JUDGMENT : K. SURENDER, J. 1. The appeal is filed aggrieved by the conviction under Section 306 of IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years and to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of six months, by Judgment dated 04.03.2020 in S.C. No. 503 of 2017 passed by the II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge at Hyderabad (for short ‘the Sessions Judge’). 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 23.06.2015, the deceased, who is the wife of the appellant/accused was admitted to the ‘Burns Ward’ in Osmania General Hospital. Statement of the deceased was recorded by PW-9 sub-inspector initially, wherein she stated that the appellant/accused, who is her husband used to consume ganja and beat her and also threatens to kill her. For the said reason, she poured kerosene on herself and set ablaze due to the said harassment. On the basis of the said complaint, the First Information Report was registered as ‘Woman Burns” vide Cr. No. 138 of 2015 of P.S. Kanchanbagh, Hyderabad on 24.06.2015. During the course of her treatment, she died on 27.06.2015 and for the reason of her death, the section of law was altered to Section 306 of IPC on 01.07.2015. 3. During the course of her treatment, the deceased was also examined by the XVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad examined as PW-6. During the course of her statement, she stated that the appellant used to beat her and when she stated that she was going to set fire to herself, the appellant/husband encouraged and then she set fire to herself. Hearing her cries, neighbours and the husband poured water on her and took her to the Osmania General Hospital. 4. The learned II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, having recorded the evidence of PWs. 1 to 11 and having marked Exs.P1 to P11, convicted the appellant/accused under Section 306 of IPC for abetting his wife to commit suicide. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused argued that there cannot be any abetment of the offence for committing suicide as the deceased herself threatened to commit suicide for not taking her to her parents’ house as per the statement made to PW-9. When she set herself ablaze before the appellant, he poured water on her and took her to the hospital. When she set herself ablaze before the appellant, he poured water on her and took her to the hospital. The two dying declarations under Exs.P6 and P9 cannot be considered for the reason of the said statements being recorded on 24.06.2015, whereas, the deceased died three days thereafter i.e. on 27.06.2015, for which reason, the statements made under Exs.P6 and P9 cannot be treated as dying declarations and make them basis for conviction. Further, the trial court failed to examine any Doctor or duty Doctor to speak about the mental and health condition of the deceased to make any statement and lastly none of the witnesses supported the case of the prosecution and the mother of the deceased stated that because of tutoring by her husband, the victim/deceased had stated about harassment in the statements made under Exs.P6 and P9 and the deceased was angry woman. The trial Court could not have based conviction on the statements made by the deceased as they were not subjected to cross-examination and there is no other corroborating evidence as far as the statements made under Exs.P6 and P9 are concerned. 6. On the other hand, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor while supporting the finding of the trial court, argued that there is no necessity of any corroboration for the statements made under Exs.P6 and P9, since they were made regarding her death immediately after she was joined with severe burn injuries. It cannot be said that they do not fall within the category of dying declaration under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. There is no necessity for any corroboration when the dying declarations are reliable and only on the basis of the dying declarations under Exs.P6 and P9 conviction can be recorded as rightly done by the learned Sessions Judge. 7. The basis for convicting the appellant under Section 306 of IPC are two dying declarations, one under Ex.P6, the statement made to the learned XVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate-PW-6, recorded on 24.06.2015 at 10.05 a.m. the deceased stated as follows: “8. Question: How did you get hurt? Answer: Last night at 11.00 P.M, my husband Quereshi have beaten me. Then I told him that I will burn myself and he told me to do so. Then I poured kerosene and set fire to my body. My husband watching from there. 9. Question: Then what happened? Question: How did you get hurt? Answer: Last night at 11.00 P.M, my husband Quereshi have beaten me. Then I told him that I will burn myself and he told me to do so. Then I poured kerosene and set fire to my body. My husband watching from there. 9. Question: Then what happened? Answer: When I raised cries, the neighbours have poured water. Thereafter my husband also poured water and quenched the fire. 10. Question: What is the reason for disputes between yourself and your husband? Answer: When I told my husband that I want to go to my parents’ house, he didn’t take me up to 9.00 p.m. At that time he has consumed ganjai and picked up quarrel with me and beaten me.” 8. The other statement was the statement recorded by PW-9 vide Ex.P9 recorded on 24.06.2015 at 9.15 a.m. prior to EXP6 is as follows: “I am to state that on23.06.2015 night in between 11.00 p.m. and 12.00 midnight, I informed my husband that I will die, for which my husband said Yes. Then I poured kerosene of my body and ablaze myself. My husband used to consume Ganja and beat me, tortured me daily. He bends my hands. He harassed me physically and mentally. He threatened to kill me. Due to fear and torture, and there is no other alternative, I poured kerosene on my body and set ablaze myself. My husband’s sister also harassed me physically and mentally, due to which I set ablaze myself. Later my family members brought me to Osmania General Hospital, admitted me and treatment is going on. I request you to take necessary action against the said persons.” 9. The statement under Ex.P9 was prior to recording statement by the learned Magistrate/PW-6 at 9.15 a.m. on 24.06.2015. There is no doubt regarding the admissibility and reliability of a statement made by a deceased regarding her death. However the said statement should be convincing and free from any kind of influence like tutoring or for any other probable reason to be established by the defence, the court has to look into the said statements with caution and also if necessary, in the facts and circumstances, seek corroboration for the said allegations. In the present case, as already stated, none of the prosecution witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution to infer any harassment by the appellant. In the present case, as already stated, none of the prosecution witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution to infer any harassment by the appellant. The mother of the deceased, in fact entered into the witness box and was declared hostile. She stated in her cross-examination as follows: “One and half hour after we went to the hospital, my husband/LW-2 came to the said hospital. My daughter is an anger woman. I heard my daughter being tutored by my husband to state in the dying declaration against the accused. Tahsildar did not record my statement after the death of my daughter at the time of inquest proceedings.” 10. The said witness was not cross-examined by the learned Public Prosecutor regarding any undue influence or force to make such statements. When it was specifically stated by the mother of the deceased that the allegations made in the statements of the deceased were at the instance of her husband i.e. father of the victim/deceased, the said statements have to be looked into with more caution, as any inference of guilt from such statements would lead to convicting a person. 11. A close scrutiny of Exs.P6 and P9 which were made within a period of one hour, there is not much of a discrepancy regarding the reason for the act of committing suicide by the deceased. In Ex.P9, which statement was made at the first instance to PW-9, Sub Inspector of Police, she stated that she informed her husband that she would die, for which, the husband said ‘yes’. Then, she poured kerosene on herself and set herself ablaze. However, immediately thereafter when examined by the learned Magistrat/PW-6, she stated that appellant/accused had beaten her and then she went and poured kerosene herself and set fire. Though there is not much of a difference in between the two statements, the crux of her statements is that she had committed suicide due to harassment of her husband/appellant. 12. It is admitted that even prior to the said statements, the father(not examined ) of the deceased, PW-4, her mother and other relatives have gathered at the hospital and PW-4 on oath stated that her husband, in fact, tutored the deceased to state that it was the appellant who was responsible. 12. It is admitted that even prior to the said statements, the father(not examined ) of the deceased, PW-4, her mother and other relatives have gathered at the hospital and PW-4 on oath stated that her husband, in fact, tutored the deceased to state that it was the appellant who was responsible. In the present set of facts when the mother of the deceased has stated that the deceased was a very angry woman and her statement was result of tutoring, the said statement cannot be brushed aside for the reason of the witness being declared hostile to the prosecution case. The evidence of the prosecution witness or a defence witness or any witness supporting either the prosecution or defence have to be given equal weightage. Of course, the said principle would apply when any force or undue influence is ruled-out. Unless specific reasons are stated by the Court, the evidence of the witnesses has to be considered irrespective of the witnesses either turning hostile to the party producing the said witnesses or the party producing the witnesses to deny the case of the prosecution. Here, it is the mother of the deceased who had stated that the statements made under Exs.P6 and P9 were result of tutoring by her husband and also stated that the deceased was a angry woman. Considering the statements under Exs.P6 and P9, the deceased stated that she informed her husband that she was going to set herself ablaze and the husband did not pay any attention to such statements, for which reason, she poured kerosene on to herself and set herself fire. In the said circumstances, admitting that the husband did not pay any attention to the threat of his wife to set herself on fire, would not amount to an offence under Section 306 of IPC. 13. It is stated in both the statements that the appellant was beating her almost on daily basis. Except making said bald allegations, no reasons are given by the deceased as to why the appellant was beating her. She further stated that the accused was in the habit of smoking ganja. 13. It is stated in both the statements that the appellant was beating her almost on daily basis. Except making said bald allegations, no reasons are given by the deceased as to why the appellant was beating her. She further stated that the accused was in the habit of smoking ganja. However, there is no evidence from any quarter either through the witnesses or by the investigating agency to say that the appellant who was addicted to ganja and for the said reason also, when there is no independent corroboration, the allegation of harassment also has to be viewed with suspicion. Further, there is no allegation of any additional dowry demand or any reason except stating that the appellant was in the habit of consuming ganja. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Indrajit Kundu and Others, 2020 (1) ALD (Crl.) 185 (SC), held as follows: “12. In the judgment in the case of Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chattisgarh, 2001 (2) ALD (Crl.) 873 (SC) : (2001) 9 SCC 618 , this Court has considered the scope of Section 306 and the ingredients which are essential for abetment as set out in Section 107 IPC. While interpreting the word “instigation” it is held in paragraph 20 as under: “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act.” To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.” 15. In the said circumstances of the present case, when two views are possible, one favourable to the accused has to be considered. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.” 15. In the said circumstances of the present case, when two views are possible, one favourable to the accused has to be considered. Further, the case of the prosecution rests upon two statements made under Exs.P6 and P9 which are in fact not subjected to any cross-examination and the prosecution, except relying on the said statements, has no independent corroboration which is required in the background of the evidence of PW-4, who is the mother of the deceased. In the said circumstance, the benefit of doubt is extended to the appellant and accordingly, the conviction for the offence under Section 306 of IPC is set aside. 16. Accordingly, the criminal appeal is allowed and bail bonds stand cancelled. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.