JUDGMENT : Ashutosh J. Shastri, J. 1. The present contempt proceedings has been initiated for alleged willful and deliberate disobedience of order dated 02.09.2020 as well as 05.10.2020 passed in Special Civil Application 10363 of 2020. 2. The premise on which the present contempt application is filed is that applicant herein is the original writ petitioner, whereas opponent no. 8 herein is original respondent nos. 2 and opponent nos. 9 to 14 herein are original respondent nos. 3, 4, 7 to 9 and 12 respectively in the main Special Civil Application. Opponent no. 1 is the Chairman and opponent nos. 2 to 6 are the members of the Gujarat State Wakf Board and opponent no. 7 is the Chief Executive official of the Wakf Board. The case of the applicant is that in contravention to the procedure under the Wakf Act and in violation of the statutory provisions, opponent no. 1 i.e. Gujarat State Wafk Board passed an order dated 03.07.2020 and as such, same was challenged on the grounds of jurisdiction as well as violation of principles of natural justice. The learned Single Judge in main Special Civil Application was pleased to issue notice on 02.09.2020, by making it returnable on 05.10.2020 and further was pleased to stay the implementation of the impugned order qua removal of the present applicant as Secretary, till the next date of hearing. It is the case of the applicant that said order though was passed, vide letter dated 08.09.2020, the applicant was informed about the proposed agenda for the meeting to be held on 13.09.2020. However, opponent nos. 8 to 14 deliberately did not remain present in the meeting on 13.09.2020 and in the presence of the committee members and other Members of the Trust/Wakf, Resolutions were passed and in response to it, on 18.11.2020, Shri Deen Mohammad Noor Mahammad Ruma - original respondent no. 11 submitted Change Report no. 602 of 2020 before the Wakf Board, which is pending till date. It is further asserted that on 03.10.2020, opponent nos. 8 to 14 filed Civil Application No. 1 of 2020 under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India for vacation of interim relief granted vide order dated 02.09.2020, in the pending petition. Subsequently, on 05.10.2020, the matter was heard, and thereafter opponent no. It is further asserted that on 03.10.2020, opponent nos. 8 to 14 filed Civil Application No. 1 of 2020 under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India for vacation of interim relief granted vide order dated 02.09.2020, in the pending petition. Subsequently, on 05.10.2020, the matter was heard, and thereafter opponent no. 1 through learned advocate, sought time to submit reply in the petition as well as to the draft amendment. It has been asserted by the applicant that the interim relief was unlimited and not restricted by virtue of an order dated 05.10.2020. Later on, the main matter was adjourned along with Civil Application from time to time and according to the applicant, request of opponent nos. 8 to 14 for vacating interim relief was not dealt with by the Court and thereby interim order granted on 02.09.2020 has been continued. 2.1. It is the case of the applicant that though opponents having full knowledge about the fact that by virtue of interim order the action against the applicant is not to be initiated, but still in connivance and with a mala fide intent, the applicant was directed to hand over the records within three days vide letter dated 25.11.2020. On 26.11.2020, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant - original petitioner requested for some time on account of personal difficulty and accordingly main matter was adjourned and as such, it is the case of the applicant that though interim relief granted earlier is not vacated, the situation is tried to be altered by the opponents herein, namely the contemners and major changes have been affected to the detrimental of the applicant. So according to the applicant, opponents have tried to overreach the process of the Court and has deliberately willfully disobeyed the interim order granted in favour of the applicant so much so that later on, in defiance of the interim protection, Change Reports have been prepared and submitted in the month of January, 2021 whereby, name of the applicant as General Secretary came to be cancelled and also as a Trustee/Mutawalli and further Change Report in the form of Change Report no. 711 of 2020 is also submitted. 711 of 2020 is also submitted. This is clearly in violation of the interim protection and the order which has been passed in the main proceedings and as such, a request is made by the applicant to initiate contempt proceedings in willful disobedience of order dated 02.09.2020 as also order dated 05.10.2020. 3. In the aforesaid background, contempt petition came up for consideration initially before the co-ordinate Bench of this Court on 19.07.2021, whereby notices have been issued and in response thereto, replies have been filed and since pleadings have been completed, learned advocates appearing for the respective sides have requested the Court to take up the hearing. Accordingly, we heard Shri M.T.M. Hakim, learned advocate for Mr. Rizvan Shaikh for the applicant learned advocates Mr. Manish Shah for respondent nos. 1, 5 and 6, Mr Abhaykumar Shah for respondent no. 8, Mr. Kirtidev R. Dave for respondent nos. 9, 11 and 13 and Mr. Hasim Qureshi for respondent nos. 10,12 and 14. 4. Learned advocate Mr. Hakim appearing for the applicant has vehemently contended that despite the fact that interim orders were operative in the main Special Civil Application, the opponents herein have in connivance altered the situation and passed the orders and as such, it is a clear case of defiance of the orders of this Court. Learned advocate Mr. Hakim has submitted that throughout the petition, time and again, adjournments have been sought, hearing have taken place and knowing fully well that Court is seized of the matter, still the situation is altered by the opponents, which itself is nothing but a clear case of overreaching the process of Court. Learned advocate Mr. Hakim has further submitted that though there was a clear order on 02.09.2020 not to remove the applicant as a Secretary, by not implementing the order of removal, still the opponents knowing fully well have acted contrary to this interim protection and thereby have committed contempt of court which requires to be viewed seriously. It has been further submitted that Resolutions have been passed during the pendency of the petition, not only in the month of February, but also in the month of December, 2020 and that being the situation, the conduct on the part of the opponents deserves to be deprecated as serious attempt is made to frustrate the protection which has been granted to the applicant. In addition to this, Change Reports have also been tried to be given effect to during the pendency of the main proceedings which itself amounts contempt. As a result of this appropriate punishment be awarded to the opponents for willful defiance of the order of this Court. Hence, a request is made to grant the reliefs as prayed for in the petition. 4.1. At this stage, learned advocate Mr. Hakim has also drawn our attention to an order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Sunni Muslim Samaj, Bhavnagar v. Pandya Manishanker Dhanjibhai reported in 2004 (1) GLR 1436, to strengthen his submissions. 5. As against this, learned advocate Mr. Hasim Qureshi appearing for opponent nos. 10, 12 and 14 has submitted that there is no willful defiance of any nature committed by any of the respondents nor any attempt is made, on the contrary, a close perusal of original interim order is reflecting that the protection which was granted was on a further stipulation that the applicant shall act for benefit of the Trust and in accordance with Trust Deed and on the contrary, after getting order on 02.09.2020, the applicant himself has violated the order dated 02.09.2020 outrageously namely condition stipulated in the order has been violated and applicant himself had grossly committed the contempt. Hence, there is hardly any reason reflecting to initiate contempt proceedings against the opponents. Learned advocate Mr. Qureshi has submitted that in any case, the applicant was right from the beginning aware about the non extension of interim order after a particular period, on the contrary, the matter from time to time got adjourned with no interim relief as can be seen from several orders reflecting on page 36 onwards. On 26.10.2020, when the matter came up for consideration, despite the fact that the stay vacating application was submitted under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India, extension for interim relief was not sought by the applicant. On 26.10.2020, when the matter came up for consideration, despite the fact that the stay vacating application was submitted under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India, extension for interim relief was not sought by the applicant. Yet another order which has been passed on 06.11.2020, in which also, knowing the situation, the applicant himself though appeared has not sought for extension of interim relief as can be seen from page 40 and further from the order dated 26.11.2020 also, it is the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant who sought adjournment and at that time also, no request for extension of interim relief was made as can be seen from page 42 of the petition compilation as well and, therefore, according to learned advocate Mr. Qureshi, there is hardly any reason of initiating contempt against the opponents, particularly, when the applicant himself was clearly aware about non extension of interim relief. 5.1. Learned advocate Mr. Qureshi has further submitted that issue is apparently clear that moment application under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India is filed, on the lapse of fifteenth day, interim relief stands automatically stands vacated and though this fact having in clear knowledge, no attempt is made to persuade the Court for extending the interim relief and it is not that the petitioner was not aware about this situation, since on 25.11.2020, it was specifically made it clear that the application is already submitted under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India and same was also brought to the notice of the applicant that upon lapse of fifteenth day, interim relief will stand automatically vacated and this communication dated 25.11.2020 is well within the knowledge of the applicant himself reflecting on page 41A of the petition compilation and except filing reply to the same, no extension was sought. So, here is the applicant who is conscious about the fact of controversy of extension of interim relief and automatic discontinuance of it, still has chosen to remain conveniently silent and at no point of time extension of interim relief is prayed for and in any case, Civil Application was also not attempted to be disposed of by insistence of hearing in any form by the applicant himself. Hence, that being the situation, there is hardly any reason for the applicant to maintain present proceedings. 5.2. Additionally, learned advocate Mr. Hence, that being the situation, there is hardly any reason for the applicant to maintain present proceedings. 5.2. Additionally, learned advocate Mr. Qureshi has pointed out that the condition stipulated to act in the best interest of the Trust and the Trust Deed, it was obligatory on the part of the applicant to act accordingly and that having not been done, the applicant cannot be allowed to play hot and cold in the present proceedings. Hence, the present contempt petition deserves to be dismissed with cost. Learned advocate Mr. Qureshi has pointed out that the petitioner himself is acting detrimental to the interest of Trust and Trust Deed by outrageously violating the stipulation contained in the final order dated 02.09.2020 and for that purpose, he has drawn attention to the affidavit-in- reply filed in detail against the applicant. Hence, according to the respectful submission of learned advocate Mr. Qureshi, the present contempt proceedings may not be entertained. 6. In addition to it, learned advocates Mr. Kirtidev R. Dave, Mr. Manish Shah and Mr. Abhaykumar P. Shah appearing for the respective opponents have submitted and practically adopted the arguments submitted by learned advocate Mr. Qureshi and has requested the Court not to entertain the contempt proceedings. It has been submitted that there is no clear case of contempt made out by the applicant in any form and there is no extension of interim relief and further the applicant himself has not acted in the best interest of the Trust or the Trust Deed and that being the situation, there is hardly any reason for the applicant to maintain the present proceedings and in any case, learned advocates have submitted that the main petition is very much pending before the learned Single Judge, where, if any subsequent development which has taken place by virtue of which, the applicant is aggrieved, he may amend or carry out appropriate steps permissible under the law and may also bring this fact to the notice of the learned Single Judge where the petition is pending and as such, the applicant being not remediless, contempt proceedings may be dismissed. 7. 7. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material placed before the Court, first of all the Court would like to postulate the position of law on the contempt, as enunciated by catena of decisions delivered by Hon'ble Supreme Court and last in line are the decisions delivered in the year 2021 as well as year 2022. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the contempt proceedings in the case of V. Senthur & Anr., v. M. Vijayakumar, IAS, Secretary, Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission & Anr., reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 846 has propounded that Court while dealing with the contempt proceedings cannot travel beyond that original judgment or direction and it is not permissible for the Court to issue any supplementary or incidental directions which are not found in the original judgment or order and the Court is only concerned with the willful or deliberate non compliance of any directions. Paragraph 15, reads as under :- "15. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that in a contempt jurisdiction, the court will not travel beyond that original judgment and direction; neither would it be permissible for the court to issue any supplementary or incident directions, which are not to be found in the original judgment and order. The court is only concerned with the willful or deliberate non-compliance of the directions issued in the original judgment and order." 7.1. Even in the decision delivered yet in another case by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and Managing Director, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited and Ors., v. M. George Ravishekaran & Ors., reported in (2014) 3 SCC 373 , wherein, it has been propounded that the Court while exercising contempt jurisdiction has power to punish for contempt which is a special and rare power and as such, the Court imposing or travelling beyond the four corners of order which is alleged to have been flouted, no order or direction supplemental to what has been expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising contempt jurisdiction. Paragraph 19 are the observations which this Court deems it proper to reproduce hereunder :- "19. Paragraph 19 are the observations which this Court deems it proper to reproduce hereunder :- "19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission of contempt. The very natural of the power casts a scared duty in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self-determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged. The Courts must not therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or willful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of equities be considered. The Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above. The above principles would appear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at the Bar, namely Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, V.M. Manohar Coop. Society Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami and Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV." 7.2. Even this principle is also observed and reiterated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in a later decision in the case of K. Arumugam v. V. Balakrishnan & Ors., reported in (2019) 18 SCC 150 and as such, law on the issue is absolutely clear so far as exercise of contempt jurisdiction is concerned. 8. Even this principle is also observed and reiterated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in a later decision in the case of K. Arumugam v. V. Balakrishnan & Ors., reported in (2019) 18 SCC 150 and as such, law on the issue is absolutely clear so far as exercise of contempt jurisdiction is concerned. 8. In light of the aforesaid position prevailing on record, coupled with the proposition as stated herein-above, perusal of the records further indicates that order dated 02.09.2020 passed in the main petition reflecting on page 21 no doubt indicates that till next date of hearing, order of removal of the petitioner as Secretary of the Trust in question was ordered not be implemented and the petitioner shall be continued as a Secretary. However, it can be noticed that under the same order, the petitioner was directed to act for the benefit of Trust and in accordance with Trust Deed. 9. Now this observation is also in the form of mandate to the petitioner that applicant has to act for the benefit of Trust. Now, later part of this order, if to be viewed in the context of the affidavit-in-reply filed by some of the respondents, where-under they have clearly raised grievance about the conduct of the petitioner after passing this order from 02.09.2020. A clear assertion is made which is not in dispute that after the service of the copy of the order dated 02.09.2020, management was given to the applicant and since then keys of the office and all books of accounts and other relevant documents remained in the custody of the applicant, and as such, opponent nos. 10, 12 and 14 appears to have in true spirit allowed the applicant to act, but then, has further asserted in this very affidavit dated 21.11.2021 indicating that in discharge of his function, applicant passed unilateral order on 07.09.2020 without seeking approval of the Chairman and had re-constituted/re-appointed the Managing Committee and the Committee by co-opting members already dissolved by the Trust on earlier occasion and members have been re-posted and on the next date i.e. on 08.09.2020, again without the permission of the Chairman which is otherwise must under Clause 6(c)(1) of the Constitution of the Society. It is also stated that applicant again in the capacity of General Secretary of Trust had convened the meeting unilaterally and decided the agenda, particularly, Agenda no. It is also stated that applicant again in the capacity of General Secretary of Trust had convened the meeting unilaterally and decided the agenda, particularly, Agenda no. 3 shockingly has indicated about the discussion held in respect of action to be taken against the Chairman, Vice Chairman and Joint Secretary for alleged violation of the Rules and Regulations and therefore, taking advantage of ex-parte order dated 02.09.2020, the petitioner himself tries to misuse the office as alleged, detrimental to the interest of the Trust and against the Trust Deed. This aspect appears to have not been countered by the petitioner and on the contrary, applicant has grossly misused the order as averred in paragraph 14 of the said affidavit reflecting on page 265 of the petition compilation. 9.1. Apart from this conduct which has been alleged against the applicant, now the background of interim orders which are alleged to have been violated if looked into, it appears that under the ex-parte order dated 02.09.2020, protection of removal from office of Secretary had been granted was continued and on 05.10.2020 when the matter was posted for hearing, the interim relief was extended. The said petition then came up for consideration again on 26.10.2020, since reply was not placed on record, matter was posted for further hearing on 04.11.2020 which is reflecting on page 36. This order does not indicate anything about extension or continuance of interim relief. In addition to this, we also see from the record that in the contempt petition a specific averment on oath is made in paragraph 10 on internal page 7 to the effect that the request of the advocate for opponent nos. 8 to 14 for vacation of interim relief was declined and a reference is made to an order dated 26.10.2020 at Annexure-F. Perusal of the said order on page 36 indicates no such thing is asserted by the applicant and as such also, we are disapproving the conduct of the present applicant who tried to make averments on oath which is quite contrary to the record. 10. 10. In the meantime, applicant has clearly pointed out on 25.11.2020 reflecting on page 41A informing the petitioner specifically that an application for vacating ex-parte order is already filed under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India and he was specifically informed and put to the notice and guard that ex-parte order dated 02.09.2020 is attempted to be vacated by way of specific application under the said Article. Last paragraph of the said communication reads as under :- "Now, the duration of two weeks has lapsed as per Section 226(3) of the Constitution, the Honourable High Court of Gujarat has neither disposed the application nor has passed any other order in your favour. Thereby, the ex-parte order granted has ended automatically on 02.09.2020. It is thereby informed to you by this notice that, the record, files, stamp and keys to the office cupboards should be handed over the Secretary Mr. Alimohammed, in case if you fail to do so, we shall initiate relevant civil and criminal proceedings against you." 11. To this, applicant has not made any attempt to either get resolved or dispose of said application for vacating the interim relief at the earliest or for extension of interim relief specifically though he was aware about the fact that after lapse of fifteenth day, his interim relief would automatically stand vacated. The matter then came along with Civil Application on 26.11.2020 and applicant was very much present and at his request, the matter was posted to the next date. At that stage also, applicant never made any attempt to get the interim relief extended specifically. Yet on further date i.e. on 24.12.2020 also, no such extension is visible in the order nor any attempt is made by the applicant to get the interim relief extended specifically. The matter further was adjourned and as stated by both the learned counsel, though it has been heard for quite some time, but Civil Application for vacating the stay was not disposed of nor the learned Single Judge has extended the interim relief. 12. The matter further was adjourned and as stated by both the learned counsel, though it has been heard for quite some time, but Civil Application for vacating the stay was not disposed of nor the learned Single Judge has extended the interim relief. 12. Now, in the background of the aforesaid circumstance, the decision of the Full Bench of this Court brought to the notice of this Court in the case of District Development official v. Maniben Virabhai reported in (2000) 2 GLH 204 on the issue of application for vacating the interim relief under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India and the relevant observations contained in the said decision requires to be noticed. It reads thus :- "10. In our considered opinion, where the language of constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, the provision cannot be read down on consideration that if plain meaning is assigned the consequences would be inconvenient or unjust to a party. On the plain language of Clause (3), we do not find that the provision stating that the ex parte order of stay or injunction would stand vacated after a specified period of fulfillment of specified formalities by the party aggrieved, has any unjust result against the party who had obtained the ex parte order. The object and intention of the Parliament behind the constitutional amendment has to be kept good in view in construing the provision. The Parliament has noticed large number of cases where ex parte orders of stay or injunction are obtained by parties without furnishing copies of the petition and stay applications thus denying grant of opportunity to the opposite parties of hearing and such ex parte orders continue to remain in operation to the prejudice of the aggrieved parry for an indefinite period of time as the stay matters do not receive consideration by the High Court within a reasonable period of time. To protect the interest of such aggrieved parties suffering under ex parte orders of stay or injunction, Article 226 in the Constitution is amended to incorporate Clause (3) providing for automatic vacation of ex parte order or stay, if the aggrieved party is not heard against the ex parte order within a specific period after it had approached the Court for the purpose in accordance with the laid down procedure. 11. 11. In our opinion, the expressions employed in Clause (3) -- "makes an application" and "when it is received" are clearly intended to convey the meaning of filing of an application in accordance with the practice of the High Court. The said expressions on their plain language cannot be read to mean placing of an application before the concerned Judge to whom the case, in which the ex parte order is passed, has been assigned. All the High Courts in India have framed their own High Court Rules regulating their procedure. In Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993, the procedure for making applications under Article 226 is contained in Chapter XVII. Rule 188 of the Rules states that subject to Rules in Chapter XVII, the Rules in other Chapter shall apply mutaitis mutandis to petitions and applications under Chapter XVII laying down procedure for filing applications and writ petitions under Articles 226, 227 and 228. By virtue of Rule 188 in Chapter XVII, Rule 30 in Chapter IV which lays down the normal procedure of presentation of any application is applicable to application made under Article 226. Rule 30 of Chapter IV lays down a procedure stating that "all matters which are to be instituted in the High Court shall be presented in the office of the Registry to such person as the Registry by special or general authorities, ordinarily between 10.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m." 12. The expression "making of an application" and "receiving of such application" cannot on their plain language be construed to mean cognizance of the application by the Judge to whom the case is assigned as per the roster prepared by the Chief Justice. Such an interpretation, as has been placed by Hon'ble H.L. Gokhale, J. is one sided and favours the party which has obtained the ex parte order. It defeats the purpose for which Clause (3) has been inserted in the Constitution to protect the aggrieved party from the ill effects of continuance of ex parte order obtained against it for an indefinite point of time. 13. It defeats the purpose for which Clause (3) has been inserted in the Constitution to protect the aggrieved party from the ill effects of continuance of ex parte order obtained against it for an indefinite point of time. 13. In our considered opinion from Clause (3) the intention of Parliament Is very clear that an ex parte order of stay or injunction obtained in proceedings under Article 226 will have a maximum life of two weeks from the date the application is made by the opposite party and is received by the High Court or to the party obtaining such order. The specified period would not commence from the date it is actually placed before the Judge to whom the case is assigned on the judicial side. Maxwell in a book on "The interpretation of Statutes" (12th Edition) has stated as under :-- "Enactments regulating the procedure in Courts are usually construed as imperative, even where the observance of the formalities in question is not a condition exacted from the party seeking the benefit of the statute, but a duty imposed on a Court or public officer when no general inconvience or injustice seems to call for a different construction." Crales in "Statute Law" (7th Edition) contains the following statement of law on the canon of construction of an Act of Parliament : "Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure, but we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used. Merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning." 18. On the discussion aforesaid, we have answered all the questions posed by the learned single Judge M.R. Calla, J. formulated in his order. Our conclusion therefore, is that that on plain language of Clause (3) in Article 226, an ex parte order of injunction or stay shall stand vacated automatically after two weeks, if the aggrieved party completes all the formalities of making an application to the High Court and furnishing copy of such application to the party in whose favour the order is made. The period of limitation of two weeks specified under Clause (3) shall commence on the plain language of that Article from the date the application is received by the Registry of the Court or is furnished to the party for whose benefit it is passed whichever is later in accordance with the Rules and practice of the Court. In our opinion, action or inaction on the part of the parties or Registry shall have no consequence of undoing what the Constitution law contemplates of automatic vacation of the order after expiry of two weeks on the completion of required formalities of procedure and occurrence of eventualities mentioned in Clause (3) of Article 226." 13. The aforesaid observations would clearly indicate that once application for vacating the interim relief under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India is submitted after lapse of fifteenth day, if application is not disposed of, nor a specific extension of order is granted, the said ex-parte interim order would loose its life after lapse of fifteenth day. Hence, we are of the opinion that in the background of the aforesaid peculiar set of circumstance, no cogent case of willful disobedience or violation of interim order can be said to have been made out and in addition thereto, further uncontroverted assertion in the affidavit filed by respondents 10, 12 and 14 about alleged misuse of his office by the applicant after ex-parte order dated 02.09.2020 would also persuade us not to continue the present proceedings any further. In fact, applicant was under obligation to act in the interest and for the benefit of Trust and Trust Deed. However, applicant is said to have taken unilateral decision without even consulting the Chairman by re-constituting the Committee. Hence, we are not inclined to continue these proceedings in the peculiar background of facts obtained as noted herein-above. 14. However, we are not expressing any opinion on merits, since the main proceedings are very much pending before the learned Single Judge and it would be open for both the sides to agitate the same in accordance with law and observations made herein-above would not come in the way matter being examined on merit. 15. with the aforesaid observation, we hereby drop the contempt proceedings with no order as to costs.