JUDGMENT : SATYEN VAIDYA, J. 1. The appellant has assailed judgment and sentence dated 21.12.2016 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Kinnaur Sessions Division at Rampur Bushehr, H.P. in Sessions Trial No. 0000024/2014, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under: Offences Substantive Sentence Fine Default Punishment 302 of the IPC Imprisonment for life. Rs. 10,000/- Simple imprisonment for two years. 363 of the IPC Rigorous imprisonment for seven years. Rs. 5,000/- Simple imprisonment for one year. 201 of the IPC Rigorous imprisonment for seven years. Rs. 5,000/- Simple imprisonment for one year. All the substantive sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. In case of realization of fine, the same has been ordered to be paid to the mother of the child. 2. The prosecution case in a nutshell was that PW-1 Ganga Devi had telephonically informed Police Station, Nirmand, District Kullu, H.P. at about 8.30 PM on 22nd April, 2013 that her son, aged about 4 years, was missing since 4-4.30 P.M from village Nirmand. The Police had helped complainant in searching the child but could not trace him. A missing report vide DDR No. 35-(A), dated 22.04.2013 Ext. PW-13/A was recorded at the police station concerned at about 10.30.PM. Despite efforts, the child could not be traced and finally on 24.04.2013 at about 2.15 P.M. FIR Ex.PW-1/A was registered under Section 363 of the IPC. 3. On 24.04.2013, at about 4.30 P.M. the dead body of the child (Master Sumit) was found, packed in a gunny bag, in a field near Ambika Public School. Suspicion was entertained that the offence might have been committed by some labourer working in the area belonging to Bihar. Accordingly, the police had instructed all the labourers from Bihar, residing in the area, not to leave the place. 4. On 25.04.2013, a team of forensic experts and a dog squad was also associated in the investigation. On the lead provided by the dog squad, the appellant was suspected to have committed the crime. 5. It was also found that the appellant had tried to abscond from the village during early morning hours of 25.04.2013. He was chased and apprehended by the villagers at a distance of about 8-10 kilometers from the village. The appellant was handed over to the police. He was arrested. 5. It was also found that the appellant had tried to abscond from the village during early morning hours of 25.04.2013. He was chased and apprehended by the villagers at a distance of about 8-10 kilometers from the village. The appellant was handed over to the police. He was arrested. Police recorded a disclosure statement of the appellant, Ex.PW-3/B on 25.04.2013, in presence of PW-3 Padam Singh and Yogesh Bhargav, whereby he disclosed that he could get recovered the “Pyjama” (lower apparel) of deceased from a place where it had been hidden. On the basis of such disclosure statement, recovery of “Pyjama” was made from the rented room of the appellant. 6. On the same day i.e. on 25.04.2013, a team of forensic experts also examined the spot where the dead body was lying as also the rented room of appellant. Certain incriminating articles were collected and seized from both the places by the police, on the instructions of the forensic experts. The forensic experts had also prepared their spot inspection report Ex.PW-10/A. The material collected by police was sent to RFSL, Mandi and SFSL, Junga, for scientific examination and analysis. The reports in this regard were produced in evidence as Ex. PW-10/B, Ex.PW-11/A, Ex.PW-11/B, Ex.PW-19/A, Ex.PW-19/B and Ex.PW-23/C. 7. On completion of investigation “challan” was presented. Appellant was charged for offences under Sections 302, 201, 363 and 102-B of the IPC. Along with appellant, one Manohar Lal was also charged for offences under Sections 202, 201 and 120-B of the IPC. It was alleged against said Manohar Lal that he had acquired prior knowledge of the commission of offences committed by the appellant, but he did not report the matter to the police or authorities. He had also helped the appellant in destroying the evidence. 8. Learned trial Court acquitted Manohar Lal of all the charges. However, the appellant has been convicted and sentenced, as noticed above. 9. We have heard Ms. Veena Sood, learned counsel for the appellant (legal-aid) and Mr. Kamal Kant, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent and have also carefully perused the entire record. 10. The prosecution based its case on circumstantial evidence. However, the appellant has been convicted and sentenced, as noticed above. 9. We have heard Ms. Veena Sood, learned counsel for the appellant (legal-aid) and Mr. Kamal Kant, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent and have also carefully perused the entire record. 10. The prosecution based its case on circumstantial evidence. The circumstances alleged against the appellant were firstly, that on the disclosure statement of appellant “Pyjama” of deceased was recovered from the rented room of the appellant, secondly, the child was last seen in the company of the appellant on 22.04.2013, thirdly, appellant had tried to abscond from the village after discovery of the dead body of child and fourthly, the articles found in the gunny bag in which dead body was found as also littered around the place, matched with the articles seized from the rented room of the appellant. 11. The learned trial Court did not find circumstances firstly and secondly as proved. However, the circumstances detailed above as thirdly and fourthly were held proved and made basis to convict the appellant. 12. The circumstance that the appellant made the disclosure statement and in pursuance thereto got recovered “Pyjama” of deceased was not found proved on the premise that the evidence led by the prosecution was contradictory and not convincing. Referring to the statement of PW-3 Padam Singh, one of the witnesses to the making of disclosure statement and also recovery of “Pyjama” learned trial Court held that the same was in irreconcilable contradiction with the other material on record. Learned trial Court found that according to PW-3, the room of appellant was locked from outside when he (appellant) had led the police party for recovery of “Pyjama” there was only one brick in the room behind the door and one side of “Pyjama” was visible. Whereas PW-6 Bhaskra Nand (father of deceased) had contradicted PW-3 by stating that door of the rented room of appellant was found bolted only from outside and not locked. According to this witness, even “Pyjama” was not visible underneath the brick. PW-22 Praveer Thakur (Dy. S.P.) had stated that room of the appellant was found locked and was opened with the help of key provided by the appellant. According to this witness, even “Pyjama” was not visible underneath the brick. PW-22 Praveer Thakur (Dy. S.P.) had stated that room of the appellant was found locked and was opened with the help of key provided by the appellant. Learned trial Court also took notice of that part of statement of PW-6 Bhaskra Nand where he had stated that room of the appellant had been searched by the police even on 24.04.2013 and nothing had been found. Further PW-10 Dr. B.R. Rawat, one of the members of team of forensic experts had stated that the forensic experts including himself had inspected the rented room of appellant from inside and at that time the orange coloured “Pyjama” was visible underneath the brick. As per this witness, he had visited the room at around 12.00 noon. PW-18, Inspector Prem Lal contradicted PW-10 by stating that the police had inspected the room of appellant along with forensic experts at about 2.30 p.m. According to PW-3 Shri Padam Singh “Pyjama” was recovered on the disclosure of appellant at about 11.00 A.M. Taking notice of all these facts, learned trial Court held that if the “Pyjama” was recovered at 11.00 A.M. how the forensic team could notice “Pyjama” at about 12.00 noon or 2.30 P.M. as the case might have been. Looking from another angle, in case forensic expert team had visited the room before the recovery of “Pyjama” on disclosure and had noticed “Pyjama” there was no secret left for the hiding of “Pyjama” and the forensic expert could themselves have seized or instructed the police to seize the article there and then. 13. The prosecution had sought to prove the circumstance that deceased was last seen in the company of the appellant on the basis of statements of PW-5 Sh. Yugal Kishore and PW-9 Sh. Moti Ram. PW-5 Yugal Kishore was a Shopkeeper in the village. This witness had stated that on 22.04.2013 at about 4.00 PM, the appellant had visited his shop and purchased a packet of biscuits and a chocolate. He denied that the appellant had given the biscuits and chocolate to any one in his presence. PW-5 was declared hostile but nothing material could be elicited from him. PW-9 stated that he was running a Dhaba in village Nirmand. On 22.04.2013, at about 2.30 p.m. the appellant had visited his Dhaba with a boy, aged around 3-4 years. He denied that the appellant had given the biscuits and chocolate to any one in his presence. PW-5 was declared hostile but nothing material could be elicited from him. PW-9 stated that he was running a Dhaba in village Nirmand. On 22.04.2013, at about 2.30 p.m. the appellant had visited his Dhaba with a boy, aged around 3-4 years. The boy had his lunch whereas the appellant did not. Thereafter, both left the Dhaba and it was on 25.04.2013 that this witness had come to know that a boy from the village was missing. 14. Learned trial Court held the statements of PW-5 and PW-9 to be insufficient to conclude that the deceased was in the company of appellant on 22.04.2013. The reasons assigned for such conclusion by the learned trial Court were that PW-5 did not notice any child with the appellant and PW-9 had also not identified the child to be the deceased. It was also held that according to PW-9, the child accompanying the appellant had visited his Dhaba at 2.30 P.M. whereas the complainant i.e. the mother of the deceased, PW-1 had stated that the child was with her till 4.00-4.30 P.M. and had gone missing thereafter. 15. On perusal of evidence on record and the material relied upon by learned trial Court for holding the aforesaid circumstances firstly and secondly not proved, we are convinced with the findings recorded by learned trial Court and do not have reasons to differ. 16. Now coming to the circumstance that the appellant had tried to escape from the village despite instructions to the contrary, we find that the findings and conclusion drawn by learned trial Court are not based on legal evidence, rather were result of mere surmises and conjectures. Learned trial Court placed reliance on the fact that the police had got lead with the help of dog squad, which was sufficient to raise suspicion regarding the involvement of the appellant. Statement of PW-8 Tek Chand, to the effect that police had taken help of dog squad, the dog had tracked the route upto the accommodation of appellant and also that police had issued instructions that no “Bihari” labourer would leave the village, apparently weighed with learned trial Court. The appellant has been held to defy such a command. We find such view of learned trial Court to be erroneous. The appellant has been held to defy such a command. We find such view of learned trial Court to be erroneous. Indubitably, the dog squad had visited the spot on 25.04.2013 along with the team of forensic experts. Reference in this behalf can be had from the statements of PW-18 Inspector Prem Lal and PW-22 Dy. S.P. Praveer Thakur. Thus, the lead, if any, could have been provided by dog squad only after its visit on 25.4.2013. In such circumstance, the reason for raising suspicion against “Bihari” labour in general and against appellant in particular, especially on 24.04.2013 remained unexplained. What was the other reason to suspect “Bihari” labour or the appellant has not come forth, hence, there was no reason for the police to have commanded all the labour class from Bihar, residing in the village or the area, not to leave the village. Further, there is no evidence on record to suggest that what was the mode of communicating said command by police to Bihari labour, especially to the appellant. In fact, the communication of such command by police to the appellant has not been proved. Even while examining the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the appellant was not confronted that he was under instructions not to leave the village. Vide question number 25 of said statement appellant was asked about the instructions issued to “Bihari” labourers in general, regarding which he had answered “I do not know.” 17. Appellant was stated to have been apprehended at a distance of 8-10 Kms. from village Nirmand in the morning of 25.04.2013. As per PW-2 Ram Krishan, he was approached by Manohar Lal (the acquitted co-accused) on 25.4.2013 in the morning and was apprised that appellant had confessed before him (Manohar Lal) that the victim child had been murdered by appellant. PW-2 had further stated that while Manohar Lal was conversing with him a telephonic call was received by Manohar Lal regarding the factum of appellant having absconded in the meanwhile. PW-8 Tek Singh stated that on 25.04.2013, at about 8.30 P.M. one Bihari Labourer asked this witness as to whether he had seen some Bihari labourer. On inquiry by PW-8, the Bihari labour told that they all would be implicated as one of their native fellow had absconded. PW-8 Tek Singh stated that on 25.04.2013, at about 8.30 P.M. one Bihari Labourer asked this witness as to whether he had seen some Bihari labourer. On inquiry by PW-8, the Bihari labour told that they all would be implicated as one of their native fellow had absconded. On such information, this witness apprehended the appellant at village Daropa at a distance of about 10 kilometers from Nirmand at about 10.30 A.M. PW-8 was also accompanied by other co-villagers for apprehending the appellant including PW-20 Ghanshyam. From the statement of PW-8, it was not clear as to why the appellant was chased when none was named by the person who had informed PW-8 about the fleeing of a Bihari labourer. It also remained unexplained as to who disclosed about the direction where the appellant had gone. Similarly, reliance has been placed on the statement of PW-20 Ghanshyam, who had stated that he noticed appellant running towards Daropa and PW-8 Tek Singh was following him, so he also followed Tek Singh. As per this witness, the appellant had confessed his crime after his apprehension. 18. The statements of PW-2, PW-8 and PW-20 have to be looked at with some circumspection as they could be said to be interested witnesses being residents of same village and also emotionally charged at the happening of gruesome murder of the child. It was not the case that PW-2 had informed PW-8 about the information supplied by Manohar Lal. PW-8 Tek Singh had stated that he had telephonically informed PW-20 Ghanshyam and another person about the fact of appellant having escaped, whereas PW-20 did not say so. According to PW-20, appellant had confessed his crime, but PW-8 did not confirm such fact. Thus, the prosecution evidence in this regard was not very cogent. Yet, what was inferable from statements of above noted witnesses was that the appellant had left the village in the morning. 19. In given circumstances could it be assumed that appellant had intended to escape? Simply because he was found at some distance from the village in the morning, was not such a circumstance on the basis of which the allegations against the appellant could be said to have been proved. PW-8 had further stated that when appellant was apprehended at Daropa, he was drunk and was carrying a bottle of liquor in his hand. Simply because he was found at some distance from the village in the morning, was not such a circumstance on the basis of which the allegations against the appellant could be said to have been proved. PW-8 had further stated that when appellant was apprehended at Daropa, he was drunk and was carrying a bottle of liquor in his hand. Had the appellant left the village with intent to abscond, he would not be found in drunken state in the early hours of the morning with a bottle of liquor in his hand. He would have tried to be as far away as possible from the village. In addition to above, the prosecution case was that there was rage and emotional burst in the entire village after discovery of dead body of the victim child. PW-18, the Investigating Officer of the case, had been categoric about such fact. Had the appellant being apprehensive of his implication, he could have easily taken the benefit of night intervening 24th to 25th April, 2013, to abscond and would not have waited for the sun to rise next morning. 20. Learned trial court had further based the conviction of the appellant on the hypothesis that articles found from the gunny bag, from surroundings of spot where dead body was found and also recovered from the room of appellant had similarities. We do not find such premise to have backing of legal evidence. It is worth noticing that even the evidence in this respect was not convincing and free from suspicion. 21. There was glaring evidence on record that the room of appellant was accessible even on 24.04.2013. PW-6 stated that the room was searched even on 24.04.2013 by the police and nothing was found therein. It being so, how the alleged incriminating material came to be placed in the room thereafter is a mystery. Even otherwise, it was not the case that the appellant had not used his room during intervening night of 24th -25th April, 2013. On the next date i.e. 25.04.2013 also as per available evidence the room was only bolted from outside. Meaning thereby, that room could be opened and accessed by anyone. The reason for making search in the room of appellant on 24.04.2013 have remained unexplained. In case of any suspicion the said room should have been preserved immediately. 22. On the next date i.e. 25.04.2013 also as per available evidence the room was only bolted from outside. Meaning thereby, that room could be opened and accessed by anyone. The reason for making search in the room of appellant on 24.04.2013 have remained unexplained. In case of any suspicion the said room should have been preserved immediately. 22. The emergence of facts regarding, articles found in the gunny bag or around the spot of discovery of dead body, again was not beyond suspicion. Immediately after discovery of dead body, the police had made inquest reports Ex.PW-18/B and Ex.PW-18/C. The time of receipt of the information by police is recorded as 6.30 P.M. whereas as per statement of PW-18 Inspector Prem Lal he had received telephonic information from C. Pritam Singh at about 4.30 P.M. The inquest papers despite having specific columns requiring the police to provide details regarding the articles found near the dead body, were completely silent about any article found from the gunny bag or the surroundings. The trial Court has placed reliance on photographs Ex.PW-18/A-1 to Ex.PW-18/A-6, allegedly clicked by the police at the time of discovery of dead body, but there is no convincing evidence that these photographs were clicked on 24.04.2013. Another fact which could not be ignored was that in case such articles were found in the gunny bag or near the place of discovery of dead body, why the police did not seize such articles immediately on 24.04.2013? It was only during the inspection of the spot by the forensic experts on 25.4.2013 that such articles were taken into possession. Strangely, no document of recovery and seizure of body of the child and articles found therewith was prepared on 24.4.2013. Ext. PW-2/A, the recovery and seizure memo, in this regard, bears the date 25.4.2013. PW-18 stated that the spot of recovery of body of deceased was preserved and protected till 25.4.2013 but again no positive evidence had been led in that behalf. None of the prosecution witness had come forward to depose that he had witnessed the discovery of gunny bag with dead body. Even C. Pritam Singh, who had allegedly informed the investigating officer telephonically regarding this fact, had not been examined as witness. 23. Even otherwise, the scientific laboratory reports Ex. None of the prosecution witness had come forward to depose that he had witnessed the discovery of gunny bag with dead body. Even C. Pritam Singh, who had allegedly informed the investigating officer telephonically regarding this fact, had not been examined as witness. 23. Even otherwise, the scientific laboratory reports Ex. PW-10/B, Ex.PW-11/A, Ex.PW-11/B, Ex.PW-19/A, Ex.PW-19/B and Ex.PW-23/C obtained during investigation did not suggest, any strikingly incriminating evidence against the appellant, from analysis of articles allegedly found in the gunny bag as also near the spot. Though, the butt of “Beedi” found on the spot had generated sufficient DNA but it had not matched the DNA of appellant. What only had been found similar in both sets of articles, from the scientific laboratory reports, was the pieces of card board with words “Binola No. 1 Nirol Soap” printed thereon. Undisputedly, this is a brand name of Soap and the card boards were nothing but packing material of the product, which would be same if found at different places. Thus, similarity found between these pieces of card board could not be taken as an incriminating circumstance against the appellant especially in light of various other attending facts having emerged on record and as noticed above. 24. Thus, the evidence, in our considered view was completely lacking and insufficient as also unconvincing to hold the circumstances thirdly and fourthly, as noticed above, proved against the appellant. The findings and conclusions drawn by learned trial court, to sustain conviction of appellant on the basis of available material, cannot be sustained. The facts considered hereinabove appears to have escaped the attention of learned Sessions Judge, which have led to the conviction of appellant on the material which in our considered opinion is not sufficient to hold him guilty. 25. The cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence has remained impassive. The prosecution has to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts. Appearance of serious doubt in the prosecution case only helps the case of accused. More serious the offence, more arduous is the duty cast upon prosecution to discharge its burden strictly in accordance with law. In absence of direct evidence, circumstances relied upon by the prosecution have to satisfy the same standard of proof i.e. beyond all reasonable doubts. Appearance of serious doubt in the prosecution case only helps the case of accused. More serious the offence, more arduous is the duty cast upon prosecution to discharge its burden strictly in accordance with law. In absence of direct evidence, circumstances relied upon by the prosecution have to satisfy the same standard of proof i.e. beyond all reasonable doubts. Once this barrier is successfully crossed, it is to be shown that all the circumstances form a complete chain of facts suggesting only one hypothesis i.e. the guilt of the accused. 26. In Anjan Kumar Sarma vs. State of Assam, (2017) 14 SCC 359 Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “14. Admittedly, this is a case of circumstantial evidence. Factors to be taken into account in adjudication of cases of circumstantial evidence laid down by this Court are: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned “must” or “should” and not “may be” established. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 27. We are governed by rule of law. No conviction can be recorded on assumption. Prosecution has to discharge its burden by proving the guilt of accused beyond all reasonable doubts and for such purposes, it has to prove the fact in issue on the basis of relevant and admissible evidence. Merely, because police get knowledge about the culprit either from illegal confession extracted from him or from any other source will not absolve the prosecution from its duty to prove the guilt of the accused in accordance with law. 28. In the instant case, the prosecution has also failed to attribute and prove any motive to the appellant for commission of crime in question. 28. In the instant case, the prosecution has also failed to attribute and prove any motive to the appellant for commission of crime in question. In Babu vs. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “25. In State of U.P. vs. Kishanpal and Others, (2008) 16 SCC 73 , this Court examined the importance of motive in cases of circumstantial evidence and observed: (SCC pp. 87-88, Paras 38-39). “38........the motive is a thing which is primarily known to the accused themselves and it is not possible for the prosecution to explain what actually promoted or excited them to commit the particular crime. 39. The motive may be considered as a circumstance which is relevant for assessing the evidence but if the evidence is clear and unambiguous and the circumstances prove the guilt of the accused, the same is not weakened even if the motive is not a very strong one. It is also settled law that the motive loses all its importance in a case where direct evidence of eyewitnesses is available, because even if there may be a very strong motive for the accused persons to commit a particular crime, they cannot be convicted if the evidence of eyewitnesses is not convincing. In the same way, even if there may not be an apparent motive but if the evidence of the eyewitnesses is clear and reliable, the absence or inadequacy of motive cannot stand in the way of conviction.” 26. This Court has also held that the absence of motive in a case depending on circumstantial evidence is a factor that weighs in favour of the accused.” 29. Though, the absence of motive may not be a determinative factor, yet it is an important link to complete the chain of circumstance, which is wholly missing in the present case. 30. A close scrutiny of the material on record would disclose that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant were not proved and also failed to form a complete chain of events leading to the conclusion that in all human probability the murder must have been committed by the appellant. 31. In light of above discussion, there is merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly allowed. 31. In light of above discussion, there is merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly allowed. The judgment dated 21.12.2016 and consequent sentence order of the same day, passed in Sessions Trial No. 0000024/2014, whereby, the appellant has been convicted and sentenced for commission of offence under Sections 302, 363 and 201 IPC is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of all charges and is directed to be set free forthwith, if not required in any other case. 32. In view of the provisions of Section 437 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, appellant is directed to furnish his personal bonds in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount, before the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, which shall be effective for the period of six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of leave, the appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Supreme Court. 33. The appeal is accordingly disposed of so also pending misc. applications, if any.4o05