JUDGMENT : 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 18.1.2021 passed by the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department in Fragmentation Case No. CON/VDD/74/2019 and order dated 5.10.2019 passed by the Assistant Collector, Vadodara (Rural) in Fragmentation Case No.15 of 2019. 2. With the consent of learned advocates for the parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing. Hence, Rule. Learned advocate Mr. U.M.Shastri and learned AGP, Mr. Nikunj Kanara waive rule on behalf of respective respondents. 3. Brief facts of the petition are that the land bearing Survey/Block No.288/3 admeasuring 0-18-21 H-Ra-Sq.Mtrs. of Village Nandesri, Taluka & District Vadodara was originally belonged to the forefathers of respondent No.3.1 i.e. Jagdishbhai Salambhai and others, who inherited the land and who were in possession of the land from their forefathers. 3.1 In the year 2009 by way of a registered sale deed dated 17.11.2009 said Jagdishbhai Salambhai and others transferred the aforesaid land in favour of one Harendrasinh Chadrasinh Kher and Jagdishbhai Punjabhai Chauhan (respondent Nos.4 and 5). Pursuant to the aforesaid sale deed, a revenue entry No.2346 was also mutated in the revenue record on 3.1.2012. 3.2 The petitioner purchased the land in question vide registered sale deed dated 1.11.2013 from respondent Nos.4 and 5 and accordingly mutation entry No.2456 was mutated on 2.11.2013. 3.3 After about 6 years after the land was purchased and revenue entry was mutated in favour of the petitioner, in the year 2019 the Assistant Collector, Vadodara by registering Fragmentation Case No.15 of 2019 took the aforesaid two sale transactions of the year 2013 and 2019 into suo motu revision as according to the Assistant Collector, Vadodara, both the aforesaid transactions were in breach of Sections 7(1) and 8 of the Gujarat Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (for short, ‘Fragmentation Act’) and the lands were transferred to the persons other than owners of contiguous land. 3.4 Pursuant to the show cause notice dated 31.8.2019 the proceedings before the Assistant Collector, Vadodara (Rural) took place and ultimately vide order dated 18.1.2019 passed in the Fragmentation Case No.15 of 2019, the Assistant Collector, Vadodara declared the sale transaction illegal and void under Section 9(1) of the Act and further passed an order of summary eviction of the petitioner and also imposed penalty as per Sections 9(2) and 9(3) of the Fragmentation Act. 3.5 The petitioner carried the matter further by preferring revision application as per Section 35 of the Act, which was registered as Revision Application No. CON/VDD/74/2019. However, ultimately after hearing the parties even the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department also vide order dated 18.1.2021 rejected the revision application preferred by the petitioner and confirmed the order dated 5.10.2019 passed by the Assistant Collector, Vadodara (Rural). 3.6 Hence, being aggrieved by and feeling dissatisfied with the aforesaid orders dated 5.10.2019 and 18.1.2021 passed by the Assistant Collector, Vadodara (Rural) and Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department, present petition is filed by the petitioner. 4. Mr. Trilok Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the very initiation of the proceedings under the provisions of the Fragmentation Act was without jurisdiction, as for a sale transaction, which has taken place in the year 2013 after a delay of 6 years, in the year 2019 a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner. He further submitted that reasonable period could not be more than 3 years, and therefore, since the proceedings were initiated after an unreasonable delay, the entire proceedings can be termed as without jurisdiction and hence the entire proceedings are vitiated and impugned are required to be quashed and set aside. 4.1 Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner also drew the attention of this Court to the fact that Fragmentation Act was amended in the year 2012, whereas the land was purchased after amendment in the year 2013, and therefore, the petitioner's case would not fall under the un-amended Act and as per the amended Act, action of the petitioner of purchasing the land would not amount to breach of provisions of Fragmentation Act. 4.2 Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner, submitted that in the instant case the authorities below have lost sight towards the most important legal aspect of case regarding the amendment made in the Fragmentation Act in the year 2012. It is submitted that even before the initiation of the proceedings under the Fragmentation Act in the year 2019, the Section 7 of the Fragmentation Act was substituted by the Gujarat Act No.14 of 2012. Section 7 reads as under: “3. It is submitted that even before the initiation of the proceedings under the Fragmentation Act in the year 2019, the Section 7 of the Fragmentation Act was substituted by the Gujarat Act No.14 of 2012. Section 7 reads as under: “3. Amendment of Section 7 of Bom.LXII of 1947:- in the principle Act in Sec.7, - [i] for sub-sec.(1) except the proviso, the following sub-section and the proviso shall be substituted, namely:- “[1] Any Fragment in respect of which a notice has been given, under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 6 may be transferred to any agriculturist as defined in the relevant Tenancy Law: Provided that if such fragment is transferred to the owner of a contiguous survey number or recognized sub-division of a survey number. Then such fragment shall be consolidated:” [ii] in the existing proviso to sub-sec. (1) for the words “provided that”, the words “Provided further that” shall be substituted. Prior to substitution, the sub-section (1) of Section 7 was as under:- “[1] No person shall transfer any fragment in respect of which a notice has been given under sub-section (2) of section 6 except to the owner of a contiguous survey number or recognized subdivision of survey number. It means that provisions contained in old sub section (1) of Section 7 regarding the transfer of any fragment except to the owner of a contiguous survey number or recognized sub-division of survey number is taken away or does not remain in force since the amendment/substitution made in subsection (1) of Section 7 of the Act vide Amending Act 14 of 2012. Therefore no proceedings or any kind of inquiry can be initiated and/or to be continued in view of the aforesaid amendment made in the Fragmentation Act. 4.3 Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner submits that there is no machinery available for the State Government and/or the State Government has no jurisdiction or a power to take any action in view of the aforesaid amendment. Therefore, by taking note of the aforesaid subsequent development/amendment made in the Act, learned advocate for the petitioner prayed to quash and set aside the impugned orders passed by the authorities below. 4.4 After making the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner relied upon the judgment dated 29.7.2015 rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.798 of 2011. 4.4 After making the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner relied upon the judgment dated 29.7.2015 rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.798 of 2011. Learned advocate for the petitioner also relied upon latest judgment dated 9.3.2022 rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.2436 of 2017, wherein it is held that the reasonable time which can be construed as reasonable period would be 3 years. It is further submitted that the authorities below have exercised powers beyond reasonable period coupled with the fact that in view of the amendment of the Act if land was purchased by owner of contiguous land it would be construed that there was no breach of Fragmentation Act, but in view of the amended act any agriculturalist can purchase fragment of land and yet it would not be construed as breach of provision of Fragmentation Act. 5. Mr. U.M.Shastri, learned advocate for the private respondents submits upon instructions that since they have parted with the land and by accepting the consideration of land in question they do not have any objection if the petition is allowed. 6. Mr. Nikunj Kanara, learned AGP, submitted that as and when the authority came to know about the fact that the petitioner has purchased only a fraction of land notice was issued and, therefore, limitation would start from the date of knowledge and not from the date of execution of sale deed. However, Mr. Kanara could not point out as to why show cause notice was issued in respect of un-amended Act though the act was amended on the date of the sale transaction of the year 2013 took place. Mr. Kanara, learned AGP also could not dispute the status of the petitioner as an agriculturist. 6.1 Mr. Kanara, learned AGP further submitted that the petitioner never remained present before the Assistant Collector and made any submissions before him, which would show that the petitioner was negligent and was never careful about the rights of the petitioner. If the petitioner has chosen to remain absent before the Assistant Collector, the order passed by the Assistant Collector on the basis of the material before him cannot be said to be an illegal order. 7. In rejoinder, Mr. If the petitioner has chosen to remain absent before the Assistant Collector, the order passed by the Assistant Collector on the basis of the material before him cannot be said to be an illegal order. 7. In rejoinder, Mr. Patel, learned advocate fro the petitioner, submitted that the the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner in August, 2019, whereas the impugned order was passed on 5.10.2019, which would indicate that the entire proceedings were over within a period of a month. Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner, submitted that it was the duty of the Assistant Collector to give sufficient time to the petitioner or to defer the hearing at least for sufficient time to ensure that the petitioner may appear before him and put forth his version. Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner, submitted that even thereafter the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department has also not considered the contentions raised by the petitioner and has in fact confirmed the order passed by the Assistant Collector without taking into consideration the fact that the date on which the petitioner purchased the land in question, the Act was already amended and the petitioner enjoys the status of agriculturist, and therefore, the petitioner would be out of purview of Section 7 of the Fragmentation Act as amended in the year 2012. 8. Considering the arguments advanced by Mr. Trilok Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner, Mr. U.M.Shastri, learned advocate for the private respondents and Mr. Nikunj Kanara, learned AGP and on perusal of the material available on record this Court has found that the petitioner has purchased the land in question on 1.11.2013, whereas the Act was amended in the year 2012 by way of amended Act Section 7(1) was amended and as per the amended Section 7(1), if a person is an agriculturist and he purchases the fragment in that case that would not be considered to be breach of provisions of the Fragmentation Act. Earlier, as per un-amended Act a person, who holds contagious land and purchases a fragment in that case only he would be out of purview of Fragmentation Act. Further, it is not the case of the respondent – State that the petitioner is not the agriculturist. By way of the amendment the requirement of holding the contagious land has been done away. Further, it is not the case of the respondent – State that the petitioner is not the agriculturist. By way of the amendment the requirement of holding the contagious land has been done away. That being the settled legal position, as the amendment does not require an agriculturist to be the owner of the contiguous land and as the petitioner's case fall under that category, the case of the petitioner would be covered by amended Act and not by the pre-amended Act. However, the authority while issuing show cause notice and initiating the proceedings has lost sight of that fact, and therefore, the entire proceedings can be said to be erroneous. 8.1 The Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.798 of 2011 in paras 8 to 10 observed as under: “8. On the first aspect, for reasonable period, we may refer to some of the decisions, though of course there are number of such decisions. The first judgment on the principle delay in exercise of power came to be considered in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Patel Raghav Natha reported at (1969) 2 SCC 187 , wherein it was held that if the revisional authority was inclined to exercise the power under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, it ought to have been satisfied that such power has been invoked within reasonable time, otherwise the bar of delay would operate. Thereafter, there are number of decisions on the said point but, we may usefully refer to the recent decision of this Court in the case of Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya & Ors. v. State of Gujarat reported at 2013(2) GLR 1788 , wherein, this Court while considering the question of delay in initiation of action under section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, in a case where delay was about 5 years, observed at paragraph 13 as under: “13. In our opinion, it is well settled that even though void transaction if is allowed to remain effective for considerable long period, the authority named therein will be precluded from initiating proceedings to annul it. It can remain effective and in existence till it is invalidated and set aside. In our opinion, it is well settled that even though void transaction if is allowed to remain effective for considerable long period, the authority named therein will be precluded from initiating proceedings to annul it. It can remain effective and in existence till it is invalidated and set aside. If its existence is allowed for a considerable period and by a passage creating valuable rights in favour of a considerable section of people, like the appellants in the present case, it is difficult to accept the proposition that despite the change the competent authority under the Act would be entitled to exercise powers under Section 84(C) of the Act at any point of time.” Further, this Court in the said decision elaborately considered the question of delay and the reasonable period at paragraph 16, which reads as under: “16. In the case of Employees State Insurance Corporation v. C.C. Santhakumar reported in 2007(1) SCC 584 , the Supreme Court has elaborately explained this principle of action to be taken within a reasonable period of time. It would be appropriate for us to quote paragraph Nos.35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40. “35. A "reasonable period" would depend upon the factual circumstances of the case concerned. There cannot be any empirical formula to determine that question. The court/authority considering the question whether the period is reasonable or not has to take into account the surrounding circumstances and relevant factors to decide that question. 36. In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha ( 1969 (2) SCC 187 ) it was observed that when even no period of limitation was prescribed, the power is to be exercised within a reasonable time and the limit of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which was sought to be varied. This aspect does not appear to have been specifically kept in view by the Division Bench. Additionally, the points relating to applicability of the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977, and even if it is held that the Act was applicable, the reasonableness of the time during which action should have been initiated were also not considered. It would be hard to give an exact definition of the word "reasonable". Additionally, the points relating to applicability of the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977, and even if it is held that the Act was applicable, the reasonableness of the time during which action should have been initiated were also not considered. It would be hard to give an exact definition of the word "reasonable". Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic stands now like the jingling of a child's toy. But mankind must be satisfied with the reasonableness within reach; and in cases not covered by authority, the decision of the Judge usually determines what is "reasonable" in each particular case; but frequently reasonableness "belongs to the knowledge of the law, and therefore to be decided by the courts". It was illuminatingly stated by a learned author that an attempt to give a specific meaning to the word "reasonable" is trying to count what is not a number and measure what is not space. It means prima facie in law reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. (See: Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar ( 1987 (4) SCC 497 ) and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. ( 1989 (1) SCC 532 ). As observed by Lord Romilly, M.R. in Labouchere v. Dawson (41 LJ Ch 472) it is impossible a priori to state what is reasonable as such in all cases. You must have the particular facts of each case established before you can ascertain what is reasonable under the circumstances. Reasonable, being a relative term is essentially what is rational according to the dictates of reason and not excessive or immoderate on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 37. These aspects were highlighted in Collector and Others v. P.Mangamma and Others ( 2003 (4) SCC 488 ). 38. Reasonable, being a relative term is essentially what is rational according to the dictates of reason and not excessive or immoderate on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 37. These aspects were highlighted in Collector and Others v. P.Mangamma and Others ( 2003 (4) SCC 488 ). 38. As observed in Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal ( 2002 (1) SCC 134 ), it is "looking at all the circumstances of the case; a "reasonable time" under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than 'directly'; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea". 39. According to Advanced law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar 3rd Edition, 2005 reasonable time means as follows: "That is a reasonable time that preserves to each party the rights and advantages he possesses and protects each party from losses that he ought not to suffer. "Reasonable Time" is defined to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. If it is proper to attempt any definition of the words "reasonable time", as applied to completion of a contract, the distinction given by Chief Baron Pollock may be suggested, namely, that a "reasonable time" means as soon as circumstances will permit. In determining what is a reasonable time or an unreasonable time, regard is to be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage or trade or business, if any, with respect to such instrument, and the fact of the particular case. The reasonable time which a passenger is entitled to alighting from a train is such time as is usually required by passengers in getting off and on the train in safety at the particular station in question. The reasonable time which a passenger is entitled to alighting from a train is such time as is usually required by passengers in getting off and on the train in safety at the particular station in question. A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than "directly" such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea. Reasonable time always depends on the circumstances of the case. (Kinney) It is unreasonable for a person who has borrowed ornaments for use in a ceremony to detain them after the ceremony has been completed and the owner has demanded their return. (AIR 1930 Oudh 395). The expression "reasonable time" means so much time as is necessary under the circumstances to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case". [See: Joseph Severance v. Benny Mathew ( 2005(7) SCC 667 )] 40. In all these cases at hand the factual aspects have not been examined, because the grievance appears to have been focused on the applicability of Section 77 (1A) (b).” Further, at para 19, it was observed as thus “19. It must be fairly said that if the statute does not prescribe time limit for exercise of revisional powers, it does not mean that such powers can be exercised at any point of time even if there is a breach of Section 43 of the Act, which is a provision which relates to a new tenure land, rather it should be exercised within a reasonable period of time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. It is clear from various judgments of the Supreme Court that where a statutory provision for exercise of any suo motu powers of revision does not prescribe any limitation, the powers must be exercised within a reasonable period of time even in the case of transaction which would be termed as void transaction.” 9. It is clear from various judgments of the Supreme Court that where a statutory provision for exercise of any suo motu powers of revision does not prescribe any limitation, the powers must be exercised within a reasonable period of time even in the case of transaction which would be termed as void transaction.” 9. We may also record that in the another decision of this Court in the case of Bhanji Devshibhai Luhar Vs State of Gujarat reported at 2011(2) GLR 1676 , the question arose for consideration of the initiation of the action after 17 years under the Ordinance itself wherein the provisions of section 54 and 75 of the Ordinance were referred to in the show-cause notice and the action was initiated. This Court at paragraphs 19 to 23, observed thus – “19. In this background, it deserves to be considered that when the respondent’s action of scrutinizing the transaction in question after delay of 17 years is under consideration and when it is apparent that if the respondent’s action and decision are allowed to prevail and are not interfered with, the purchaser (i.e. the appellant), as a consequence of the said decision, will be deprived of the land purchased by him before 17 years (by now almost 30 years) then in such facts, circumstances the aforesaid aspects i.e. the fact that the appellant has put the land in question for agricultural use only and has not used the land for any purpose other than agricultural use and has not changed its status and has even incurred expenditure to improve the quality of soil, would become relevant and would deserve due consideration. 20. Even if the concept that the void action cannot be validated on the ground of belated action is applied in present case, then also, in view of the special facts and circumstances of present case it would be appropriate to take into account the peculiar facts of present case which emerge from the record viz: (a) during the entire period of 17 years the vendor has not taken out any action in law against the transaction and any suit or proceeding for declaration or for any other relief does not appear to have been filed by the vendor. (b) the petitioner was an agricultural labourer at the time when the transaction was executed and was tiling and cultivating various agricultural lands. (b) the petitioner was an agricultural labourer at the time when the transaction was executed and was tiling and cultivating various agricultural lands. (c) The petitioner was also artisan i.e. engaged in the activity of preparing agritools. (d) more important is the fact that even after purchasing the land in question the petitioner has, as claimed by him, continued to use the land for agricultural purpose and the status or nature of the land in question as agricultural land is not changed and it continues to be agricultural land (said factual assertion by the petitioner has not been disputed by the respondents and any contrary evidence is not placed on record) (e) the petitioner has also claimed that he has incurred substantial expenditure in improving quality of soil. (f) another important factor which, in the facts of present case, has emerged is that in view of the orders of the authorities it is only the vendor who will stand to gain/benefit since the land, even after the orders, will not vest in the government in absence of any provision providing for such consequential. 21. In light of aforesaid facts of present case, we are of the view that while the conclusion and the decision of the competent and appellate authority holding the transaction in question as void, is in consonance with the provisions of the ordinance and cannot be faulted, in the interest of justice and equity it also ought not be overlooked that the impugned action in exercise of the power under Section 75 of the Ordinance to summarily evict the petitioner, after having allowed the transaction to remain alive for 17 years not only ignores the wide chasm between the date of transaction and the dates of the notice and the order but it also overlooks the fact that the petitioner has continued to put the land to use for agricultural purpose and has not changed the status and nature of the land and that he has also incurred expenditure to improve the quality of soil and invested further amounts for betterment of the land in question. The figures of such expenditure by the petitioner are not available on record, however the respondents have not disputed the said factual assertion by the petitioner. 22. The figures of such expenditure by the petitioner are not available on record, however the respondents have not disputed the said factual assertion by the petitioner. 22. In backdrop of the aforesaid facts and circumstances if we recall the observations by the larger bench in the case of Shailesh J. Varia (supra)to the effect that: “if delay of few months cannot be explained it would be beyond reasonable period. If a delay of years can be explained and justified it would be “within reasonable period” (emphasis supplied) and when we consider present case in light of said observations, then we have to record that from the material on file the respondents do not appear to have, in any manner, explained and justified the long gap of 17 years in initiating the action. The said delay of 17 years has remained unexplained and unjustified. It is only defended on the ground that the transaction is statutorily void. However, while defending the action the aforesaid relevant aspects and the absence of explanation regarding delay are not being taken into account. 22.1 In this context, we may refer to the decision by the Apex Court in the case between Smt. Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport and ors ( AIR 2010 SC 2962 ) wherein, while considering the legal position with regard to Section 34 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 observed in paragraph 23 that: “23. The legislature in its wisdom did not fix a time limit for exercising the revisional power nor inserted the words "at any time" in Section 34 of the Act, 1976. It does not mean that the legislature intended to leave the orders passed under the Act open to variation for an indefinite period inasmuch as it would have the effect of rendering title of the holders/allottee(s) permanently precarious and in a state of perpetual uncertainty. In case, it is assumed that the legislature has conferred an everlasting and interminable power in point of time, the title over the declared surplus land, in the hands of the State/allottee, would forever remain virtually insecure. The Court has to construe the statutory provision in a way which makes the provisions workable, advancing the purpose and object of enactment of the statute. The Court has to construe the statutory provision in a way which makes the provisions workable, advancing the purpose and object of enactment of the statute. In view of the above, we reach the inescapable conclusion that the Revisional powers cannot be used arbitrarily at belated stage for the reason that the order passed in Revision under Section 34 of the Act, 1976, is a judicial order. What should be reasonable time, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” (emphasis supplied) 22.2 We may also refer to a recent decision in the case between Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia vs. Bombay Environmental Action Group (2011 {3} SCC 363), the Apex Court, has, with regard to void order, observed in paragraph No.16 that: “16. It is a settled legal proposition that even if an order is void, it requires to be so declared by a competent forum and it is not permissible for any person to ignore the same merely because in his opinion the order is void. In Sate of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth Naduvil, Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd., M. Meenakshi v. Metadin Agarwal and Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup, this Court held that whether an order is valid or void, cannot be determined by the parties. For setting aside such an order, even if void, the party has to approach the appropriate forum. While referring to the earlier decisions in the case State of Punjab (supra) as well as in the case of Sultan Sadik v. Sanjay Raj Sabba (2004 [2] SCC 377) the Apex Court has observed: “19.Thus, from the above it emerges that even if the order/notification is void/voidable, the party aggrieved by the same cannot decide that the said order/notification is not binding upon it. It has to approach the court for seeking such declaration. The order may be hypothetically a nullity and even if its invalidity is challenged before the court in a given circumstance, the court may refuse to quash the same on various grounds including the standing of the petitioner or on the ground of delay or on the doctrine waiver or any other legal reason. The order may be void for one purpose or for one person, it may not be so for another purpose or another person”. 23. The order may be void for one purpose or for one person, it may not be so for another purpose or another person”. 23. Under the circumstances, upon considering the overall facts and circumstances of the present case and in light of the foregoing discussion and having regard to the fact that at the time of transaction the petitioner was agricultural labourer and he purchased the land for agriculture use and since then he has maintained the status of the land and continues to put the land to agricultural use, the decision to compulsorily evict the petitioner after lapse of 17 years (by now almost 30 years) deserves to be set aside. 23.1 One of the reasons for our aforesaid view and conclusion is that the only person who would benefit because of the orders of the lower authorities is the vendor who is party to the disputed transaction. The consequence of the impugned order by the authorities would, ultimately and eventually result into unjust enrichment for the vendor who entered into the transaction and has, since then not taken out any action in law before any competent Court against the transaction. 23.2 Therefore, in view of the facts of the present case, and having regard to the aspects noted in paras 20 to 23.1 above, we are inclined to set aside the impugned orders passed by the lower authorities. We order accordingly.” 10. In our view, the above referred well considered two decisions of this Court makes the position abundantly clear that if the action is to be initiated for setting aside of a transaction under the Ordinance by invoking section 54 read with section 75 of the Ordinance, it has to be within reasonable period. The above referred two decisions are in respect of the cases wherein the powers were exercised and proceedings were initiated after 5 years and 17 years respectively, whereas in the present case, it is after more than 35 years. Hence, we find that the initiation of the action itself can be said as beyond reasonable period and the bar of delay and laches could operate against the authority in initiation of the action. Hence, we find that the initiation of the action itself can be said as beyond reasonable period and the bar of delay and laches could operate against the authority in initiation of the action. The aforesaid aspect is coupled with two additional circumstances, one is that the land has changed hands further during the period of delay and the ownership is transferred by the purchaser to the another person and the second is that the revenue entries were mutated. Thereafter, they were also certified by the competent authority and in spite of that, no action was taken for cancellation of such entry or otherwise or even for declaration of the transaction as invalid within reasonable period. If during the period of delay, the rights of the parties in the properties are altered, the delay would operate as a bar with more gravity and when the ownership is changed during the period of delay, the bar for not taking action within reasonable period would also operate with more gravity against the authority in initiation of the action.” 8.2 Similarly, Division Bench of this Court while deciding Letters Patent Appeal No.2436 of 2017 vide judgment dated 9.3.2022 in para 6 observed as under: “6. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and on perusal of records, we notice that initially the proceeding was initiated against the present applicants under Section 26(2) of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 way back on 2011. On notice being issued, petitioners had submitted the reply and after considering the said reply, the Mamlatdar and ALT by order dated 21.04.2012 withdrew the notice issued to the petitioners. In other words, he was satisfied that lands held by the petitioners was not in excess of ceiling limit so fixed under the Act. This order was sought to be reviewed by the Deputy Collector and in exercise of the suo motu power of revision vested had called for the records from the office of the Mamlatdar and ALT and on perusal of records arrived at a conclusion by order dated 08.05.2012 to the effect that order passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT was in consonance with the records and lands held by the petitioners was not in excess of the ceiling. In other words, order dated 21.04.2012 passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT came to be affirmed. In other words, order dated 21.04.2012 passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT came to be affirmed. Undisputedly, the orders dated 21.04.2012 and 08.05.2012 attained finality. If at all, the State was aggrieved by said orders, it was fully within its jurisdiction to challenge the same by filing a revision petition before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal as provided under Section 38 of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960. In fact, the limitation to file such revision has also been prescribed as sixty (60) days under Section 39 subject to just exceptions prescribed under Sections 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Be that as it may. The aforesaid course of action was not undertaken by the authorities, yet they sought to re-agitate the matter by issuing afresh notice for exercising suo motu powers which had already been exercised and got exhausted. Even otherwise, the suo motu powers which is the repository of powers vested with the authorities has to be necessarily exercised within a reasonable time, as what would be reasonable time, all depends upon the facts and circumstances obtained in each case. There cannot be any straight-jacket formula which can prescribe as to what would be the reasonable time. However, the reasonable time which can be construed as “reasonable” would be three (3) years. Any power exercised beyond the reasonable period would have to be justified as otherwise it cannot be held or construed that the authorities have acted in a fair and reasonable manner.” 8.3 In the instant case also, the proceedings are initiated after a period of almost 6 years, whereas the reasonable period can be said to be 3 years, as held by the Division Bench of this court in the above judgments. Therefore, the impugned orders are without jurisdiction on the ground of delay in initiating the proceedings as well as on the ground that the case of the petitioner would be covered by the amended Section 7(1) of the Act and not under pre-amended (original) Section 7(1) of the Act and yet the show cause notice was given to the petitioner and the entire proceedings against the petitioner took place without taking into consideration the provisions of amended Section 7(1) of the Act by not considering the fact that the petitioner is an agriculturist and hence both the impugned orders are bad on that count as well. 9. 9. In view of the above settled legal position of law, the petition is allowed and order dated 18.1.2021 passed by the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department in Fragmentation Case No. CON/VDD/74/2019 and order dated 5.10.2019 passed by the Assistant Collector, Vadodara (Rural) in Fragmentation Case No.15 of 2019 are hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. However, there shall be no order as to costs.