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2022 DIGILAW 419 (ALL)

Nidhi Singh v. State of U. P.

2022-03-23

MANJU RANI CHAUHAN

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Nripendra Kumar Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Asim Mukherjee, learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents. 2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the charge-sheet dated 24th August, 2021 issued by respondent no.4 (Annexure No.6 to the writ petition) and the order dated 31st October, 2021 passed by respondent no.2 (Annexure No.7 to this writ petition), whereby he has been placed under suspension pending departmental inquiry. Further the petitioner has prayed that a direction be issued to respondents not to proceed with the departmental proceedings pursuant to the charge-sheet dated 24th August, 2021 issued by respondent no.4. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that when the petitioner was posted at Police Station-Adampur, District Amroha, a first information report has been lodged by one Roop Kishore, which has been registered as Crime No. 0051 of 2019 under Sections 363, 366 I.P.C. and Sections 7/8 POCSO Act, at Police Station-Adampur, District Jyotibaphuley Nagar. The investigation of the said case was handed over to one Arif Mohammad, Sub-Inspector. Mr. Arif after recording the statements of the informant and witnesses submitted charge sheet no. 107 of 2029 dated 15th May, 2019 against Horam and Harphool under Sections 363, 366 I.P.C. and Sections 7/8 POCSO Act. The aforesaid case committed to the Court of Special Judge, POCSO ACT, III, Amroha, which was numbered as Session Trial No. 21 of 2019. The investigation of aforesaid Crime No. 0051 of 2019 was transferred to one Ashok Sharma, Inspector on 28th May, 2019, who submitted the charge sheet no. 107A of 2020 on 19th March, 2020. against Roop Kishor, Suresh and Devendra under Sections 302, 201 and 120B I.P.C. Thereafter the investigation was transferred to one Pankaj Sharma, Inspector who submitted his report on 12th August, 2020 thereafter the case was converted under Sections 363, 366 I.P.C. and Sections 7/8 POCSO Act after deleting Sections 302, 201 and 120B I.P.C. After framing the charge and examination of witnesses, the trial court has acquitted the persons, namely, Horam and Harphool against whom charge sheet no.107 of 2019 was submitted, in Session trial no. 21 of 2019 vide order dated 19th January, 2021. 21 of 2019 vide order dated 19th January, 2021. On the basis of charge-sheet no.107A of 2020 dated 19th March, 2020, the case was committed to court of Sessions Judge, Amroha, which has been numbered as Sessions Trial No. 354 of 2020 and charges were framed against Roop Kishore, Suresh and Devendra for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 201 and 120B I.P.C. and further a Session Trial being Session Trial No. 403 of 2020 was registered in which charges were framed against one Suresh for the offence punishable under Section 3/25 Arms Act. Both the Sessions Trial being Sessions Trial No. 354 of 2020 and Session Trial No. 403 of 2020 have been tried together and the session trial no. 354 of 2020 was treated to be the leading case. 4. Further, it is the case of the petitioner that after considering the facts and evidences adduced during trial, the Sessions Court has acquitted all the accused persons from all the charges vide judgment and order dated 31st March, 2021 and further the Sessions Judge, Amroha forwarded a letter dated 31st March, 2021 to the Superintendent of Police, Amroha, Additional Director General of Police, Bareilly Region, Bareilly and Director General of Police, U.P. at Lucknow to initiate departmental proceedings against Inspector Ashok Sharma and those police personnel whose signatures were found over the Fard Baramdagi. 5. Pursuant to the above letter of the Sessions Judge, Amroha, Inspector Ashok Sharma was suspended vide order dated 7th August, 2020 and proceedings under Rule 14 (1) of U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 was initiated and vide order dated 21st November, 2020, the enquiry was allotted to Mr. Vijay Kumar Rana, Circle Officer, Amroha, who submitted his report on 24th March, 2021. On the basis of said report, order dated 21st November, 2020 was cancelled and again a detailed enquiry was allotted to the Additional Superintendent of Police, Amroha i.e. respondent no.3, who submitted his preliminary enquiry, wherein Sub-Inspector Vinod Kumar Tyagi (retired), Sub-Inspector Rakesh Kumar, Sub-Inspector Arif Mohammad, Constable-Krishnaveer, Constable-Aniruddha Singh, Constable-Deepak Kumar, Female Constable Apeksha Tomar, Female Constable-Nidhi Singh (applicant herein), Amroha along with Inspector Ashok Sharma were found guilty of submitting charge-sheet on the basis of fake evidence. Respondent no.3 submitted his report on 8th June, 2021 before the Superintendent of Police, Amroha i.e. respondent no.2. Respondent no.3 submitted his report on 8th June, 2021 before the Superintendent of Police, Amroha i.e. respondent no.2. On the basis of the said preliminary enquiry report of respondent no.3, Presiding Officer, Circle Officer, Amroha i.e. respondent no. 4 issued a charge sheet dated 24th August, 2021 for departmental proceedings under Rule 14 (1) of U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991. After issuing the charge-sheet dated 8th June, 2021, the petitioner has been suspended and attached to the Police Lines, Amroha by respondent no.2. The said charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner in the month of September, 2021. Subsequently, one Suresh has lodged a first information report on 23th October, 2021 against 11 persons, namely, Ashok Kumar (Inspector), Mohammad Arif (Sub-Inspector), Rakesh Kumar (Sub-Inspector), Manoj Kumar (Sub-Inspector), Vinod Kumar Tyagi (Sub-Inspector), Bhupendra Singh (Constable-cum-Driver), Krishnaveer singh (Constable), Aniruddha (Constable), Deepak Kumar (Constable), Apeksha Tomar (Women Constable) and Nidh Singh (Women Constable) (applicant herein), which has been registered as Case Crime No. 0286 of 2021 under Sections 120-B, 193, 194, 342, 344 I.P.C., Police Station-Adampur, District-Amroha. In the said case, the petitioner has been granted anticipatory bail from this Court vide order dated 8th February, 2022 a copy of which has been enclosed as Annexure-9 to the writ petition. 6. Challenging the impugned charge-sheet and order of suspension, learned counsel for the petitioner has made following submissions: i. The Sub-Inspector Mr. Arif Mohammad remained as Investigating Officer since 20th February, 2019 to 27th May, 2019 and he has submitted Charge-Sheet No. 107 of 2019 in Crime No. 0051 of 2019 under Sections 363, 366 I.P.C. and Sections 7/8 POCSO Act and on 28th May, 2019, the investigation of the aforesaid crime was transferred to Ashok Sharma (Inspector), who has submitted Charge-Sheet No. 107A of 2020, under Sections 302, 201, 120B I.P.C. and Sections 3/25 Arms Act on 19th March, 2020. The entire investigation of the aforesaid crime goes to Ashok Kumar (Inspector), therefore, the petitioner being women constable, has no concern with the investigation of the aforesaid crime at any point of time except that recovery memo showing the Baramadagi of clothes, shoes and alakatla, bears her signatures, hence the entire proceedings including the impugned charge-sheet are liable to be quashed by this Court. ii. ii. The act of respondents by not adopting proper procedure for conducting enquiry is misconceived and not sustainable in the eyes of law. On the cumulative strength of the aforesaid, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned charge-sheet dated 24th August, 2021 issued against the petitioner is illegal, unwarranted and against the evidence on record, therefore, the same is liable to be quashed by this Court. 7. On the other-hand, learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents submits that the charges so levelled against the petitioner cannot be examined at this stage, inasmuch as the explanation and documents relied upon by the petitioner can be a defence in the departmental inquiry, as during departmental inquiry, the petitioner will have ample opportunity to prove her innocence (Reference the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Orrisa & Another Vs. Sangram Keshari Mishra & Another, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 311 ). Apart from the above, learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents submits that ordinarily a writ petition does not lie against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person who has no jurisdiction to do so (Reference-the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Others Vs. Prabhash Chandra Mishra reported in (2012) 11 SCC 565 ). In view of the aforesaid, learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents submits that no interference is called for by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 8. This Court has considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and has carefully scanned the records of the present writ petition specifically the laws laid down by the Apex Court on the aforesaid aspect. 9. Hence, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 8. This Court has considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and has carefully scanned the records of the present writ petition specifically the laws laid down by the Apex Court on the aforesaid aspect. 9. From the records of the present writ petition, it is established that while deciding the Sessions Trial No. 354 of 2020 along with Session Trial No. 403 of 2020 vide judgment and order dated 31st March, 2021, the Sessions Judge, Amroha has found that prima facie the Police personnels along with Inspector Ashok Sharma were responsible for making a forged baramadagi of clothes, shoes and alakatla of Km. Kamlesh for showing her to be dead, when as matter of fact she is alive, therefore, he wrote a letter dated 31st March, 2021 to the Superintendent of Police, Amroha, Additional Director General of Police, Bareilly Region, Bareilly and Director General of Police, U.P. at Lucknow to initiate departmental proceedings against Inspector Ashok Sharma and those police personnel whose signatures were found over the Fard Baramdagi. Pursuant to the above letter, proceedings were initiated and vide order dated 21st November, 2020, the enquiry was allotted to Mr. Vijay Kumar Rana, Circle Officer, Amroha, who submitted his report on 24th March, 2021. On the basis of said report, again a detailed enquiry was allotted to the Additional Superintendent of Police, Amroha i.e. respondent no.3, who submitted his preliminary enquiry, wherein Sub-Inspector Vinod Kumar Tyagi (retired), Sub-Inspector Rakesh Kumar, Sub-Inspector Arif Mohammad, Constable-Krishnaveer, Constable-Aniruddha Singh, Constable-Deepak Kumar, Female Constable Apeksha Tomar, Female Constable-Nidhi Singh (applicant herein), Amroha along with Inspector Ashok Sharma were found guilty of submitting charge-sheet on the basis of fake evidence. Respondent no.3 submitted his report on 8th June, 2021 before the Superintendent of Police, Amroha i.e. respondent no.2. On the basis of the said preliminary enquiry report of respondent no.3, Presiding Officer, Circle Officer, Amroha i.e. respondent no. 4 issued a charge sheet dated 24th August, 2021. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that on the Baramadagi, petitioner has not appended her signatures. Therefore, this Court finds that the petitioner is prima facie guilty of forged Baramdagi along with other Police personnels. 4 issued a charge sheet dated 24th August, 2021. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that on the Baramadagi, petitioner has not appended her signatures. Therefore, this Court finds that the petitioner is prima facie guilty of forged Baramdagi along with other Police personnels. As such, the ground taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner that she has no concern with the investigation of the aforesaid crime as also the respondent authority has not adopted proper procedure in conducting preliminary enquiry, have no legs to stand and the same are liable to be rejected. 10. With respect to challenge made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the order of suspension, this Court has referred following case laws as settled by the Apex Court, which are relevant for deciding the same: The Apex Court in the case of Allahabad Bank And Another vs Deepak Kumar Bhola reported in (1997) 4 SCC 1 , in paragraph-11 has held as follows : "We are unable to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that there has been no application of mind or the objective consideration of the facts by the appellant before it passed the orders of suspension. As already observed, the very fact that the investigation was conducted by the C.B.I which resulted in the filing of a charge-sheet, alleging various offences having been committed by the respondent, was sufficient for the appellant to conclude that pending prosecution the respondent should be suspended. It would be indeed inconceivable that a bank should allow an employee to continue to remain on duty when he is facing serious charges of corruption and mis-appropriation of money. Allowing such a employee to remain in the seat would result in giving him further opportunity to indulge in the acts for which he was being prosecuted. Under the circumstances, it was the bounden duty of the appellant to have taken recourse to the provisions of clause 19.3 of the First Bipartite Settlement, 1966. The mere fact that nearly 10 years have elapsed since the charge-sheet was filed. can also be no ground for allowing the respondent to come back to duty on a sensitive post in the bank, unless he is exonerated of the charge. In our opinion, the High Court was not justified in quashing the orders of suspension. The mere fact that nearly 10 years have elapsed since the charge-sheet was filed. can also be no ground for allowing the respondent to come back to duty on a sensitive post in the bank, unless he is exonerated of the charge. In our opinion, the High Court was not justified in quashing the orders of suspension. We, accordingly, allow this appeal, set-aside the impugned judgment of the Allahabad High Court and dismiss the Writ Petition No. 6118/1988 which had been filed by the respondent. There will, however, be no order as to costs." In the case of State of Orrisa Vs. Bimal Kumar Mohanti, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 125, the Apex Court inter alia, held that the suspension pending enquiry is not an order of punishment and it is a procedural suspension inasmuch as the delinquent is refrained to avail further opportunity to perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty or conduct unbecoming of a Government servant would pay fruits and the offending employee could get away even pending enquiry without impediment or to prevent an opportunity to such an employee to scuttle the enquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses. The Apex Court also specifically observed that each case of suspension must be considered depending upon the nature of allegations, gravity of the situation and the indelible impact that creates on the service for the continuance of the delinquent employee in service pending enquiry or contemplated enquiry or investigation and the suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the inquiry or investigation. (Emphasis added) The Apex Court in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Another reported (1999) 3 SCC 697, in paragraph 29, has opined as follows : "Exercise of right to suspend an employee may be justified on facts of a particular case. Instances, however, are not rare where officers have been found to be afflicted by "suspension syndrome" and the employees have been found to be placed under suspension just for nothing. It is their irritability rather than the employee's trivial lapse which has often resulted in suspension. Suspension notwithstanding, non-payment of Subsistence Allowance is an inhuman act which has an unpropitious effect on the life of an employee. It is their irritability rather than the employee's trivial lapse which has often resulted in suspension. Suspension notwithstanding, non-payment of Subsistence Allowance is an inhuman act which has an unpropitious effect on the life of an employee. When the employee is placed under suspension, he is demobilised and the salary is also paid to him at a reduced rate under the nick name of 'Subsistence Allowance', so that the employee may sustain himself. This Court, in O.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India & Others, (1987) 4 SCC 328 made the following observations with regard to Subsistence Allowance : "An order of suspension of a government servant does not put an end to his service under the government. He continues to be a member of the service in spite of the order of suspension. The real effect of suspension as explained by this Court in Khem Chand Vs. Union of India, is that he continues to be a member of the government service but is not permitted to work and further during the period of suspension he is paid only some allowance -- generally called subsistence allowance -- which is normally less than the salary instead of the pay and allowances he would have been entitled to if he had not been suspended. There is no doubt that an order of suspension, unless the departmental inquiry is concluded within a reasonable time, affects a government servant injuriously. The very expression 'subsistence allowance' has an undeniable penal significance. The dictionary meaning of the word 'Subsist' as given in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol.II at p. 2171 is "to remain alive as on food; to continue to exist". "Subsistence" means -- means of supporting life, especially a minimum livelihood." (Emphasis supplied) If, therefore, even that amount is not paid, then the very object of paying the reduced salary to the employee during the period of suspension would be frustrated. The act of non-payment of Subsistence Allowance can be likened to slow-poisoning as the employee, if not permitted to sustain himself on account of non-payment of Subsistence Allowance, would gradually starve himself to death." 11. The act of non-payment of Subsistence Allowance can be likened to slow-poisoning as the employee, if not permitted to sustain himself on account of non-payment of Subsistence Allowance, would gradually starve himself to death." 11. As already noticed above the petitioner is posted as Constable and working in a disciplined force like Police Department of the State of U.P. I am of the considered opinion that a member of a disciplined force must strictly follow the executive orders or circulars or instructions issued by the department or by the higher authority of the department as those executive orders etc. are as good as service condition. As a matter of fact such executive intimation/order has been issued to maintain the discipline in the force directing to keep the appearance and uniform befitting for the members of disciplined force. Further, police force has to be a disciplined force and being a law enforcing agency, it is necessary that such force must have secular image which strengthen the countenance of national integration. 12. This Court has also noticed that prima facie the petitioner has been found guilty of a forged Baramadagi on which her signatures have been appended, which is an admitted position and also for criminal conspiracy by preparing forged and wrong documents showing an alive person, namely, Km. Kamlesh as dead. One Suresh has lodged a first information report against 11 police personnels including the petitioner which has been registered as Case crime No. 0286 of 2021 under Sections 120B, 193, 194, 342, 344 I.P.C. Therefore, in view of the settled legal positions by the Apex Court referred to herein-above and facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds no illegality or infirmity in the order of suspension dated 31st October, 2021 passed by respondent no.2. 13. 13. So far as challenge made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the impugned charge-sheet is concerned, it is necessary for this Court to refer following laws laid down by the Apex Court on the aspect: In State of U.P. vs. Shri Brahm Datt Sharma and another, reported in AIR 1987 SC 943 , the Apex Court has held that when a show-cause notice was issued to a government servant under the statutory provisions calling upon him to show cause, ordinarily the government servant must place his case before the authority concerned by showing cause and the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued palpably without any authority of law. The purpose of issuing show cause is to afford opportunity of hearing to the government servant and once cause is shown it is open to the Government to consider the matter in the light of the facts and submissions placed by the government servant and only thereafter a final decision in the matter could be taken. Interference by the Court before that stage would be premature. The Apex Court in the case of State of H.P. Vs. B.C. Thakur reported in 1994 SCC (L&S), in paragraph nos. 3 and 4 has held as follows: "(3) HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order of the Tribunal quashing the order of respondents suspension does not call for any interference, even though the other part of the Tribunals order quashing the charge-sheet issued to the respondent cannot be sustained. The quashing of the charge-sheet by the Tribunal is not on the ground of want of authority to issue the charge-sheet or any other inherent defect therein. This being so, the question of going into the merits of the charges, which are yet to be investigated in the departmental proceedings, did not arise for consideration or adjudication by the Tribunal at this stage. This being so, the Tribunals order quashing the charge-sheet as well, on reaching the conclusion that the suspension order had to be set aside, is unwarranted. The respondent had been under suspension for nearly two years on the date of the Tribunals order and another year has elapsed since then. This being so, the Tribunals order quashing the charge-sheet as well, on reaching the conclusion that the suspension order had to be set aside, is unwarranted. The respondent had been under suspension for nearly two years on the date of the Tribunals order and another year has elapsed since then. Setting aside the suspension order in this situation, particularly when no substantial progress in the disciplinary proceedings has been made as yet, does not, therefore, call for any interference. (4) CONSEQUENTLY, the appeal is partly allowed to the extent that the Tribunals order quashing the charge-sheet issued to the respondent is set aside while the challenge to the quashing of the suspension order dated 10-5-1990 is rejected. No costs." The Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Ashok Kacker reported in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 180, while hearing a matter where the employee had challenged the charge sheet, clearly held that the Tribunal entertained the application at a premature stage. It was observed as follows :- ".........In our opinion, this was not the stage at which the Tribunal ought to have entertained such an application for quashing the charge-sheet and the appropriate course for the respondent to adopt is to file his reply to the charge-sheet and invite the decision of the disciplinary authority thereon. This being the stage at which the respondent had rushed to the Tribunal, we do not consider it necessary to require the Tribunal at this stage to examine any other point which may be available to the respondent or which may have been raised by him." Again in the case of Secretary to Government, Prohibition & Excise Department Vs. L. Srinivasan, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 157 , the Apex Court set-aside the order of the Tribunal by which the departmental enquiry and the charge-sheet were quashed on the ground of delay in initiation of the disciplinary proceedings and it was observed as follows :- "Order dated 12.11.1993 in Nos. Nos. 1702 of 1993 and 2206 of 1993 of the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Madras is in question before us. The respondent while working as Assistant Section Officer, Home, Prohibition and Excise Department had been placed under suspension. Departmental inquiry is in process. We are informed that charge-sheet was laid for prosecution for the offences of embezzlement and fabrication of false records etc. The respondent while working as Assistant Section Officer, Home, Prohibition and Excise Department had been placed under suspension. Departmental inquiry is in process. We are informed that charge-sheet was laid for prosecution for the offences of embezzlement and fabrication of false records etc. and that the offences and the trial of the case is pending. The Tribunal had set aside the departmental enquiry and quashed the charge on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings. In the nature of the charge, it would take a long time to detect embezzlement and fabrication of false records which should be done in secrecy. It is not necessary to go into the merits and record any finding on the charge levelled against the charged officer since any finding recorded by this Court would gravely prejudice the case of the parties at the enquiry and also at the trial. Therefore, we desist from expressing any opinion on merit or recording any of the contentions raised by the counsel on either side. Suffice it to state that the Administrative Tribunal has committed grossest error in its exercise of the judicial review. The member of the Administrative Tribunal appears to have no knowledge of the jurisprudence of the service law and exercised power as if he is an appellate forum dehors the limitation of judicial review. This is one such instance where a member had exceeded his power of judicial review in quashing the suspension order and charges even at the threshold. We are coming across such orders frequently putting heavy pressure on this Court to examine each case in detail. It is high time that it is remedied." (emphasis supplied)." The Apex Court in re:- State of Orrisa and another vs. Sangram Keshari Misra and another [reported in (2010) 13 SCC 311 ] in para 10 has opined as under:- "10. Though there appears to be some merit in the said contentions of the first respondent, it is unnecessary to examine the correctness of these contentions as normally a charge-sheet is not quashed prior to the conducting of the enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous. It is well settled that the correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority (vide Union of India v. Upendra Singh, SCC p. 362, para 6). It is well settled that the correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority (vide Union of India v. Upendra Singh, SCC p. 362, para 6). Therefore we reject the contention that the charge ought to have been quashed without reserving to the State to proceed in accordance with law." The Hon'ble Apex Court in re:- Union of India and others vs. Upendra Singh [reported in (1994) 3 SCC 357 ] in para 6 has held as under:- "6. In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the tribunal or court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. At this stage, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges. The tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to court or tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as the case may be. The function of the court/tribunal is one of judicial review, the parameters of which are repeatedly laid down by this Court. It would be sufficient to quote the decision in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal v. Gopi Nath & Sons. The Bench comprising M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) and A.M. Ahmadi, J., affirmed the principle thus : (SCC p. 317, para 8) "Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself." The Apex Court in the case of Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others vs. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha [reported in (2012) 11 SCC 565 ] in para nos. 10 to 12 has opined as follows: "11. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a chargesheet or show cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, chargesheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a chargesheet or show cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the Court. (Vide : State of U.P. Vs. Brahm Datt Sharma, AIR 1987 SC 943 ; Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board Vs. Ramesh Kumar Singh & Others, (1996) 1 SCC 327 ; Ulagappa & Ors. v. Div. Commr., Mysore & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 3603 (2); Special Director & Anr. Vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse & Another, AIR 2004 SC 1467 ; and Union of India & Another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, AIR 2007 SC 906 ). 12. In State of Orissa & Anr. v. Sangram Keshari Misra & Anr., (2010) 13 SCC 311 , this Court held that normally a chargesheet is not quashed prior to the conclusion of the enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous for the reason that correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. v. Sangram Keshari Misra & Anr., (2010) 13 SCC 311 , this Court held that normally a chargesheet is not quashed prior to the conclusion of the enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous for the reason that correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. (See also: Union of India & Ors., (1994) 3 SCC 357 ). 13. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that chargesheet cannot generally be a subject matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the chargesheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings." In the case of Union of India and another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28 , Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under:- "Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge sheet." 14. It was, therefore, emphasized by the Apex Court that even by way of final order the departmental enquiry or the charge-sheet could not have been quashed. Thus, what could not have been done even at the final stage certainly could not have been done by way of any interim measure by the Tribunal. 15. The law on this point is that the Courts are, therefore, not to grant stay/quash the disciplinary proceedings nor they should go into the correctness or otherwise of the charges leveled in the charge-sheet and the departmental inquiry should be allowed to continue uninterrupted to come to its natural conclusion. 16. 15. The law on this point is that the Courts are, therefore, not to grant stay/quash the disciplinary proceedings nor they should go into the correctness or otherwise of the charges leveled in the charge-sheet and the departmental inquiry should be allowed to continue uninterrupted to come to its natural conclusion. 16. In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary enquiry, the tribunal or Court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. The tribunal or the Court cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charge is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of their disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to court or tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as the case may be. 17. From the aforesaid legal positions, it is clear that in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter. 18. In view of the aforesaid settled legal positions of the Apex Court which have been referred to above, this Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned charge-sheet dated 24th August, 2021 passed by respondent no.4 so as to warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 19. The present writ petition being devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed. 20. However, it is provided that the departmental inquiry be initiated against the petitioner and brought to its logical end, strictly in accordance with law, at the earliest possible preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before the disciplinary authority.