JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. 2. This petition is filed by the petitioner under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India against an order dated 01.09.2018 passed below Exh. 14 in Family Suit No. 199 of 2017 by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Vadodara. By the said application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the respondent herein had prayed for interim maintenance to the tune of Rs.50,000/- p.m. i.e. Rs.30,000/- for herself and Rs.20,000/- for minor son, pending the captioned suit, which came to be partly allowed and the learned Family Judge granted interim maintenance of Rs.30,000/- p.m. i.e. Rs.20,000/- for the respondent – wife and Rs.10,000/- for minor son. Civil Application No. 1 of 2021 has been filed for stay of the aforesaid impugned order dated 01.09.2018. 3. Heard, learned advocate Mr. Hiren Modi for the petitioner and learned advocate Ms. Dharitri Pancholi for the respondent. 3.1 The learned advocate for the petitioner, with all vehemence at his command, submitted that the learned Family Judge has committed a grave error in passing such order inasmuch as, he has failed to take into consideration the material aspect of the matter viz. the petitioner – husband is already paying a sum of Rs.16,000/- towards maintenance to the respondent wife and son and is paying regularly. It is further submitted that the learned Family Judge ought to have appreciated the fact that the petitioners has responsibility of her widowed mother, her sister who is deserted by her husband and his nephew as well as of unemployed brother and have to maintain them and in the circumstances, granting such a huge amount would make it difficult for the petitioner to survive. 3.2 The learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted that the learned Family Judge has failed to consider the aspect that the father of the petitioner who has died quite before, had received a sum of Rs.11 lakh only towards Provident Fund and his widowed mother is getting a petty amount of Rs.1,986/- p.m. towards pension and in the circumstances, it is very difficult for the petitioner to maintain his family, moreso when, his mother is suffering from diabetes and blood pressure and is on regular medication. 3.3 The learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that although efforts have been made to settle the matter, all went in vain. 3.3 The learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that although efforts have been made to settle the matter, all went in vain. Further, the respondent is staying with her father, who is working with IOCL and earning handsome amount of Rs.1.5 lakh p.m. and in the circumstances, the learned Family Judge ought to have considered such an aspect of the matter and would have granted maintenance accordingly. Further, drawing attention to the copies of pay-slips of the petitioner, it is submitted that responsibilities of the petitioner weigh more than the earnings of the petitioners. 3.4 Making above submissions, it is requested to allow this petition and to set aside the impugned order. 4. As against this, learned advocate Ms. Dharitri Pancholi for the respondent, while heavily opposing this writ petition, submitted that the learned Family Judge has committed no error which requires interference at the hands of this Court. She submitted that the respondent – wife is having no means to survive and is at the mercy of her father and the minor son is also residing with her and in the circumstances, the maintenance granted by the learned Family Judge being just and proper, this petition merits no consideration. 4.2 Inviting attention to the pay-slips of the petitioners, the learned advocate for the respondent submitted that the petitioner is earning quite handsome amount and accordingly, no modification is required to be done in the impugned order. 4.3 Thus, making above submissions, it is urged that this petition may be dismissed. 5. Regard being had to the submissions made and considering the averments made in the petition so also, considering the material on record, it appears that petitioner has filed the suit in question under the provisions of Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce against the respondent, in which, pending the suit, the respondent filed an application under Section 24 of the said Act for interim maintenance, which came to be allowed in part and the respondent and minor son are granted maintenance totalling to Rs.30,000/- per month. It is this order, which is under challenge in this petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 5.1 In this regard, at the outset, it would be worthwhile to refer to a decision of the Apex Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another Vs. It is this order, which is under challenge in this petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 5.1 In this regard, at the outset, it would be worthwhile to refer to a decision of the Apex Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 , wherein, the Court has considered in detail the scope of interference by this Court to hold and observe that Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court Suo motu as a custodian of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power would be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. The observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, read as under: “57. Articles 226 and 227 stand on substantially different footing. As noted above, prior to the Constitution, the Chartered High Courts as also the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council could issue prerogative writs in exercise of their original jurisdiction. [See 1986 (suppl.) SCC 401 at page 469)]. 58. However, after the Constitution every High Court has been conferred with the power to issue writs under Article 226 and these are original proceeding. [State of U.P . and others vs. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj - AIR 1963 SC 946 , page 951]. 59. The jurisdiction under Article 227 on the other hand is not original nor is it appellate. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred under Articles 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. 60. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article 226, High Court normally annuls or quashes an order or proceeding but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court, apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior tribunal should have made. {See Surya Dev Rai (supra), para 25 page 690 and also the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and others - [ AIR 1955 SC 233 , para 20 page 243]}. 61. {See Surya Dev Rai (supra), para 25 page 690 and also the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and others - [ AIR 1955 SC 233 , para 20 page 243]}. 61. Jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their fundamental rights or other statutory rights. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by the High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the State. In certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution can be claimed ex-debito justicia or as a matter of right. But in cases where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 227, such exercise is entirely discretionary and no person can claim it as a matter of right. From an order of a Single Judge passed under Article 226, a Letters Patent Appeal or an intra Court Appeal is maintainable. But no such appeal is maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge of a High Court in exercise of power under Article 227. In almost all High Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. No such rule appears to have been framed for exercise of High Court's power under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise entirely in the domain of the discretion of High Court. 62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L.Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 5.2 Thus, exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should be with a view to keep the tribunals / Courts within the bounds of their authority, to ensure that law is followed by tribunals / Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and/or when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. In exercise of its power of superintendence, High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. 5.3 The Apex Court in a recent decision in Puri Investments v. Young Friends and Co. and Others, MANU/SC/0290/2022 has observed as under: “13. There was no perversity in the order of the Appellate Tribunal on the basis of which the High Court could have interfered. In our view, the High Court tested the legality of the order of the Tribunal through the lens of an appellate body and not as a supervisory Court in adjudicating the application under Article 227 of the Considering. This is impermissible. The finding of the High Court that the appellate forum’s decision was perverse and the manner in which such finding was arrived at was itself perverse.” 5.4 Thus, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be given a shape of appeal in disguise. This is impermissible. The finding of the High Court that the appellate forum’s decision was perverse and the manner in which such finding was arrived at was itself perverse.” 5.4 Thus, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be given a shape of appeal in disguise. 5.5 In the said backdrop, since much has been argued, if the case on hand is adverted to, the salary slips of the petitioner are placed on record, a perusal of the same reveals the income of the petitioner as under: Month Take Home Amt. (Rs.) Income Tax Deduction for the month January 2014 68,750/- 26,743/- February 2014 55,990/- 34,806/- March 2014 33,290/- 32,843/- April 2014 96,390/- 6,943/- May 2014 77,600/- 7,874/- June 2014 76,240/- 8,867/- July 2014 1,06,690/- 10,918/- August 2014 61,910/- 10,260/- September 2014 1,03,690/- 22,042/- October 2014 80,440/- 15,668- November 2014 77,100/- 19,286/- December 2014 77,610/- 24,202/- 5.6 Thus, from the above, it clearly emerges that the average monthly income of the petitioner is more than Rs.70,000/-, that too, in the year 2014. Now, if the impugned order in this petition is referred to, the learned Family Judge has granted maintenance under Section 24 of the Act, pending suit, in the sum of Rs.30,000/- for the respondent and minor son, minus the amount which she is already getting under any other law. The respondent is stated to have been getting maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (the Code) in the sum of Rs.16,000/-, which amount, if deducted from the aforesaid amount of Rs.30,000/-, in effect, the respondent and son would further get Rs.14,000/- (i.e. Rs.30,000 – Rs.16,000/-) per month. Considering the contemporary situation, the income of the petitioner vis-a-vis the fact that the maintenance is awarded qua two persons i.e. the respondent and the minor son whose responsibility is upon the respondent only, the Court is of the opinion that the learned Family Judge has committed no error, much less, an error apparent on the face of it, which requires interference at the hands of this Court in this petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 6. For the forgoing reasons, the petition fails and dismissed accordingly. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. 6.1 In view of main petition is dismissed, Civil Application No. 1 of 2021 (For Stay) also stands dismissed.