was lodged under duress and the dictate of the petitioners. Subsequently, on 20.05.2015, evidences were led before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC, Nagaon, by the victim-Smti Anjana Roy and her husband, Shri Shamal Ray, wherein, it has been stated that the F.I.R. was lodged under duress and the dictate of the petitioners. Thereafter, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC, Nagaon, vide its judgment, dated 30.06.2015, found respondent No. 2 not guilty for the charge under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and, accordingly, acquitted him from the offence and set him at liberty. Thereafter, in the year 2016, the respondent No. 1-Shri Ajay Ghosh lodged a Complaint case before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Hojai, Sankardev Nagar, Nagaon, Assam, which is being registered as C.R. Case No. 157/2016, against the present petitioners and Smti Anjana Roy, alleging that as the petitioners, with a common intention, dictated Smti Anjana Roy to lodge a false F.I.R. and as such, they have committed offence under Sections 500/501(B)/503/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Thereafter, on 24.01.2018, the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sankardev Nagar, Hojai, having been found primafacie material, took cognizance of the offence under Sections 120(B)/500/211 of the Indian Penal Code and issued summons against Smti Anjana Roy and the petitioners, namely, Shri Pallab Das & Shri Biplab Das to appear before him and to stand trial.” 3. Thereafter, on 24.01.2018, the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sankardev Nagar, Hojai, having been found primafacie material, took cognizance of the offence under Sections 120(B)/500/211 of the Indian Penal Code and issued summons against Smti Anjana Roy and the petitioners, namely, Shri Pallab Das & Shri Biplab Das to appear before him and to stand trial.” 3. Then, being highly aggrieved by the impugned order, the petitioners approached this Court by filing the instant petition on the following grounds : (i) That, the learned Court below has committed manifest error in law as well as in facts in taking cognizance of the offence alleged and ordering issuing summons against the petitioners; (ii) That, the learned Court below has failed to appreciate the provision of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. while taking cognizance of the offence in the year 2018, although there is bar under the provision of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. in taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation and in view thereof, the impugned order, dated 24.01.2018, passed by the learned Court below, is apparently an abuse of the process of the Court and not sustainable in law; (iii) That, the learned Court below has failed to appreciate the fact that the petitioner No. 2 is a resident of Kolkata and his name nowhere been mentioned in the complaint and the complainant has just put his name in the Complaint case with an intent to harass and humiliate the petitioners; and, therefore, it is contended to set aside and quash the impugned order, dated 24.01.2018, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sankardev Nagar, Hojai, and the further proceedings of the C.R. Case No. 157/2016, pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sankardev Nagar, Hojai.” 4. I have heard Mr. P. K. Roychoudhury, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. K. K. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 and Ms. S. Jahan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State respondent No. 3. 5. Mr. P. K. Roychoudhury, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the petitioners were accused Nos. 2 & 3 in the Complaint Case No. 157/2016, lodged by the complainant-Shri Ajay Ghosh. K. K. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 and Ms. S. Jahan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State respondent No. 3. 5. Mr. P. K. Roychoudhury, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the petitioners were accused Nos. 2 & 3 in the Complaint Case No. 157/2016, lodged by the complainant-Shri Ajay Ghosh. The said Complaint Case was filed on 26.02.2016 and the F.I.R. of Hojai P.S. Case No. 169/2012 was lodged on 12.06.2012 and the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Hojai, had taken cognizance of the said Complaint Case No. 157/2016 on 24.01.2018, under Sections 120(B)/500/211 of the Indian Penal Code and issued process against the petitioners. Mr. Roychoudhury, further submits that the brother of the complainant, Shri Ramkrishna Ghosh, was acquitted from the offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC, Nagaon, in Sessions Case No. 180(N)/2013, vide order dated 30.06.2015, and the present complaint has been filed after 3 (three) years, which is barred by Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. Relying upon 2 (two) judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (i) State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal [ AIR 1992 SC 604 ]; and, (ii) Sirajul & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh: Criminal Appeal No. 854 of 2011 decided on 06.07.2015, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the present prosecution against the petitioners, in the aforesaid Complaint Case, cannot be maintained and no explanation for such delay has been made by the complainant so as to extend the benefit of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. Mr. P. K. Roychoudhury, also referred one case law of Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.(Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2021) in support of his submission that the present prosecution against the petitioners cannot be maintained in the Complaint Case No. 157/2016. Mr. P. K. Roychoudhury also referred another case law of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarah Mathew Vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases by its Director Dr. K. M. Cherian & Ors. reported in [ (2014) 2 SCC 62 ] to contend that the date, on which the complaint was filed is taken to be material in computing the period of limitation, not the date of cognizance of the offence. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases by its Director Dr. K. M. Cherian & Ors. reported in [ (2014) 2 SCC 62 ] to contend that the date, on which the complaint was filed is taken to be material in computing the period of limitation, not the date of cognizance of the offence. As herein this case the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on 24.01.2018, though the case was filed on 26.02.2016, in the meantime it becomes time barred as the period of limitation for the offence under section 500/501B/503/34 of Indian Penal Code is three years under section 478(2)(c). Therefore Mr. Roychoudhury contended to allow the petition. 6. Per contra, Mr. K. K. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 & 2, submits that there is no dispute regarding the proposition of law in respect of the period of limitation and the extension thereof and that, here in this case, the limitation is protected by Section 468 (3) of the Cr.P.C., which provides that ‘for the purposes of this Section, the period of limitation in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment’. Mr. Mahanta further submits that, the learned Court below has taken cognizance of the offence under Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code where the punishment prescribed is 7 (seven) years and the original FIR was registered under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code where the punishment prescribed is 7 (seven) years and as such, the bar of Section 468 (2) of the Cr.P.C. will not come into aid of the petitioners, as Section 468 (3) Cr.P.C. saved the case. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that the decision referred to by Mr. P. K. Roychoudhury, learned counsel for the petitioners, does not say anything about Section 468 (3) of the Cr.P.C. and, therefore, those cases are not applicable to the factual matrix of the case and that the learned Court below has rightly taken cognizance against the petitioners. 7. In reply to the submission of Mr. K. K. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 & 2, Mr. 7. In reply to the submission of Mr. K. K. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 & 2, Mr. P. K. Roychoudhury, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that against the complainant, the I.O. had submitted final report and against his brother (respondent No.2) only the Charge-Sheet has been submitted and thereafter, more than 2 (two) years elapsed and as such, the bar of limitation will apply here in this case. 8. Whereas, Mr. K. K. Mahanta, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 & 2, submits that there is enough material against the petitioners under Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Mahanta, also referred one case law of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. [ (2017) 9 SCC 641 ] to contend that the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised to quash the proceeding of a heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offence such as murder, rape and dacoity as such offences are not private in nature but have a serious impact upon the society and the case in hand involves the mental depravity and as such, the proceeding against the petitioners cannot be quashed by exercising the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 9. Having heard the submissions of learned Advocates of both sides, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and also the record of learned Court below and the case laws referred to by the learned Advocates of both sides. 10. It appears that the F.I.R. of Hojai P.S. Case No. 169/2012, under Sections 493/376/506/420/34 of the Indian Penal Code, was lodged on 11.06.2012 by Smti Anjana Roy imputing some serious allegation against the complainant, Sri Aju Ghosh @ Shri Ajay Ghosh and his brother, Shri Ramakrishna Ghosh, who has been cited as witness No.1 in the complaint. Upon the said F.I.R., the Officer-In-Charge, Hojai Police Station, registered the aforesaid Hojai P.S. Case No. 169/2012, under Sections 493/376/506/420/34 of the Indian Penal Code, on 12.06.2012, and investigated the same. The investigation thereafter culminated in submission of Charge-Sheet against Shri Ramakrishna Ghosh, respondent No. 2 herein, and the final report was submitted against the respondent No. 1, Shri Ajay Ghosh. The investigation thereafter culminated in submission of Charge-Sheet against Shri Ramakrishna Ghosh, respondent No. 2 herein, and the final report was submitted against the respondent No. 1, Shri Ajay Ghosh. During the course of trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC, Nagaon, in Sessions Case No. 180(N)/2013, framed charge against the respondent No. 2, Shri Ramakrishna Ghosh, under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, to which the respondent No. 2 pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, on completion of trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC, Nagaon, vide judgment and order dated 30.06.2015, acquitted respondent No. 2, Shri Ramakrishna Ghosh, from the charge under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. It also appears that in the course of trial, the prosecution side had examined Smti. Anjana Roy, the complainant as well as the victim, wherein, she has testified that in the year 2013, while dispute between her and her husband was going on, then Pallav Das @ Kiroyoung and his brother came to know about the same and taking advantage of the same, they made her to lodge the complaint against the respondents and she admitted that at the dictation of Pallav Das and his brother, the F.I.R. was written and she was compelled to make statement before the learned Magistrate by them and she was not aware of the contents of the F.I.R. and no incident, as alleged therein had taken place between her and the respondents of this petition. On the basis of the said piece of evidence of the victim and her husband, Shri Syamal Ray, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC, Nagaon, has acquitted the respondent No. 2 from the charge. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1, Shri Ajay Ghosh, has filed the complaint against Smti Anjana Roy and the 2 (two) petitioners, namely, Shri Pallab Das and Shri Biplab Das, under Section 500/501(B)/503/34 of the Indian Penal Code, before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sankardev Nagar, Hojai, and upon the said complaint, the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sankardev Nagar, Hojai, has taken cognizance of the offence under Sections 120(B)/500/211 of the Indian Penal Code and vide order dated 24.01.2018 had issued process to the petitioners to appear before the court. 11. 11. Be it mentioned here that the learned counsel for the petitioners has assailed the impugned order on the ground that the learned Court below had taken cognizance of the offence after the period of limitation as provided under Section 468 (2) of the Cr.P.C. 12. For ready reference, Section 468 (2) of the Cr.P.C. is quoted as under: “468. (2). The period of limitation shall be- (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.” 13. Here in this case, the complaint was filed under Sections 500/501(B)/503/34 of the Indian Penal Code, where the punishment prescribed is two years with fine or fine or both and as such, there is substance in the submission of Mr. P. K. Roychoudhury, learned counsel for the petitioners, that the case appears to be barred by limitation as provided under Section 468 (2) of the Cr.P.C. The law regarding counting of period of limitation is well settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions and in the case of Sarah Mathew (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the date on which the complaint is filed is taken to be material and not the date of taking cognizance by the learned Court. 14. But, it appears that the F.I.R. was lodged by Smti Anjana Roy on 11.06.2012, upon which the Hojai P.S. Case No. 169/2012 was registered under Sections 493/376/506/420 /34 of the Indian Penal Code and in the said offence, the maximum period of punishment prescribed under Section 376 IPC, at that point of time, was minimum 7 (seven) years and as such, Mr. K. K. Mahanta, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 & 2, has rightly submitted that the bar of Section 468 (2) does not attract here in this case and the period of limitation is saved by Section 468 (3) of the Cr.P.C., which provides that:- 468.(3). “For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.” 15. “For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.” 15. It also appears that the respondent No.1 though not charge sheeted, yet his brother-respondent No.2 was charge sheeted under section 493/376/506/420/34 Indian Penal Code and he was acquitted on 30.06.2015. The respondent No. 2 is the principal witness of the complaint case which was lodged on 26.02.2016. It is a fact that respondent No.2 has not filed the complaint. But, it was filed by his brother against whom also the case the case was registered under section 493/376/506/420/34 Indian Penal Code, but the I.O. has submitted Final Report having found no material against him with a prayer to discharge him from the liability of the case. Of course, he did not file any complaint immediately thereafter. However, he also appears to be a ‘victim’ as defined under section 2 (wa) of Cr.P.C. and has every right to file a case for prosecuting his brother in false and fabricated allegations. 16. It also appears that the sections, mentioned in the complaint case are 500/501B/503(2) of IPC respectively. The punishment prescribed for the same are two years and apparently no explanation is there for filing the complaint lately, so as to extend the period of limitation, as provided under section 473 Cr.P.C. But, the learned court below had taken cognizance of the offence on 24.01.2018, under section 120 B/500/211 of the Indian Penal Code upon the said complaint. Though section 211 Indian Penal Code is not mentioned in respective column of the complaint, yet, the factual foundation of the said offence was already laid therein the complaint and based on which the learned court below, apart from section 120B/500 of the Indian Penal Code took cognizance of the offence under section 211 IPC, upon the material that have already been available in the complaint. It is not the case of the petitioner that in the meantime some new facts have been added to it, after filing of the complaint on 26.02.2016, and before taking cognizance on 24.01.2018. It is not the case of the petitioner that in the meantime some new facts have been added to it, after filing of the complaint on 26.02.2016, and before taking cognizance on 24.01.2018. Since the factual foundation of the offence under section 211 IPC was already laid in the complaint and since punishment prescribed for the offence under section 211 IPC may extend to seven years and with fine (where the false charge of an offence punishable with imprisonment for seven years or upward), the bar of limitation is protected as per the provision of section 468(3) Cr.P.C. 17. At this juncture, reference can also be made to a judgment of the Apex Court, delivered in the case of State of H.P. Vs. Tara Dutt & Anr. :(2000) 1 SCC 250, where it has been held:- “5. .........This being the position, in the case in hand, when the respondents were charged under Section 468 read with Section 120-B for which the imposable punishment is seven years and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and for such offences no period of limitation having been provided for in Section 468, the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge cannot be said to be barred by limitation. The High Court in recording its conclusion relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh (1981) 3 SCC 34 . In the said case, the respondent was charged under Section 406 for misappropriation. The challan was presented on October 13, 1976 and therein it was clearly mentioned that the offence was committed on August 22, 1972. The learned trial Judge acquitted the accused of the charges under Section 468 but convicted him of the charge under Section 406 of the CrPC. This Court came to the conclusion that since the charge-sheet itself mentions that the offence was committed on August 22, 1972, the cognizance was barred under Section 468(2)(c) of the Code. At the outset it may be stated that in the aforesaid case the Court had not considered the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 468 which was in fact not there on the statue book when the alleged offence was held to have been committed. At the outset it may be stated that in the aforesaid case the Court had not considered the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 468 which was in fact not there on the statue book when the alleged offence was held to have been committed. But in view of the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 468 which we have already considered this decision will be of no application and the High Court committed error in relying upon the aforesaid decision to come to the conclusion that in the case in hand the cognizance itself was barred by limitation.” 18. In the case of Gurubachan Singh Gill Vs. (2005) 13 SCC 381 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “3. By the impugned order, the High Court affirmed order dated 24-3-2004 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi whereby he dismissed the complaint petition holding that the same was barred by limitation. In view of the stand taken by both the parties on the point of limitation from the very beginning, we are of the view that in the facts of the present case the question of limitation is not a pure question of law, but a mixed question of law and facts and for deciding the said question certain disputed questions of facts have to be adjudicated after giving opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence. The said procedure having not been adopted, the trial Court committed an error in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the same was barred by limitation and the High Court was not justified in upholding the said order.” 19. Again in the case of Harnam Singh Vs. Everest Construction Co. & Ors. (2004) 6 SCC 754 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “6. We are unable to perceive any legal basis for the observation quoted above. The bar against cognizance after the lapse of the prescribed period of limitation is laid down under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. It is within the parameters of that provision that the Court called upon to take cognizance of the offence should act. Most of the offences alleged against the respondents viz., Sections 420, 467, 471 & 474 IPC are punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding three years and therefore as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, the bar of limitation under Section 468 is not attracted. Most of the offences alleged against the respondents viz., Sections 420, 467, 471 & 474 IPC are punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding three years and therefore as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, the bar of limitation under Section 468 is not attracted. The complaint cannot therefore be thrown out at the threshold on the ground of limitation. If, apart from the question of limitation, the effect of delay if any in instituting the complaint is necessary to be determined for considering the merits of the charge, that can only be done at the stage of trial on the basis of the evidence on record. Obviously, the High Court did not bear in mind the explicit provision contained in Section 468 and the allied provisions of chapter XXXVI of Criminal Procedure Code.” 20. The legal proposition, which can be crystallised from the above discussion, are recapitulated as under:- (I) In view of Section 468(3) Cr.P.C. cognizance of an offence can be taken by the court taking into consideration that if it is a case of joint trial, then the limitation prescribed for the offence which is punishable with the highest punishment has to be considered. (II) The question of limitation is to be considered only on the basis of averments made in the complaint /charge sheet. (III) Merely, because subsequent to the filing of the charge sheet/complaint some of the offences are held to be not made out either by the court this would not make the filing of the complaint/charge sheet barred by limitation even if the remaining offence had a lesser limitation. iv) Limitation is a mixed question of law and facts. v) If prima facie the Court is satisfied that the charge sheet/complaint has been filed within the period of limitation as per the provisions contained under Section 468(3) Cr.P.C. then cognizance of the charge sheet/complaint can be taken. iv) Limitation is a mixed question of law and facts. v) If prima facie the Court is satisfied that the charge sheet/complaint has been filed within the period of limitation as per the provisions contained under Section 468(3) Cr.P.C. then cognizance of the charge sheet/complaint can be taken. vi) Even if there is a delay in filing of the complaint/charge sheet beyond limitation then also the Court has a power to condone the delay by applying the principals laid down under Section 473 Cr.P.C. vii) If prima facie the complaint/charge sheet appears to be within limitation taking into consideration the offences alleged, the charge sheet/complaint cannot be thrown out at the threshold on the plea of limitation and the question of limitation can be determined at the time of considering the merits of the charge or at the stage of trial on the basis of evidence which may come on record. viii) The language of Section 468(3) makes it imperative that the limitation provided for taking cognizance is in respect of the offence charged and not in respect of offence finally proved. 21. Applying the aforesaid propositions of law to the facts herein this case it can safely be concluded that the petitioners have failed to make out a case for quashing the proceeding of C.R. Case No. 157/2016, pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sankardev Nagar, Hojai., by invoking the inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. 22. I have carefully considered the submission of Mr. Roychoudhury, the learned counsel for the petitioners and also gone through the case laws -Bhajanlal (supra), Sarah Mathew (supra) and Siraj (supra), so referred him and I find that the same would not come into his aid. In the given factual scenario, the proposition of law laid down in the referred case laws, would not be applicable in all force, as in no point of time section 468(3) Cr.P.C. is dealt with in those cases, as pointed out by Mr. K.K. Mahanta, the learned senior counsel for the respondent during argument. 23. Also, having carefully gone through the complaint, this court left unimpressed by the submission of Mr. Roychoudhury that no offence is made out against the petitioner No.2, who allegedly resided at Kolkata. K.K. Mahanta, the learned senior counsel for the respondent during argument. 23. Also, having carefully gone through the complaint, this court left unimpressed by the submission of Mr. Roychoudhury that no offence is made out against the petitioner No.2, who allegedly resided at Kolkata. Factual foundation of the offence of criminal conspiracy and other offences are clearly laid in the complaint against him also, and this court, while dealing with a petition under section 482 Cr.P.C., is not entitled to embark upon roving enquiry to ascertain the veracity of the same, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Niharika Infrastructure (supra). The allegations made against him are serious involving moral depravity as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parbatbhai Ahir (supra) and also in the case of Niharika Infrastructure (supra), and as such the same cannot be quashed. 24. In the result, I find no merit in this petition and, accordingly, the same stands dismissed. No order as to cost. 25. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.