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2022 DIGILAW 426 (KER)

Nandanam Tiles & Sanitaries (P) Ltd. v. Abdul Gaffur, S/O Puthiyaveettil Muhammed

2022-06-02

ANIL K.NARENDRAN, P.G.AJITHKUMAR

body2022
JUDGMENT : Anil K. Narendran, J. The petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R.C.P.No.2 of 2020 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Munsiff) Kodungallur, a petition filed by the respondent herein-landlord under Section 11(2)(b) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of arrears of rent to the tune of Rs.23,05,577/- in respect of the petition schedule building, from the month of March 2019 onwards. During the pendency of that Rent Control Petition, the landlord filed I.A No.1 of 2020, an application under Section 12 of the Act seeking an order directing the tenant to deposit Rs.29,07,975/- towards the arrears of rent. In that interlocutory application, the tenant submitted objections. He raised the contention that the landlord had purchased articles worth Rs.26,00,000/- on credit, agreeing to adjust the value of the same towards the rent payable at the rate of Rs.1,44,500/- per month. The tenant has also contented that Rs.25,00,000/- has already been paid to the landlord towards the security deposit. Still the same is with the landlord, which has to be adjusted towards arrears. The Rent Control Court, after considering the materials on record, passed Ext.P4 order, in exercise of its powers under Section 12(1) of the Act, whereby the tenant was directed to deposit the admitted arrears of rent on or before 31.05.2022. The said order reads thus: “The petition is filed seeking to deposit admitted arrears of rent under Section 12 of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The only contention made by the respondent is that security amount has to be adjusted towards rent arrears. The respondent also claimed that there are other transactions between the petitioner and respondent. Hence some amounts to be realized from the those transactions. Hence after adjusting all those amount nothing more will be there for arrears of rent. The learned counsel also questioned the maintainability of this petition on the ground that the petition filed seeking the arrears even before filing R.C.P. All the contentions raised by the respondent is not maintainable since they have no case to the effect that they are remitting admitted arrears of rent during the pendency of proceedings. Regarding adjustment this court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate those matter, since those questions to be adjudicated properly before civil court. Regarding adjustment this court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate those matter, since those questions to be adjudicated properly before civil court. Hence respondents is hereby directed to deposit the admitted rent arrears on or before 31.05.2022.” Challenging the said order of the Rent Control Court, the petitioner-tenant is before this Court with this original petition, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant. 3. The issue that arises for consideration in this original petition is as to whether any interference is warranted on Ext.P4 order dated 01.04.2022 by the Rent Control Court in I.A. No.1 of 2020 in R.C.P.No.2 of 2020 invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. Section 12 of the Act deals with payment or deposit of rent during the pendency of proceedings for eviction. As per Section 12(1), no tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 11, shall be entitled to contest the application before the Rent Control Court under that Section, or to prefer an appeal under Section 18 against any order made by the Rent Control Court on the application, unless he has paid or pays to the landlord, or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. As per Section 12(2), the deposit under sub-section (1) shall be made within such time as the court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed for the service of notice referred to in sub-section (4). As per Section 12(2), the deposit under sub-section (1) shall be made within such time as the court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed for the service of notice referred to in sub-section (4). As per the proviso to Section 12(2), the time fixed by the court for the deposit of the arrears of rent shall not be less than four weeks from the date of the order and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently accrues due shall not be less than two weeks from the date on which the rent becomes due. As per Section 12(3) of the Act, if any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. As per Section 12(4), when any deposit is made under sub-section (1), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall cause notice of the deposit to be served on the landlord in the prescribed manner, and the amount deposited may, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him to the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority in that behalf. 5. Section 12(1) of the Act enjoins a tenant, against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 11, to pay to the landlord, or deposit with the Rent Control Court, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building, up to the date of payment or deposit, and continue to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court, in order to contest that application for eviction before the Rent Control Court. Similarly, Section 12(1) of the Act enjoins a tenant, in order to prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the Act against any order made by the Rent Control Court on an application made by a landlord under Section 11, to pay the landlord, or deposits with the Appellate Authority, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Appellate Authority. 6. The liability of a tenant under Section 12(1) of the Act, against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 11, or who prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the Act, against any order made by the Rent Control Court on an application made by a landlord under Section 11, is limited to all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building, up to the date of payment or deposit, and he shall continue to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. 7. The object of the provisions of Section 12(1) of the Act is to deny the defaulting tenant the right to contest the application for eviction before the Rent Control Court, or to prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the Act against any order made by the Rent Control Court on an application made by a landlord under Section 11, unless he pays to the landlord, or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by him to be due in respect of the building, up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. 8. 8. In J. Ramkumar v. Ashok Jacob [ 2022 (1) KHC 495 : ILR 2021 (4) Kerala 876] this Court held that, Section 12(2) of the Act enjoins a tenant to deposit the admitted rent under sub-section (1), within such time as the court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed. The time fixed by the court for the deposit of the arrears of rent and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently accrues due shall not be less than that specified in the proviso to Section 12(2). As per the statutory mandate of Section 12(1), on an application filed by the landlord under Section 12, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, has to order payment or deposit of arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the petition schedule building, up to the date of payment or deposit and the tenant shall also be directed to continue to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, regardless of the relief sought for in that application. As per Section 12(3) of the Act, if any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. 9. In the instant case, the tenants contended that the landlord had purchased articles worth Rs.26,00,000/-, agreeing to adjust the value of the same towards the rent payable at the rate of Rs.1,44,500/- per month and as such there is no arrears of rent in respect of the petition schedule building. 10. In Gopala Panicker Baiju and another v. Mallika [ 2018 (5) KHC 95 ] the Division Bench of this Court had occasion to deal with a case in which the tenants raised a contention that, no amount was due from them as arrears of rent. That apart, they had spent more than Rs.3,00,000/- for renovation of the building and the landlady is liable to adjust the said amount towards rent. That apart, they had spent more than Rs.3,00,000/- for renovation of the building and the landlady is liable to adjust the said amount towards rent. Thus, according to the tenants, there is no admitted arrears of rent payable under Section 12(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Unless the tenant himself admits in the objection to the petition under Section 12 of the Act or in the counter statement filed in the Rent Control Petition that any amount is due to the landlord, as arrears of rent, there cannot be any admitted arrears of rent. In short, the contention was that the simple denial of the tenant would absolve him from the liability to deposit the admitted arrears under Section 12 of the Act. 11. In Gopala Panicker Baiju the Division Bench held that, the admitted arrears of rent contemplated under Section 12(1) of the Act need not be an admission in the rent control proceedings itself and it cannot be insisted that the acceptance of the arrears or the quantum of admitted arrears of rent should come by the express words from the tenant himself in his counter statement in the Rent Control Petition or in the objection to the application filed under Section 12 of the Act by the landlord. But, it can be inferred from any document containing admission, as to the rate of rent, and period of default made by the tenant. The relevant factors, from which ‘arrears of rent’, can be inferred are the rate of rent and period of default. Normally, the rent deed executed by the tenant is a document which contains admission as to the rate of rent made by the tenant. The periodical enhancement in the rate of rent is evident from the rent receipts, in case the rent deed is not current. Similarly, the rent receipts, postal receipts or bank records, contemplated under Section 9(2) of the Act, produced by the tenant, are the documents which would suggest the period for which rent is paid. According to Section 9(1) of the Act, the tenant is entitled to get receipt on payment of rent and in case of refusal, an alternative remedy for payment of rent is also provided in Section 9(2) of the Act. Therefore, a tenant cannot be heard to say that the landlord refused to issue receipt, on payment of rent. According to Section 9(1) of the Act, the tenant is entitled to get receipt on payment of rent and in case of refusal, an alternative remedy for payment of rent is also provided in Section 9(2) of the Act. Therefore, a tenant cannot be heard to say that the landlord refused to issue receipt, on payment of rent. The rent receipt is a statutorily accepted substantive evidence from which the period of default can be inferred indirectly. According to Taylor on evidence, an admission may be direct or indirect, express or implied. Therefore, rent receipts, money order receipts and other bank records provided under Section 9 of the Act are documents containing admission which would suggest an inference indirectly as to the period of default also. The term 'admitted arrears of rent' has to be understood and construed in conformity with statutorily recognised payment only. Therefore, for the determination of a petition under Section 12 of the Act, it is permissible to require production of rent deed by the landlord and rent receipt or document mentioned in Section 9(2) of the Act by the tenant. These materials would obviously show the admitted arrears of rent, without conducting any enquiry or adjudication. 12. In Gopala Panicker Baiju the Division Bench noticed that, any kind of set off or adjustment towards arrears of rent cannot be accepted, while considering an application under Section 12 of the Act, as such counter claims require enquiry and adjudication. Neither Section 11(2)(b) nor Section 12 of the Act recognises or permits any kind of set off, adjustment or counter claim by the tenant towards arrears of rent or admitted arrears. The enabling provision which permits set off towards rent is Section 17(2) of the Act and the same is permissible, where an order to that effect is passed by the Accommodation Controller, on satisfaction of the failure on the landlord to attend to maintenance and necessary repairs of the building. 13. In Gopala Panicker Baiju the Division Bench concluded that the admitted arrears is an amount that can be quantified by the Rent Control Court from the rent deed produced by the landlord and the receipts or documents specified under Section 9 of the Act, evidencing payment of rent, produced by the tenants, unless the rent deed contains anything to the contrary. To sum up, the tenant cannot be allowed to wriggle out from the statutory liability, under Section 12 of the Act, by a blank denial in his counter statement or objection to the application filed under Section 12 of the Act, where the rent deed and receipts would quantify an amount, as admitted arrears of rent, from the admissions therein; but otherwise, the determination empowered with the Rent Control Court contemplated under Section 12(1) of the Act would come to an end, on a bare denial of the tenant and thereby the purpose of Section 12 of the Act itself would be defeated. 14. In the instant case, admittedly the rate of rent of the petition schedule building is Rs.1,44,500/-. The tenants contended that the landlord had purchased articles worth Rs.26,00,000/- agreeing to adjust the value of the same towards the rent payable at the rate of Rs.1,44,500/- per month and as such there is no arrears or rent. The tenants have not chosen to produce any materials to substantiate the said plea. They have no dispute as to the rate of rent payable in terms of the lease deed. The tenants have no case that they made any payment of rent after the filing of the Rent Control Petition, for which they have obtained rent receipts, postal receipts or bank records, as contemplated under Section 9(2) of the Act. In a proceedings under Section 12 of the Act, a tenant cannot be allowed to wriggle out from the statutory liability by making such a blank denial. The tenant cannot also be permitted to make such claim of set off or adjustment towards arrears of rent. A blank denial in the counter statement or objection to the application filed under Section 12 of the Act that no amount is payable towards arrears of rent is not at all sufficient. In such circumstances, the aforesaid contention raised by the tenant regarding purchase of articles worth Rs.26,00,000/- by the landlord, agreeing to adjust the value of the same towards the rent payable at the rate of Rs.1,44,500/- per month, cannot be accepted, which was rightly rejected by the court below. 15. In such circumstances, the aforesaid contention raised by the tenant regarding purchase of articles worth Rs.26,00,000/- by the landlord, agreeing to adjust the value of the same towards the rent payable at the rate of Rs.1,44,500/- per month, cannot be accepted, which was rightly rejected by the court below. 15. In Bhaskaran Assan v. Ammukutty Amma [ 1992 (2) KLT 565 ] a Division Bench of this Court has held that Section 9 of the Act provides that a tenant is entitled to demand and obtain a receipt for the payment of rent made by him to the landlord. It also provides that in a case where the landlord refuses to issue receipt, it is open to the tenant to sent the rent by way of money order after deducting the money order commission or issue a notice to the landlord requiring the landlord to specify a bank into which the tenant could remit the rent due. This statutory provision is a protection to the tenant and it is for the tenant to make use of such protection in a case where the landlord refuses to issue receipt to the tenant. Any prudent tenant would and should resort to Section 9 of the Act in cases where the landlord refuses to issue receipt to him on his paying the rent due. If he is not prudent enough to resort to that course it will require very strong evidence on his side to substantiate a plea that he has paid the rent without obtaining receipts for the same. 16. In Sukumaran v. Hamza Haji [ 2014 (3) KHC 667 ], a Division Bench of this Court has held in paragraph 10 that, any prudent tenant would and should, resort to Section 9 of the Act in cases where the landlord refuses to issue receipt to him on his paying the rent due. If he is not prudent enough to resort to that course it will require very strong evidence on his side to substantiate a plea that he has paid the rent without obtaining receipts for the same. The case put forward by the tenant was that, the landlord was in the habit of not issuing receipts on payment of rent. If that be so, one would normally expect the tenant to take recourse to Section 9 of the Act. The case put forward by the tenant was that, the landlord was in the habit of not issuing receipts on payment of rent. If that be so, one would normally expect the tenant to take recourse to Section 9 of the Act. His failure to take recourse to Section 9 is a relevant circumstance in appreciating the ground for eviction made by the landlord under Section 11(2) of the Act. 17. In the instant case, tenants contended that, the security amount deposited by them is still with the landlord, which has to be adjusted towards admitted arrears of rent. 18. The Rent Control Petition is one dated 18.05.2020. The statutory notice is one dated 05.03.2020, in which arrears of rent is demanded from March 2019. The tenants have not produced any receipts issued by the landlord under Section 9(2) of the Act, evidencing payment of monthly rent at the rate of Rs.1,44,500/-, during the pendency of the Rent Control Petition. 19. In Nalla Thampy Thera v. Abdulla [ 2002 (2) KLT 158 ] the contention raised before the Division Bench, relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in Modern Hotel, Gudur v. K. Radhakrishnaiah [ AIR 1989 SC 1510 ] and K. Narasimha Rao v. T.M. Nasimuddin Ahmed [ AIR 1996 SC 1214 ] was that the landlord was not justified in not adjusting the advance amount towards rent arrears. As per the proviso to Section 8(1)(a) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act the tenant is liable to pay only one month’s rent, by way of advance. Therefore, the balance is liable to be adjusted towards rent arrears. The Division Bench noticed that, in Issac Ninan v. State of Kerala [ 1995 (2) KLT 848 ] the Court has struck down Sections 5, 6 and 8 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act in its entirety. Since Section 8 of the Act is not in the Statute book, it would be open to the tenant and landlord to enter into an agreement with regard to the payment of advance. The Division Bench found that, reliance placed on the above mentioned decisions of the Apex Court is misplaced. Since Section 8 of the Act is not in the Statute book, it would be open to the tenant and landlord to enter into an agreement with regard to the payment of advance. The Division Bench found that, reliance placed on the above mentioned decisions of the Apex Court is misplaced. Those are all cases where there is specific provision in the Andhra Pradesh as well as Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, which obliges the landlord to keep only one months rent as advance, just like Section 8 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. However, as far as Kerala Rent Control Act is concerned, Section 8 has already been struck down. 20. In Santhosh K. Thomas v. Usha Suresh [ 2013 (1) KLT 767 ], before the Division Bench of this Court, relying on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Pathumma Beevi v. Lonappan [ 1985 KLT 705 ], the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant argued that the landlord is bound to adjust the security amount towards the arrears of rent and when there is a deposit of security amount, tenant cannot be directed to deposit arrears of rent, before adjusting the security amount, under Section 12 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The tenant also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in G. Reghunathan v. K.V. Varghese [ (2005) 7 SCC 317 ]. In the said decision, relying on Section 8(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the Apex Court held that no landlord is entitled to receive as advance any amount in excess of one month's rent and if he has accepted or received any amount in excess of one month's rent, it is liable to be repaid to the tenant forthwith. The Division Bench held that, when Section 8(1) of the Act is not in Statute book, as Section 8 was declared ultra vires by the Division Bench of this Court in Issac Ninan v. State of Kerala [ 1995 (2) KLT 848 ], based on Section 8(1) of the Act the tenant cannot contend that the landlords are not entitled to retain the security amount in excess of one month's rent and therefore, he is not liable to deposit the arrears of rent as found by Rent Control Court. Though in Edger Ferus v. Abraham Ittycheria [ 2004 (1) KLT 767 ] Section 5(1) out of Section 5, Section 6 and Section 8 which were declared ultra vires in Issac Ninan was severed and retained in the Statute, the declaration in Issac Ninan that Section 8 of the Act is ultra vires is still subsisting. Another Division Bench in Nalla Thampy Thera v. Abdulla [ 2002 (2) KLT 158 ] considered the said question and held that Section 8 is not in the Statute book and based on Section 8(1) a tenant is not entitled to contend that the landlord is not entitled to retain the advance in excess one month's rent. In such circumstances, the Division Bench repelled the case of the tenant that the Rent Control Court was not justified in passing an order under Section 12(1) of the Act, when there is deposit of Rs.2,00,000/- as security. 21. Section 8 of the Act has already been declared ultra vires by the Division Bench of this Court in Issac Ninan v. State of Kerala [ 1995 (2) KLT 848 ]. When Section 8(1) of the Act is not in Statute book, as it was declared ultra vires, a tenant is not entitled to contend that the landlord is not entitled to retain the advance in excess of one month's rent. Therefore, the contention of the tenant that, the security amount deposited by him, which is still with the landlord, has to be adjusted towards admitted arrears of rent payable under Section 12(1) of the Act, and as such, he is not liable to deposit the admitted arrears of rent as per Ext.P4 order of the Rent Control Court, is untenable. 22. In the above circumstances, the Rent Control Court cannot be found fault with in issuing Ext.P4 order dated 01.04.2022 in I.A.No.1 of 2020 in R.C.P.No.2 of 2020, under Section 12(1) of the Act. 23. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. 23. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Clause (2) of Article 227 provides that, without prejudice to the generality of the provisions under clause (1), the High Court may call for returns from such courts; make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts. Going by clause (4), nothing in Article 227 shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. 24. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. 25. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [ (2010) 9 SCC 385 ], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasijudicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognised constraints. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. 26. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [ (2015) 12 SCC 39 ] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 27. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [ 2016 (1) KHC 1 ] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law. 28. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 29. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to above, conclusion is irresistible. Ext.P4 order warrants no interference, in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the result, this original petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.