ORDER : Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 2. The appellants, who are three in numbers, are the plaintiffs in a civil suit in which the respondents are the defendants. The suit is lying on the file of the court of learned Ist Additional District Judge, Srinagar, filed on 28th October 2021. 3. In the suit the appellants are seeking a decree of declaration with consequential reliefs of mandatory and perpetual injunction qua their respective status being in service/employment of the respondent no. 1 (Vishwa Bharati Women’s Welfare Institution) in the context of their age of retirement. 4. The legal status set up in the suit by the appellants with respect to themselves is that they are the faculty members of the respondent no. 1 run, managed and administered private educational college, namely, Vishwa Bharati Women’s Degree College, Rainawari, Srinagar. The appellants trace their employment with the respondent no. 1 by appointment as lecturers in the year 1993 starting firstly on contractual basis followed by temporary appointment maturing in the regular permanent basis with effect from year 2001 onwards. 5. Being the faculty members of the Vishwa Bharati Women’s Degree College, Rainawari, Srinagar, the appellants came to find their service tenure being sought to be subjected to a purported end upon issuance of a communication no. VB/CJ/AC/327-31/MC dated 6th July 2021 issued by the respondent no. 4 i.e., the General Secretary, Managing Committee of the respondent no. 1 addressed to the respondent no. 5 i.e., the Principal Vishwa Bharati Women’s Degree College Rainawari, Srinagar. In terms of this communication, the respondent no. 5 gets directed to delete the names of eight employees, which included the names of the appellants as well, from the salary bill on the ground that said eight employees have already attained age of 60 years. This communication gets acted upon by the respondent no. 5 by issuance of communication no. VB/CJ/AC/333-35/MC dated 14th July directing thereby withholding of the salary of the appellants being in the group of eight employees. 6. The issue which came to brew, with issuance of the aforementioned two communications, is the age of retirement of the appellants from the service of the respondent no. 1. 5 by issuance of communication no. VB/CJ/AC/333-35/MC dated 14th July directing thereby withholding of the salary of the appellants being in the group of eight employees. 6. The issue which came to brew, with issuance of the aforementioned two communications, is the age of retirement of the appellants from the service of the respondent no. 1. The appellants claimed that even after attainment of age of 60 years they continue to be in service as the age of retirement in their case as per the Rules governing the time of their appointment is 65 years, whereas by import of the said two communications the respondents reckoned the appellants to be overstaying in the Service after age of 60 years as being the age of retirement put in place by the amendment of the Rules with effect from year 2005. 7. The trial court of learned Ist Additional District Judge, Srinagar came to hear and dispose of the temporary injunction application filed by the appellants accompanying their suit. The trial court, vide its order dated 24th May 2022, came to decline the indulgence to said temporary injunction application of the appellants on the count that by effect of section 19 read with section 10 of the J&K Private Colleges (Regulation & Control) Act, 2002, a civil court suffers a bar to grant any injunction or make any interim order restraining any proceeding which is being or about to be taken under the Act. Thus, not on merits of the case but because of the statutory hurdle, the court below came to pass the order dated 24th May, 2022 which is now being assailed by the appellants in appeal purportedly filed under Order 43 rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 before this Court. 8. Mr. R. A. Jan, the learned Senior Advocate, arguing for the appellants submits that the court below has fallen in a very patent error of reading and understanding of section 19 of the J&K Private Colleges (Regulation & Control) Act, 2002 (hereinafter to be referred as “Act of 2002”) which in no manner was applicable to the facts of the case of the appellants in the suit. The learned Sr. The learned Sr. Advocate, with his inviting professional argumentative felicity, has adverted to the provisions of the said Act of 2002 to show that section 19 is diametrically positioned in opposite to the case of the appellants in the suit and the relief as asked for in the temporary injunction application. This Court has been assisted by the learned Sr. Counsel representing the appellants to bear the understanding of the scheme of the Act of 2002 so as to appreciate the true scope and intendment of section 19. 9. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondents has banked upon the impugned order itself to argue that section 19 of Act of 2002 comes in way of the appellants to seek any temporary injunction relief in their suit from the court below. 10. Though both sides have adverted at length to factual side of the case as well but this court has registered the factual side submissions only to keep the same observation free as the same may not be of any avail to deal with the matter in hand by this court. 11. Before proceeding to delve into and dwell upon the meat of the matter, this court deems it fit at first to check as to which jurisdiction this court shall embark upon for dealing with the impugned order. 12. The appellants have come invoking the appellate jurisdiction of this court purportedly bearing an impression that since their temporary injunction application in civil suit has been declined by the trial court so the impugned order renders itself amenable to an appeal under section 104 read with Order 43 rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. However, a close examination of the matter instantiates that the trial court has not carried out any adjudication, under Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, of the temporary injunction application of the appellants on its merits so as to clothe the impugned order with full trappings of an order under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Thus, with nature of the impugned order as it is, this Court may not be possessed of an appellate jurisdiction under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to deal with the examination of the impugned order. 13. Thus, with nature of the impugned order as it is, this Court may not be possessed of an appellate jurisdiction under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to deal with the examination of the impugned order. 13. On the other hand, this court finds that as the trial court of learned Ist Additional District Judge, Srinagar, has declined the indulgence in the matter on the count of bar of jurisdiction to adjudicate the temporary injunction application of the appellants on its own merits, by reading a statutory bar set in place not by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 but by section 19 of the Act of 2002, so this court is well possessed of a constitutional jurisdiction of supervisory nature and intent under article 227 of the Constitution of India to venture into examination of the matter from the point of view as to whether the court below has acted in abidance of the jurisdiction or in abdication of jurisdiction. Thus, it is under article 227 of the Constitution of India that this court is enabling the examination of the impugned order notwithstanding the nomenclature of the jurisdiction cited by the appellants. 14. Since the trial court of learned Ist Additional District Judge Srinagar has read a bar to grant injunction or interim relief from section 19 of the Act of 2002, so the text of said section calls for its immediate reproduction text wise which is as under:- “19. Courts not to grant injunction Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, Samvat 1977 or in any other law for the time being in force, no court shall grant any injunction or make any interim order restraining any proceeding which is being or about to be taken under this Act.” 15. In order to bring the case of the appellants for temporary injunction in the suit within the prohibition contained in section 19 of the Act of 2002, the trial court has read and related the issue of age of retirement in the private college being served by section 10 of the Act of 2002. Thus Section 10 also needs to be set out for the facility of its reading:- “10. Thus Section 10 also needs to be set out for the facility of its reading:- “10. Conditions of service of staff in private colleges The general conditions of service of teaching and non-teaching staff in private colleges including conditions relating to minimum eligibility, pay, gratuity, provident fund and age of retirement shall be such as may be determined by the concerned educational agency in the prescribed manner.” 16. Now it is evident beyond any doubt that by mix play and perception of section 10 and section 19 of said Act of 2002 the trial Court assumed rather than held the issue of claim and counter claim as to age of retirement of the appellants in the service of the respondent no. 1’s educational institution as a matter of proceeding and as such to be beyond the reach of an injunction or interim restraining Order. The reading of operative part of impugned order is set out next. “8. Thus, from the conjoint reading of Section 10 as well as Section 19 of the Act, the relief claimed in the suit comes within the preview of Section 10 of the Act for which the concerned Educational Agency has taken a decision with respect to the withholding of the salary and the age of retirement, as such Section 19 bars this court from granting any injunction or making any interim order restraining any proceedings which is being or about to be taken under this Act. In my humble view the impugned order has been passed by the non-applicants/defendants in consonance with the Act, as such this court lacks its jurisdiction to grant any injunction or make any interim order restraining any proceeding which is being or about to be taken under this Act as mentioned herein above. Therefore, the ad-interim order passed by this court on 09.11.2021 stands vacated. Ordered accordingly...” 17. This Court will hazard a safe guess that the Court below focused its mind more on the prohibition part of section 19 saying that no Court shall grant any Injunction, and then suspended its judicial application of mind any further as to which sort of fact position of a given case the bar is meant to apply. 18. This Court will hazard a safe guess that the Court below focused its mind more on the prohibition part of section 19 saying that no Court shall grant any Injunction, and then suspended its judicial application of mind any further as to which sort of fact position of a given case the bar is meant to apply. 18. There are two angles from which the appreciation of the Court below can be safely analysed to have taken flight and that makes this court to see which of two angles can hold footing or the court below erred in its very understanding and interpretation. Said two angles tangent upon expression “Proceeding” finding mention in section 19 of the Act of 2002 the face value impression of said expression and/or the implied impression of said expression. 19. It is a clear that the Act of 2002 does not define the expression “Proceeding” as used in section 19. Once it has not been defined as such, then principle stated in the Latin maxim “ ex vi termini” meaning that “ from the very meaning of the expression used” serves the purpose to understand the expression in the context of the Act of 2002. As Act of 2002 is not providing any adjudication of disputes mechanism so the expression “Proceeding” will not be understood in the manner and intent as explained by the Hon’ble SC in Babu Lal Vs Hazari Lal Kishore Lal ( 1982 (1) SCC 525 ) and Ram Chander Aggarwal Vs State of UP (1966 AIR SC 1888) because in said two citations the expression proceeding is in context adjudicatory procedure related proceeding. So, this court is left to be guided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s interpretative approach as laid down in Tarlochan Dev Sharma vs State of Punjab & Ors (2001 AIR SC 2524) affording service of “subject and object rule”. 20. The Court below has not laboured enough to explain lest expound as to how section 19 of the Act of 2002 has been held applicable to apply bar contemplated under said section 19. This is evident from the para 8 of the impugned order, the operative part of which has been reproduced supra. 21. It is a well-known principle of law as embodied in legal maxim “ ex facto jus oritur” meaning that law arises out of facts. This is evident from the para 8 of the impugned order, the operative part of which has been reproduced supra. 21. It is a well-known principle of law as embodied in legal maxim “ ex facto jus oritur” meaning that law arises out of facts. Firstly it is the facts which are to be scanned and surveyed in full frame without any editing before the application of law is called upon to take effect. The facts of the present case carrying the dispute are as to the applicable age of retirement of the appellants which is 65 years as per the appellants by reference to contemporary rule position of the time, and which is 60 years as per the amended position of the rule as claimed by the respondents. Now, before accepting the application of bar of section 19, the Court below was obliged first to discern from the pleadings of the case as to whether the relief in the suit and accompanying application for temporary injunction is being claimed against any named/identified proceeding or in other words which purported proceeding under the Act is said to have germinated the issue but the Court below has faulted on this score by saying nothing and in fact not even pondering on this aspect. Surely the consequential reliefs of injunctions sought in the suit and the temporary injunction relief sought in the application accompanying the suit are not addressed against any proceeding per-se but are aimed against a direction as communicated vide the communications challenged in the suit. On which factual basis the Court below read the communications under challenge in the suit before it as reflective and representative of proceeding is missing link in the impugned order. The reason for the said omission on the part of the court below is obvious as the Court below did not pose to itself an elementary question before mechanically applying the break of bar under section 19 which question is that which is the proceeding generated under the Act being challenged in the case against which the appellants are craving for an injunction. This is the first of two conceivable angles from which the Court below might have held the application of bar of section 19 but said angle has not been evidently used to reach the impugned conclusion in its order. 22. This is the first of two conceivable angles from which the Court below might have held the application of bar of section 19 but said angle has not been evidently used to reach the impugned conclusion in its order. 22. Now, as in the impugned order the Court below has not traced/tracked the particular proceedings involved in the case against which bar of grant of injunction or interim order of restraint was held applicable, so the other angle left to be taken note of is that the court below, in fact, by default assumption read and reckoned the expression “Proceeding” containing and subsuming the expressions namely an Order/Decision/Direction/Action. Only by carrying the hangover of Order/Decision/decision/action being an outcome of some proceeding under the Act, the Court below’s application of mind in the case to hold the application of section 19’s bar can be said to have been borne. Thus, by over stretching its own assumption that the direction contained in the communications challenged in the suit must be a product of some proceeding under the Act, so the Court below magnetised the bar under section 19 to the application for temporary Injunction of the appellants. This is where the Impugned Order is to be found faltering factually and legally. 23. Now, coming to examine the aspect as to whether the expression “Proceeding” used in section 19 of the Act of 2002 is restricted in its intent and import or expansive one so as to test the legality of the impugned Order, this court is to embark upon the interpretation mode to find an answer. 24. The Act of 2002’s preamble carries its introduction that it is meant for the regulation and control of the private colleges. Thus, the Act is a regulatory in subject. The regulation and control mechanism are by and between the Govt. and the Private Colleges. To achieve the said objective of regulation and control, the Act envisages dos and don’ts for the Private Colleges, its promoters/ founders/administrators etc. This regulation and control is to be generated and exercised through statute envisaged proceeding. It is with respect to said regulation and control related and relatable proceeding under the Act of 2002 that the legislature intended to provide insulation from Civil courts’ injunctions or restraint orders which section 19’s bar actually aims at and nothing else. This regulation and control is to be generated and exercised through statute envisaged proceeding. It is with respect to said regulation and control related and relatable proceeding under the Act of 2002 that the legislature intended to provide insulation from Civil courts’ injunctions or restraint orders which section 19’s bar actually aims at and nothing else. If the legislature had intended that other than proceeding, even an order/direction/decision/action of and on behalf of the Private college were also to be saved from suffering any court injunction or restraint, then very list of said words would not have been lost to memory and wisdom of the legislature from being inscribed in section 19 itself in the next company of the expression proceeding, and not leaving it for the courts to surf the section 19 of the Act of 2002 to read and understand expression proceeding including every order/direction/decision/action. Words order/decision/direction/action are words of ordinary as well as of well accepted and acknowledged legal import and as such if these words have been left out from being put in section 19 of the Act of 2002 leaving word “proceeding” to stay and stand alone in said section then it means that the compass of the word/expression “Proceeding” is restrictive and not expansive. 25. There is a very staring difficulty in going along with the understanding of the court below with respect to section 19 of the Act of 2002 because if it is accepted as it is then that literally means to read a bar of every civil suit in which principal or consequential relief claimed be of a perpetual/mandatory injunction. However, the legislature has not legislated a bar of jurisdiction of civil court to take cognizance of civil suit in which relief claimed is an injunction because if that would have been the intendment then section 19’s wording would have been very direct in saying so. Thus, it means that the prohibition for civil court to grant injunction under the provisions of CPC as contemplated under and by section 19 of the Act of 2002 is restrictive and that restriction is with respect to the proceeding under the Act. Order/Decision/Direction within the administration and management domain of a private college is not meant to be a proceeding within fore corner of section 19. Law, other than law of limitation, is not meant to create a disability of remedy. Order/Decision/Direction within the administration and management domain of a private college is not meant to be a proceeding within fore corner of section 19. Law, other than law of limitation, is not meant to create a disability of remedy. Act of 2002 does not provide an alternate adjudicatory mechanism for service-related disputes of the establishment of a private college so as to read section 19 in that context. 26. Keeping in view the aforesaid examination, evaluation and understanding of the case, the impugned order is set aside. The Court below is directed to hear and dispose of the temporary injunction application in the case on its merits without suffering the bar of section 19 of the Act of 2002. Till the disposal of the temporary injunction application of the appellants by the Court below, interim direction as was operating in the case shall stand and stay revived to be in operation.