JUDGMENT : REKHA BORANA, J. 1. The brief facts of the case are as under: The petitioner applied for the post of Constable in pursuance to the notification dated 25.05.2018 issued by the respondent Department. After having successfully passed the written examination as well as the physical verification test and the physical standard test, the petitioner was awaiting his appointment order but vide communication dated 18.12.2018 (Annex. 3) it was informed that his candidature has been rejected on the ground that a criminal case was pending against him which fact was verified during the police verification process. Aggrieved against the said rejection, the present writ petition has been filed. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the criminal case registered against him was of the year 2011 at which time he was a juvenile and therefore, the trial for the said offence was conducted by Juvenile Justice Board, Bikaner. Counsel submitted that vide Section 24 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 2015’) an umbrella protection had been granted to a juvenile and therefore, in light of the same, the protection ought to have been extended to him also. Counsel submitted that on the date of the passing of the impugned order i.e. 18.12.2018, he was under trial and no order had been passed by the Juvenile Justice Board. He argued that even if it had been a case of conviction, the protection of Section 24 was to be granted to him as even in cases of conviction, the same cannot amount to a disqualification. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgments passed by Co-ordinate Benches of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4321/2019, Nadeem Khan vs. State of Rajasthan and Others decided on 01.05.2019; S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11395/2015, Hanuman vs. State of Rajasthan and Others decided on 28.09.2016 and S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 88/2017 Nirmal Kumar Vishnoi vs. Employees State Insurance Corporation and Others decided on 26.10.2017. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the petitioner would not be entitled to the protection of Section 24 of the Act of 2015 as on the date of the passing of the impugned order, the petitioner was under trial only. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the petitioner would not be entitled to the protection of Section 24 of the Act of 2015 as on the date of the passing of the impugned order, the petitioner was under trial only. He submitted that Section 24 talks of “a child who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the provisions of this Act” and admittedly, in the present matter as there had been no final adjudication by the Juvenile Justice Board, the same would not fall within the category of “has been dealt with under the provisions of this Act.” He argued that the matter where a juvenile is undergoing trial i.e. he has neither been convicted nor been acquitted, would not fall within the parameters of Section 24 and hence, the protection of the same would not be available to him. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents further argued that all the judgments relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner are those wherein the juvenile had been acquitted and therefore, the Court came to his rescue. 6. In the present case, the offence is punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code which by its very nature is a heinous crime and therefore, protection of Section 24 cannot be granted. He further argued that in the present matter even the Juvenile Justice Board declined to grant probation to the petitioner and therefore too, the petitioner was not entitled to any relaxation. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. A perusal of the record shows that the petitioner was convicted for offences under Sections 302/201 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and the appeal against the same had also been rejected. As clear on record, the revision against the same is pending before the High Court and the application for suspension of sentence is pending till date. But a bare reading of Section 24 of the Act of 2015 makes it clear that the same provides for no distinction between a juvenile who is under trial or who has been convicted. Section 24 provides for a protection even to the juvenile who had been convicted therefore, it can safely be concluded that it would include in its ambit, the cases of the juvenile who are under trial. Section 24 provides for a protection even to the juvenile who had been convicted therefore, it can safely be concluded that it would include in its ambit, the cases of the juvenile who are under trial. Therefore, argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that Section 24 would not apply as the petitioner was under trial on the date of the passing of the impugned order, cannot be held to be tenable. It is clear that the petitioner was being tried under the provisions of the Act of 2015 and therefore, it would fall within the parameters of the matter which has been dealt with under the provisions of this Act. 9. In the case of Nirmal Kumar Vishnoi (supra) also the offences for which the candidate therein was tried, were under Sections 307 and 323 of the Indian Panel Code. The same was also a matter, wherein, the candidate was under trial and the matter had not been adjudicated finally. 10. Considering the ratio as laid down in Avtar Singh vs. Union of India, 2016 (8) SCC 471 , in the case of Nirmal Kumar Vishnoi (supra) it was held as under: “At the time of the commission of the alleged offence, the petitioner was admittedly a juvenile, for which he is being tried by the Juvenile Court. The petitioner's all rights including right to seek appointment will be governed by the provisions of Act of 2000. The protective umbrella in the form of Section 19 of the Act of 2000, obliterates or dilutes the disqualification, if any, arising on account of pendency of the criminal case against the petitioner. Given the fact that there is analogous provision in the shape of Section 24 in the new Act of 2015 also. In view of the discussion foregoing, it is held and declared that denial of appointment to the petitioner is contrary to Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000/ 24 of the Act of 2015; arbitrary and violative of fundamental rights of the petitioner, enshrined under Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. In view of the discussion foregoing, it is held and declared that denial of appointment to the petitioner is contrary to Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000/ 24 of the Act of 2015; arbitrary and violative of fundamental rights of the petitioner, enshrined under Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The oppugned action of denial of appointment is also contrary to the law laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court is Avtar Singh's case (supra), as the petitioner is seeking an appointment on the lowest ladder as Multi - Tasking Staff for which mere pendency of a criminal case should not be treated as a hurdle or road block.” 11. The same ratio has been propounded in Nadeem Khan's case (supra) and Hanuman's case (supra). 12. In view of the ratio as laid down in the matters mentioned above and in view of the observations made above, the present writ petition of the petitioner deserves to be and is allowed. The order dated 18.12.2018 (Annex. 3) is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to accord appointment to the petitioner, if he is otherwise eligible for the same. However, it is made clear that the petitioner would be allowed the consequential benefits from the date the person lower in merit to him had been granted the appointment. All the monetary benefits would be permissible to the petitioner from the date of his appointment. 13. The above mentioned exercise be completed by the Department within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order.