JUDGMENT : 1. A common question arises in these Writ Petitions concerning the interpretation of bye-law 30 A(16) of the Bye-laws pertaining to the Respondent no.3-Goa State Co-operative Bank Ltd. and in that context, the correctness or otherwise of the impugned Judgments and Orders passed by the Co-operative Tribunal of Goa. 2. Writ Petition no. 1242 of 2021, is filed by Ramchandra Govind Mule, challenging the impugned order passed by the Tribunal upholding the rejection of his nomination papers for contesting in the elections to the board of Directors of the Respondent no.3-Society. 3. Writ Petition No. 1219 of 2021 is filed by Krishna Vasudev Kudnekar and Upasso Putu Gaonkar, challenging the same impugned Judgment and Order of the Tribunal to the extent that their election as Directors of the Respondent no.3-Society stood quashed and set aside on the basis that their nomination papers were wrongly accepted by the Respondent no.2-Returning Officer. 4. Writ Petition No. 2611 of 2021, is filed by Premanand Chawdikar, to challenge Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2021 passed by the Tribunal, whereby his election as Member of Board of Directors of the Respondent no.3-Society has been set aside and it has been declared that the rejection of nomination papers of the Respondent no.4 in the said Writ Petition was illegal. It is significant that the Tribunal in the said Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2021, has taken a view on the same bye-law, diametrically opposite to the view adopted by the Tribunal in the Judgment and Order dated 30.04.2021, which is the subject matter of challenge in Writ Petition nos. 1219 of 2021 and 1242 of 2021. Thus, the decision in the Writ Petitions depends upon the interpretation of bye-law 30 A(16) of the aforesaid Bye-laws of Respondent no.3-Society. 5. Election program for electing members for the Board of Directors of the Respondent no.3-Society was declared. The scrutiny of nomination forms was to take place on 08.08.2019, to be completed by 10.08.2019 and on 14.08.2019, the final list of the contesting candidates was to be published. The Respondent no.1-Returning Officer scrutinized the nomination papers and passed an order on 10.08.2019, rejecting the nomination papers of Petitioner-Ramchandra Mule (Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1242 of 2021) on the ground that he did not fulfil the eligibility criteria as per bye-law 30 A(16) of the aforesaid Bye-laws and held that the nomination papers of Respondent nos. The Respondent no.1-Returning Officer scrutinized the nomination papers and passed an order on 10.08.2019, rejecting the nomination papers of Petitioner-Ramchandra Mule (Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1242 of 2021) on the ground that he did not fulfil the eligibility criteria as per bye-law 30 A(16) of the aforesaid Bye-laws and held that the nomination papers of Respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 were accepted since they fulfilled all the eligibility conditions as per the Bye-laws. As a consequence of the order passed by the Returning Officer, in the category in which the Petitioner and the aforesaid Respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 were contesting elections, it was found that only the aforesaid Respondents were eligible candidates in the field and accordingly they stood elected unopposed. 6. Aggrieved by the said order of the Respondent no.1-Returning Officer and the consequent declaration of Respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 as elected in the concerned category as members of the Board of Directors of Respondent no.3-Society, the Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1242 of 2021, Ramchandra Mule, filed a dispute before the Tribunal under Section 83 of The Goa Co-operative Societies Act, 2001, (hereinafter referred to as the aforesaid Act). In the dispute filed before the Tribunal, the said Petitioner emphasized upon alleged wrongful rejection of his nomination papers and also that he was challenging the acceptance of said nomination papers of the said Respondents and their consequent election. The grounds raised in the said dispute focused primarily on the alleged wrongful rejection of the nomination papers of the said Petitioner. The aforesaid Respondents filed their reply before the Tribunal on the aspect of alleged wrongful rejection of nomination papers of the said Petitioner, contending that the Returning Officer was justified in rejecting the nomination papers. In the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the said Petitioner, specific grounds were raised on the aspect of alleged wrongful acceptance of nomination papers of the aforesaid Respondents. It is on the basis of such pleadings that the Tribunal proceeded to consider the rival submissions. 7. The crux of the controversy raised before the Tribunal was that bye-law 30 A(16) required the Society, which the candidate was representing, to have shown a profit for three years out of five consecutive preceding years, being classified as A or B in audit classification and such Society should have distributed dividend/patronage to members not less than 5%. 7. The crux of the controversy raised before the Tribunal was that bye-law 30 A(16) required the Society, which the candidate was representing, to have shown a profit for three years out of five consecutive preceding years, being classified as A or B in audit classification and such Society should have distributed dividend/patronage to members not less than 5%. It is an admitted position that the Society whom the aforesaid Petitioner sought to represent in the election, distributed the dividend for three years at one go in the year 2019. Insofar as the aforesaid Respondents were concerned, the Societies whom they sought to represent in the election had shown audit annually in the Audited Accounts Statement placed before the General Body of the Society, specifying the dividend payable to the members of the Society, but the dividend was not actually paid to the members. The Returning Officer had held that payment of the dividend of three years at one go was not in compliance with the aforesaid bye-law and it was also held that merely earmarking dividend payable to the members in the Audit Account Statement was not enough and actual payment of the same was necessary for complying with the aforesaid bye-law. On this basis, the Tribunal passed the impugned Judgment and order dated 30.04.2021 and held that the nomination papers of the aforesaid Petitioner were rightly rejected while the nomination papers of the aforesaid Respondents were wrongly accepted. On this basis, the dispute was partly allowed, the order passed by the Returning Officer declaring Respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 as elected was quashed and set aside and the Respondent no.1 was directed to conduct fresh elections expeditiously. 8. Aggrieved by the same, the Petitioner-Ramchandra Mule (in Writ Petition No. 1242 of 2021) and Petitioners-Krishna Vasudev Kudnekar and Upasso Putu Gaonkar (in Writ Petition No. 1219 of 2021), approached this Court. This Court granted interim relief in favour of the Petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1219 of 2021, as a result of which they have continued as Directors of Respondent no.3-Society during the pendency of the Writ Petitions. By order dated 13.07.2021, Rule was granted in both the Writ Petition nos. 1219 of 2021 and 1242 of 2021, while continuing the interim relief in Writ Petition no. 1219 of 2021, with a further direction for an expedited hearing of the said Writ Petitions. 9. By order dated 13.07.2021, Rule was granted in both the Writ Petition nos. 1219 of 2021 and 1242 of 2021, while continuing the interim relief in Writ Petition no. 1219 of 2021, with a further direction for an expedited hearing of the said Writ Petitions. 9. Insofar as Writ Petition No. 2611 of 2021 is concerned, the subject matter of challenge is Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2021 passed by the Tribunal. As noted above, in the said Judgment and Order, the Tribunal has taken a diametrically opposite view and it has been held that payment of dividend for three years at one go amounted to compliance with aforesaid bye-law 30 A(16) of the Bye-laws pertaining to Respondent no.3-Society. On this basis, the order of the Returning Officer rejecting the nomination papers of Respondent no.4 in the said Writ Petition was declared as illegal and, consequently the election of the Petitioner in the said Writ Petition was set aside. Although the said Writ Petition came up for hearing as a fresh matter before this Court, since the controversy in the said Writ Petition was identical to the controversy in Writ Petition Nos. 1219 of 2021 and 1242 of 2021, as also for the reason that all the Respondents in the said Writ Petition were represented by Counsel before this Court, the aforesaid Writ Petition was taken up for final disposal along with the other two Writ Petitions. 10. Mr. Dinesh Naik, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1242 of 2021 and for Respondent no.4 in Writ Petition No. 1219 of 2021, submitted that the Tribunal committed a grave error in only partly allowing the dispute filed by the Petitioner. It was submitted that the Tribunal erred in confirming the order of the Returning Officer to the extent that it rejected the nomination papers of the Petitioner. It was submitted that the bye-law in question stood amended with effect from 29.09.2017 and therefore, when the elections were due in the year 2019, payment of dividend in terms of the amended bye-law 30 A(16) of the said Bye-laws at one go in the year 2019 was justified and amounted to compliance with the requirements of the said Byelaw. According to the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, the Returning Officer passed a cryptic order rejecting the nomination papers of the Petitioner and also merely stated that Respondent nos. According to the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, the Returning Officer passed a cryptic order rejecting the nomination papers of the Petitioner and also merely stated that Respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 had complied with all the requirements of the Bye-laws while accepting their nomination papers. It was submitted that as long as the Society whom the Petitioner desired to represent in the said election had paid the dividends for three out of the five consecutive preceding years, even if at one go, there was indeed sufficient compliance with the requirements of the bye-law and that, therefore, rejection of the nomination papers was unjustified. It was submitted that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that when the amended bye-law itself came into effect on 29.09.2017, the insistence that the dividend ought to have been distributed separately in each financial year and not at one go, was not justified and that the Tribunal committed a grave error in doing so. 11. The learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submitted that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the nomination papers of Respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 could not have been accepted because compliance with the aforesaid bye-laws required actual distribution of the dividend to the members of the Society and merely showing the dividend as payable in the statement of the Audited Accounts was not sufficient. As regards objection raised on behalf of Respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 that pleadings in the dispute filed by the Petitioner were deficient as the emphasis in the dispute was on the question of rejection of nomination papers of the Petitioner and that grounds pertaining to alleged wrongful acceptance of nomination papers of Respondent nos. As regards objection raised on behalf of Respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 that pleadings in the dispute filed by the Petitioner were deficient as the emphasis in the dispute was on the question of rejection of nomination papers of the Petitioner and that grounds pertaining to alleged wrongful acceptance of nomination papers of Respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6, were raised only in the rejoinder, the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Balaji vs. Virendra Singh & Ors., (2004) 8 SCC 312 and Pratima Chowdhury v. Kalpana Mukherjee & anr., AIR 2014 SC 1304 , to contend that the rigors of Rules of pleadings in a civil suit under the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) or an election petition under the provisions of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951, would not apply to a dispute filed under Section 83 of the Act and further that rejoinder affidavit was certainly part of the pleadings, which could not be ignored by the Tribunal. The learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner further relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Nalin Behari Lall Singha, etc., AIR 1970 SC 388 to contend that dividend means a sum paid or received by a shareholder and therefore, distribution of the dividend under the aforesaid bye-law required actual disbursal of the same, which was not complied with by the Respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 and that therefore, the impugned Order passed by the Tribunal to that extent was justified. On this basis, it was submitted that Writ Petition no. 1242 of 2021 deserved to be allowed and that Writ Petition no. 1219 of 2021 deserved to be dismissed. 12. On the other hand, Mr. S. S. Kantak, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1219 of 2021 and Respondent nos. On this basis, it was submitted that Writ Petition no. 1242 of 2021 deserved to be allowed and that Writ Petition no. 1219 of 2021 deserved to be dismissed. 12. On the other hand, Mr. S. S. Kantak, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1219 of 2021 and Respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 in Writ Petition No. 1242 of 2021, submitted that a perusal of the said bye-law along with the relevant provisions of the aforesaid Act would show that Co-operative Societies are required to calculate the dividend payable and to place the same by way of Annual Audited Financial Statements before the General Body and that such statements specifically showing the dividend or net surplus payment are required to be approved in the General Body meetings of the Societies. It was submitted that even if the amendment in the bye-law came into effect from 29.09.2017, Sections 52 and 58 of the aforesaid Act applied and compliance with the said provisions was necessary. It was submitted that the aforesaid bye-law read with the said provisions made it clear that dividend or the net surplus was to be declared and approved by the General Body of the Society annually and therefore, distribution of dividend at one go in the year 2019, just prior to the election to the Respondent no.3-Society, did not amount to compliance with the aforesaid bye-law. On this basis, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in Writ Petition no. 1219 of 2021, submitted that the nomination paper of the Petitioner in Writ Petition no. 1242 of 2021 was rightly rejected. 13. It was further submitted that the Tribunal erred in holding that the nomination papers of the aforesaid Petitioners were wrongly accepted. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that compliance with the aforesaid bye-law required payment of dividend to the members of the Society and that so long as the Societies had specified the dividend payable in the Audited Annual Financial Statements of the Societies and the same were approved by the General Body of the Societies, it amounted to sufficient compliance. It was submitted that earmarking of such dividend in the Audited Annual Financial Statement and approval of the same by the General Body amounted to the distribution of the dividend, because such amount was no longer available to the Society and it was specifically earmarked as dividend payable to the members of the Society. The learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of J. Dalmia vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi, AIR 1964 SC 1866 in support of the said contention. It was submitted that reading of the bye-law otherwise would be unreasonable, for the reason that the failure of actual disbursal of the dividend to even one member of the Society would lead to disqualification of the candidate seeking to represent the Society in such elections. 14. In Writ Petition no. 2611 of 2021, Mr. S. R. Rivankar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, expressed surprise that the Tribunal had taken a view diametrically opposite in the said case, compared to the Judgment and Order impugned in Writ Petition nos. 1219 and 1242 of 2021. It was submitted that the Tribunal committed a grave error in holding that payment of dividend for three years at one go was sufficient compliance with the aforesaid bye-law, because the said bye-law did not specifically require that the dividend had to be paid every year or on an annual basis. It was submitted that Sections 52 and 58 of the aforesaid Act were completely ignored by the Tribunal while adopting the aforesaid view. It was submitted that the whole purpose of the aforesaid bye-law read in conjunction with the statutory requirement of Sections 52 and 58 of the aforesaid Act, would be frustrated if the view adopted by the Tribunal was to be sustained. On this basis, it was submitted that the impugned order deserved to be set aside. 15. On the other hand, Mr. Shivan Desai, learned Counsel appearing for the contesting Respondent no.4 in the aforesaid Writ Petition, sought to justify the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. It was submitted that there was sufficient compliance on the part of the said Respondent because the dividend was indeed paid for three of the past five consecutive years. On this basis, it was submitted that the Writ Petition deserved to be dismissed. 16. It was submitted that there was sufficient compliance on the part of the said Respondent because the dividend was indeed paid for three of the past five consecutive years. On this basis, it was submitted that the Writ Petition deserved to be dismissed. 16. The learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the Returning Officer and the Respondent-authorities submitted that the records were available when the matters were heard before the Tribunal and that insofar as the judgment and order impugned in Writ Petition no. 1219 of 2021 was concerned, inter alia, the Tribunal had proceeded on the basis that resolutions of the General Body were not placed on record by the Petitioners therein, although such documents were indeed part of the record available before the Returning Officer. It was submitted that the Tribunal could have called for the record from the Returning Officer before rendering findings against the Petitioners in the aforesaid Writ Petition. It was further submitted that since the Returning Officer while scrutinizing the nomination papers has to conduct a summary inquiry, there is no substance in the contentions raised in Writ Petition no. 1242 of 2021, that detailed reasons were not stated by the Returning Officer while rejecting the nomination papers of the Petitioner in the said Writ Petition and while accepting the nomination papers of the Respondent nos.4, 5 and 6 therein. The learned Counsel submitted that the Returning Officer would abide by any directions that this Court may give while disposing of the Writ Petitions. 17. Considering the elaborate submissions made on behalf of the learned Counsel appearing for the rival parties, it would be appropriate to refer to the concerned Bye-law and the relevant provisions of the aforesaid Act. 18. Bye-law 30 A(16) of the aforesaid Bye-law pertaining to the Respondent no.3-Society, reads as follows : “30. DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE BOARD. (A) No person shall be eligible for election to the Board of Directors of the Bank if he: (1) …. (2) …. (3) …. (4) …. (5) …. (6) …. (7) …. (8) …. (9) …. (10) …. (11) …. (12) …. (13) …. (14) …. (15) …. DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE BOARD. (A) No person shall be eligible for election to the Board of Directors of the Bank if he: (1) …. (2) …. (3) …. (4) …. (5) …. (6) …. (7) …. (8) …. (9) …. (10) …. (11) …. (12) …. (13) …. (14) …. (15) …. (16) the category of society to which the elected director is representing to contest the election should be in profit for three years out of five consecutive preceding years and have to be classified as A or B audit classification and should have distributed dividend/patronage to members not less than 5%.” Sections 52 and 58 of the aforesaid Act read as follows: “Section 52 -Disposal of net surplus— (1) A society earning profit, shall calculate the net profits by deducting from the gross profits for the financial year, all accrued interest which is overdue for more than six months, establishment charges, interest payable on loan and deposits, audit fees, rebate, discount, bonus or patronage or any other incentive, working expenses including repairs, rent, taxes, depreciation and funds provided for promotion of objectives and after providing for or writing off bad debts and losses not adjusted against any funds created out of profit. (2) The society shall prepare its Annual Financial Statement and arrive at its surplus or deficit. [If provided in it’s bye-laws], the society shall, out of it’s net surplus arising from its business in any year, make deferred payment to its members as patronage refund in proportion to the contribution of the members to such business an amount not less than 20% and not exceeding 50% of such surplus. [If provided in it’s bye-laws], the society shall, out of it’s net surplus arising from its business in any year, make deferred payment to its members as patronage refund in proportion to the contribution of the members to such business an amount not less than 20% and not exceeding 50% of such surplus. The balance of net surplus shall be appropriated in the following manner:- (a) At least 25% shall be transferred to statutory reserve fund; (b) Not exceeding 20% shall be transferred to a deficit fund for meeting unforeseen deficits; (c) “[Not less than 2% with a maximum limit of Rupees fifty thousand towards contribution to the Co-operative Education Fund which shall be transferred to the Co-operative Education fund as maintained by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies;] (d) Upto 5% to be transferred to a common benefit fund or common welfare fund whose purpose is approved by the general body; (e) Upto 5% towards contribution for any purpose connected with the development of the co-operative movement; (f) Not exceeding 25% of paid-up share capital towards payment of dividend to members; (g) The balance of surplus may be appropriated towards such other funds and reserves as may be approved by the board and confirmed by the general body. [Provided that the co-operative banks and urban co-operative credit societies may, instead of making deferred payment to their members as patronage refund, issue bonus shares as prescribed: Provided further that if any society has not made patronage refund as specified under this section then, the entire amount of net surplus shall be appropriated in the proportion as mentioned in clauses (a) to (g) above]. Section 58. General body.— (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the final authority of every society shall vest in the general body of members, in general meeting summoned in such a manner as may be specified in the bye-laws. (2) Where, because of spread of number of members a society feels the need for constituting a representative general body for more effective decision making, it may constitute a representative general body in such manner and with such functions as may be specified in the bye-laws. (2) Where, because of spread of number of members a society feels the need for constituting a representative general body for more effective decision making, it may constitute a representative general body in such manner and with such functions as may be specified in the bye-laws. (3) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the bye-laws, the following matters shall be dealt with by the general body in the general meetings:- (a) amendments to bye-laws; (b) removal of directors; (c) consideration of- (i) annual audited financial statement of the society and its subsidiaries, if any; (ii) annual report of activities; (iii) auditors report and audit rectification report. (iv) annual operational plan and budget. (v) Approval of excess budgetary expenditure of the previous year; (vi) long term perspective plan and budget, if any; (vii) special audit report or inquiry report, if any; (d) appointment and removal of statutory auditors; (e) appropriation of net surplus; (f) management of deficits; (g) fixation of remuneration and other facilities to be allowed to the chairman, any directors or member of any committee or internal auditor in connection with his duties in that capacity or his attendance at related meetings; (h) amalgamation, division, reconstitution and partnership with any other society; (i) sale and disposal of business undertakings; (j) dissolution of society; (k) all other functions expected of the general body under the other provisions of this Act.” 19. There is no dispute amongst the rival parties that the aforesaid bye-law came into effect by way of an amendment on 29.09.2017. As per the aforesaid bye-law, a person would be eligible for election to the Board of Directors to the Respondent no.3-Society-Bank, if the Society whom the candidate represents in the election shows a profit for three years out of five consecutive preceding years and such Society has classification A or B and further that such Society should have distributed dividend/patronage to members not less than 5%. 20. It is significant that even before the said bye-law was introduced with effect from 29.09.2017, statutory requirements under Sections 52 and 58 of the aforesaid Act were already in place. Section 52 of the aforesaid Act pertains to disbursal of net surplus, indicating that it refers to the dividend to be distributed to the members of the Society when it earns a profit. Section 52 of the aforesaid Act pertains to disbursal of net surplus, indicating that it refers to the dividend to be distributed to the members of the Society when it earns a profit. In this provision, it is stipulated that the Society shall prepare its Annual Financial Statement to arrive at the net surplus or profit and then the manner of distribution of such net surplus or profit is classified under the said provision i.e. Section 52 of the aforesaid Act. Section 58 of the aforesaid Act refers to the General Body and sub-Section (3) thereof specifically provides that the General Body in its meetings shall deal with, inter alia, under clause (e) appropriation of net surplus. A conjoint reading of Sections 52 and 58 of the aforesaid Act shows that the Society is required to prepare an annual financial statement regarding the surplus or deficit in the concerned year and the said Annual Audited Financial Statement of the Society is to be placed before the General Body in its meeting for the appropriation of net surplus. A perusal of Section 59 of the said Act shows that the management of the Society does not have the power to consider the question of appropriation of net surplus and that the same is within the exclusive domain of the General Body of the Society under subsection 3(e) of section 58 of the said Act. 21. The scheme of the Act clearly indicates that even when the aforesaid bye-law by way of amendment dated 29.09.2017 was brought into force, every Society was required to not only prepare an audited annual financial statement showing the net surplus, but to place the same before the General Body to be approved in the General Body meeting for appropriating such net surplus or dividend under subsection 3(e) to section 58 of the said Act. The said scheme clearly indicates that the net surplus or the dividend as patronage to the members of the Society is to be calculated and distributed annually after the same is approved at the General Body meeting of the society. 22. The said scheme clearly indicates that the net surplus or the dividend as patronage to the members of the Society is to be calculated and distributed annually after the same is approved at the General Body meeting of the society. 22. In the case of the Petitioner in Writ Petition No.1242 of 2021 and Respondent no.4 in Writ Petition No. 2611 of 2021, it is an admitted position that no such exercise of annually calculating the net surplus or the dividend was undertaken in three years out of five consecutive preceding years in the run-up to the elections and the documents placed on record on behalf of the aforesaid candidates, did not disclose that the Societies whom they represented had calculated and distributed dividend annually in three years. Such dividend was admittedly distributed at one go, thereby indicating that the requirements of bye-law 30A(16) read with Sections 52 and 58 of the aforesaid Act were not complied with. In fact, in the case of the Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1242 of 2021, the document placed on record only shows that the Managing Committee of the Society took a decision to distribute the dividend for three years at one go in the year 2019. As noted above, this fell within the exclusive domain of the General Body under Section 58(3)(e) of the said Act and that the document showing the alleged distribution of dividend for three years at one go by the Managing Committee was not in compliance with bye-law 30 A(16) of the said Bye-laws, read with the aforesaid statutory provisions. Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in the Judgment and Order dated 30.04.2021 passed in Cooperative Appeal No. 24 of 2019, in holding that the rejection of nomination papers of the Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1242 of 2021 i.e. Ramchandra Mule, was justified and to that extent, the prayer made in the dispute was not accepted. 23. Equally, the aforesaid analysis shows that the Tribunal committed an error in the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2021 passed in Co-operative Appeal No. 20 of 2019, whereby the dispute filed by Respondent no.4 in Writ Petition No. 2611 of 2021 was allowed. It was wrongly held that distribution of dividend at one go for three years amounted to compliance with bye-law 30 A(16) of the aforesaid Bye-laws. It was wrongly held that distribution of dividend at one go for three years amounted to compliance with bye-law 30 A(16) of the aforesaid Bye-laws. The said impugned order dated 29.11.2021 passed by the Tribunal deserves to be set aside. 24. Insofar as Writ Petition No. 1219 of 2021 is concerned, the Petitioners are aggrieved by the dispute filed by the Respondent no.4 therein being partly allowed by the impugned Judgment and Order dated 30.04.2021, as a consequence of which the election of the said Petitioners unopposed as members of the Board of Directors of the Respondent no.3-Society, stood set aside. The contention raised on behalf of the Petitioners therein is that, specifying dividend payable to the members of the Society in the Audited Annual Financial Statement, approved by the General Body in its meeting, thereby appropriating the net surplus/dividend in favour of the members of the Society, was sufficient compliance with bye-law 30 A(16) of the aforesaid Bye-laws. It was submitted that such amounts specifically identified in the Audited Annual Financial Statement and approved by the General Body for appropriating to the members of the Society, resulted in the Society having no access to the said amount and the same amounted to distribution amongst the members of the Society. It was submitted that insistence on actual payment of the same to the members of the Society as compliance with the aforesaid bye-law, was unreasonable. 25. On the other hand, Respondent no.4 in Writ Petition No.1219 of 2021, has contended that distribution of dividend contemplated under the aforesaid bye-law 30 A(16) of the aforesaid Bye-law requires actual payment of the same to the members and that, therefore, the said Writ Petition deserved to be dismissed. 26. The aforesaid rival contentions revolve around the interpretation of the word “distribution” found in bye-law 30 A(16) of the said Bye-laws. A perusal of Sections 52 and 58 of the aforesaid Act shows that the Society is required to prepare an Audited Annual Financial Statement, specifying the net surplus and consequently the dividend to be distributed and paid to be members of the Society. The same is required to be placed before the General Body and approved in the General Body meeting for the appropriation of such net surplus/dividend. The same is required to be placed before the General Body and approved in the General Body meeting for the appropriation of such net surplus/dividend. The Audited Annual Financial Statements of the Societies concerning the Petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1219 of 2021, does show identification of the dividend payable to the members of the Society. It is recorded in the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the Tribunal that although the Audited Financial Statements and balance sheets for the year 2015-16, 2016-17 and 2017-18 were indeed produced, the resolutions of the General Body were not produced on record. It was further held by the Tribunal that the statement of account showing “dividend payable” cannot be construed as “dividend distributed”, primarily because the Petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1219 of 2021 failed to place on record resolutions of the General Body approving distribution of such dividend/patronage. Thus, the principal reason why the Tribunal held against the said Petitioners is alleged failure to produce on record resolutions of the General Body approving the distribution of such dividend/patronage. 27. In this context, the judgment relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the aforesaid Petitioners, passed by the Supreme Court in J. Dalmia (supra) is relevant, wherein it is laid down that declaration of dividend in a General Body gives rise to debt. Thus, when the General Body approves appropriation of the net surplus/dividend under Section 58 of the aforesaid Act on the basis of the Audited Annual Financial Statement of a particular year, it amounts to distribution of the dividend amounting to sufficient compliance with bye-law 30 A(16) of the said Bye-laws. Once such dividend and its appropriation are approved under Section 58(3)(e) of the said Act by the General Body by passing the resolution, the dividend stands distributed to the members of the Society. This Court is of the opinion that it would be unreasonable to hold that compliance with bye-law 30 A(16) of the said Bye-laws would necessarily require actual payment of dividend to the members of the Society. This may lead to a situation where for technical reasons if actual payment of dividend of a few members or even one member of a Society is not made, the disqualification contemplated under the bye-law 30 A(16) of the said Bye-law would be triggered. Such an interpretation cannot be accepted. This may lead to a situation where for technical reasons if actual payment of dividend of a few members or even one member of a Society is not made, the disqualification contemplated under the bye-law 30 A(16) of the said Bye-law would be triggered. Such an interpretation cannot be accepted. Hence, if the Society has prepared Audited Annual Financial Statement demonstrating the dividend payable and the same is approved by resolution of the General Body by exercising power under Section 58 (3)(e) of the said Act for appropriating the net surplus/dividend, it would amount to distribution of the dividend and sufficient compliance with bye-law 30 A(16) of the aforesaid Bye-laws. 28. It is perhaps for this reason that even the Tribunal in the impugned Judgment and Order dated 30.04.2021 has held against the Petitioners in Writ Petition no. 1219 of 2021, primarily on the ground of their alleged failure to place on record resolutions of the General Body approving the Audited Annual Financial Statements showing “dividend payable”. In fact, the Tribunal has drawn adverse inference against the Petitioners for their failure to produce the resolutions of the General Body. But it is pertinent that according to the aforesaid Petitioners, all such records were placed before the Returning Officer. The learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the Returning Officer indeed confirmed that the record placed before the Returning Officer consisted of copies of such resolutions of the General Body. In such a situation, the Tribunal could certainly have called for the record for satisfying itself as to whether the Petitioners in the aforesaid Writ Petition satisfied the requirement of bye-law 30 A(16) of the aforesaid Byelaws. But the Tribunal failed to do so and held against the said Petitioners. In writ jurisdiction, this Court is not inclined to examine the records to give findings one way or the other. Therefore, this becomes a fit case for partly setting aside the aforesaid order passed by the Tribunal dated 30.04.2021, to the extent that it holds against the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1219 of 2121, as also similarly situated persons and remanding the matter for examination of the records to verify as to whether the Returning Officer was justified in accepting the nomination papers. 29. 29. This Court is of the opinion that the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the Returning Officer whilst scrutinizing nomination papers is necessarily summary in nature and that, therefore, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the Petitioner in Writ Petition no. 1242 of 2021 that the order passed by the Returning Officer while rejecting his nomination papers and accepting the nomination papers of the contesting Respondents therein, was cryptic in nature and hence unsustainable. The Returning Officer was expected to peruse the records made available before his office and upon an analysis of the same, the order concerning the acceptance of nomination papers could be passed. This Court is not inclined to hold that the Returning Officer committed an error. 30. The learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1242 of 2021 is justified in contending that the strict Rules of pleadings contemplated in civil suits in CPC and the provisions of the Representation of Peoples Act, cannot be applied to disputes filed under Section 83 of the aforesaid Act. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that there were sufficient pleadings on record before the Tribunal to consider the challenge raised on behalf of the Petitioner to the acceptance of nomination papers of the contesting Respondents in Writ Petition No. 1242 of 2021. 31. It was also sought to be argued on behalf of the Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1242 of 2021 and Respondent no.4 in Writ Petition No. 2611 of 2021, that the manner in which nomination papers were accepted and rejected by the Returning Officer, it was against the spirit of democracy as candidates stood elected unopposed. In support of the said contention, the learned Counsel relied upon Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary vs Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited & Ors., (2015) 8 SCC 1 In fact, the Tribunal in the impugned orders also relied on the said Judgment. In this regard, suffice it to say, that the spirit of democracy requires a contest in an election amongst candidates found eligible as per the relevant statutes and laws. If by operation of such statutes and laws, only a single candidate is found to be eligible in the electoral fray, the unopposed election of such eligible candidate cannot be said to be against the spirit of democracy. If by operation of such statutes and laws, only a single candidate is found to be eligible in the electoral fray, the unopposed election of such eligible candidate cannot be said to be against the spirit of democracy. Therefore, reliance placed by the Tribunal on the said judgment was misplaced. 32. In view of the above, the findings rendered by the Tribunal in Judgment and Order dated 30.04.2021 passed in Co-operative Appeal No. 24 of 2019, holding that the nomination paper of Petitioner in Writ Petition No.1242 of 2021-Ramchandra Mule, was correctly rejected, is to be upheld and the impugned Judgment and Order to that extent is sustained. But the said impugned Judgment and Order dated 30.04.2021 to the extent that it holds against Respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 in the said Writ Petition thereby declaring their election as quashed, is found to be unsustainable and hence, to that extent, the said impugned Order is set aside. 33. The direction of the Respondent no.1 therein to conduct elections is also set aside. On this aspect, the matter is remanded to the Tribunal for fresh consideration i.e. as to whether the nomination papers of Respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 were correctly accepted by the Returning Officer. 34. The Returning Officer is directed to place the entire record that was available at the time of scrutiny of the nomination papers before the Tribunal. The said record shall be taken into consideration afresh by the Tribunal while considering the question as to whether the said Respondents complied with bye-law 30 A(16) of the aforesaid Bye-laws and, consequently, whether their nomination papers were correctly accepted by the Returning Officer. The said analysis of the record shall be carried out in the light of findings given by this Court in the present Judgment. 35. The Tribunal shall carry out the aforesaid exercise afresh and dispose of the said dispute on the said aspect of the matter as expeditiously as possible and, in any case, within three months from the date on which a copy of the present order is produced before the Tribunal. 36. In the light of the findings rendered above, Writ Petition No. 2611 of 2021 is allowed and the impugned order dated 29.11.2021 passed by the Tribunal is quashed and set aside. Consequently, the dispute filed by the Respondent no.4 therein is dismissed. 37. 36. In the light of the findings rendered above, Writ Petition No. 2611 of 2021 is allowed and the impugned order dated 29.11.2021 passed by the Tribunal is quashed and set aside. Consequently, the dispute filed by the Respondent no.4 therein is dismissed. 37. Accordingly, Rule is made absolute in Writ Petition No. 1219 of 2021 and Writ Petition No. 1242 of 2021 and Writ Petition No. 2611 of 2021 stands disposed of as aforesaid.