JUDGMENT : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. Since both the above criminal appeals have arisen out of one and same judgment dated 19-2-2015 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Baikunthpur in Sessions Trial No. 70/2014 and since common question of fact and law is involved in both the appeals, they have been clubbed together, heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. These two criminal appeals have been preferred by the accused/appellants under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. against the impugned judgment convicting them for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 120B of the IPC and sentencing them to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 1,000/- each, in default, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years on both counts. 3. Appellant in Cr. Appeal No. 920/2015 namely, Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) and appellant in Cr. Appeal No. 340/2015 namely, Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) have assailed their conviction for offences under Sections 302 and 120B of the IPC by way of these appeals. 4. The two appellants were charged by the trial Court for offences under Sections 302, 201, 506 Part-II and 120B read with Section 34 of the IPC and by the impugned judgment, they have been convicted only for offences under Sections 302 and 120B of the IPC and for rest of the offences including that of Sections 201 and 506 Part-II read with Section 34 of the IPC, they have been acquitted. 5. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 27-3-2014 at about late night (11.30 p.m.) Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) and Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) strangulated the wife of Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) namely, Namita Rajwade with help of a nylon rope which was witnessed by his daughter Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1), thereafter, she has informed the same to her maternal grand-father and maternal grandmother and also to her aunt (mausi) and thereafter, the wheels of investigation started running. It is the further case of the prosecution that on 27-3-2014, appellant Mahendra Rajwade along with his wife after taking dinner had gone for sleep and in the late night, Kum. It is the further case of the prosecution that on 27-3-2014, appellant Mahendra Rajwade along with his wife after taking dinner had gone for sleep and in the late night, Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1) heard the cry of her mother Namita Rajwade, then she went inside the room of her mother as the door was open on which she saw that with help of a nylon rope, the two appellants (A-1 and A-2) were stretching the rope tightened on the neck of her mother Namita Rajwade, whereupon she requested them from not doing the illegal act against which her father threatened her and asked her to go outside, thereafter, she went outside of her mother’s room. In the morning, she saw that her mother's dead body was found hanging in the first floor then she informed the incident to her maternal grand-father and maternal grand-mother and also to her aunt (mausi). Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1) got registered the first information report vide Ex.P-1. Spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-2 and thereafter, inquest was conducted vide Ex.P-4 and the dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination. Postmortem was conducted vide Ex.P-10 by Dr. Yogendra Chauhan (PW-6) and cause of death was reported to be asphyxia due to strangulation and nature of death was homicidal. Memorandum statement of accused Mahendra Rajwade was recorded vide Ex.P-14 pursuant to which broken bangles and ear tops of the deceased were recovered from his possession vide Ex.P-15 and same was proved by Hitesh Kumar Rajwade (PW-8). Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. Thereafter, after usual investigation, the appellants were charge-sheeted for offences under Sections 302, 201, 506 Part-II and 120B read with Section 34 of the IPC. 6. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution has examined as many as 13 witnesses and brought on record 27 documents Exs.P-1 to P-27. The defence has examined none, but exhibited one document Ex.D-1 i.e. the statement of Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1) recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. 7. 6. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution has examined as many as 13 witnesses and brought on record 27 documents Exs.P-1 to P-27. The defence has examined none, but exhibited one document Ex.D-1 i.e. the statement of Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1) recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. 7. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence, convicted and sentenced the appellants under Sections 302 and 120B of the IPC in the manner mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment against which these appeals have been preferred and acquitted them of the charge under Sections 201 and 506 Part-II read with Section 34 of the IPC. 8. Mr. Jeet Patel, learned counsel appearing for appellant Mahendra Rajwade in Cr. Appeal No. 920/2015, would submit that Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1) is the daughter of appellant Mahendra Rajwade and deceased Namita Rajwade and out of love and affection towards her mother, she has made false statement against the appellant which cannot be relied upon, in fact, she has not witnessed the incident and therefore her statement is not reliable and it does not inspire confidence. He would further submit that motive of the offence that the appellant used to suspect his wife for having illicit relationship with the son of local MLA is also not proved. He would also submit that seizure of ear tops and broken bangles of the deceased would not connect the appellant with the offence in question. Therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted by setting aside the impugned judgment and his appeal be allowed. 9. Mr. D.N. Prajapati, learned counsel appearing for appellant Dhansai @ Giri in Cr. Appeal No. 340/2015, would submit that appellant Dhansai @ Giri is stranger to the family of Mahendra Rajwade and he did not visit the house of Mahendra Rajwade on the fateful day. He would further submit that Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1) is relative witness and her statement has to be scrutinized with great care and caution and it would be unsafe to convict the present appellant under Section 302 of the IPC on the basis of her statement, particularly when offence under Section 34 of the IPC has not been found proved by the learned trial Court. He would also submit that except the so-called testimony of eyewitness Kum. He would also submit that except the so-called testimony of eyewitness Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1), there is no other piece of evidence like memorandum and seizure of any article from the possession of appellant Dhansai @ Giri and there is no evidence of criminal conspiracy against appellant Dhansai. He would further submit that even looking to the nature of injury which the deceased has received, it would be inappropriate to hold that appellant Dhansai was party to the crime in question and there is no evidence that after the doors of the house were closed by appellant Mahendra Rajwade and deceased Namita Rajwade on the fateful night, the doors were opened and appellant Dhansai was seen along with appellant Mahendra Rajwade and after conspiring with Mahendra Rajwade, he has strangulated the deceased. As such, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside and appellant Dhansai @ Giri deserves to be acquitted. 10. Per contra, Mr. Sudeep Verma, learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the State/respondent, would submit that eyewitness Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1) has clearly stated the presence of two appellants and that she has seen the two appellants strangulating the deceased in the mid night and in cross-examination, she has maintained her version that she has seen the incident by which the appellants have strangulated deceased Namita Rajwade and death of the deceased was also found to be homicidal in nature, it is not the case of suicidal death. Against appellant Mahendra Rajwade, motive is established, as Mahendra Rajwade used to suspect the character of his wife i.e. the deceased alleging her to be in relationship with son of the local MLA namely, Vijay Rajwade and further, medical evidence also supports the case of the prosecution, as the sign of struggle has been noticed over the body of the deceased. Furthermore, pursuant to the memorandum statement of appellant Mahendra Rajwade (A-1), broken bangles and ear tops have been seized from the possession of appellant Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) at the place indicated by him and as such, it is a case where both the appeals deserve to be dismissed. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 12. The first question for consideration is whether, the trial Court is justified in holding that death of deceased Namita Rajwade was homicidal in nature? 13. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 12. The first question for consideration is whether, the trial Court is justified in holding that death of deceased Namita Rajwade was homicidal in nature? 13. The trial Court has answered this question in affirmative holding that death of the deceased was homicidal in nature taking into account the statement of Dr. Yogendra Chauhan (PW-6) and further taking into account the postmortem report Ex.P-10. 14. In order to judge the correctness of the said finding it would be appropriate to notice the statement of Dr. 13. The trial Court has answered this question in affirmative holding that death of the deceased was homicidal in nature taking into account the statement of Dr. Yogendra Chauhan (PW-6) and further taking into account the postmortem report Ex.P-10. 14. In order to judge the correctness of the said finding it would be appropriate to notice the statement of Dr. Yogendra Chauhan (PW-6) who has noticed injuries over the body of the deceased which state as under: ¼3½ xys esa fyxspj ekdZ mifLFkr FksA ;g fu'kku e`R;q iwoZ ds FksA xys esa nks fyxspj ekdZ FksA igyk% xys ds Åijh fgLls esa Åij dh fn'kk dh vksj ekStwn Fks tks xys ds lkeus fgLls ls ysdj ihNs ds fgLls rd x;s Fks vkSj ck,a elVksfM Ákslsl rd ekStwn FksA fyxspj ekdZ lw[kk] dM+k ,oa yky ,oa Hkwjs jax dk FkkA fyxspj ekdZ esa mifLFkr FkkA fyxspj ekdZ dh yEckbZ 7-5 bUp vkSj pkSM+kbZ 0-5 lsŒehŒ FkkA bl ekdZ dh nkfgus rjQ dh pkSM+kbZ 01 lsŒehŒ FkhA nwljk% xys ds Fkk;jk;M dkfVZyst Lrj ij ekStwn Fkk tks VkUjloZ MkjsD'ku esa FkkA ftldh yEckbZ 05 bUp ,oa pkSM+kbZ 0-5 lsŒehŒ FkkA ¼4½ e`frdk ds 'kjhj ij dbZ pksVsa ik;h xbZ Fkh ftldk fooj.k fuEukuqlkj gS%& ¼,½ psgjs ds ck,a Hkkx esa 06 daV~;wtu FksA igyk & psgjs ds ck,a Hkkx tk;xksesfVd jhtu ij 01 lsŒehŒ yEck ,oa 01 lsŒehŒ pkSM+kA nwljk & ukd ds ck,a rjQ 0-5 lsŒehŒ yEck ,oa 0-5 lsŒehŒ pkSM+kA rhljk & ck,a Hkkx ds gksB ds Åijh fgLls ij 01 lsŒehŒ yEck ,oa 01 lsŒehŒ pkSM+kA pkSFkk & ck,a Hkkx gksaB ds uhpys fgLls esa 03 lsŒehŒ yEck ,oa 0-5 lsŒehŒ pkSM+kA iakpok & psgjs ds ck,a rjQ uhps fgLls esa 02 lsŒehŒ yEck ,oa 01 lsŒehŒ ,oa 01 pkSM+kA NBk & BqM~Mh ds ck,a fgLls ij 1-5 lsŒehŒ yEck ,oa 01 lsŒehŒ pkSM+kA ¼ch½ fyxspj ekdZ ds Åij nkfgus Hkkx esa nks ,Scsztu ¼[kjksap½ FkkA igyk & nkfgus Hkkx esa esafMcy ds uhps rhu pksaV Fkh tks Øe'k% 1-5 xq.kk 1 lsŒehŒ vkSj 1-5 xq.kk 0-5 lsŒehŒ ,oa 1 xq.kk 1 lsŒehŒ FkkA nwljk & Fkk;jk;M dkfVZyst ds 02 lsŒehŒ Åij tks 2-5 xq.kk 2 lsŒehŒ FkkA ¼lh½ fyxspj ekdZ ds uhps fgLls esa 03 daV~;w'ku FksA igyk & fyxspj ekdZ ds lkeus Hkkx ij 02 lsŒehŒ uhps nkfgus rjQ 2 xq.kk 1-5 lsŒehŒ FkkA nwljk & igys pksV ds cxy esa fLFkr Fkk tks 2 xq.kk 2 lsŒehŒ FkkA rhljk & fyxspj ekdZ ds lkeus Hkkx ij 04 lsŒehŒ uhps ck,a Hkkx ij tks 3 xq.kk 1 lsŒehŒ FkkA ¼Mh½ daV~;w'ku tqxyj Qkslk ij 1 xq.kk 1 lsŒehŒ FkkA ¼b½ ck,a dysfoDy gM~Mh ds ikl 2 xq.kk 2 lsŒehŒ FkkA ¼,Q½ [kjksap & nkfgus da/ks fiNys fgLls ij 6 xq.kk 3 lsŒehŒ FkkA ¼th½ [kjksap & ck,a da/ks ds fiNys fgLls ij 3 xq.kk 3 lsŒehŒ FkkA ¼,p½ ihB esa daV~;w'ku LdSiwyj jhtu ds chp esa frjNk tks 21 xq.kk 2 lsŒehŒ FkkA ¼vkbZ½ [kjksap & nk,a [kqVus ds ckgj rjQ 2-5 xq.kk 2-5 lsŒehŒ FkkA ¼ts½ [kjksap & nk,a [kqVus ds vanj dh vksj 1 xq.kk 1 lsŒehŒ FkkA ¼ds½ [kjksap & ck,a ?kqVus ds ckgjh rjQ 2 xq.kk 1 lsŒehŒ FkkA ¼,y½ [kjksap & ck,a elVksfM Ákslsl ds vkxs lkeus dh vksj 3 xq.kk 0-5 lsŒehŒ FkkA ¼,e½ e`frdk lkekU; dn&dkBh dh FkhA xnZu ij xkaB ds fu'kku FkkA vkarfjd ijh{k.k%& ¼1½ diky ds nkfgus rjQ uhps [kwu dk FkDdk tek gqvk FkkA efLr"d & datLVsM inkZ] ilyh] dksyeLo & LoLF; FkkA daB vkSj 'okl uyh & Fkk;jk;M dkfVZyst VwVh gq;h Fkh] 'okl uyh VwVh gq;h FkhA nka;k vkSj cka;k QsQM+k datLVsMA isfjvksu & LoLF;] g`n; ds nksuks psEclZ [kwu ls Hksjs gq, FksA inkZ] vka[kksa dh f>Yyh] eaqg rFkk xzkl uyh & LoLF;A isV ,oa mlds Hkhrj dh oLrq,a & v/kipk Hkkstu ekStwn FkkA NksVh vkar vkSj mlds Hkhrj dh oLrq,a & ipk gqvk Hkkstu ekStwn FkkA cM+h vkar ,oa mlds Hkhrj dh oLrq,a & ey ,oa xSlsl ekStwn FksA ;d`r] Iyhgk] xqnkZ & datLVsMA ew=k'k; [kkyh] Hkhrj ,oa ckgj dh tusfUæ;ka & LoLF; ,oa ;wVªl esa ekgokjh py jgh FkhA isf'k;ka vkSj vfLFk;ka LoLFk FkhA pksV dk fooj.k ,oa 'kjhj esa ik;h xbZ oLrqvksa dk fooj.k eSaus iwoZ esa fn;k gSA 15. Thereafter, Dr. Yogendra Chauhan (PW-6), who has conducted postmortem on the body of deceased Namita Rajwade, has also found that the death of the deceased has occurred on account of asphyxia due to strangulation and it was homicidal in nature. He has been subjected to some extent of cross-examination on behalf of the prosecution in which he has clearly stated that on the neck of the deceased, two ligature marks were noticed by him which shows that the case of Namita Rajwade was not the case of suicide as there was bleeding from nose as well as from mouth and bloodstained froth was noticed, in case of suicide, tongue would be protruded. As such, the doctor in his cross-examination paragraph 5 has clearly refuted that it is a case of suicide and has categorically and firmly maintained that it is a case of homicidal nature. After going through the record, we are of the opinion that the trial Court is absolutely justified in holding that it was not the case of suicide by the deceased, but death was due to strangulation on account of asphyxia. We hereby affirm the finding of the trial Court that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. 16. The two appellants A-1 and A-2 both were charged by the trial Court for offences punishable under Sections 302, 201 and 506 Part-II read with Section 34 of the IPC by order dated 18-8-2014, but the learned trial Court has convicted them only for offences under Sections 302 and 120B of the IPC, and acquitted them from the offences under Sections 201 and 506 Part-II read with Section 34 of the IPC. Since the learned trial Court has acquitted the two appellants from the offences under Sections 201 and 506 Part-II read with Section 34 of the IPC and convicted them holding it to be a simpliciter individual crime i.e. Sections 302 and 120B of the IPC, conviction under Section 302 of the IPC simpliciter is permissible in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Rohtas and Another vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2021 SC 114 : AIR Online 2020 SC 900 in which their Lordships considered the question, whether a charge framed with the assistance of Section 149 of the IPC can later be converted to one read with Section 34 of the IPC or even a simplicitor individual crime? Their Lordships considered and reviewed all the earlier case laws on the point including the Constitution Bench decision in the matter of Willie (William) Slaney vs. State of M.P. AIR 1956 SC 116 and relying upon the decision in the matter of Nallabothu Venkaiah vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2002) 7 SCC 117 holding that “the conviction under Section 302 simpliciter without aid of Section 149 is permissible if overt act is attributed to the accused resulting in the fatal injury which is independently sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased and is supported by medical evidence” observed in paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 of the report as under: “20. The above-extracted position of law was further concretised in Willie (William) Slaney vs. State of M.P. (supra) and by the majority in Chittarmal vs. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 2 SCC 266 : AIR 2003 SC 796 . The permissibility of convicting an accused individually under a simplicitor provision after group conviction with the aid of Section 149 of IPC fails, was further explored in Atmaram Zingaraji vs. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 7 SCC 41 : AIR 1997 SC 3573 wherein this Court held that: “4. The next question that falls for our determination is whether, after having affirmed the acquittal of all others, the High Court could convict the appellant under Section 302, I.P.C. (simpliciter). The next question that falls for our determination is whether, after having affirmed the acquittal of all others, the High Court could convict the appellant under Section 302, I.P.C. (simpliciter). The charges framed against the accused (quoted earlier) and the evidence adduced by the prosecution to bring them home clearly indicate that according to its case, the nine persons arraigned before the trial Court and, none others, either named or unnamed (totalling minimum five or more persons) formed the unlawful assembly. Consequent upon the acquittal of the other eight the appellant could not be convicted with the aid of Section 149, I.P.C., more particularly, in view of the concurrent findings of the learned Courts below that the other eight persons were not in any way involved with the offences in question. 5. The same principle will apply when persons are tried with the aid of Section 34, I.P.C. In the case of Krishna vs. State of Maharashtra, (1964) 1 SCR 678 : AIR 1963 SC 1413 a four Judge Bench of this Court has laid down that when four accused persons are tried on a specific accusation that only they committed a murder in furtherance of their common intention and three of them are acquitted, the fourth accused cannot be convicted with the aid of Section 34, I.P.C. for the effect of law would be that those who were with him did not conjointly act with the fourth accused in committing the murder. 6. In either of the above situations therefore the sole convict can be convicted under Section 302, I.P.C. (simpliciter) only on proof of the fact that his individual act caused the death of the victim. To put it differently, he would be liable for his own act only. In the instant case, the evidence on record does not prove that the injuries inflicted by the appellant alone caused the death; on the contrary the evidence of the eye-witnesses and the evidence of the doctor who held the post-mortem examination indicate that the deceased sustained injuries by other weapons also and his death was the outcome of all the injuries. The appellant, therefore, would be guilty of the offence under Section 326, I.P.C. as he caused a grievous injury to the deceased with the aid of jambia (a sharp-cutting instrument).” (Emphasis supplied) 21. The appellant, therefore, would be guilty of the offence under Section 326, I.P.C. as he caused a grievous injury to the deceased with the aid of jambia (a sharp-cutting instrument).” (Emphasis supplied) 21. This position of law has finally been summed up very succinctly in Nallabothu Venkaiah vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra): “24. Analytical reading of catena of decisions of this Court, the following broad proposition of law clearly emerges; (a) the conviction under Section 302 simpliciter without aid of Section 149 is permissible if overt act is attributed to the accused resulting in the fatal injury which is independently sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased and is supported by medical evidence; (b) wrongful acquittal recorded by the High Court, even if it stood, that circumstance would not impede the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 r/w Section 149 I.P.C. (c) charge under Section 302 with the aid of Section 149 could be converted into one under Section 302 r/w Section 34 if the criminal act done by several persons less than five in number in furtherance of common intention is proved.” (Emphasis supplied) 22. Although both Section 34 and 149 of the IPC are modes for apportioning vicarious liability on the individual members of a group, there exist a few important differences between these two provisions. Whereas Section 34 requires active participation and a prior meeting of minds, Section 149 IPC assigns liability merely by membership of the unlawful assembly. In reality, such ‘common intention’ is usually indirectly inferred from conduct of the individuals and only seldom it is done through direct evidence. [Mahbub Shah vs. Kine Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 118 ].” 17. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rohtas (supra), it is quite vivid that though in the instant case charge was framed by the trial Court against the appellants with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC, but they have been acquitted for other offences including that of Section 34 also, however, in view of the aforesaid pronouncement in Rohtas (supra), it was permissible for the trial Court to convict the appellants for offences under Sections 302 and 120B of the IPC simpliciter. 18. 18. Now, the question is, whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellants for offences under Sections 302 and 120B of the IPC? 19. Considering the nature of evidence and further considering the submissions made on behalf of the two appellants separately and since two appeals have been preferred, we will consider the cases of two appellants in seriatim. Case of appellant Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) - Cr. Appeal No. 920/2015: 20. The trial Court has recorded a finding that in order to convict appellant Mahendra Rajwade (A-1), motive of offence has been established and furthermore, Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1) being daughter of the deceased has witnessed the incident at 11.30 p.m. in the night and pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant Ex.P-14, ear tops and broken bangles of the deceased - Namita Rajwade have been seized vide Ex.P-15, which connects the appellant with the offence in question. Moreover, the appellant vide Ex.P-18 lodged morgue intimation to the police station on 28-3-2014 that his wife Namita Rajwade has committed suicide by hanging. As such, giving false information would be one of the incriminating evidence and therefore A-1 is guilty of the offence of murder of the deceased i.e. his wife Namita Rajwade and in that view of evidence, the trial Court proceeded to convict him (A-1) and sentenced him as stated herein-above. 21. It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant used to suspect the character of his wife for having alleged relationship with the son of local MLA namely, Vijay Rajwade in protest of which, the appellant’s wife had gone to stay with his father Pillu Rajwade (PW-4) and mother and had returned from her paternal house one week prior to the date of offence. Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1), 16 years old daughter of the deceased and the appellant (A-1), has been cited as eye-witness to the incident by the prosecution. She has clearly stated in her statement before the Court that her father used to suspect the character of her mother and he used to quarrel with her on that account and her mother has gone to her parental house of Pillu Rajwade (PW-4) with whom she stayed and one week prior to the date of incident, she had returned along with her parents to the house of the appellant. Same statement has also been reiterated by Pillu Rajwade (PW-4) – father of the deceased. He has stated that his son-in-law i.e. appellant Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) used to quarrel with his daughter for having illicit relationship with another man for which he made him to understand not to quarrel and one week prior to the date of incident, he had gone to the appellant’s house along with his daughter and asked them to live peacefully and the trial Court has rightly held that on account of suspecting the character of his wife i.e. the deceased, of having illicit relationship with the son of a local MLA namely, Vijay Rajwade, the appellant (A-1) used to quarrel with his wife. Therefore, motive of the offence to commit the murder has rightly been held to be established by the trial Court. 22. The next question would be, whether appellant Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) is the author of the crime in question? 23. It is not in dispute that the appellant had two houses at the time of offence and the appellant and his wife Namita Rajwade, his son Manish, daughter Shimla and another daughter Sneha were residing in the new house which is one kilometer away from Village Kharwat where the offence has been committed. It is a new house which is under construction and which has not been plastered and doors were not fitted except chaukhat. This fact has clearly been established by the testimonies of Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1), Shiv Kumar (PW-2), Devprakash @ Devprasad (PW-3) and Pillu Rajwade (PW-4). Likewise, Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1), Shiv Kumar (PW-2), Devprakash @ Devprasad (PW-3), Pillu Rajwade (PW-4), Preetlal (PW-9) and Vikas Singh (PW-10) have clearly established that there was no electricity connection in the new house where the offence is said to have been committed and they have also clearly stated that the dead body of the deceased was found hanging in the first floor and it was not in the room where the deceased and the appellant (A-1) were sleeping on the fateful night. 24. Kum. 24. Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1), who is eye-witness, has also clearly stated that on the date of offence, she along with her brother Manish and sister Shimla were sleeping in a separate room after taking their dinner and her father and mother were sleeping in a separate room, and in between 11-12 p.m. she heard the cry of her mother - Namita Rajwade, on hearing that cry, she had gone into the room of her father and mother and saw that her mother's neck was being tightened by a nylon rope and it was being pulled by both the appellants (A-1 and A-2) whereupon she asked them to refrain from that act on which her father scolded her and asked her to go out from the room pursuant to which she frightened and went inside her room and went asleep. In the morning, she had seen the dead body of her mother in the first floor and immediately informed to her maternal grand-father and maternal grand-mother and thereafter, the matter was reported to the police vide Ex.P-1. In her cross-examination, she has stated that she has seen the incident, after hearing the cry of her mother, though she has not entered into the room, but she has seen from outside the room and from the courtyard and the incident has taken place in the new house which is located outside the Sargaon Basti. She has refuted the fact that she has not witnessed the incident in paragraph 6 of her statement in her cross-examination. On further cross-examination made on behalf of appellant Dhansai @ Giri (A-2), she has clearly stated that all have gone for sleep after locking the main door and in the house, there was no electricity connection, but it was illuminating from the candle light which was available in the courtyard. On further cross-examination made on behalf of appellant Dhansai @ Giri (A-2), she has clearly stated that all have gone for sleep after locking the main door and in the house, there was no electricity connection, but it was illuminating from the candle light which was available in the courtyard. As such, she has seen the incident and immediately thereafter, she has lodged the FIR and therefore she has confronted to her statement before the Court, though in the house there was no electricity connection and she was sleeping along with her brother and sister in the room adjoining to her father and mother, but in the late night at about 11.30 after hearing the cry of her mother, she has seen the incident from outside the room, in which appellants Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) and Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) both were pulling the nylon rope which was tightened around the neck of her mother Namita Rajwade and on being scolded by her father, she had gone back for sleep and in the morning, her mother’s dead body was found hanging in the first floor. In night, the house was being illuminating by the candle light which was available in the courtyard. As such, it is established that Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1) has witnessed the incident of strangulation of her mother by her father at late night from outside the room of her father and mother in the candle light available in the courtyard which the trial Court has relied upon. We also do not find any infirmity in the testimony of the aforesaid witness qua the appellant herein (A-1). [So far as the role of appellant Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) is concerned, it will be discussed in the later part of the judgment while discussing the case of A-2]. 25. Thereafter, inquest on the dead body of the deceased was prepared and on the recommendation of Panchas, the dead body was subjected to postmortem as Panchas were of the opinion that deceased Namita Rajwade has been murdered and as per the recommendation of Panchas, her body was subjected to postmortem. According to the opinion of doctor, though death was homicidal in nature, abrasion was found on right shoulder, left shoulder and on back side and on scapular region also contusion was found and abrasion was also found on right and left knee. According to the opinion of doctor, though death was homicidal in nature, abrasion was found on right shoulder, left shoulder and on back side and on scapular region also contusion was found and abrasion was also found on right and left knee. As such, sign of struggle was found over the body of the deceased as stated by Dr. Yogendra Chauhan (PW-6) in his statement before the Court in paragraph 2. Not only this, pursuant to the memorandum statement Ex.P-14, ear tops and broken bangles of the deceased were seized vide Ex.P-15 which have been proved by Hitesh Kumar Rajwade (PW-8) – brother of the deceased and witness to memorandum statement and seizure, though ear tops and bangles were seized from below the bed. Moreover, after the incident, on 28-3-2014, the appellant (A-1) lodged morgue intimation Ex.P-18 that his wife Namita/deceased has committed suicide by hanging which was false to the knowledge of the appellant and giving false information to the police itself is an incriminating piece of evidence against the appellant (A-1) in which it is stated that she has committed suicide by hanging which he has informed to appellant Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) and thereafter, to father and mother of the deceased. In the considered opinion of this Court, the trial Court has rightly held that the prosecution has established the motive of the offence and that Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1) is eye-witness to the incident, qua appellant Mahendra Rajwade (A-1), as she has not only heard the cry of her mother, but also witnessed the incident from courtyard outside the room of her father and mother and thereafter, on her report, the FIR was registered vide Ex.P-1 and in the postmortem, sign of struggle has also been recorded and the dead body was found in the house of the appellant, who in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. has not explained the incriminating circumstances found against him, rather he tried to mislead the police by giving false information by way of morgue intimation vide Ex.P-18 that the deceased died on account of suicide by hanging. As such, the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence against Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) and rightly held that he is guilty of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. Accordingly, Cr. As such, the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence against Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) and rightly held that he is guilty of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. Accordingly, Cr. Appeal No. 920/2015 deserves to be dismissed so far as for offence under Section 302 of the IPC is concerned. The case of Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) for commission of offence under Section 120B of the IPC will be considered in the later part of the judgment. Case of appellant Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) - Cr. Appeal No. 340/2015: 26. Appellant Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) at the relevant point of time was resident of the same village where Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) used to reside i.e. Village Mahuwapara, Charcha, Police Station Charcha, District Koria and he has been arraigned as accused as he has been named in the FIR by Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1). She has clearly stated in the FIR Ex.P-1 that on hearing the cry made by her mother at 11-12 p.m. she had gone to the room of her mother and father where she noticed that her mother's neck was being tightened by nylon rope being pulled by Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) and Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) also. She has maintained her version, whereas Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) has been convicted only on the basis of the statement of Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1) being daughter of appellant Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) and the deceased, being a related and interested witness, whereas, Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) is resident of same village. 27. It is well settled law that the evidence of a related or interested witness should be meticulously and carefully examined and it is also held that merely because the witnesses are related to the complainant or the deceased, their evidence cannot be thrown out. If their evidence is found to be consistent and true, the fact of being a relative cannot by itself discredit their evidence. In other words, the relationship is not a factor to affect the credibility of a witness and the courts have to scrutinise their evidence meticulously with a little care. The Supreme Court in the matter of Raju alias Balachandran and Others vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 12 SCC 701 after reviewing the earlier case laws held that the evidence of a related or interested witness should be meticulously and carefully examined. The Supreme Court in the matter of Raju alias Balachandran and Others vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 12 SCC 701 after reviewing the earlier case laws held that the evidence of a related or interested witness should be meticulously and carefully examined. Relying upon the cases of Dalip Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364 and Sarwan Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 369 it has been further held that the evidence of an interested witness does not suffer from any infirmity as such, but the courts require as a rule of prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses should be scrutinised with a little care. Once that approach is made and the court is satisfied that the evidence of interested witnesses have a ring of truth such evidence could be relied upon even without corroboration. 28. The Supreme Court in the matter of Vadivelu Thevar vs. State of Madras, (1957) SCR 981 has observed as under: “......Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well-established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way-it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court, equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial......” 29. After going through the statement of Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1), we find that she is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable and her case would fall under the third category and she is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable and therefore the Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars in order to rely upon her statement [Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1)]. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1), we find that she is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable and her case would fall under the third category and she is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable and therefore the Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars in order to rely upon her statement [Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1)]. As such, it will be necessary that there is some corroboration to his ocular testimony to base conviction. 30. Admittedly, the incident happened in the house of appellant Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) when the appellant and the deceased were sleeping in one room and Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1) was sleeping in a separate room along his brother and sister in the said house. It is established by the statements of Shiv Kumar (PW-2), Devprakash @ Devprasad (PW-3), Pillu Rajwade (PW-4) and Preetlal (PW-9) that the said house was not having the electricity connection and it is also established that doors were not fitted in most of the places reserved for the same and it has further been established that in the said fateful day and night, as per paragraph 12 of Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1), the room (hall/courtyard) was illuminating by candle light. Nothing has been brought on record that Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1) - daughter of the deceased and the appellant, had acquaintance with Dhansai @ Giri (A-2). Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1) has stated that on hearing her mother’s shout or cry, she entered the room of her father and mother and Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) - her father and Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) were pulling the rope tightened over the neck of her mother i.e. the deceased. Even if it is accepted that there was lack of electricity in the house under construction where the offence is said to have been committed, since she heard the voice of her mother, she has identified her mother by her voice and she had identified her father in the dim candle light available therein, but it would be difficult for us to accept that in such a dim light of candle, she had rightly identified Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) who was only resident of same locality and village. In the statement before the Court she has refused having any relationship with Dhansai (A-2) and that Dhansai used to stay with the family in the village. In the statement before the Court she has refused having any relationship with Dhansai (A-2) and that Dhansai used to stay with the family in the village. The prosecution has not established the relationship of Dhansai is so close and intimate with Mahendra and his family that Dhansai would take such an extreme step and made himself involved in the offence of murder. As such, we are not convinced that in such a dim candle light available in the courtyard outside the room of the appellant and the deceased, she had identified A-2 that too at late night, particularly when she had no previous acquaintance with him and furthermore, A-2 had also participated in the last rites of deceased Namita Rajwade, as stated by Shiv Kumar (PW-2) in paragraph 5 and Devprakash @ Devprasad (PW-3) in paragraph 7, otherwise, natural conduct of a person who has committed the offence is to abscond immediately from the place of occurrence and not to remain present in the locality wherein the offence has been committed or in house of the deceased, more particularly, no recovery has been made from Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) and no evidence of friendship between both the appellants (A-1 and A-2) has been brought on record. Furthermore, there is no corroborative piece of evidence led by the prosecution to support the statement of Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1), though corroboration is rule of caution and not rule of law, but the principles of administration of justice require that for capital offences including that of murder for which severe punishment has been laid down, proof of guilt must be so clear that there is no other room except the culpability of accused/appellant Dhansai @ Giri (A-2). 31. The Supreme Court in the matter of Amar Singh vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC Online SC 826 followed in Chunthuram vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 10 SCC 733 has held about the conduct and unreliability of eye witness as under: “32. The conviction of the appellants rests on the oral testimony of PW-1 who was produced as eye witness of the murder of the deceased. The conviction of the appellants rests on the oral testimony of PW-1 who was produced as eye witness of the murder of the deceased. Both the Learned Sessions Judge, as well as High Court have placed reliance on the evidence of PW-1 and ordinarily this Court could be reluctant to disturb the concurrent view but since there are inherent improbabilities in the prosecution story and the conduct of eye witness is inconsistent with ordinary course of human nature we do not think it would be safe to convict the appellants upon the in-corroborated testimony of the sole eye witness. Similar view has been taken by a Three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Selveraj vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1976) 4 SCC 343 . Wherein on an appreciation of evidence the prosecution story was found highly improbable and inconsistent of ordinary course of human nature concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the two Courts below was set aside.” 32. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be unsafe to base conviction of Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) on the sole oral testimony of Kum. Sneha Rajwade (PW-1), though she is eye-witness and the prosecution has not brought on record any corroborative piece of evidence to connect A-2 for the offence in question. As such, conviction of Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) for offence under Section 302 of the IPC is set aside. Conviction of the appellants (A-1 and A-2) for offence under Section 120B of the IPC: 33. Both the appellants have been convicted for offence under Section 120B of the IPC. Section 120B of the IPC provides as under: “120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy: (1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence. (2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.” 34. (2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.” 34. The essential ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy would be: (a) an object to be accomplished, (b) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object, (c) an agreement or understanding between two or more of the accused persons whereby, they become definitely committed to co-operate for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means, and (d) in the jurisdiction where the statute required an overt act. [See Chaman Lal and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another, AIR 2009 SC 2972 ] 35. To substantiate the charge under Section 120B of the IPC, there must be criminal conspiracy at least between two or more persons. It has been held that meeting of mind is essential to constitute an offence under Section 120B of the IPC, mere knowledge or discussion would not be sufficient. 36. Recently, in the matter of Ram Sharan Chaturvedi vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2022 Live Law (SC) 709 the Supreme Court has held that the principal ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the IPC is an agreement to commit an offence, such an agreement must be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence, and some kind of physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established. It has been observed in paragraphs 22, 25 and 26 as under: “22. The principal ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the IPC is an agreement to commit an offence. Such an agreement must be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence. Court has to necessarily ascertain whether there was an agreement between the Appellant and A-1 and A-2. In the decision of State of Kerala vs. P. Sugathan and Another, (2000) 8 SCC 203 , this Court noted that an agreement forms the core of the offence of conspiracy, and it must surface in evidence through some physical manifestation: “12.........As in all other criminal offences, the prosecution has to discharge its onus of proving the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt..... A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy..... 13.........The most important ingredient of the offence being the agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act. In a case where criminal conspiracy is alleged, the court must inquire whether the two persons are independently pursuing the same end or they have come together to pursue the unlawful object. The former does not render them conspirators but the latter does. For the offence of conspiracy some kind of physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established. The express agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful act is not sufficient.....” (Emphasis supplied) 25. It is not necessary that there must be a clear, categorical and express agreement between the accused. However, an implied agreement must manifest upon relying on principles established in the cases of circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, in the majority opinion of Ram Narayan Popli vs. CBI, (2003) 3 SCC 641 , this Court had held: “354.........For the offence of conspiracy some kind of physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established. The express agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful act is not sufficient.....” 26. In view of the clear enunciation of law on the criminal conspiracy by this Court, we find that the prosecution has failed to produce any evidence whatsoever to satisfy the Court that there was a prior meeting of minds between the Appellant and A-1 and A-2. There is no physical manifestation of such a concurrence extractable from surrounding circumstances, declarations, or the conduct of the Appellant. The evidence is shorn of even a passive acknowledgment of conspiracy of the Appellant with the accused, let alone heralding a clear and conscientious participation of the Appellant in the conspiracy. As noted above, this Court has cautioned against replacing mere suspicion with the legal requirement of proof of agreement.” 37. The evidence is shorn of even a passive acknowledgment of conspiracy of the Appellant with the accused, let alone heralding a clear and conscientious participation of the Appellant in the conspiracy. As noted above, this Court has cautioned against replacing mere suspicion with the legal requirement of proof of agreement.” 37. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid proposition of law for proving the offence of criminal conspiracy, we find that the prosecution has miserably failed to produce any evidence and to satisfy that there was meeting of mind between A-1 and A-2 and merely on the basis of suspicion, the legal requirement of manifestation of agreement cannot be held to be established. As such, the prosecution has failed to establish the existence of any agreement between A-1 and A-2 which is sine qua non for charge under Section 120B of the IPC and in absence of such agreement, even by inference by circumstantial evidence, the two appellants are entitled to be acquitted for offence under Section 120B of the IPC. 38. Concludingly, conviction of appellant Mahendra Rajwade (A-1) for offence under Section 302 of the IPC is maintained, however, his conviction under Section 120B of the IPC is hereby set aside. His appeal is partly allowed. Simultaneously, conviction of Dhansai @ Giri (A-2) under Sections 302 and 120B of the IPC are set aside and he is acquitted of the said charges. He be released forthwith if not required any other case. His appeal is allowed in full.