Sunstar Seed Pvt Ltd Rep By D. Sriramulu Reddy v. Yeruva arla Reddy
2022-04-19
K.SREENIVASA REDDY
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, is filed to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.213 of 2016 on the file of the I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Sattenapalli, Guntur District, registered for the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 2. The facts averred in the present Criminal Petition are that the 1st respondent/complainant is doing business in seeds. The complainant purchased chilli seeds from the company of the petitioner/accused and sold the same to the farmers of Thallacheruvu, Pedapalem Villages and also surrounding villages. The farmers who purchased the said chilli seeds through the accused company have cultivated their lands. But, the said chilli seeds did not give fruitful yielding and the same was informed to the accused company authorities by the complainant. In response, the accused company authorities visited the said fields and agreed to give compensation to the farmers through the complainant and had issued five (5) cheques each, for an amount of Rs.6 lakhs after executing an undertaking letter on 04.01.2016. But, the said cheques were returned with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. Hence, the 1st respondent filed complaint for the offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I.Act and the I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Sattenapalli, Guntur District, took cognizance of the said offence. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, the learned Special Assistant Public Prosecutor for the 2nd respondent. This Court perused the record. 4. The cheques, dated 25.1.2016, 25.2.2016 and 25.3.2016, were returned unpaid for the reason ‘funds insufficient’ in the account of petitioner’s company. The complainant got issued a registered legal notice on 25.4.2015 demanding the petitioner/accused to arrange the payment of cheque amount. The petitioner/accused refused to receive the said legal notice on 05.5.2016. Subsequently, the 1st respondent/complainant has filed the present complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act on 18.5.2016. The present complaint, is a premature one, since the same has been filed even before completion of 15 days period. 5.
The petitioner/accused refused to receive the said legal notice on 05.5.2016. Subsequently, the 1st respondent/complainant has filed the present complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act on 18.5.2016. The present complaint, is a premature one, since the same has been filed even before completion of 15 days period. 5. Section 138 (c) of N.I. Act says that “the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice:” The relevant date, on which, the complaint is filed has to be taken but not the date of taking cognizance by the Court. 6. According to Section 190 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such an offence. Unless the offence is ex facie disclosed in the complaint, the Magistrate cannot have any competence to take cognizance of the offence and proceed further. If the complaint is filed even before the expiry of 15 days, it would amount to premature complaint. The Magistrate ought not to have taken cognizance of the said complaint. The Negotiable Instruments Act is a special law. When once certain conditions are stipulated under the special law the conditions have to be strictly complied with. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Yogendra Pratap Singh Vs. Savitri Pandey and another, (2014) 10 SCC 713 held as follows; “36. Can an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act be said to have been committed when the period provided in clause (c) of the proviso has not expired? Section 2(d) of the Code defines ‘complaint’. According to this definition, complaint means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to taking his action against a person who has committed an offence. Commission of an offence is a sine qua non for filing a complaint and for taking cognizance of such offence. A bare reading of the provision contained in clause (c) of the proviso makes it clear that no complaint can be filed for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act unless the period of 15 days has elapsed.
Commission of an offence is a sine qua non for filing a complaint and for taking cognizance of such offence. A bare reading of the provision contained in clause (c) of the proviso makes it clear that no complaint can be filed for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act unless the period of 15 days has elapsed. Any complaint before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint at all in the eye of law. It is not the question of prematurity of the complaint where it is filed before expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on him, it is no complaint at all under law. As a matter of fact, Section 142 of the NI Act, inter alia, creates a legal bar on the Court from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 138 except upon a written complaint. Since a complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint in the eye of law, obviously, no cognizance of an offence can be taken on the basis of such complaint. Merely because at the time of taking cognizance by the Court, the period of 15 days has expired from the date on which notice has been served on the drawer/accused, the Court is not clothed with the jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under Section 138 on a complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice by the drawer of the cheque. 37. A complaint filed before expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on drawer/accused cannot be said to disclose the cause of action in terms of clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 and upon such complaint which does not disclose the cause of action the Court is not competent to take cognizance.
37. A complaint filed before expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on drawer/accused cannot be said to disclose the cause of action in terms of clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 and upon such complaint which does not disclose the cause of action the Court is not competent to take cognizance. A conjoint reading of Section 138, which defines as to when and under what circumstances an offence can be said to have been committed, with Section 142(b) of the NI Act, that reiterates the position of the point of time when the cause of action has arisen, leaves no manner of doubt that no offence can be said to have been committed unless and until the period of 15 days, as prescribed under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, has, in fact, elapsed. Therefore, a Court is barred in law from taking cognizance of such complaint. It is not open to the Court to take cognizance of such a complaint merely because on the date of consideration or taking cognizance thereof a period of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused has elapsed. We have no doubt that all the five essential features of Section 138 of the NI Act, as noted in the judgment of this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd.19 and which we have approved, must be satisfied for a complaint to be filed under Section 138. If the period prescribed in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 has not expired, there is no commission of an offence nor accrual of cause of action for filing of complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act.” 8. Admittedly, the complaint filed before expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on drawer/accused, cannot be said to disclose the cause of action in terms of clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the N.I. Act. When the cause of action has not arisen, the Court is not competent to take cognizance of the said offence. A conjoint reading of Section 138 of N.I. Act, and Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, would categorically say that when the cause of action arises. In view of the said legal position, the Court is barred from taking cognizance on such complaint. 9.
A conjoint reading of Section 138 of N.I. Act, and Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, would categorically say that when the cause of action arises. In view of the said legal position, the Court is barred from taking cognizance on such complaint. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court also observed that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque may file a fresh complaint within one month from the date of decision in the criminal case and, in that event, delay in filing the complaint will be treated as having been condoned under the proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the NI Act. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vishal Sharma Vs. Balakran Singh, 2015 SCC Online P & H 4321 when a similar situation has arisen where the complaint was premature and the same was quashed in view of the fact that the complaint is not maintainable. It is held in paragraph No.13 as follows; “In view of the above, it is held that the complaint (Annexure P-8) was premature and not maintainable. The petition is allowed and impugned complaint and subsequent proceedings taken therein are quashed. The complainant-respondent may file fresh complaint within one month from today in the Court of competent jurisdiction raising the grievance in relation to the said cheque referred to in the impugned complaint. The delay in filing the complaint will be treated as having been condoned under the proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act, as held in Yogendra Pratap Singh's case (supra). The petitioner can also seek return of his original documents which prayer shall be dealt with in accordance with law by the Court concerned expeditiously to enable him (complainant) to file a fresh complaint.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in Manas Karmakar vs Jayprakash Prasad, 2016 SCC Online Cal 2090 held in paragraph No.10 as follows; “In view of my above findings, the criminal proceeding being A.C.2081 of 2011 pending before the Court of learned Magistrate, 8th Court, Alipore is quashed. The opposite party/complainant is at liberty to file fresh complaint against the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the delay in filing the fresh complaint must be treated as condoned by learned Magistrate under the proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.” 11.
The opposite party/complainant is at liberty to file fresh complaint against the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the delay in filing the fresh complaint must be treated as condoned by learned Magistrate under the proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.” 11. Learned counsel for the complainant/ 1st respondent in all fairness accepted the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the complaint filed before the trial Court is a premature complaint. The said complaint has been filed before expiry of 15 days time given to the petitioner herein for payment of cheque amount. He did not dispute the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Yogendra Pratap Singh Vs. Savitri Pandey and another, (2014) 10 SCC 713 . 12. In view of the facts in this case and also the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex court in the above cited cases, this Court is of the view that continuation of proceedings as against the petitioner is nothing but abuse of process of Court. Hence, the proceedings in C.C.No.213 of 2016 on the file of the I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Sattenapalli, Guntur District are hereby quashed. The complainant/respondent is at liberty to file fresh complaint before the competent Court within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The delay in filing the complaint will be treated as having been condoned under the proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act, as held in Yogendra Pratap Singh’s case (supra). The petitioner Court concerned expeditiously to enable the complainant to file a fresh complaint. With the above observation, the Criminal Petition is disposed of. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in the Criminal Petition shall stand closed.