JUDGMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. 1. These three writ petitions, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, have been preferred by the petitioners for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari and/or Mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction of like nature, directing respondent authorities for payment of solatium amount to the petitioners, at the rate of 100% of the compensation amount, under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. 2. It is submitted at the Bar that since common questions of law are involved in all these petitions, the same may be heard and disposed of together at this admission stage itself, by passing a common judgment and order. And accordingly, it is decided to hear arguments of learned Advocates of all the parties and to dispose of the petitions, by this common judgment and order. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND: 3. The factual background, leading to filing of these three writ petitions are adumbrated herein-below: “The Government of Arunachal Pradesh, through the Secretary (Land Management), Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar, issued a Notification, Vide No. LM-14/2014, dated 17.02.2014, for acquiring lands mentioned in the schedule of the said Notification, for construction of road under Trans Arunachal Highway (for short ‘TAH’) from Potin to Bopi (Godak) via Yazali, Yachuli, Ziro, Boasimla, Tamen and Raga. In the said Notification, the lands of the petitioners were also included in the schedule mentioned in the Notification for acquisition. The aforesaid Notification was issued under Section 10 of the Balipara/Tirap/Sadiya Frontier Tract Jhum Land Regulation Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Regulation of 1947’). It is to be mentioned here that the State respondent No. 1 has already issued one Notification No. LM-134/2011(Pt), dated 28.09.2012, prescribing procedure and manner to be followed, as prescribed under Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for calculation of land compensation including land value, interest, solatium, establishment charge and contingency charge. Thereafter, the State respondent has issued another Notification No. LM-20/2005(Pt)/1546, dated 20.03.2014, through the Secretary-cum- Revenue Commissioner, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Land Management Department, extending the RFCT & LARR Act, 2013, in Arunachal Pradesh and directing all the Deputy Commissioners/Additional Deputy Commissioners and District Land Revenue and Settlement Officers to process the land acquisition cases under the provision of said Act. Thereafter, the respondent No. 4, the Chief Engineer, (Highway), Western Zone, PWD, Itanagar, Vide No. CEAP (HW)/WZ/W-9/PP/2015-16/122-28, dated 22.04.2015, submitted estimate of compensation to the Chief Engineer (NER), Transport Bhavan, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, wherein, 30% solatium was included for approval and sanction of fund, whereas the solatium amount was not been paid to the petitioners at the time of payment of compensation. Thereafter, vide Notification No. LM/134/2011, dated 22.01.2016, the State respondent has, in super-session of the earlier Notification No. LM-134/2011(Pt), dated 20.09.2012, providing that payment of solatium and interest shall be made in all kind of land acquisition. Thereafter, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highway has issued a guideline Vide No. NH-11011/30/2015-LA, dated 28.12.2017, in regards to payment of compensation and solatium, wherein, it has been provided that payment of solatium @ 100% of the compensation amount. The petitioners, thereafter, through their engaged counsels, submitted notice, dated 20.04.2018, to the Deputy Commissioner, Lower Subansiri District, Ziro, respondent No. 3 herein, for payment of solatium amount and the respondent No. 3, in its reply to the same, stated that Section 10 of the Balipara/Tirap/Sadiya Frontier Tract Jhum Land Regulation Act, 1947, does not provide for payment of solatium for the land acquired though, however, it provides for payment of compensation. Then, being aggrieved by the reply of the respondent No. 3, the petitioners preferred a series of writ petitions before this Court praying for a direction to the respondent authorities for payment of solatium amount to the petitioners, as provided under Section 30 of the RFCT & LARR Act, 2013. But, the said writ petitions were dismissed by this Court, vide order dated 06.06.2018, stating that the land of the petitioners were acquired under the provision of Section 10 of the Regulation 1947, and there is provision for appeal and revision before the Governor of the State as provided under Clause 17 of Regulation 1947, and the petitioners have sufficient alternative remedy to approach the concerned authority for redressal of their grievance. Thereafter, the petitioners preferred an appeal before the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh, which was, however, rejected vide order dated 14.08.2020. Being highly aggrieved the petitioners’ approached this court again by filing the present sets of writ petitions.” 4. The respondent No. 3 has filed affidavit-in-opposition denying the averments made in the petition. Thereafter, the petitioners preferred an appeal before the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh, which was, however, rejected vide order dated 14.08.2020. Being highly aggrieved the petitioners’ approached this court again by filing the present sets of writ petitions.” 4. The respondent No. 3 has filed affidavit-in-opposition denying the averments made in the petition. It is stated that the Notification No. L.M. 134/2011(Pt) dated 10.12.2012 issued by the Secretary (Land Management), and Notification No. LM-20/2005(Pt)/1546, dated 20.03.2014, and Notification No. LM/134/2011, dated 22.01.2016, are not admissible under the Jhum Land Regulation 1947, under which the lands of petitioners were acquired, and that nothing is mentioned in the Notification issued for acquisition of lands of the petitioners, dated 17.02.2014, under section 10 of the Regulation 1947 as regard the payment of solatium for construction of TAH from Potin to Bopi. However, it is admitted that 30% solatium was added to the cost of land value in the earlier proposal of Rs. 436,16,69632/- (Rupees four hundred and thirty six crore sixteen lacs sixty nine thousand and six thirty two) but the Govt. of India has restricted the amount to Rs. 188,00,00000/- (Rupees one hundred and eighty eight crore). It is further stated that Notification No. LM-191/2015 dated 11.03.2016 is also not applicable for the land acquired under Regulation 1947. Therefore, it is contended to dismiss the petition. 5. Respondent No. 5 the Union of India also filed its counter affidavit denying its concerned with any of the averments made in the paragraph No. 1 to 17 and as such it has withhold its comment. It is stated that as per policy of Ministry of Road Transport and Highway (MORTH) detailed estimates for compensation of Land Acquisition are prepared by the State Government and forwarded to the respondent and after scrutiny it accords administrative, technical approval and financial sanction to such estimates and thereafter place the funds at disposal of the State Government for disbursement to the land owners. It is also stated that the land of the petitioners were acquired under the Regulation 1947 and reasonable compensation has been paid to the owners. Therefore, it is contended to delete its name form from the array of the respondents. It is also stated that the land of the petitioners were acquired under the Regulation 1947 and reasonable compensation has been paid to the owners. Therefore, it is contended to delete its name form from the array of the respondents. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF LAW INVOLVED IN THE PETITIONS: (i) Balipara/Tirap/Sadia Frontier Tract Jhum Land Regulation, 1947: Section 10 (ii) Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: (a) Section 30 (b) Section 106 (c) Section 107 (d) The First Schedule (e) The Fourth Schedule SUBMISSION OF THE PARTIES: 6. Heard Mr. S. Koyang, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. K. Ete, learned Senior In-Charge Advocate General, Arunachal Pradesh, assisted by Ms. P. Pangu, learned Junior Government Advocate representing the State respondents and Mr. N. Ratan, the learned Central Government Counsel (CGC) for the Union of India representing respondent No. 5. 7. Mr. S. Koyang, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the petitioners’ lands were acquired by the Government of Arunachal Pradesh for construction of Trans Arunachal Highway, vide Notification No. LM-14/2014, dated 17.12.2014, as per the provision under Section 10 of the Regulation of 1947, and they have been paid compensation for acquiring their land, however, without paying solatium. Mr. Mr. S. Koyang, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the petitioners’ lands were acquired by the Government of Arunachal Pradesh for construction of Trans Arunachal Highway, vide Notification No. LM-14/2014, dated 17.12.2014, as per the provision under Section 10 of the Regulation of 1947, and they have been paid compensation for acquiring their land, however, without paying solatium. Mr. Koyang, further submits that in view of Notification No. LM-134/2011(Pt), dated 28.09.2012, the petitioners are entitled to 30% solatium in view of the procedure No. 3 prescribed in the said Notification and the Notification No. LM-134/2011, dated 22.01.2016, the petitioners are also entitled to solatium and interest, and vide Letter No. CEAP (HW)/WZ/W-9/ PP/2015-16/122-28, dated 22.04.2015, the Chief Engineer, Western Zone, PWD, has forwarded the compensation estimate including the 30% solatium for approval and sanction of fund for the land value to the Chief Engineer (NER), Transport Bhavan, Ministry of Road Transport & Highways, and, thereafter, vide Notification No. LM-20/2005(Pt)/1546, dated 20.03.2014, the Government of Arunachal Pradesh has directed all the Deputy Commissioner, Additional Deputy Commissioners and District Land Revenue and Settlement Officers to process land acquisition cases under the provision of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Act, 2013, from the date of coming into force of the said Act, i.e. 01.01.2014, and as per Section 30 of the said Act of 2013 and as per 1st Schedule of the said Act of 2013 and as per S. No. 5.8 of the Letter dated 20.12.2017 of the Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, vide No. NH-11011/30/2015-LA, 100% solatium has to be paid to the land owners. Mr. Koyang further submits that, in the instant case, the petitioners were paid only the value of the land without solatium, though the solatium is a part of the compensation. Mr. Koyang further submits that the petitioners also preferred an Appeal under Section 17 of the Regulation of 1947, and the same was dismissed by the Hon’ble Governor of Arunachal Pradesh, vide order dated 14.08.2020, and as such the state respondents have violated its own earlier order. Mr. Mr. Koyang further submits that the petitioners also preferred an Appeal under Section 17 of the Regulation of 1947, and the same was dismissed by the Hon’ble Governor of Arunachal Pradesh, vide order dated 14.08.2020, and as such the state respondents have violated its own earlier order. Mr. Koyang further submits that the Government has acquired land for the purpose of establishing one 33/11 KV Sub-Station under Comprehensive Scheme for Strengthening T&D System in Arunachal Pradesh, in one circle of Lower Subansiri District and in the said case, the Government has paid solatium to the affected land owners vide order dated 18.07.2017, No. LMZ/PGCIL-5/2015. Thereafter also, while constructing Bomdila By-pass in Dirang Circle, the Government has paid solatium to the affected land owners and in both the cases, the Government has acquired land under Section 10 of the Regulation of 1947, as such the petitioners are treated differently though they are similarly situated with the land owners of the said two case and consequently, their rights under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution stands violated. Mr. Koyang, therefore, submits that the Government has illegally denied solatium to the petitioners without any ground. It is further submitted that the land is a subject of concurrent list and upon the same subject, there are 2 (two) Legislation, one is Regulation of 1947, a State Legislation and the other one is Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘RFCT & LARR Act, 2013’) a Central Legislation and when the 2 (two) Legislations dwell upon the same subject of concurrent list, then the Central Legislation will prevail. Mr. Koyang, therefore, contended to allow the petition. Mr. Koyang has relied upon following authorities to bolster his submission: (i) P.C. Goswami vs. Collector of Darrang, AIR 1982 SC 1214 (ii) Sunder vs. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 211 (iii) Young Lai Association vs. State of Mizoram, (2017) 4 GLR 134 (iv) R. Lalthanzuava and Others vs. Union of India Others, (2017) SCC Online Gau. 1430 (v) Union of India and Another vs. Tarsem Singh and Others, (2019) 9 SCC 304 8. Per contra, Mr. 1430 (v) Union of India and Another vs. Tarsem Singh and Others, (2019) 9 SCC 304 8. Per contra, Mr. K. Ete, learned In-Charge Advocate General, Arunachal Pradesh, representing State respondents, submits that the acquisition process prescribed in the new Act, i.e. RFCT & LARR Act, 2013, is a cumbersome one, whereas, the process prescribed in Section 10 of the Regulation 1947 is a simple one and as such, the Government has proceeded to acquire the land for construction of Trans Arunachal Highway, under Section 10 of the Regulation of 1947. Mr. Ete further submits that there is no provision of payment of solatium under the Regulation of 1947, though it is provided under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, and the petitioners have happily accepted it and the same was acquired following the principle of natural justice and as there is no provision for payment of solatium, the Government has not paid it and without any protest, the petitioners have accepted it. But, they have agitated belatedly. Mr. Ete further submits that the proposal for solatium has been sent to the Central Government, but the Central Government has raised the question about the same and that the petitioners have preferred an Appeal before the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh under section 17 of the Regulation. But, the Governor has rejected the same and without challenging the order of the Governor, the petitioners preferred these writ petitions, which are not at all maintainable. Mr. Ete further submits that upon the same subject of concurrent list, 2 (two) Legislations may exist and the Regulation of 1947 has not been repealed or altered by the new Central Act and the petitioners have not challenged the vires of Section 10 of the Regulation of 1947 and it is not permissible to read a provision, if it is not provided for in the Regulation. Mr. Ete further submits that the case laws, upon which the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on, are totally misconceived and misplaced and that though the Government, out of mistake, has paid solatium in case of construction of 33/11 KV Sub-Station, yet, the petitioners cannot claim negative equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and that though solatium was paid in the case of acquisition of land for construction of Bomdila By-pass, yet, the same was not part of the Trans Arunachal Highway. Mr. Mr. Ete further submits that in the entire State, for construction of Trans Arunachal Highway, land was acquired under Section 10 of the Regulation of 1947 and there is no case for violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the petitioners slept over 5 to 6 months and the parity, as claimed by the petitioners with so far as establishment of 33/11 KV Sub-Station is concerned, the same is not applicable. Mr. Ete has relied upon following authorities to make good of his submission: (i) Union of India vs. Hari krishna Khosla, (1993) Supp. (2) SCC 149 (ii) Veerayee Ammul vs. Seeri Anmol, (2002) 1 SCC 134 (iii) Rena Drego vs. Lalchand Soni and Others, (1998) 3 SCC 341 (iv) Union of India and Others vs. Dhanwanti Devi and Others, (1996) 6 SCC 44 (v) Union of India vs. Chajju Ram and Others, (2003) 5 SCC 568 9. Mr. N. Ratan, learned CGC representing respondent No. 5, also subscribe the submission made by Mr. K. Ete, learned In-Charge Advocate General, Arunachal Pradesh, representing State respondents, that the disbursement of the compensation was made on 2017 and the claim and objection has been filed after 4 (four) years. 10. Having heard the submissions of learned Advocates of both sides, I have carefully gone through the petitions and the grounds taken therein and also the documents placed on record and the case laws referred by learned Advocates of both sides. THE ISSUES INVOLVED: 11. From the pleadings of the parties and also from the submissions, so advanced by their engaged counsel of both sides, the issues to be dealt with here in these petitions, are identified as under: (i) Whether Regulation, 1947 and RFCT & LAAR Act dwell upon the same subject matter and are in conflict and if so which one will prevail? (ii) Whether classification, in acquisition of land for ‘public purpose’ is permissible? (iii) Whether the right of the petitioners under Article 14 of the Constitution of India stands violated and whether they are entitled to protection of their right? (iv) Whether the petitioners are entitled to solatium as provided under section 30 of the RFCT & LAAR Act, though their land was acquired not under the said Act but under section 10 of the Regulation 1947? 12. (iv) Whether the petitioners are entitled to solatium as provided under section 30 of the RFCT & LAAR Act, though their land was acquired not under the said Act but under section 10 of the Regulation 1947? 12. Before directing a discussion into the issues involved, it would be in the interest of justice to understand what is solatium. Solatium is not defined either in Land Acquisition Act 1894 or in RFCT & LARR Act 2013. As per dictionary meaning it is something, for example money, that is given to someone to make them feel better when they have suffered in some way. A five Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Sunder (supra), it has been held that it envisaged in sub-section (2) “in consideration of the compulsory nature of acquisition” is thus not the same as damages on account of the disinclination to part with the land acquired. It is further held that compulsory nature of acquisition of land is to be distinguished from voluntary sale or transfer. In the later, the land owner has the widest advantage in finding out a would be buyer and in negotiating with him regarding the sale price. Even in such negotiation or haggling, normally no land owner would bargain for any amount in consideration of his disinclination to part with the land. The mere fact that he is negotiating for sale of the land would show that he is willing to part with the land. The owner is free to settle terms of transfer and choose the buyer as also to appoint the point of time when he would be receiving the consideration and parting with his title and possession over the land. But, in the compulsory acquisition, the land owner is deprived of the right and opportunity to negotiate and bargain for the sale price. It depends on what the Collector or the Court fixes, as per the provision of the Act. Referring to a judgment of a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in State of Haryana vs. Kailashwati, AIR 1980 P.H. 117, it is stated that solatium, as provided for under section 23(2) of the Act form an integral and statutory part of the compensation to the land owner and interest is also payable on the compensation awarded and not merely on market value of the land. Same view is expressed in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra) also. 13. It is not in dispute that ‘acquisition’ of land is a matter of concurrent list i.e. list III, (Entry 42) and the State Government and the Central Government both can legislate upon the said matter. The Balipara/Tirap/Sadiya Frontier Tract Jhum Land Regulation Act, 1947, is admittedly a pre-constitutional, special law and it is prevalent till date only in the state of Arunachal Pradesh. It was enacted by the Governor of Assam, in exercise of power conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 92 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as adopted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 and it received assent of the Governor General, in the year 1948 and it is protected under Article 372 of the Constitution of India and not repealed by the RFCT & LARR Act, 2013. This Regulation is being followed in the state of Arunachal Pradesh, till date, since the date of its enactment. Section 10 of the Regulation provides for acquiring of any Jhum land by the Government required for public purpose. It also provides that no formal acquisition proceedings shall be necessary, but an opportunity shall be given to those having rights in the land to show cause against such acquisition and reasonable compensation shall be paid for all land acquired under this section. 14. The Central Government has enacted a new Act, which is known as RFCT & LARR Act, 2013, by repealing the earlier Land Acquisition Act, 1894. There is also no quarrel at the Bar that the lands of the petitioners were acquired under Section 10 of the Regulation, 1947. The reason behind acquiring the land under the said Regulation of 1947, as submitted by the learned In-Charge Advocate General, is that the process mentioned therein for acquiring the land is simple and the construction of Trans Arunachal Highway is urgent from the strategic point of view and, therefore, the Government has chosen to acquire the land under the said Regulation of 1947. 15. It is also not in dispute that after acquiring the land, under the said Regulation of 1947, the Government has paid the compensation to the petitioners and the petitioners have happily accepted it without any protest. 15. It is also not in dispute that after acquiring the land, under the said Regulation of 1947, the Government has paid the compensation to the petitioners and the petitioners have happily accepted it without any protest. But, after 5 to 6 months, they approached the authority and filed an Appeal before the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh to redress their grievance, whereas, the Governor had rejected the same vide order dated 14.08.2020. Though referring two case laws i.e. in Veerayee Ammul (supra) and Rena Drego (Mrs.) (supra), the learned In-Charge Advocate General contended that the petitioners ought to have approached in appropriate time, yet the delay in approaching this court seems to cause no dent to the petitioners’ case, which is being filed under Article 226 of the Constitution for enforcing their fundamental right. It is to be noted here that in the case of Veerayee Ammul (supra), it has been held that person seeking specific enforcement of contract must approach the court within reasonable time, if time is not of the essence of the contract. It is also held that reasonable time means as soon as circumstance permit. In the case of Rena Drego (supra), in a similar line, it has been held that it is difficult to give an exact definition of word reasonable, however, the expression reasonable can be taken as providing an angle which is conformable or agreeable to reason, having regards to the facts of the particular controversy. 16. It is also not in dispute that as per provision of the RFCT & LARR Act, 2013, 100% solatium has to be paid to the affected land owners and the Government of Arunachal Pradesh also issued one Notification to that effect directing the Deputy Commissioners, Additional Deputy Commissioners and District Land Revenue and Settlement Officers for processing the compensation of land owners vide Notification No. LM-20/2005(Pt)/1546, dated 20.03.2014. THE REPUGNANCY FACTOR: 17. In view of the submissions made by Mr. THE REPUGNANCY FACTOR: 17. In view of the submissions made by Mr. Koyang, the learned counsel for the petitioners, that when two legislations, one central and one state, dwell upon the same subject, then central legislation will prevail over the state legislation, further hearing of the learned Advocates of both sides was found to be necessary and accordingly, giving advance notice, learned Advocates of both the parties were heard again on the point of repugnancy and on section 105 as well as section 107 of the RFCT & LAAR Act, 2013. ADDITIONAL SUBMISSIONS: 18. Mr. S Koyang, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has reiterated his submission that when the 2 (two) Legislations dwell upon the same subject of concurrent list, then the Central Legislation will prevail. Mr. Koyang has drawn the attention of this court to the ratio laid down by a co-ordinate Bench of this court in the case of R. Lalthanzuava (supra), and submits that in view of section 30 of ‘RFCT & LARR Act, 2013’ section 10 of the ‘Regulation of 1947’ is repugnant and cannot be acted upon in view of Article 254 of the Constitution of India. And the Government has to pay solatium to the petitioners under section 30 of the new Act, 2013. 19. Whereas, Mr. K. Ete, the learned In-Charge Advocate General has raised objection in hearing the said issue, as no such contention is there in the pleadings of the parties. Referring one case law - Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. vs. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. (1983) 1 SCC 147 , Mr. Ete submits that without there being a lis between the parties, properly ranged on either side and a crossing of the swords, no important point of law should be decided. Mr. Ete further submits that when constitutionality of a law challenged, the same is to be heard by a Division Bench only. Mr. Ete submits that without there being a lis between the parties, properly ranged on either side and a crossing of the swords, no important point of law should be decided. Mr. Ete further submits that when constitutionality of a law challenged, the same is to be heard by a Division Bench only. Mr. Ete further submits that the Regulation 1947 is a pre-constitutional special law for the state of Arunachal Pradesh, but in strict sense it cannot be considered as state law as it was enacted under special circumstances by the Governor of Assam, in exercise of power conferred by Sub-Section (2) of Section 92 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as adopted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, and it received assent of the Governor General in the year 1948 and it is protected under Article 372 of the Constitution of India and it is not repealed by the RFCT & LARR Act, 2013. It is the further submission of Mr. Ete that Article 254, is therefore, not applicable and that the ratio laid down in R. Lalthanzuava (supra), is also not applicable here in this case and that the Mizoram law was post-constitutional law enacted after coming into force of the RFCT & LARR Act, 2013. Mr. Ete also referred a case law Forum for People's Collective Efforts (EPCE) and Another vs. State of West Bengal, (2021) 8 SCC 599 , in support of his submission. Mr. Ete further submitted that framing of a comprehensive policy in case of acquisition of land for public purpose is under active consideration of the government of Arunachal Pradesh. 20. In reply, Mr. S. Koyang has submitted that Article 254 of the Constitution of India is applicable in case of both pre and post constitutional law. 21. I have considered the submissions of Mr. Ete, the learned In-Charge Advocate General and I am in respectful disagreement with his submission. It is, however, a settled proposition of law that without there being a lis between the parties properly ranged on either side; no important point of law should be decided. In no uncertain terms Hon’ble Supreme Court has held the same in the case of Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. (supra) referred by him. It is, however, a settled proposition of law that without there being a lis between the parties properly ranged on either side; no important point of law should be decided. In no uncertain terms Hon’ble Supreme Court has held the same in the case of Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. (supra) referred by him. But, herein this case the learned counsel for the petitioner, at the time of hearing, has made categorical submission that Regulation 1947 and RFCT & LARR Act, 2013 are on the same subject and section 10 of the Regulation 1947 is repugnant to section 30 of the RFCT & LARR Act, 2013, and as per Article 254 of the Constitution, the later Act will prevail. It is in this context that the learned counsels were heard again by giving notice in advance. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no lis between the parties to be decide by this court. 22. It is to be noted here that RFCT & LARR Act, 2013, was enacted by repealing the earlier Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Its object was: “to ensure, in consultation with institutions of local self-government and Gram Sabhas established under the Constitution, a humane, participative, informed and transparent process for land acquisition for industrialisation, development of essential infrastructural facilities and urbanisation with the least disturbance to the owners of the land and other affected families and provide just and fair compensation to the affected families whose land has been acquired or proposed to be acquired or are affected by such acquisition and make adequate provisions for such affected persons for their rehabilitation and resettlement and for ensuring that the cumulative outcome of compulsory acquisition should be that affected persons become partners in development leading to an improvement in their post acquisition social and economic status and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.” 23. On the other hand Regulation, 1947 was enacted “to safeguard and regulate the right of the tribes and indigenous to the Balipara/Tirap/Sadia Frontier Tracts to Jhum land in the Balipara/Tirap/Sadiya Frontier Tract.” And section 10 provides for acquisition of jhum land for the public purpose and payment of reasonable compensation to the affected persons. 24. On the other hand Regulation, 1947 was enacted “to safeguard and regulate the right of the tribes and indigenous to the Balipara/Tirap/Sadia Frontier Tracts to Jhum land in the Balipara/Tirap/Sadiya Frontier Tract.” And section 10 provides for acquisition of jhum land for the public purpose and payment of reasonable compensation to the affected persons. 24. Thus, having considered the relevant provisions of both the laws and analyzing the same in the light of the statement object and reason behind enacting the same, it has been found that both are dwell upon the same subject matter of acquisition of land and payment of compensation to the affected persons. There is no quarrel at the Bar on this point. Though Mr. Ete, the learned In-Charge Advocate General submits that Regulation, 1947 is not in strict sense, is a state legislation, yet it left this court unimpressed in as much as it is prevalent only in the state of Arunachal Pradesh. Though, Regulation, 1947 is a pre-constitutional law and protected under Article 372 of the Constitution of India, yet, section 10 of the Regulation 1947, became inconsistent with section 30 of the RFCT & LARR Act 2013, with coming into force of the later, with effect from 01.01.2014. 25. Article 254 of the Constitution of India provides that when 2 (two) Legislations, i.e. one is State Legislation and another is Central Legislation, upon the same subject matter exists, then the Central Legislation will prevail. Mr. S. Koyang, learned counsel for the petitioners, has rightly pointed this out during his argument and Mr. K. Ete, learned In-Charge Advocate General, Arunachal Pradesh, has also not controverted the same. 26. In Zaverbhai vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 752 , Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 11 thereof, has observed as under: “11. Mr. S. Koyang, learned counsel for the petitioners, has rightly pointed this out during his argument and Mr. K. Ete, learned In-Charge Advocate General, Arunachal Pradesh, has also not controverted the same. 26. In Zaverbhai vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 752 , Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 11 thereof, has observed as under: “11. It is true, as already pointed out, that on a question under Article 254(1) whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the State, no question of repeal arises; but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests, namely, that if the subject of the matter of the later legislation is identical with that of the earlier, so that they cannot both stand together, then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment, will be equally applicable to a question under Article 254(2) where the further legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as that of the State law. We must accordingly hold that S.2 of Bombay Act No. 36 of 1947 cannot prevail as against S.7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Power) Act (24 of 1946) as amended by Act No. 52 of 1950.” 27. Again in the case of T. Barai vs. Henry Ah Hoe, (1983) 1 SCC 177 , Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 15, has held as under: “15. There is no doubt or difficulty as to the law applicable. Article 254 of the Constitution makes provision firstly, as to what happen in the case of conflict between a Central and State law with regard to the subjects enumerated in the Concurrent List and secondly, for resolving such conflict. Article 254(1) enunciates the normal rule that in the event of a conflict between a Union and a State law in the concurrent field, the former prevails over the latter. Clause (1) lays down that if a State law relating to a Concurrent subject is ‘repugnant’ to a Union law relating to that subject, then, whether the Union law is prior or later in time, the Union law will prevail and the State law shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, be void. To the general rule laid down in clause (1), Clause (2) engrafts an exception, viz. To the general rule laid down in clause (1), Clause (2) engrafts an exception, viz. that if the President assents to a State law which has been reserved for his consideration, it will prevail notwithstanding its repugnancy to an earlier law of the Union, both laws dealing with a Concurrent Subject. In such a Case, the Central Act will give way to the State act only to the extent of inconsistency between the two, and no more. In short, the result of obtaining the assent of the President to a State Act which is inconsistent with a previous Union law relating to a Concurrent subject would be that the State Act will prevail in that State and override the provision of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. The predominance of the state law may however be taken away if Parliament legislates under the Proviso to clause (2). The Proviso to Article 254(2) empowers the Union Parliament to repeal or amend a repugnant State law even though it has become valid by virtue of the President’s assent. Parliament may repeal or amend the repugnant State law, either directly, or by itself enacting a law repugnant to the State law with respect to the “same matter.” Even though the subsequent law made by Parliament does not expressly repeal a State law, even then, the State law will become void as soon as the subsequent law of Parliament creating repugnancy is made. A State law would be repugnant to the Union law when there is direct conflict between the two laws. Such repugnancy may also arise where both laws operate in the same field and the two cannot possibly stand together e.g., where both prescribe punishment prescribed. In all such cases, the law made by Parliament shall prevail over the State law under Article 254(1). That being so, when Parliament stepped in and enacted the Central Amendment Act, it being a later law made by Parliament “with respect to the same matter”, the West Bengal Amendment Act stood impliedly repealed.” 28. In all such cases, the law made by Parliament shall prevail over the State law under Article 254(1). That being so, when Parliament stepped in and enacted the Central Amendment Act, it being a later law made by Parliament “with respect to the same matter”, the West Bengal Amendment Act stood impliedly repealed.” 28. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court also, in the case of R. Lalthanzuava (supra), considering the Mizoram Land Acquisition Act, 2016, and new Land Acquisition Act, i.e. RFCT & LARR Act, 2013, held that the Mizoram Land Acquisition Act, 2016, failed to pass the test provided under Article 254 of the Constitution of India, to be applicable in the State, as both the law relates to the same subject matter and the Mizoram Land Acquisition Act, 2016, is repugnant to the new Land Acquisition Act i.e. RFCTLARR Act, 2013. Though Mr. Ete, the learned In-Charge Advocate General has attempted to make a distinction that the Mizoram Land Acquisition Act is a post constitutional law and enacted after the RFCT & LARR Act, yet, I find the same bereft of any logic, in as much as Article 254 is applicable to both post and pre-constitutional law, which Mr. Koyang has rightly pointed out at the time of hearing. 29. In a very recent case Forum for People's Collective Efforts (FPCE) and Another vs. State of West Bengal and Another, (2021) 8 SCC 599 , while dealing with the issue of repugnancy Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “131. Our journey of tracing the precedents of this Court, commencing from Zaverbhai (supra) up until Innovative Industries (supra) indicates a thread of thought dwelling on when, within the meaning of Article 254(1), a law made by the legislature of a State can be considered to be repugnant to a provision of a law made by Parliament with respect to one of the matters in the Concurrent List which Parliament is competent to enact. The doctrine of repugnancy under Article 254(1) operates within the fold of the Concurrent List. Clause (1) of Article 254 envisages that the law enacted by Parliament will prevail and the law made by the legislature of the State shall be void “to the extent of repugnancy.” Clause (1) does not define what is meant by repugnancy. The doctrine of repugnancy under Article 254(1) operates within the fold of the Concurrent List. Clause (1) of Article 254 envisages that the law enacted by Parliament will prevail and the law made by the legislature of the State shall be void “to the extent of repugnancy.” Clause (1) does not define what is meant by repugnancy. The initial words of Clause (1) indicate that the provision deals with a repugnancy between a law enacted by the State legislature with: (i) A provision of a law made by Parliament which it is competent to enact. (ii) To any provision of an existing law. (iii) With respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. 132. The initial part of Clause (1) alludes to a law enacted by a state legislature being “repugnant” to a law enacted by Parliament or to an existing law. The concluding part of clause 1 provides for a consequence, namely that the State law would be void “to the extent of the repugnancy” and the Parliamentary enactment shall prevail. The concept of repugnancy emerges from the decisions of this Court PART H which have elaborated on the context of clause (1) of Article 254. Clause (2) of Article 254 has also employed the expression “repugnant” while providing that a law enacted by the legislature of a State which is repugnant to a law enacted by Parliament or an existing law on a matter within the Concurrent List shall, if it has received the assent of the President, prevail in the State. The decisions of this Court essentially contemplate three types of repugnancy: 132.1. The first envisages a situation of an absolute or irreconcilable conflict or inconsistency between a provision contained in a State legislative enactment with a Parliamentary law with reference to a matter in the Concurrent List. Such a conflict brings both the statutes into a state of direct collision. This may arise, for instance, where the two statutes adopt norms or standards of behavior or provide consequences for breach which stand opposed in direct and immediate terms. The conflict arises because it is impossible to comply with one of the two statutes without disobeying the other. 132.2. The second situation involving a conflict between State and Central legislations may arise in a situation where Parliament has evinced an intent to occupy the whole field. The conflict arises because it is impossible to comply with one of the two statutes without disobeying the other. 132.2. The second situation involving a conflict between State and Central legislations may arise in a situation where Parliament has evinced an intent to occupy the whole field. The notion of occupying a field emerges when a Parliamentary legislation is so complete and exhaustive as a Code as to preclude the existence of any other legislation by the State. The State law in this context has to give way to a Parliamentary enactment not because of an actual conflict with the absolute terms of a Parliamentary law but because the PART H nature of the legislation enacted by Parliament is such as to constitute a complete and exhaustive Code on the subject. 132.3. The third test of repugnancy is where the law enacted by Parliament and by the State legislature regulate the same subject. In such a case the repugnancy does not arise because of a conflict between the fields covered by the two enactments but because the subject which is sought to be covered by the State legislation is identical to and overlaps with the Central legislation on the subject. 133. The distinction between the first test on the one hand with the second and third tests on the other lies in the fact that the first is grounded in an irreconcilable conflict between the provisions of the two statutes each of which operates in the Concurrent List. The conflict between the two statutes gives rise to a repugnancy, the consequence of which is that the State legislation will be void to the extent of the repugnancy. The expression ‘to the extent of the repugnancy’ postulates that those elements or portions of the state law which run into conflict with the central legislation shall be excised on the ground that they are void. The second and third tests, on the other hand, are not grounded in a conflict borne out of a comparative evaluation of the text of the two provisions. Where a law enacted by Parliament is an exhaustive Code, the second test may come into being. The intent of Parliament in enacting an exhaustive Code on a subject in the Concurrent List may well be to promote uniformity and standardization of its legislative scheme as a matter of public interest. Where a law enacted by Parliament is an exhaustive Code, the second test may come into being. The intent of Parliament in enacting an exhaustive Code on a subject in the Concurrent List may well be to promote uniformity and standardization of its legislative scheme as a matter of public interest. Parliament in a given case may intend to secure the protection of vital interests which require a uniformity of law and a consistency of its application all over the country. A uniform national legislation is considered necessary by Parliament in many cases to prevent vulnerabilities of a segment of society being exploited by an asymmetry of information and unequal power in a societal context. The exhaustive nature of the Parliamentary code is then an indicator of the exercise of the State’s power to legislate being repugnant on the same subject. The third test of repugnancy may arise where both the Parliament and the State legislation cover the same subject matter. Allowing the exercise of power over the same subject matter would trigger the application of the concept of repugnancy. This may implicate the doctrine of implied repeal in that the State legislation cannot co-exist with a legislation enacted by Parliament. But even here if the legislation by the State covers distinct subject matters, no repugnancy would exist. In deciding whether a case of repugnancy arises on the application of the second and third tests, both the text and the context of the Parliamentary legislation have to be borne in mind. The nature of the subject matter which is legislated upon, the purpose of the legislation, the rights which are sought to be protected, the legislative history and the nature and ambit of the statutory provisions are among the factors that provide guidance in the exercise of judicial review. The text of the statute would indicate whether Parliament contemplated the existence of State legislation on the subject within the ambit of the Concurrent List. Often times, a legislative draftsperson may utilize either of both of two legislative techniques. The draftsperson may provide that the Parliamentary law shall have overriding force and effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force. Such a provision is indicative PART H of a Parliamentary intent to override anything inconsistent or in conflict with its provisions. The draftsperson may provide that the Parliamentary law shall have overriding force and effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force. Such a provision is indicative PART H of a Parliamentary intent to override anything inconsistent or in conflict with its provisions. The Parliamentary legislation may also stipulate that its provisions are in addition to and not in derogation of other laws. Those other laws may be specifically referred to by name, in which event this is an indication that the operation of those specifically named laws is not to be affected. Such a legislative device is often adopted by Parliament by saving the operation of other Parliamentary legislation which is specifically named. When such a provision is utilized, it is an indicator of Parliament intending to allow the specific legislation which is enlisted or enumerated to exist unaffected by a subsequent law. Alternatively, Parliament may provide that its legislation shall be in addition to and not in derogation of other laws or of remedies, without specifically elucidating specifically any other legislation. In such cases where the competent legislation has been enacted by the same legislature, techniques such as a harmonious construction can be resorted to in order to ensure that the operation of both the statutes can co-exist. Where, however, the competing statutes are not of the same legislature, it then becomes necessary to apply the concept of repugnancy, bearing in mind the intent of Parliament. The primary effort in the exercise of judicial review must be an endeavour to harmonise. Repugnancy in other words is not an option of first choice but something which can be drawn where a clear case based on the application of one of the three tests arises for determination.” 30. Thus, keeping in mind the nature of the subject matter of Regulation, 1947 and of the REFCT & LAAR Act, 2013, the purpose of both the legislation, the rights which are sought to be protected, the legislative history and the nature and ambit of the statutory provisions of both the legislation and having tested the same on the touchstone of the principle laid down in the cases discussed herein above, this court is of the considered opinion that the Regulation 1947, cannot withstand the test of Article 254 of the Constitution of India. 31. 31. Section 107 of the RFCT & LARR Act, 2013, provides for power of state legislatures to enact any law more beneficial to affected families which read as under: “Nothing in this Act shall prevent any State from enacting any law to enhance or add to the entitlements enumerated under this Act which confers higher compensation than payable under this Act or make provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement which is more beneficial than provided under this Act.” 32. Section 108 also provides for option to affected families to avail better compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement. It read as under: (1) Where a State law or a policy framed by the Government of a State provides for a higher compensation than calculated under this Act for the acquisition of land, the affected persons or his family or member of his family may at their option opt to avail such higher compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement under such State law or such policy of the State. (2) Where a State law or a policy framed by the Government of a State offers more beneficial rehabilitation and resettlement provisions under that Act or policy than under this Act, the affected persons or his family or member of his family may at his option opt to avail such rehabilitation and resettlement provisions under such State law or such policy of the State instead of under this Act. 33. A cursory perusal of both the sections reveals that the state can make law to enhance or add to the entitlements enumerated under this Act, which confers higher compensation than payable under this Act or make provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement which is more beneficial than provided under this Act. Option is also given to the affected person to avail such higher compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement under such State law or such policy of the State. Thus, from the language employed therein it can be well inferred that an implied restriction is place upon the states in enacting any law in derogation to the aforesaid provisions. The affected persons are entitled to higher compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement under such State law or such policy of the State not below what has been provided in the said Act. The affected persons are entitled to higher compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement under such State law or such policy of the State not below what has been provided in the said Act. But, in the case of the petitioners’ only the compensation has been provided under section 10 of the Regulation which is much lesser than what has been provided under section 30 of the Act of 2013. They have not been given any option to accept higher compensation. Though they have preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble Governor, who is the appellate authority under section 17 of the Regulation, their appeal has been dismissed. It is to be noted here that the First Schedule of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, provides for solatium equivalent to 100% of the market value multiplied by various factors depending upon whether the land is situated in rural or urban area constituted minimum comparative package to be given to those whose land is acquired. 34. In the given facts and circumstances, I find sufficient force in the submission of Mr. S. Koyang, learned counsel for the petitioners, that the petitioners are entitled to solatium though their land have not been acquisitioned under the RFCT & LARR Act, 2013, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunder (supra) and Tarsem Singh (supra). In the said case, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “the solatium that is paid to a landowner is on account of the fact that a landowner, who may not be willing to part with his land, has now to do so and that too at a value fixed legislatively and not through negotiation, by which, arguably, such land owner would get the best price for the property to be sold. Once this is understood in its correct perspective, it is clear that “solatium” is part and parcel of compensation that is payable for compulsory acquisition of land.” 35. The RFCTLARR Act, 2013, come into force w.e.f 01.01.2014 and Section 105 of the Act provides as under: 105. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases or to apply with certain modification: (1) Subject to sub-section (3), the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule. The RFCTLARR Act, 2013, come into force w.e.f 01.01.2014 and Section 105 of the Act provides as under: 105. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases or to apply with certain modification: (1) Subject to sub-section (3), the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule. (2) Subject to sub-section (2) of the Section 106, the Central Government may, by notification, omit or add to any of the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule. (3) the Central Government shall, by notification, within one year from the date of commencement of this Act, direct that any of the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in the Second and Third Schedules, being beneficial to the affected families, shall apply to the cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule or shall apply with such exceptions or modifications that do not reduce the compensation or dilute the provisions of this Act relating to compensation or rehabilitation and resettlement as may be specified in the notification, as the case may be. (4) A copy of every notification proposed to be issued under sub-section (3), shall be laid in draft before each House of the Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one sessions or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in disapproving the issue of the notification or both Houses agree in making any modification in the notification, the notification shall not be issued or, as the case may be, shall be issued only in such modified form as may be agreed upon by both the Houses of Parliament. 36. In the case in hand, the admittedly the State respondent No. 1 has failed to make any State amendment of Section 105 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, so as to place the Regulation, 1947 in the Fourth Schedule. In that view of the matter, continuation of the land acquisition process by the state respondent, under section 10 of the Regulation, 1947 put a big question mark about its propriety. NOTIFICATION AND GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE STATE RESPONDENT: 37. In that view of the matter, continuation of the land acquisition process by the state respondent, under section 10 of the Regulation, 1947 put a big question mark about its propriety. NOTIFICATION AND GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE STATE RESPONDENT: 37. (i) Notification No. 1 (Annexure-II): It is to be mentioned here that the State respondent No. 1 has issued one Notification No. LM-134/2011(Pt), dated 28.09.2012, prescribing procedure and manner to be followed as prescribed under Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for calculation of land compensation including land value, interest, solatium, establishment charge and contingency charge. The State respondent No. 1 has been paying compensation and solatium to the land affected person for acquisition of land as per said Notification. 38. (ii) Notification No. 2 (Annexure VI): Thereafter, the State respondent has issued another Notification No. LM-20/2005(Pt)/1546, dated 20.03.2014, through the Secretary-cum-Revenue Commissioner, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Land Management Department, extending the RFCT & LARR Act, 2013, in Arunachal Pradesh and directing all the Deputy Commissioners/Additional Deputy Commissioners and District Land Revenue and Settlement Officers to process the land acquisition cases under the provision of said Act and further notified that the date of coming into force of the said Act is appointed by the Central Government as 01.01.2014. 39. (iii) Notification No. 3 (Annexure-III): Thereafter, vide Notification No. LM/134/2011, dated 22.01.2016, the State respondent has in super-session of the earlier Notification No. LM-134/2011(Pt), dated 20.09.2012, providing that payment of solatium and interest in all kind of land acquisition. Guideline of the Central Government (Annexure-VII): 40. Thereafter, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highway has issued a guideline vide No. NH-11011/30/2015-LA, dated 28.12.2017, regards payment of compensation and solatium, wherein, it has been provided that payment of solatium @ 100% of the compensation amount. And as such it has been rightly averred by the petitioners that their cases are also similarly situated as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunder (supra). ARTICLE 14 AND 16 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: 41. Article 14 of the Constitution of India contains an express Constitutional injunction against the ‘State’ as defined in Article 12, prohibiting the ‘State’ from denying to any person (1) equality before the law, or (2) the equal protection of the laws. ARTICLE 14 AND 16 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: 41. Article 14 of the Constitution of India contains an express Constitutional injunction against the ‘State’ as defined in Article 12, prohibiting the ‘State’ from denying to any person (1) equality before the law, or (2) the equal protection of the laws. What Article 14 forbids is discrimination by law, that is, treating persons similarly circumstanced differently or treating those not similarly circumstanced in the same way or, as has been pithily put, treating equals as un-equals and un-equals as equals. Article 14 prohibits hostile classification by law and is directed against discriminatory class legislation. In the State of Andhra Pradesh and Another vs. Nalla Raja Reddy and Others, (1967) 3 SCR 28 , Hon’ble Supreme Court, has held as under: “Official arbitrariness is more subversive of the doctrine of equality than statutory discrimination. In respect of a statutory discrimination one knows where he stands, but the wand of official arbitrariness can be waved in all directions indiscriminately.” 42. While considering Article 14 and 16, Hon’ble Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, (1974) 2 SCR 348 , held as under: “Article 14 is the genus while Article 16 is a species; Article 16 gives effect to the doctrine of equality in all matters relating to public employment. The basic principle which, therefore, informs both Articles 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalizing principle? It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose, J. “a way of life” and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be “cribbed, cabined and confined” within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is qutithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. From a positivistic point of view, equality is qutithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it effects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Article 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valent relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or Irrelevant co-ordinations because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would amount of mala-fide exercise of power and that is hit by Articles 14 and 16. Mala-fide exercise of power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from the same vice : in fact the latter comprehends the former.” 43. In the case of Union of India vs. Tulshiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “The principles of natural justice have, thus, come to be recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the subject-matter of that Article. Shortly put, the syllogism runs thus violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the result of state action, it is a violation of Article 14: therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice by a State action is a violation of Article 14. Article 14, however, is not the sole repository of the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or State action violating them will be struck down. Article 14, however, is not the sole repository of the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or State action violating them will be struck down. The principles of natural justice, however, apply not only to legislation and State action but also where any tribunal, authority or body men, not coming within the definition of “State” in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case, the principles of natural justice require that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially.” 44. Now, averting to the facts herein this case, I find that the State respondent has paid solatium @ 100% of the compensation to the land affected person, namely, Shri Takhe Taling, for acquisition of his land for construction of 33/11 KV Sub-Station of Khaw area, Ziro-I Circle, Lower Subansiri District and also to the land affected persons, whose lands were acquisitioned for construction of Double Lane Bomdila Bye-pass. The petitioners’ have, therefore, contended that their right to equal treatment, as guaranteed under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution, is violated here in this case and the state respondents have not followed its own Notifications, referred and discussed herein above. Mr. Koyang, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has right pointed out the same during argument and there is substance in his submission. Annexure, No. XIV and XV and XVI, which are, respectively, relevant Notification and Abstract of payment of compensation for acquisition of land for 33/11 KV Sub-station at Ziro, under section 10 of the Regulation, 1947 and Notification and Compensation Assessment Sheet for acquisition of land for construction of Double Lane Bomdila Bye-pass, under section 10 of the Regulation, 1947, has also fortified the contention of the petitioners. 45. The above contentions of the petitioners and also the Annexure, No. XIV and XV and XVI, have not been disputed by the state respondents. However, Mr. 45. The above contentions of the petitioners and also the Annexure, No. XIV and XV and XVI, have not been disputed by the state respondents. However, Mr. K. Ete, the learned In-Charge Advocate General, Arunachal Pradesh, tried to make a distinction of the case of the petitioners with that of the land owners of the affected people of land acquisitioned for the purpose of construction of 33/11 KV Sub-Station and Bomdila Bye-pass, on the ground that the petitioners’ lands were acquired for construction of Trans Arunachal Highway and for other two aforesaid cases, the lands were acquired for 33/11 KV Sub-Station and Bomdila Bye-pass, yet, the said submission of Mr. K. Ete left this Court unimpressed in as much as in all the aforesaid cases, the lands were acquired for public purpose. While the land is acquired for ‘public purpose’ no classification therein can be made. Reference in this context can be made to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust and Another vs. Vithal Rao and Others, (1973) 1 SCC 500 , wherein, a Seven Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that as ordinarily a classification based on ‘public purpose’ is not permissible under Article 14 of the Constitution of India for the purpose of determining compensation. The same view is reiterated in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra) also. 46. In paragraph 30 of the aforementioned case, it has also been held that: “It is equally immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act or another Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired; if the existence of two Acts enables the State to give one owner different treatment from another, equally situated the owner who is discriminated against can claim the protection of Article 14.” 47. In the case in hand, discrimination i.e. treating persons similarly circumstanced differently is writ large on the face of the record. Thus, applying the proposition of law, as laid down in the cases discussed herein above, it can safely be concluded that the petitioners are discriminated and their right to equality and equal protection of law is violated and on that count, they are entitled to protection under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Though Mr. Thus, applying the proposition of law, as laid down in the cases discussed herein above, it can safely be concluded that the petitioners are discriminated and their right to equality and equal protection of law is violated and on that count, they are entitled to protection under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Though Mr. K. Ete, learned Senior-In-Charge Advocate General has argued that though by mistake the solatium was awarded in the aforesaid 2 (two) cases, yet, the negative equality cannot be applied, but, the submission of Mr. Ete is found to be devoid of substance, in view of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra). 48. Similar view is also expressed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.C. Goswami (supra), wherein, in paragraph 7 thereof, it has been held as under: “7. There is, however, one contention advanced by Mr. Nandy which, in our opinion, deserves to be accepted. He contends that in the matter of payment of solatium, no discrimination can be made between acquisitions under the Assam Act and those made under the Land Acquisition Act. Section 4 (3) of the Assam Act itself says that if a land is acquired under that Act, the State Government shall be empowered to apply to such land any of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In a judgment (dated April 1, 1980) entitled State of Kerala vs. T.M. Peter, AIR 1980 SC 1438 given by this Court very recently, to which Mr. Nandy has drawn our attention, it was held that there is no justification for discriminating between an acquisition under one Act and an acquisition under another act in so far as payment of solatium is concerned. This should be more so in respect of an acquisition to which the State Government is empowered to extend the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Mr. Naunit Lal has not been able to controvert this position in view of the judgment to which we have referred above. We accordingly direct that the State Government shall pay to the appellant solatium at the rate of 15 per cent on the compensation awarded to him by the High Court. Except for this modification, the decree passed by the High Court in confirmed.” 49. I have also carefully gone through the authorities relied upon by Mr. We accordingly direct that the State Government shall pay to the appellant solatium at the rate of 15 per cent on the compensation awarded to him by the High Court. Except for this modification, the decree passed by the High Court in confirmed.” 49. I have also carefully gone through the authorities relied upon by Mr. K. Ete, the learned In-Charge Advocate General and I find that the ratios laid down in those cases are not applicable in all force to the facts and circumstances here in this case which are quite different from those case referred by him. 50. In the case of Hari krishna Khosla (supra) two Acts i.e. Requisition and Acquisition of Immoveable Property Act 1952 and Land Acquisition Act were involved. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the comparison of acquisition under the Requisition and Acquisition of Immoveable Property Act 1952 and acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act seems to be odious in view of dissimilarities between the two Acts. In Land Acquisition Act ownership itself comes to be acquired. In the other Act acquisition is restricted to two clauses under section 7(3) of the Act. In Land Acquisition Act the power of eminent domain could be exercised without any embargo, so long there is public purpose. And as such section 8(3) (a) is held to be not violative of Article 14. 51. In the case of Dhanwanti Devi (supra) also two Acts i.e. Requisition and Acquisition of Immoveable Property Act 1952 and Jammu and Kashmir Requisition and Acquisition of Immoveable Property Act, 1968 were involved and as omission of solatium in J.K. Act being deliberate, owner is not entitled to solatium and interest and it is not violative of Article 14 and 31 of the Constitution applicable to Jammu and Kashmir. 52. In the case of Chajju Ram (supra) Defence of India Act 1971 and Land Acquisition Act 1894 were involved and it has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that solatium and interest not legally sustainable under section 30 and 31 of the Defence of India Act. It is also held that the purpose for which the provision of Defence of India Act can be invoked is absolutely different and distinct from which the provision of the Land Acquisition Act can be invoked for acquisition of land. It is also held that the purpose for which the provision of Defence of India Act can be invoked is absolutely different and distinct from which the provision of the Land Acquisition Act can be invoked for acquisition of land. It is also held that classification sought to be made is a reasonable and valid one and founded on intelligible differentia and has a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation in question. 53. I have also considered the other points raised by Mr. K. Ete during his argument and in view of the finding and discussion in the foregoing paragraphs; I am unable to record my concurrence with the same. 54. From a perusal of the statement object and reason of RFCT & LARR Act, 2013, there remains no manner of any doubt that it is a social welfare piece of legislation. In interpretation of a social welfare piece of legislation the strict and narrow jacket concept of law is no longer available. The court exist for the society and in the event the courts feels the requirements in accordance with principles of justice, equity and good conscience, courts must rise up to the occasion to do justice and meet expectation of the people. The court must be vigilant to ensure that benefits conferred by welfare legislation must not be defeated by subtle device. It is the duty of the court to get behind smoke screen and discover the true state of affairs. It can go behind the form and see the substance of the transaction. Reference in this regard can be made to decision in Workman vs. Association Rubber Industries Ltd. (1985) 4 SCC 114 . 55. Thus, from the aforesaid discussion, the finding of this Court is summarized as under: (i) The Regulation of 1947 and the RFCT & LARR Act, 2013, are enacted on the same subject, i.e. land, which is a subject of concurrent list. There is no provision for payment of solatium and interest in the Regulation of 1947, whereas the same is available in the RFCT & LARR Act. The object sought to be achieved by the Regulation 1947 and the RFCT & LAAR Act are almost the same. And as such Regulation 1947 is inconsistent with the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and Regulation of 1947 failed to withstand the test of Article 254 of the Constitution of India. The object sought to be achieved by the Regulation 1947 and the RFCT & LAAR Act are almost the same. And as such Regulation 1947 is inconsistent with the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and Regulation of 1947 failed to withstand the test of Article 254 of the Constitution of India. (ii) The land of the petitioners acquired for the construction of Trans Arunachal Highway and for construction of 33/11 KV Sub-Station and Bomdila Bye-Pass, all are acquired for the ‘public purpose’ and no classification for ‘public purpose’ is permissible. (iii) Regulation of 1947 and the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, enables the State to give the petitioners different treatment from another, equally situated owners. And as such the petitioners, who are discriminated against, are entitled to protection of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Though a classification is sought to be made by the learned In-Charge Advocate General, yet the same is not based upon intelligible differentia, as they cannot be treated differently from the land owners whose lands were acquired for construction of 33/11 KV Sub-Station and Bomdila Bye-Pass, as in all the cases the lands are acquired for only one purpose, i.e. public purpose. (iv) The petitioners are entitled to compensation and solatium and interest in view of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, as the State cannot make any law in derogation of any provision of the said Act. 56. Under the above facts and circumstances, I find sufficient merit in these petitions and, accordingly, the same are allowed. Admittedly, the state respondents have already paid compensation to the petitioners herein, under the Regulation 1947. In addition to the said compensation amount, the petitioners are entitled to solatium and interest. By a mandamus of this court, the state respondents are directed to work out and make payment of solatium and interest to the petitioners, as provided in the RFCT & LARR Act, 2013, and under the Notifications, presently holding the field. The petitioners shall obtain a certified copy of this judgment and order and place the same before the respondent authorities. On receipt of the certified copy the respondent authorities shall carry out above exercise within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the certified copy. 57. In terms of above, these three writ petitions stands disposed of. The parties have to bear their own costs.