ORDER : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The instant petition has been filed for the grant of following substantive reliefs:- 1. Allow the present writ petition and the auction of truck bearing No.HP 03 D 6262 may be set aside; 2. Direct the respondents to further make a fresh auction as per the guidelines and by giving the petitioner an opportunity to participate in the auction process; 3. Direct respondents to call the records pertaining to loan, auction, transfer of registration of truck bearing No. HP 03D 6262.” 2. It would be noticed that the auction of the truck has been conducted by respondent Nos. 4 and 5 i.e. Hinduja Leyland Finance Ltd. which is a private entity and not a creature of statute nor discharging statutory duties and, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. 3. Respondent Nos.4 and 5 against whom alone the reliefs have been claimed do not fall within the meaning of State under Article 12 of the Constitution and they are not financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. These respondents are not even discharging public duties or public functions. 4. The question regarding maintainability of the petition is otherwise no longer res integra and reference in this regard can be made to a fairly recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramakrishna Mission and another vs. Kago Kunya and others AIR 2019 SC 5570 , wherein it was observed as under :- “20. The Governing Body of the Mission is constituted by members of the Board of Trustees of Ramakrishna Math and is vested with the power and authority to manage the organization. The properties and funds of the Mission and its management vest in the Governing Body. Any person can become a member of the Mission if elected by the Governing Body. Members on roll form the quorum of the annual general meetings. The Managing Committee comprises of members appointed by the Governing Body for managing the affairs of the Mission. Under the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations of the Mission, there is no governmental control in the functioning, administration and day to day management of the Mission. The conditions of service of the employees of the hospital are governed by service rules which are framed by the Mission without the intervention of any governmental body. 21. Under the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations of the Mission, there is no governmental control in the functioning, administration and day to day management of the Mission. The conditions of service of the employees of the hospital are governed by service rules which are framed by the Mission without the intervention of any governmental body. 21. In coming to the conclusion that the appellants fell within the description of an authority under Article 226, the High Court placed a considerable degree of reliance on the judgment of a two judge Bench of this Court in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani AIR 1989 SC 1607 . Andi Mukta (supra) was a case where a public trust was running a college which was affiliated to Gujarat University, a body governed by State legislation. The teachers of the University and all its affiliated colleges were governed, insofar as their pay scales were concerned, by the recommendations of the University Grants Commission. A dispute over pay scales raised by the association representing the teachers of the University had been the subject matter of an award of the Chancellor, which was accepted by the government as well as by the University. The management of the college, in question, decided to close it down without prior approval. A writ petition was instituted before the High Court for the enforcement of the right of the teachers to receive their salaries and terminal benefits in accordance with the governing provisions. In that context, this Court dealt with the issue as to whether the management of the college was amenable to the writ jurisdiction. A writ petition was instituted before the High Court for the enforcement of the right of the teachers to receive their salaries and terminal benefits in accordance with the governing provisions. In that context, this Court dealt with the issue as to whether the management of the college was amenable to the writ jurisdiction. A number of circumstances weighed in the ultimate decision of this Court, including the following: (i) The trust was managing an affiliated college ; (ii) The college was in receipt of government aid; (iii) The aid of the government played a major role in the control, management and work of the educational institution; (iv) Aided institutions, in a similar manner as government institutions, discharge a public function of imparting education to students; (v) All aided institutions are governed by the rules and regulations of the affiliating University; (vi) Their activities are closely supervised by the University; and (vii) Employment in such institutions is hence, not devoid of a public character and is governed by the decisions taken by the University which are binding on the management. 22. It was in the above circumstances that this Court came to the conclusion that the service conditions of the academic staff do not partake of a private character, but are governed by a right-duty relationship between the staff and the management. A breach of the duty, it was held, would be amenable to the remedy of a writ of mandamus. While the Court recognized that “the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting rights of people cannot be put into watertight compartments”, it laid down two exceptions where the remedy of mandamus would not be available: “15. If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to mandamus…” 23. Following the decision in Andi Mukta (supra), this Court has had the occasion to re-visit the underlying principles in successive decisions. This has led to the evolution of principles to determine what constitutes a ‘public duty’ and ‘public function’ and whether the writ of mandamus would be available to an individual who seeks to enforce her right. 24. Following the decision in Andi Mukta (supra), this Court has had the occasion to re-visit the underlying principles in successive decisions. This has led to the evolution of principles to determine what constitutes a ‘public duty’ and ‘public function’ and whether the writ of mandamus would be available to an individual who seeks to enforce her right. 24. In VST Industries Ltd v. VST Industries Workers’ Union (2001) 1 SCC 298 , a two judge Bench of this Court held that a mere violation of the conditions of service will not provide a valid basis for the exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226, in a situation where the activity does not have the features of a public duty. This Court noted: “7. In de Smith, Woolf and Jowell's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th Edn., it is noticed that not all the activities of the private bodies are subject to private law e.g. the activities by private bodies may be governed by the standards of public law when its decisions are subject to duties conferred by statute or when, by virtue of the function it is performing or possibly its dominant position in the market, it is under an implied duty to act in the public interest… After detailed discussion, the learned authors have summarised the position with the following propositions: (1) The test of whether a body is performing a public function, and is hence amenable to judicial review, may not depend upon the source of its power or whether the body is ostensibly a ‘public’ or a ‘private’ body. (2) The principles of judicial review prima facie govern the activities of bodies performing public functions. “(3) …In the following two situations judicial review will not normally be appropriate even though the body may be performing a public function : (a) Where some other branch of the law more appropriately governs the dispute between the parties. In such a case, that branch of the law and its remedies should and normally will be applied; and (b) where there is a contract between the litigants. In such a case the express or implied terms of the agreement should normally govern the matter. This reflects the normal approach of English law, namely, that the terms of a contract will normally govern the transaction, or other relationship between the parties, rather than the general law. In such a case the express or implied terms of the agreement should normally govern the matter. This reflects the normal approach of English law, namely, that the terms of a contract will normally govern the transaction, or other relationship between the parties, rather than the general law. Thus, where a special method of resolving disputes (such as arbitration or resolution by private or domestic tribunals) has been agreed upon by the parties (expressly or by necessary implication), that regime, and not judicial review, will normally govern the dispute.” (Emphasis supplied) 25. In G Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute (2003) 4 SCC 225 , a two judge Bench of this Court dealt with whether the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (“ICRISAT”) which is a non-profit research and training centre, is amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The dispute concerned the termination of employees of ICRISAT. The Court held that only functions which are similar or closely related to those that are performed by the State in its sovereign capacity qualify as ‘public functions’ or a ‘public duty’: “28. A writ under Article 226 can lie against a “person” if it is a statutory body or performs a public function or discharges a public or statutory duty…ICRISAT has not been set up by a statute nor are its activities statutorily controlled. Although, it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably be said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity. The primary activity of ICRISAT is to conduct research and training programmes in the sphere of agriculture purely on a voluntary basis. A service voluntarily undertaken cannot be said to be a public duty. Besides ICRISAT has a role which extends beyond the territorial boundaries of India and its activities are designed to benefit people from all over the world. While the Indian public may be the beneficiary of the activities of the Institute, it certainly cannot be said that ICRISAT owes a duty to the Indian public to provide research and training facilities.” Applying the above test, this Court upheld the decision of the High Court that the writ petition against ICRISAT was not maintainable. 26. While the Indian public may be the beneficiary of the activities of the Institute, it certainly cannot be said that ICRISAT owes a duty to the Indian public to provide research and training facilities.” Applying the above test, this Court upheld the decision of the High Court that the writ petition against ICRISAT was not maintainable. 26. A similar view was taken in Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab (2012) 12 SCC 331, where a two judge Bench of this Court held that a private body can be held to be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 when it performs public functions which are normally expected to be performed by the State or its authorities. 27. In Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733 , this Court analysed the earlier judgements of this Court and provided a classification of entities against whom a writ petition may be maintainable: “18. From the decisions referred to above, the position that emerges is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be maintainable against (i) the State (Government); (ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a private body discharging public duty or positive obligation of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function.” (emphasis supplied) 28. In Binny Ltd. v. V Sadasivan (2005) 6 SCC 657 , a two judge Bench of this Court noted the distinction between public and private functions. It held thus: “11…It is difficult to draw a line between public functions and private functions when they are being discharged by a purely private authority. A body is performing a “public function” when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest.” The Bench elucidated on the scope of mandamus: “29. However, the scope of mandamus is limited to enforcement of public duty. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest.” The Bench elucidated on the scope of mandamus: “29. However, the scope of mandamus is limited to enforcement of public duty. The scope of mandamus is determined by the nature of the duty to be enforced, rather than the identity of the authority against whom it is sought. If the private body is discharging a public function and the denial of any right is in connection with the public duty imposed on such body, the public law remedy can be enforced. The duty cast on the public body may be either statutory or otherwise and the source of such power is immaterial, but, nevertheless, there must be the public law element in such action…There cannot be any general definition of public authority or public action. The facts of each case decide the point.” (emphasis supplied) 29. More recently in K K Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (2015) 4 SCC 670 , another two judge Bench of this Court held that a writ would not lie to enforce purely private law rights. Consequently, even if a body is performing a public duty and is amenable to the exercise of writ jurisdiction, all its decisions would not be subject to judicial review. The Court held thus: “43. What follows from a minute and careful reading of the aforesaid judgments of this Court is that if a person or authority is “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, admittedly a writ petition under Article 226 would lie against such a person or body. However, we may add that even in such cases writ would not lie to enforce private law rights. There are a catena of judgments on this aspect and it is not necessary to refer to those judgments as that is the basic principle of judicial review of an action under the administrative law. The reason is obvious. A private law is that part of a legal system which is a part of common law that involves relationships between individuals, such as law of contract or torts. The reason is obvious. A private law is that part of a legal system which is a part of common law that involves relationships between individuals, such as law of contract or torts. Therefore, even if writ petition would be maintainable against an authority, which is “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution, before issuing any writ, particularly writ of mandamus, the Court has to satisfy that action of such an authority, which is challenged, is in the domain of public law as distinguished from private law.” Thus, even if the body discharges a public function in a wider sense, there is no public law element involved in the enforcement of a private contract of service. 30. Having analysed the circumstances which were relied upon by the State of Arunachal Pradesh, we are of the view that in running the hospital, Ramakrishna Mission does not discharge a public function. Undoubtedly, the hospital is in receipt of some element of grant. The grants which are received by the hospital cover only a part of the expenditure. The terms of the grant do not indicate any form of governmental control in the management or day to day functioning of the hospital. The nature of the work which is rendered by Ramakrishna Mission, in general, including in relation to its activities concerning the hospital in question is purely voluntary. 31. Before an organisation can be held to discharge a public function, the function must be of a character that is closely related to functions which are performed by the State in its sovereign capacity. There is nothing on record to indicate that the hospital performs functions which are akin to those solely performed by State authorities. Medical services are provided by private as well as State entities. The character of the organisation as a public authority is dependent on the circumstances of the case. In setting up the hospital, the Mission cannot be construed as having assumed a public function. The hospital has no monopoly status conferred or mandated by law. That it was the first in the State to provide service of a particular dispensation does not make it an ‘authority’ within the meaning of Article 226. State governments provide concessional terms to a variety of organisations in order to attract them to set up establishments within the territorial jurisdiction of the State. That it was the first in the State to provide service of a particular dispensation does not make it an ‘authority’ within the meaning of Article 226. State governments provide concessional terms to a variety of organisations in order to attract them to set up establishments within the territorial jurisdiction of the State. The State may encourage them as an adjunct of its social policy or the imperatives of economic development. The mere fact that land had been provided on a concessional basis to the hospital would not by itself result in the conclusion that the hospital performs a public function. In the present case, the absence of state control in the management of the hospital has a significant bearing on our coming to the conclusion that the hospital does not come within the ambit of a public authority. 32. It has been submitted before us that the hospital is subject to regulation by the Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act 2010. Does the regulation of hospitals and nursing homes by law render the hospital a statutory body? Private individuals and organizations are subject to diverse obligations under the law. The law is a ubiquitous phenomenon. From the registration of birth to the reporting of death, law imposes obligations on diverse aspects of individual lives. From incorporation to dissolution, business has to act in compliance with law. But that does not make every entity or activity an authority under Article 226. Regulation by a statute does not constitute the hospital as a body which is constituted under the statute. Individuals and organisations are subject to statutory requirements in a whole host of activities today. That by itself cannot be conclusive of whether such an individual or organisation discharges a public function. In Federal Bank ( AIR 2003 SC 4325 , Para 32) (supra), while deciding whether a private bank that is regulated by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 discharges any public function, the court held thus: “33. …in our view, a private company carrying on banking business as a scheduled bank, cannot be termed as an institution or a company carrying on any statutory or public duty. A private body or a person may be amenable to writ jurisdiction only where it may become necessary to compel such body or association to enforce any statutory obligations or such obligations of public nature casting positive obligation upon it. A private body or a person may be amenable to writ jurisdiction only where it may become necessary to compel such body or association to enforce any statutory obligations or such obligations of public nature casting positive obligation upon it. We don't find such conditions are fulfilled in respect of a private company carrying on a commercial activity of banking. Merely regulatory provisions to ensure such activity carried on by private bodies work within a discipline, do not confer any such status upon the company nor put any such obligation upon it which may be enforced through issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. Present is a case of disciplinary action being taken against its employee by the appellant Bank. The respondent's service with the Bank stands terminated. The action of the Bank was challenged by the respondent by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The respondent is not trying to enforce any statutory duty on the part of the Bank…” (emphasis supplied) 5. To similar effect is the another judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajbir Surajbhan Singh vs. Chairman, Institute of Banking Personnel Selection, Mumbai (2019) 14 SCC 189 , wherein it was observed as under:- “15. It is true that the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India and the Chairmen of certain Public Sector Banks along with the Joint Secretary, Banking Division, Ministry of Finance are members of the governing body of the Respondent-Institute. There is no dispute that the Respondent is not constituted under a statute. It is also not disputed that the Respondent does not receive any funds from the Government. The Respondent is not controlled by the Government. The letter dated 20.09.2010 produced by the Appellant along with the rejoinder affidavit does not show deep and pervasive control by the Government of India. The question of whether the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research fell under ‘other authorities’ within the meaning of Article 12 was referred to a 7 Judge Bench of this Court. [See: Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Others (2002) 5 SCC 111 . 16. The question of whether the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research fell under ‘other authorities’ within the meaning of Article 12 was referred to a 7 Judge Bench of this Court. [See: Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Others (2002) 5 SCC 111 . 16. Resolving the dispute, the 7 Judge Bench in Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) held that the question as to whether a corporation/society would fall within the meaning of Article 12 should be decided after examining whether the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. This Court observed that such control should be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. A control which is merely regulatory under the statute or otherwise would not make the body ‘State’ under Article 12. As there is no control by the Government over the Respondent in the manner mentioned above, we have no doubt in our mind that the Respondent cannot be said to be falling within the expression ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 17. The question that remains to be answered is whether the Writ Petition is maintainable against the Respondent on the ground that it discharges public duty. This Court in Andi Mukta Sadguru S. M. V. S. S. J. M.S.T. and Ors. v. V.R. Rudani and Ors. (1989) 2 SCC 691 held (SCC p. 700, para 20) “The term ‘authority’ used in Article 226 of the Constitution of India, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term “other authorities” in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue Writs for enforcement of fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words “any person or authority” used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or the authority to the affected party. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or the authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists, mandamus cannot be denied.” 18. This Court in the said judgment also referred to what Professor S.A. de Smith stated in ‘Judicial Review of Administrative Action’, which is as follows: (V.R. Rudani case, SCC p. 701, para 22) “22…….To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract.” 19. In Regina v. Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, Ex parte Datafin PLC and Another 1987 QB 815 , Lloyd L. J. speaking for the Court of Appeal held that if the duty is a public duty, then the body in question is subject to public law. The distinction must lie in the nature of the duty imposed, whether expressly or by implication. He referred to an earlier judgment in Reg. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex. Parte Lain, (1967) 2 QB 864 where Diplock L.J. held that in addition to looking at the source of power for the purpose of deciding the question pertaining to public law, nature of power is an important facet to decide whether a dispute pertains to public law or private law. 20. There is no manner of doubt that a Writ Petition under Article 226 is maintainable even against a private body provided it discharges public functions. While deciding the question as to whether ICRISAT is amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226, this Court held that it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is. It can reasonably be said that such functions as are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity, are public functions. It can reasonably be said that such functions as are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity, are public functions. The primary activity of ICRISAT is to conduct research and training programmes in the sphere of agriculture, purely on a voluntary basis which according to this Court, is not a public duty (G.Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute (2003) 4 SCC 225 ). A private company carrying on banking business as a scheduled commercial bank cannot be termed as an institution or a company carrying on any statutory or public duty (Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733 ). 21. In K.K. Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation &Drainage (2015) 4 SCC 670 , this Court observed that the Respondent therein would not be amenable to Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as the activities were voluntarily undertaken by the Respondents and there was no obligation to discharge certain activities which were statutory or of public character. Reference was made to the Federal Bank case wherein it was held that the Writ Petition was not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in spite of the regulatory regime of the Banking Regulation Act and the other statutes being in operation. 22. The relevant questions, according to this Court in K. K. Saksena (supra), to be answered for the purpose of deciding whether a Writ Petition is maintainable under Article 226 are : a) Whether a private body which is a nongovernmental organization partakes the nature of public duty or State action? b) Whether there is any public element in the discharge of its functions? c) Whether there is any positive obligation of a public nature in the discharge of its functions? d) Whether the activities undertaken by the body are voluntary, which many a nongovernmental organization perform? 23. The Respondent Institute has been set up for the purpose of conducting recruitment for appointment to various posts in Public Sector Banks and other financial institutions. Applying the tests mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the High Court is right in holding that the Writ Petition is not maintainable against the Respondent. Conducting recruitment tests for appointment in banking and other financial institutions, is not a public duty. Applying the tests mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the High Court is right in holding that the Writ Petition is not maintainable against the Respondent. Conducting recruitment tests for appointment in banking and other financial institutions, is not a public duty. The Respondent is not a creature of a statute and there are no statutory duties or obligations imposed on the Respondent. 24. This Court in Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733 held that a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable against a scheduled bank on the ground that the business of banking does not fall within the expression “public duty”. As the activity of the Respondent of conducting the selection process for appointment to the banks is voluntary in nature, it cannot be said that there is any public function discharged by the Respondent. There is no positive obligation, either statutory or otherwise on the Respondent to conduct the recruitment tests. For the reasons above, we are of the considered opinion that the Respondent is not amenable to the Writ Jurisdiction under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 6. From the aforesaid exposition of law, it is absolutely clear that no doubt a writ petition would be maintainable even against a private party, provided it discharges public functions or statutory duties which are conspicuously absent as regards private respondent Nos. 4 and 5 herein. 7. Accordingly, we have no difficulty in concluding that respondent Nos. 4 and 5 being private parties not discharging any public functions or statutory duties are not amenable to the writ jurisdiction. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed, so also the pending application, if any. 8. However, before parting, it needs to be observed that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of petitioner’s claim and, therefore, if the petitioner is still aggrieved, it will be open to him to take recourse to such remedy as permissible in law.