JUDGMENT : SONGKHUPCHUNG SERTO, J. 1. This is an appeal directed against the Order dated 14.02.2022 passed by the Special Judge, NIA, Dimapur, in NIA Case No. RC-10/2019/NIA/GUW, taking cognizance of the offences charged against the appellant and his co-accused in the Charge-Sheet submitted by the NIA in NIA Case No. 10/2019/NIA/GUW dated 17.09.2019. 2. Heard Mr. Biswajit Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the appellant assisted by Mr. Sanjay Shah and Mr. Moa Jamir. Also heard Mr. Vishal Dwivedi, learned Special PP, NIA and Ms. V. Suokhrie, learned PP for the State of Nagaland. 3. On 20.08.2019, the Special Operation Team of Dimapur Police was pressed on duty following an information received through sources and they intercepted a vehicle (Maruti Alto car) bearing Registration No. NL-07C-3984 at M.P. Road, Dimapur, and apprehended the occupants of the vehicle namely, Luckin Mashangva @ Wanking Lowang @ David (A-1) and Jaikishan Sharma @ Jackson (A-2), the appellant herein. On search the team recovered a sum of Rs. 18,910/- (Rupees Eighteen Thousand Nine Hundred and Ten) from the possession of Luckin Mashangva and a sum of Rs. 10,27,910/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs Twenty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred and Ten) from the possession of Jaikishan Sharma (the appellant). After the apprehension of the two accused and seizure of the amounts mentioned above, the Special Operation Team took them to Dimapur East Police Station for interrogation. Based on their statements, another two persons namely, Samgin @Sangin @ Samging Wangsu and Shri Wanglik Tangjang @ Nalik, who were later made accused Nos. 3 and 4 respectively, were apprehended by the same Special Operation Team from Hotel Saramati, Dimapur. On their arrest a sum of Rs. 99,000/- (Rupees Ninety Nine Thousand) and a sum of Rs. 360/- (Rupees Three Hundred and Sixty) were recovered from the possession of the A-3 and A-4 respectively. During interrogation, it was revealed that the A-1, i.e. Luckin Mashangva is a self-styled Major of the NSCN(IM) and he and Jaikishan Sharma (A-2), the appellant herein, were always in touch with each other and they were involved in extortion of money from businessmen from Arunachal Pradesh by threatening and also destroying machineries of contractors when they did not relent to their demand. Further, it was also revealed that Jaikishan Sharma, the appellant, used to get Power of Attorneys in the name of some firms from many contractors in Arunachal by using his relationship with senior members of the NSCN(IM) including Luckin Mashangva, and from the profits he got out of such contract works, he used to send money to Luckin Mashangva or his wife through banking channels. Due to the facts and circumstances stated above and the revelations made, the FIR No. 0204/2019 was registered under Section 384 and 34 of the IPC read with Section 7 of Nagaland Security Regulation, 1962 (in short, NSR) against all the four accused. On 22.08.2019, the accused persons were produced before the learned CJM, Dimapur, and on that day the NIA submitted an application before the learned CJM, Dimapur, for permission to formally arrest the accused Luckin Mashangva and Jaikishan Sharma in connection with the NIA Case No. RC-03/2019/NIA/GUW, which was registered in Arunachal in connection with the murder of an MLA, and at the same time prayed for their production before the Special NIA Court at Yupia, Itanagar. 4. In the meanwhile, the Ministry of Home Affairs, CTCR Division, North Block, New Delhi vide Order F. No. 11.0.11/44/2019/NIA dated 13.09.2019 directed the NIA to take up investigation of the case. Following the Order, the NIA re-registered the earlier FIR case as FIR No. RC-10/2019/NIA/GUW on 17.09.2019 under Section 384 and 34 of the IPC, Section 7 of NSR and Section 13 and 20 of UA(P) Act against the four accused, thereby adding two sections of UA(P) Act. After registration of the FIR, the NIA took over the investigation of the case and during the investigation, it was confirmed that the findings of the Dimapur Police as stated above are true. They also found that the accused Luckin Mashangva and the appellant have been engaging themselves in raising funds from businessmen and through contract works to support the terrorist activities of the terrorist gang within the NSCN(IM). And as a part of their operation, Jaikishan Sharma, i.e. the appellant had come to Dimapur to deliver the amount, from his possession, to the co-accused, Luckin Mashangva, but was seized while he was in the process of doing so. And as a part of their operation, Jaikishan Sharma, i.e. the appellant had come to Dimapur to deliver the amount, from his possession, to the co-accused, Luckin Mashangva, but was seized while he was in the process of doing so. After having collected a fair amount of evidence or materials to prove the offences charged against the accused, the NIA submitted the Charge-Sheet dated 14.02.2020, in the Court of the Special Judge, NIA, Dimapur, against the two accused, i.e. Luckin Mashangva and Jaikishan Sharma, under section 384 of the IPC and Section 17 of the UA(P) Act, 1967, thereby, substantially changing the offences charged against the accused and leaving the other two accused free. However, in the Charge-Sheet, a prayer was made to the effect that the NIA may be allowed to continue further investigation of the case as per the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. 5. On receipt of the Charge-Sheet, the learned Special Judge, NIA on 14.02.2020, took cognizance and passed the following Order: “Received Charge-Sheet dated 14.02.2020 in the present NIA Case No. RC-10/2019/NIA/GUW dated 17.09.2019 arising out of Dimapur East PS Case 0204/2019 dated 218/2019 against accused Luckin Mashangva @ Wanking Lowang @ David and accused Jaikishan Sharma @ Jackson U/s 129B and 384 IPC R/W Section 17 of the UA(P) Act, 1967. I have perused the Chargesheet and satisfied to take cognizance of the same against the said two accused persons. It is stated in the Chargesheet that there is no prosecution at this stage against accused Samgin @Sangin Wangsu @ Samging Wangsu and Wanglik Tangjang @ Nalik and further investigation to continue. The CIO has also filed application through Sr. PP, NIA, praying for production of witnesses, protection of content of document and materials concerned and prayer not to supply copies of the same to defuse until such time the Court deems fit and proper as per the NIA Act, 2008 and U/S 44 of the UA(P) Act. Prayer is allowed. The CIO has also produced the seized cash amounting to Rs. 11,45,460/- (Rupees Eleven Lakhs Forty Five Thousand Four Hundred and Sixty). The same is handed over to the PI of the Court to be kept in Malkhana for safe-keeping. Fix for further order/and compliance of Section 207 Cr.P.C. on 28.02.2020.” 6. Prayer is allowed. The CIO has also produced the seized cash amounting to Rs. 11,45,460/- (Rupees Eleven Lakhs Forty Five Thousand Four Hundred and Sixty). The same is handed over to the PI of the Court to be kept in Malkhana for safe-keeping. Fix for further order/and compliance of Section 207 Cr.P.C. on 28.02.2020.” 6. Being aggrieved by the above Order of the learned Special Judge, Jaikishan Sharma is before this Court on appeal against the same. The Grounds of Appeal as given in the Appeal Memo are reproduced, herein-below verbatim: “(A) That it has been claimed by the prosecution that initially the case was registered u/s 384/34 IPC and Section 7 MSR Act by the Nagaland Police (R-2) at Dimapur, East Police Station, but subsequently after the production before the Ld. CJM Dimapur, section 13/20 of the U.A. (P) Act were aided by the Respondent No. 1. It is submitted that after investigation of the case the NIA (R-1) exonerated the Appellant herein from section 13/20 of UA(P) Act and charged him only u/s 17 of the UA(P) Act, besides section 120B/384 IPC. It is submitted that exoneration of the Appellant from the charges of section 13 and 20 of UA(P) Act is suggestive of the fact that the Appellant herein was not a member of Unlawful Association within the meaning of section 3 of UA(P) Act and that he was not indulging in unlawful activities within the meaning of section 13 of UA(P) Act. So far exoneration of the Appellant herein u/s 20 of UA(P) Act, which talks about punishment for being member of terrorist gang or organization establishes beyond shadow of doubt that he has nothing to do with terrorist gang. (B) That in the instant case so far taking cognizance u/s 17 of UA(P) Act by the Ld. Special Judge, is concerned, is totally against the mandate of section 17 of UA(P) Act, which envisages punishment for raising funds for terrorist act within the meaning of section 15 of the Act. (B) That in the instant case so far taking cognizance u/s 17 of UA(P) Act by the Ld. Special Judge, is concerned, is totally against the mandate of section 17 of UA(P) Act, which envisages punishment for raising funds for terrorist act within the meaning of section 15 of the Act. It is submitted that in the instant case there is no commission of terrorist act has been mentioned in the entire charge-sheet, not a single bullet has been fired, nor the charge-sheet discloses anywhere that the money allegedly recovered from the Appellant herein was likely to be used in full or in part by the Appellant herein or by the co-accused persons arrested in the instant case for the purpose to commit terrorist act, as such taking cognizance under section 17 of UA(P) Act is against the law laid down in the Act. (C) That terrorist gang has been defined in section 2(i)(1) of UA(P) Act which states that any association other than terrorist organization which involved in terrorist Act. It is submitted that in the instant case there is no commission of terrorist act within the meaning of section 15 of the UA(P) Act as such alleged recovery of money from the possession of the Appellant cannot be construed that the alleged money in full or in part was meant for likely use for the purpose of terrorist act. (D) That even the secret information allegedly received by Special Operation Team (R-2) suggest about extortion of money by a group of individuals and the charge sheet submitted by Respondent No. 1 does not disclosed i.e. alleged money so recovered was to be used for the purpose of terrorist activities within the money of section 15 of the UA(P) Act, as such invoking of section 17 of UA(P) Act by the prosecution and taking cognizance against the Appellant is against all norms of Criminal Jurisprudence. (E) That the prosecution failed to collect legal evidence under UA(P) Act or any provisions of Indian Penal Code against co-accused persons Samgin @ Sangin Wangsu @ Samging Wangsu and Wanglik Tangjang @ Nalik, though they were arrested in connection with the same transaction Estavlished that the co-accused Luckin Mashangva @ Wanking Lowang @ David and the Appellant were needed to be an accused in Itanagar case allegedly occurred in 21.05.2019 and RC No. 03/2019/NIA/GUW had already been registered by the NIA (R-1). It is submitted that the investigation in case RC No. 03/2019/NIA/GUW though allegedly occurred on 21.05.2019 and till the arrest of the Appellant in the instant case, there is no reference of Appellant or his role of any kind finds mentioned in the case diary. It is submitted that the Appellant has been tried to be implicated as a person, who was instrumental in financing the NSCN (IM) operatives, thought he transactions which has been brought in record is purely on business related activities and through banking channels. (F) That as submitted earlier that after productions of the accused persons in this case on 22.08.2019 before Ld. CJM, Dimapur, NIA (R-1) intervened and Nagaland Police added section 13 and 20 of UA(P) Act, but even co-accused Luckin Mashangva @Wanking Lowang @ David has not been charge-sheeted u/s 13 and 20 of the UA(P) Act, but has also been charge sheeted u/s 17 of UA(P) Act besides section 120-B/384 IPC. It is, most respectfully submitted that section 20 of UA(P) Act is meant for being a member of terrorist gang and when the prosecution exonerates him from being a member of terrorist gang than the Appellant herein cannot be considered to be financing a member of terrorist gang simply because some money was allegedly recovered from the possession of the Appellant herein, while he was in the company of co-accused Luckin Mashangva @ Wanking Lowang @ David. (G) That addition of section 13 and 20 of the UA(P) Act after the production of the Appellant on 22.08.2019 by the Nagaland Police and exoneration from above charges by NIA (R-1) after investigation established beyond shadow of doubt that present case did not attract provisions of UA(P) Act as such Ministry of Home Affairs arbitrarily used provisions of chapter-III of NIA Act, 2008 and entrusted the instance case to NIA(R-1). Simply because some unfortunate incident of killing of one MLA took place on 21.05.2019. (H) That some of the witnesses examined by the prosecution allegedly claimed that the Appellant was working as a contractor by procuring power of attorneys from some companies, which were authorised to undertake Govt. Contract and in course of his dealing with the Govt. Officials, they were of the opinion that the Appellant had close proximity with the members of the NSCN(IM). Contract and in course of his dealing with the Govt. Officials, they were of the opinion that the Appellant had close proximity with the members of the NSCN(IM). It is submitted that the NSCN(IM) to best of the knowledge of the Appellant has not been declared as unlawful association within the meaning of section-3 of UA(P) Act, as such the claim of the prosecution through its witnesses examined u/s 161 Cr.P.C. even at this stage is not sustainable. (I) That as submitted above the invoking of powers under Chapter-III of NIA Act, 2008 is not at all warranted on merits as such filing of charge-sheet under UA(P) Act as well as under IPC is not at all sustainable. (J) That none of the witnesses examined by the prosecution states that the Appellant herein is a man of criminal background. None state that he asked for money from anyone in the name of NSCN(IM) or any organization. Nowhere in the charge-sheet has it been claimed that money paid by the Appellant to anyone to get or to felicitate any terrorist act within the meaning of section 15 of UA(P) Act. The charge-sheet filed by the prosecution (R-1) in Case RC No. 03/2019/NIA/GUW in Itanagar exonerates him from section 17 of UA(P) Act, which is meant for raising funds for terrorist act.” 7. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Biswajit Prasad, pressing on the case of the appellant submitted that, the fact that, the charge under Section 13 and 20 of the UA(P) Act, (which were added to the charges against the accused persons when the NIA took over the case) were abandoned when the Charge-Sheet was submitted, clearly shows that the appellant and his co-accused are not members of any unlawful association, terrorist gang or organization, within the meaning of Section 3 of the UA(P) Act. The learned counsel also submitted that to make out a case under Section 17 of UA(P) Act, with which the two accused i.e. the appellant and the co-accused, Luckin Mashangva have been charged in the Charge-Sheet, it must be shown by the investigation machinery that there is a terrorist gang in existence, and it must also be shown that some terrorist act or acts as described under section 15 of the same Act had been committed by such organization. Unless that is shown, no offence punishable under section 17 of UA(P) Act can be said to have been committed. The learned counsel then submitted that, in this case, nothing has been shown in the Charge-Sheet that NSCN(IM), of which the co-accused, Luckin Mashangva is alleged to be a member is a terrorist gang and any of its members had committed any terrorist act and, the appellant had funded or raised funds to support such activities of the organisation. Furthermore, the learned counsel contended that in fact, there is no allegation in the Charge-Sheet that any terrorist act or acts have been committed in Dimapur or at any place in Nagaland, therefore, there is nothing in record from which it could be concluded that the offence charged against the appellant has been made out. Hence, the order passed by the Special Judge is without any basis: (a) The learned counsel, thereafter, submitted also that, the fact that the two accused were also arrested for the charge of murder of an MLA in Arunachal would show that even if they are suspected of having funded terrorist gang for committing terrorist activities, the terrorist activity (not admitting but assuming) was committed in Arunachal and not in Nagaland, therefore, there is no material to charge the two accused including the appellant, with the offence punishable under Section 17 of the UA(P) Act, in Nagaland. Further, the learned counsel submitted that the arrest of the appellant along with his co-accused in Dimapur, with money in their possession, which the prosecution has alleged was for financing a terrorist gang is but a part of the chain of events which started in Arunachal, therefore, two FIRs cannot be registered against the appellant and his co-accused. (b) The learned counsel also submitted that the appellant, herein, is charged of raising fund for funding a terrorist gang for committing terrorist activities but there is nothing to support that he had raised funds from people in Nagaland and handed over such funds to the NSCN(IM). Moreover, the transactions that the investigation machinery is trying to project as funding for terrorist activities are business transactions only, therefore, no offence under Section 15 of the UA(P) Act which is punishable under Section 17 of the UA(P) Act has been made out. Moreover, the transactions that the investigation machinery is trying to project as funding for terrorist activities are business transactions only, therefore, no offence under Section 15 of the UA(P) Act which is punishable under Section 17 of the UA(P) Act has been made out. As such, the learned Special Judge had committed error, both in facts and law while taking cognizance of the offence charged against the appellant. Hence, the order of cognizance is liable to be quashed and set aside. (c) Lastly, the learned counsel submitted that taking cognizance of an offence is not an interlocutory order; it is intermediate or quasi-final, therefore, any order taking cognizance of an offence can be interfered with in appeal. (d) In support of his submissions stated above, the learned counsel referred to the following relevant portions of the judgments: (1) Regarding non-permissibility of registration of the second FIR, in respect of an offence or different offences committed in the course of the same transaction the learned counsel referred to the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of: (i) Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah vs. CBI and Another in Writ Petitions (Criminal) No. 149 of 2012 with Writ Petitions (Criminal) No. 5 of 2013. The relevant portion, i.e. Para 32 is reproduced herein-below: “32. This Court has consistently laid down the law on the issue interpreting the Code, that a second FIR in respect of an offence or different offences committed in the course of the same transaction is not only impermissible but it violates Article 21 of the Constitution. In T.T. Anthony (supra), this Court has categorically held that registration of second FIR (which is not a cross case) is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The following conclusion in paragraph Nos. 19, 20 and 27 of that judgment are relevant which read as under: “19. The scheme of Cr.P.C. is that an officer in charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 Cr.P.C. on the basis of entry of the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of a cognizable offence. The scheme of Cr.P.C. is that an officer in charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 Cr.P.C. on the basis of entry of the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of a cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, he has to form an opinion under Section 169 or 170 Cr.P.C. as the case may be, and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. However, even after filing such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, he need not register a fresh FIR; he is empowered to make further investigation, normally with the leave of the court and where during further investigation he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports; this is the import of sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. 20. From the above discussion it follows that under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 Cr.P.C. only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 Cr.P.C. Thus there can be no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. On receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering the FIR in the station house diary, the officer in charge of a police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 Cr.P.C. (ii) The Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Pradeep Ram vs. State of Jharkhand and Another in Criminal Appeal Nos. 816-817 of 2019 and SLP (Crl.) Nos. 10051-10052 of 2018, the relevant paragraph, i.e. Para 37 is reproduced herein-below: “37. 816-817 of 2019 and SLP (Crl.) Nos. 10051-10052 of 2018, the relevant paragraph, i.e. Para 37 is reproduced herein-below: “37. This Court has consistently laid down the law on the issue interpreting the Code, that a second FIR in respect of an offence or different offences committed in the course of the same transaction is not only impermissible but it violates Article 21 of the Constitution. In T.T. Antony (Supra), this Court has categorically held that registration of second FIR (which is not a cross-case) is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The following conclusion in Paras 19, 20 and 27 of that judgment are relevant which read as under: (SCC pp. 196-97 and 200) “19. The scheme of Cr.P.C. is that an officer in charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 Cr.P.C. on the basis of entry of the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of a cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, he has to form an opinion under Section 169 or 170 Cr.P.C. as the case may be, and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. However, even after filing such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, he need not register a fresh FIR; he is empowered to make further investigation, normally with the leave of the court and where during further investigation he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports; this is the import of sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. 20. From the above discussion it follows that under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 Cr.P.C. only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 Cr.P.C. Thus there can be no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. On receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering the FIR in the station house diary, the officer in charge of a police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 Cr.P.C. *** *** *** 27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 Cr.P.C. nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.” The above referred declaration of law by this Court has never been diluted in any subsequent judicial pronouncements even while carving out exceptions.” (2) In support of the submission that taking cognizance of an offence is not interlocutory order but is intermediate or quasi-final. The Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande and Others vs. Uttam and Another, the relevant paragraph that is Para 4 is reproduced herein-below: “In view of the rival submissions at the bar, the first question that arises for consideration is whether the order of the Magistrate, directing issuance of process can be said to be such an interlocutory order, which is not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397, in view of the bar in sub-section (2) thereof. Sub-Section (2) of Section 397 reads thus: 397(2): The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. The very object of conferring revisional jurisdiction upon the superior criminal courts is to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law or irregularity of procedure. Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should, therefore, be exercised within the four corners of Section 397, whenever there has been miscarriage of justice in whatever manner. Under sub-section (2) of Section 397, there is a prohibition to exercise revisional jurisdiction against any interlocutory order so that inquiry or trial may proceed without any delay. But the expression “interlocutory order” has not been defined in the Code. In Amar Nath and Others vs. State of Haryana, 1978 (1) SCR 222 , this Court has held that the expression “interlocutory order” in Section 397(2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in a broad or artistic sense and merely denotes orders of purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties and any order which substantially affects the right of the parties cannot be said to be an “interlocutory order.” In Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra, 1978 (1) SCR 749 , a three Judge Bench of this Court has held an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which when accepted will conclude the particular proceeding, cannot be held to be an interlocutory order. In V.C. Shukla vs. State, 1980 (2) SCR 380 , this Court has held that the term “interlocutory order” used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favor of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial and the revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi final. This being the position of law, it would not be appropriate to hold that an order directing issuance of process is purely interlocutory and, therefore, the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 397 would apply. On the other hand, it must be held to be intermediate or quasi final and, therefore, the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 could be exercised against the same. The High Court, therefore, was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order in view of the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code.” 8. Mr. Vishal Dwivedi, learned PP, NIA, submitted that there are sufficient materials in the record showing that the co-accused, Luckin Mashangva is a self-styled Major of NSCN(IM) and he was involved in the commission of so many terrorist activities both in Arunachal and Nagaland and that he along with the appellant, taking advantage of their close association or proximity with the higher-ups of the NSCN(IM), have been collecting funds by means of extortion from different individuals and business firms for funding the terrorist gang within NSCN(IM) and their activities. Therefore, no error, whatsoever, has been committed by the learned Special Judge in having taken cognizance of the offences charged against the appellant and the co-accused. The learned PP further submitted that an order of cognizance passed in a criminal case is interlocutory in nature, therefore, no appeal or revision would lie against such order. 9. The learned PP also submitted that since the offence charged against the accused persons is not only serious but relating to offences or criminal activities committed by a terrorist gang whose activities extends far and wide and not confined only to a state, investigation, though earnestly carried on, is yet to be fully completed. Therefore, a prayer has been made in the Charge-sheet to grant permission to continue the investigation and to submit additional Charge-sheet in future. Therefore, a prayer has been made in the Charge-sheet to grant permission to continue the investigation and to submit additional Charge-sheet in future. As such, an additional Charge-sheet is under preparation. 10. The learned PP further submitted that there are materials showing that the appellant and the co-accused, Luckin Mashangva, have been in association with one another for so many years and have been committing extortions by terrorizing people and, they had many financial transactions through banking channels. These financial transactions are nothing but of the funds collected or extorted from many persons for the purpose of funding the terrorist activities of the terrorist gang. Moreover, the fact that huge sum of money was seized from the appellant at the time of his arrest in the company of the co-accused, Luckin Mashangva, also shows that the appellant had come to Dimapur as a part of his activities of raising fund, and also to hand over some amount for supporting the terrorist activities of the terrorist gang. As such, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned Order. 11. In support of his submissions that the appeal is not maintainable, the learned PP referred to paragraph 24 and 25 of a common Judgment passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Shri Jai Kishan Sharma vs. Union of India (National Investigation Agency) in Criminal Appeal No. 28(AP)/2019 and in the case of Shri Luckin Mashangva vs. Union of India (National Investigation Agency) in Criminal Appeal No. 29(AP)/2019: “(24) Interlocutory order has nowhere been specifically defined. However, there is a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing on interlocutory orders. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in V.C. Shukla vs. State through S.B.I. MANU/SC/0284/1979 : 1980 Supp. SCC 92, in paragraph-24, while interpreting the Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979 observed as follows: “24. To sum up, the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. Untwalia, J. In case of Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra clearly meant to convey that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order but is an intermediate order as defined in the passage extracted above, in CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM Vol. 60. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made in CORPU JURIS SECUNDUM. It is obvious that an order framing of the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term ‘interlocutory order’ as used in Section 11(1) of the Act. WHARTON’S LAW LEXICON (14th Edn. p.529) defines interlocutory order thus: An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an action, but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decides the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all. This would be the result if the term interlocutory order is interpreted in its natural and logical sense without having resort to Criminal Procedure Code or any other statute. That is to say if we construe interlocutory order in ordinary parlance it would indicate the attributes, mentioned above, and this is what the term interlocutory order means when used in Section 11(1) of the Act. (25) A Division Bench of our own Hon’ble High Court in Londhoni Devi and Others vs. State, 2013 (3) GLT 249, while discussing as to what is an interlocutory order with reference to the provisions of Section 21(3) of the NIA Act held, after referring several authorities, held that an order framing charge under the scheme of NIA Act, 2008, is an interlocutory order and no appeal lies therefrom. Drawing analogy with the said decision of our own High Court, we can hold that the order impugned in this appeal does not terminate the proceeding or finally decide the rights of the parties and as such is an interlocutory order only. That being so, in view of the provisions of Section 21(3) of NIA Act, the appeal is not maintainable.” 12. Learned PP, State of Nagaland, Ms. V. Suokhrie, submitted also that taking cognizance of an offence is a preliminary and an interlocutory order for initiating proceedings of a criminal case in a criminal court, therefore, an appeal against such order is not maintainable. If at all the charge accused wants to challenge the Charge-sheet, he can do so at the time of charge hearing. 13. As is evident from the impugned Order, the case against the appellant and his co-accused before the Special Court (NIA) was at the stage of taking cognizance. Section 16 of the NIA Act 2008 provides the procedure and powers of Special Courts. The portions of the section which are relevant are Clause (1) and (4) of the same. They are reproduced here below for easy reference: “(1) A Special Court may take cognizance of any offence, without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon receiving a complaint of facts that constitute such offence or upon a police report of such facts. (4) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, every case transferred to a Special court under sub-section (2) of section 13 shall be dealt with as if such case had been transferred under section 406 of the Code to such Special Court.” Reading together of these two Clauses of Section 16 of the NIA Act makes it clear that it is only the Special Court constituted under the NIA Act, which is empowered to take cognizance of the offences triable by and committed to it. Taking cognizance of an offence has not been defined under the NIA Act, nor under Cr.P.C. The expression ‘cognizance’ merely means become aware of, in other words, to take notice of judicially. This is the first stage when a charge-sheet by the investigation machinery is laid before the Special Judge. Taking cognizance of an offence has not been defined under the NIA Act, nor under Cr.P.C. The expression ‘cognizance’ merely means become aware of, in other words, to take notice of judicially. This is the first stage when a charge-sheet by the investigation machinery is laid before the Special Judge. What the Judge would do at this stage is to go through the Charge-sheet along with the documents laid before him and examine the same by applying his judicial mind to find out as to whether the offence the accused is charged of has been made out or not. If he finds that the offence charged against the accused has been made out, process would be issued for initiation of the trial. But in case he finds that no offence is made out the case will not proceed against the accused thereafter. Therefore, at the cost of repetition, taking cognizance of an offence is nothing more than taking judicial notice of the offence charged against the accused if the offence is made out from what is stated in the Charge-sheet and the materials submitted along with it. It is an important stage because if the offence charged is made out and cognizance is taken the accused will then have to go through further proceedings of the case. On the contrary, in case no offence is made out the case terminates at that stage. For this reason a cognizance order is not an interim or interlocutory order, rather it is a preliminary order passed in a case. Further, at this stage, the judge has only to be satisfied as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. The latter can be determined only during or after the trial. In that view of the matter what needs to be examined in this Appeal is whether the offence under section 17 of the UA(P) Act charged against the appellant and his co-accused could be said to have been made out from the contents of the Charge-sheet and the documents/materials submitted along with it. But before that it would be appropriate to reproduce contents of the section for easy reference. Section 17 of the UA(P) Act provides as follows: “17. But before that it would be appropriate to reproduce contents of the section for easy reference. Section 17 of the UA(P) Act provides as follows: “17. Punishment for raising funds for terrorist act - Whoever, in India or in a foreign country, directly or indirectly, raises or provides funds or collects funds, whether from a legitimate or illegitimate source, from any person or persons or attempts to provide to, or raises or collects funds for any person or persons, knowing that such funds are likely to be used, in full or in part by such person or persons or by a terrorist organisation or by a terrorist gang or by an individual terrorist to commit a terrorist act, notwithstanding whether such funds were actually used or not for commission of such act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation: For the purpose of this section: (a) Participating, organising or directing in any of the acts stated therein shall constitute an offence. (b) raising funds shall include raising or collecting or providing funds through production or smuggling or circulation of high quality counterfeit India currency. (c) Raising or collecting or providing funds, in any manner for the benefit of, or, to an individual terrorist, terrorist gang or a terrorist organisation for the purpose not specifically covered under section 15 shall also be construed as an offence.” The provisions of section 17 given above makes it clear that any person who is within India or without, if he directly or indirectly raises or provides or collects funds from a legitimate or illegitimate source, from any person or persons or even attempts to do the same for any person or persons knowing that such funds are likely to be used in full or in part by such person or persons or by a terrorist organisation or by terrorist gang or by an individual terrorist to commit a terrorist act, shall be punishable for a term not less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. Further, the provision also makes it clear that such person shall also be punishable even if the funds provided or collected have not been actually used for commission of terrorist act. Further, the provision also makes it clear that such person shall also be punishable even if the funds provided or collected have not been actually used for commission of terrorist act. This means that even if the funds collected or provided by the accused have not been actually used for commission of any terrorist act, he will still be liable to be punished as stated above if it is found that it is likely to be used for such purpose. It also makes it clear that the funds so collected or raised may be for any person or persons who is not a terrorist or does not belong to any terrorist gang or organization or for an individual terrorist provided the fund collected is for committing a terrorist act, which means that the beneficiary need not be a terrorist organisation or a terrorist gang or an individual terrorist. Furthermore, it is also clear from the provisions of the section that even an attempt to commit such act is also punishable in the like manner. 14. Now, reverting to the facts and circumstances given in the Charge-Sheet, the accused is charged of having obtained several Power of Attorneys in the names of some firms for carrying out several contract works and of having extorted a lot of funds from the business community and Government servants in the State of Arunachal by using his connection with higher-ups of the NSCN(IM), and the co-accused who is a self-styled Major in the NSCN(IM) known for his terrorist activities, and transferring such profits and funds earned and collected to the account of the co-accused through banking channels, and he is also charged of having committed such acts in association, collaboration and in conspiracy with the co-accused by threatening people with dire consequences and sometimes by even destroying machineries of the contractors who were lawfully engaged for carrying out Government contract works; and he was arrested while he was travelling in a car with the co-accused in Dimapur and unaccounted sum of Rs. 10,27,910/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs Twenty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred and Ten) was seized from his possession, which was meant to be handed over to the co-accused for financing terrorist activities. 10,27,910/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs Twenty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred and Ten) was seized from his possession, which was meant to be handed over to the co-accused for financing terrorist activities. In support of the charge, the investigation machinery has taken statements of witnesses, some of whom are classified as ‘protected witnesses’ and they also collected banking documents by which they seek to prove that a number of transactions had taken place between the appellant and the co-accused. Further, to proof that the appellant and the co-accused have been in association with one another for the purpose of committing all the offences mentioned above for a long time, records of telephone/mobile-phone call between them have been collected and analyzed. All these are supported by the statements of witnesses recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the materials collected so far. Considering all these we are of the view that the offence under section 17 of the UA(P) Act charged against the appellant and the co-accused is well made out. Therefore, we find nothing wrong in the Order of the learned Special Judge by which cognizance of the offence charged against the appellant and the co-accused has been taken. We may also add here that, even if the materials submitted along with the Charge-sheet are considered to be insufficient, the investigation machinery still has time to further investigate and submit whatever materials they may collect during the investigation, because for that purpose, they have already made a prayer under the provisions of section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In fact, for that reason we are also of the view that the appellant has been a little hasty in coming before this Court at this stage. In criminal cases, after cognizance order is passed process is issued and after the process is completed, charge-hearing/consideration is next in the proceedings. At that time the appellant will have ample opportunity to submit his case including as to whether there are sufficient materials against him to go for trial or not. 15. In criminal cases, after cognizance order is passed process is issued and after the process is completed, charge-hearing/consideration is next in the proceedings. At that time the appellant will have ample opportunity to submit his case including as to whether there are sufficient materials against him to go for trial or not. 15. Regarding the arguments of the learned counsel of the appellant that, since no terrorist act has been committed by the co-accused or his alleged terrorist gang, the charge that the appellant and his co-accused were raising funds to support terrorist activities of the terrorist gang has not been made out, in our view, does not have much force because, the appellant and the co-accused are, themselves, charged of having committed terrorist activities by extorting money from business community, Government officials and by obtaining contract works by means of threats and violence. And these charges, since they are supported with documents and statements, they do not appear to be empty accusations. As per the provisions of section 17 of the UA(P) Act, a person to be punishable under the same provision, the funds so raised may not even be for a terrorist gang, it can be for an individual or group of individuals provided the accused is aware that the funds so collected is likely to be used for committing terrorist act or acts. Therefore, proof of the act of terrorism committed by the beneficiary is not necessary for sustaining a charge under section 17 of the UA(P) Act. 16. Further, on the submission of the learned counsel of the appellant that the chain of events starting from the killing of an MLA in Arunachal, to the arrest of the appellant in the company of the co-accused with unaccounted money in his possession, forms part of the transaction, therefore, the FIR registered in Arunachal in connection with the killing of the MLA and the case taken up in Dimapur under the present FIR case need not be taken up under different FIRs, in our view, is not plausible, because the FIR registered in Arunachal was specifically for the killing of an MLA whereas the FIR registered at Dimapur is specifically for raising fund for commission of or for the purpose of terrorist activities. Just because the two accused happens to be the accused in both the FIRs and they are charged with somewhat similar nature or of same offences does not connect the two offences charged against them in the two FIRs. The facts and circumstances leading to the registration of the two FIRs and filing of the separate charge-sheets are different and the cause of action are also different, therefore, the FIR registered earlier in Arunachal could not have covered the offence for which the FIR we are concerned with was registered. Therefore, we cannot agree with the submission of the learned counsel. 17. In conclusion, we are of the view that the facts and circumstances given in the Charge-sheet and the materials collected and submitted so far has made out the offence charged against the accused persons, therefore, there is nothing illegal or irregular in the order impugned in the Appeal. As such we find no reason to interfere. 18. Accordingly, the Appeal is dismissed.