JUDGMENT : J.J. Munir, J. This revision is directed against the judgment and decree of Mr. Arun Chandra Srivasava, Additional District Judge, Court No. 6, Agra dismissing S.C.C. Suit No. 21 of 2005 for eviction, recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits. 2. According to the revisionist, the plaintiff in S.C.C. Suit No. 21 of 2005, he is the owner in possession of property bearing Premises No. 1/2008, Professors' Colony, Civil Lines, Agra. The defendant, who is the respondent to this revision, according to the plaintiff-revisionist (for short, 'the plaintiff'), proposed to the plaintiff that if the latter were to construct a shop on the corner of his lawn, which was part of his premises No. 1/208, Professors Colony, Civil Lines, Agra, the defendant would take the shop on rent in the sum of Rs. 10,000/- per mensem. The plaintiff got a shop constructed on the south-western corner of his lawn between the months of July to August, 2003 and let it out to the defendant-respondent (for short, 'the defendant'). The defendant entered the tenanted shop, accepting it on a rent of Rs. 10,000/- per month. The tenancy commenced on 28.8.2003. The defendant paid to the plaintiff rent for the period 28.8.2003 to 27.9.2003 and 28.9.2003 to 27.10.2003 at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per month. The plaintiff issued receipts to the defendant for the rent paid by the latter. Next, the defendant paid the plaintiff the accumulated rent for the period 28.10.2003 to 27.12.2003, that is to say, for a period of two months in the sum of Rs.20,000/-. Thereafter, the defendant did not pay any rent to the plaintiff. The plaintiff got a notice dated 24.5.2005 served upon the defendant, which was dispatched by registered post on 17.6.2005. Despite service of the notice, the defendant did not pay the rent due. 3. The notice aforesaid determined the defendant's tenancy, asking him to quit on the expiry of thirty days from the receipt of notice, but he did not vacate. According to the plaintiff, the shop is a new construction that was raised in the months of July and August, 2003 and the contracted rent is Rs. 10,000/- per month. As such, the provisions of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (for short 'the Act') do not govern the tenancy. 10,000/- per month. As such, the provisions of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (for short 'the Act') do not govern the tenancy. The defendant is a troublesome character and whenever the plaintiff would demand the due rent, the former would get annoyed and lay false complaints to the Police. It was in the said background that the plaintiff was compelled to terminate the defendant's tenancy, as already indicated, vide notice dated 24.5.2005. It is asserted that the notice that was sent by registered post on 17.6.2005 was delivered to the defendant personally on 18.6.2005. 4. In answer to the suit, the defendant filed his written statement, saying that he is a tenant in the shop that bears the humble dimensions of 7' x 8'. The said shop is part of Municipal Premises No. 1/108, Professors' Colony, Civil Lines, Hariparvat Ward, Agra. The defendant, however, asserted that he is a tenant in the demised shop at a monthly rent of Rs. 1000/-. The demised shop was a garage in the past. He does not hold the shop on a rent of Rs. 10,000/- per month. It has been denied by him that he ever approached the plaintiff to get a shop constructed in a part of his lawn, which he later on took on a rent of Rs. 10,000/- per month. The defendant also denied the fact that the demised shop stands on the south-western corner of the plaintiff's lawn or that it was constructed in the months of July and August 2003. The defendant denied the plaintiff's case that the tenancy commenced on 28.8.2003 at a contracted rent of Rs. 10,000/-. To the contrary, the plaintiff let out the demised shop to the defendant on 1st May, 2002 on a rent of Rs. 1,000/- per month and charged from the defendant, by way security, a sum of Rs. 1,45,000/-. The security was paid by the defendant on the plaintiff's assurance that whenever the defendant would vacate the shop, his security money would be refunded. It has been denied that any rent receipt was ever issued by the plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant remitted rent to the plaintiff for the months of May and June, 2005 in the sum of Rs. 2000/- through money orders, which the plaintiff refused on 29.6.2005. It has been denied that any rent receipt was ever issued by the plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant remitted rent to the plaintiff for the months of May and June, 2005 in the sum of Rs. 2000/- through money orders, which the plaintiff refused on 29.6.2005. He then refused to accept the said rent by hand. 5. Thereupon, the defendant applied to deposit the due rent in Court under Section 30(1) of the Act. The defendant's application made for the purpose to the Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Agra was registered as Misc. Case No. 81 of 2005. In the said case, the defendant has been regularly depositing the rent well within the plaintiff's knowledge. The plaintiff has appeared in the case under Section 30(1) of the Act also. The fact that the defendant has paid rent from 28.8.2003 to 27.9.2003 and then from 28.9.2003 to 27.10.2003 in the sum of Rs. 10,000/- per month has been denied. The fact that the defendant had not paid any rent to the plaintiff after 28.12.2003 has also been denied. According to the defendant, the notice dated 24.5.2005 was received by him on 17.6.2005 and it is not true that thereafter, he has not remitted any rent to the plaintiff. The notice dated 24.5.2005 was responded to on behalf of the defendant by his Counsel Mr. Mahesh Chandra Galav by addressing a reply to the plaintiff's Counsel, Mr. H.B. Bansal. The reply was sent to the plaintiff's Counsel by registered post. 6. It has been denied for a fact that the demised shop was constructed in the month of July and August, 2003 or that the rate of rent was Rs. 10,000/- per month. The plaintiff's case that the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the demised shop was denied, and protection of his tenancy under the Act was also claimed by the defendant. Notice to quit has been assailed as invalid. It was pleaded that the defendant was not in arrears of four months of rent so as to make the default actionable under Section 20(2)(a) of the Act. The demised shop is an old construction much ante-dating the month of April, 1985 and, therefore, the Act is applicable to it. It has been denied for a fact that a sum of Rs. The demised shop is an old construction much ante-dating the month of April, 1985 and, therefore, the Act is applicable to it. It has been denied for a fact that a sum of Rs. 1,96,667/- towards arrears of rent is due to the plaintiff or there are any dues from the date of termination of the tenancy until institution of the suit on account of mesne profits. The claim in the suit is one that is designed to bear pressure upon the defendant in order to enhance the rent to Rs. 4,000/- per month, or else vacate the demised shop. 7. There is a long list of documentary evidence, the summary of which is set out in the Trial Court's judgment led on behalf of the plaintiff. It includes a carbon copy of the notice, the demolition order from the Agra Development Authority, photographs of the demised shop, bank account statements, income tax returns, the plaintiff's sale-deed in original dated 28.10.1978 relating to premises No. 1/208, Civil Lines, Agra, etc. The entire summary of evidence need not be recapitulated for the sake of brevity. Documents as are relevant would be referred to during course of the judgment. The plaintiff, by way of oral testimony testified on his own behalf as PW-1 and examined as PW-2, Adil Aziz. Both these witnesses, in lieu of their examination-in-chief in the dock, filed affidavits. Both the witnesses were cross-examined on the basis of their testimony in the affidavits. A further witness-PW-3, Deepak Kashyap, a handwriting expert, was examined, who filed his affidavit in lieu of his examination-in-chief in the dock, but before his cross-examination could be concluded, he passed away. Another witness, who testified on behalf of the plaintiff, is one Ram Autar Saxena. He filed his affidavit in lieu of his examination-in-chief in the witness-box, but did not turn up to face cross-examination. 8. The defendant also filed a host of documents, that include tenders of rent deposited in Court, house tax assessment for the years 1975-81, money order receipts, besides photographs and negatives. He filed a copy of the plaint giving rise to Suit No. 85 of 2004, together with the plaintiff's affidavit filed in support of the said plaint. The entire summary of the documents need not be recapitulated, as that finds eloquent mention in the Trial Court's judgment. He filed a copy of the plaint giving rise to Suit No. 85 of 2004, together with the plaintiff's affidavit filed in support of the said plaint. The entire summary of the documents need not be recapitulated, as that finds eloquent mention in the Trial Court's judgment. The relevant documentary evidence would, however, be referred to during course of this judgment. In support, the defendant examined himself as DW-1 and in lieu of his examination-in-chief in the witness-box, filed an affidavit. He further examined DW-2 Raj Kumar Shrotriye, a handwriting expert, who, in lieu of his testimony in the witness-box, submitted an affidavit. Both the witnesses were cross-examined with reference to their affidavits. 9. The Trial Court framed the following points for determination (translated into English from Hindi): (1) Whether there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant and the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are applicable to the property in question? (2) Whether the defendant is a tenant in the shop in question at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per month? (3) Whether the defendant has committed default in the payment of rent? (4) Relief. 10. It must be remarked that the Trial Court proceeded on the basis of points of determination, because the case before it was a small cause suit and not a regular suit. On the point of determination No. 1, which is a composite point involving two issues, it was held that there was no dispute that the defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff's in the demised shop. On the second part of the first point, it was held that the shop in dispute was an old construction, to which the provisions of the Act were applicable. On the second point of determination, it was held that the rate of rent was Rs. 1,000/- per month and not Rs. 10,000/-. On the third point of determination, it was held that no default was committed by the defendant in the payment of agreed rent that was paid regularly and through the pendency of the suit also. In view of the conclusions that the Trial Court reached on the points framed by it, the suit was ordered to be dismissed. 11. Aggrieved, this revision has been preferred by the plaintiff under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. 12. Heard Mr. In view of the conclusions that the Trial Court reached on the points framed by it, the suit was ordered to be dismissed. 11. Aggrieved, this revision has been preferred by the plaintiff under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. 12. Heard Mr. Ayush Khanna, learned Counsel for the plaintiff, Mr. Anil Kumar Pandey, learned Counsel appearing for the defendant and perused the lower Court records. 13. The most crucial question to be determined in the present suit is the fact, whether the provisions of the Act are applicable to the demised shop and govern the tenancy. Mr. Ayush Khanna, learned Counsel for the plaintiff has vehemently submitted that the Act does not apply. He submits that the demised shop is a new construction raised by the plaintiff on a corner of his residential premises virtually at the defendant's behest. The shop was raised during the months of July and August, 2003, a fact which the learned Counsel for the plaintiff seeks to support by referring to the map attached to the sale-deed dated 28.10.1978 through which the premises bearing No. 1/208, Civil Lines, Agra were purchased by the plaintiff. He has taken the Court through the map bearing paper No. 34 /10, which he says does not show any structure that may be explained as an old existing construction, now let out as a shop to the defendant. 14. On the other hand, Mr. Anil Kumar Pandey, learned Counsel for the defendant has argued that the demised shop is an integral part of the residential premises. It was formally a garage, which was let out to the defendant by the plaintiff on 1st of May, 2002 on a rent of Rs. 1000/- per month. The learned Counsel for the defendant has particularly drawn the attention of the Court to the plaint giving rise to Original Suit No. 85 of 2004, Aziz Uddin v. Agra Development Authority. This plaint is on record as paper No. 85. The learned Counsel has particularly referred to paragraph No. 2 of the plaint giving rise to Suit No. 85 of 2004, where it is averred: ''2. That inter alia other constructions existed over the property as mentioned above there is shop towards Northern Western side of the property in question which is a very old one constructions.'' 15. The learned Counsel has particularly referred to paragraph No. 2 of the plaint giving rise to Suit No. 85 of 2004, where it is averred: ''2. That inter alia other constructions existed over the property as mentioned above there is shop towards Northern Western side of the property in question which is a very old one constructions.'' 15. It is submitted on the foot of this averment in the plaint that there is a clear admission on the plaintiff's part that the demised shop is an old construction. The learned Counsel points out that the suit is one instituted after the Agra Development Authority had issued an order for demolition of the demised shop. The plaintiff instituted Suit No. 85 of 2004, seeking to assail the demolition order, where a specific stand was taken that the shop is an old construction, not requiring a sanctioned plan from the Agra Development Authority. It is urged that the plaintiff cannot go back on his word, which constitutes his stand in his pleadings. 16. This Court has keenly considered the rival submissions of parties on the issue whether the Act applies to the demised shop. This Court finds that in writing its opinion, the Trial Court has been decisively swayed by the fact that in Original Suit No. 85 of 2004, the plaintiff took a specific stand that the demised shop was an old construction. Before the Trial Court, a stand was taken by the plaintiff that he never filed the suit, but somebody else did it on his behalf in order to create evidence against him. The suit was soon afterwards withdrawn. The Trial Court has taken note of the fact that the withdrawal application was moved on 7.8.2006, after the present suit was instituted, in order to wriggle out of his admission. The stand that the plaint giving rise to the suit was not signed or filed by the plaintiff was not accepted by the Trial Court. The finding of the Trial Court that Suit No. 85 of 2004 was not filed by the plaintiff against the Agra Development Authority is an incorrect stand by the plaintiff, may not be wrong. It is also true that the plaintiff withdrew the suit after he had filed the present suit for eviction, taking a stand that the demised shop was a new construction. It is also true that the plaintiff withdrew the suit after he had filed the present suit for eviction, taking a stand that the demised shop was a new construction. It does seem that the plaintiff has been guided by his self-interest in taking contradictory stands in the two suits. He also seems to have indulged in some falsehood by saying that he never filed the earlier suit against the Agra Development Authority. A prelude to the central question is: Does such indulgence in falsehood to secure relief disentitle the plaintiff from establishing the truth of the matter, whether the demised shop is a new construction, that is free from operation of the Act? In the opinion of this Court, it does not. 17. The purpose of trial of a cause before a Court of law is to find out the truth and its bearing upon the rights of parties in accordance with law. Parties, as they go through the turmoil of litigation, may go wayward in the pursuit of relief. They may vacillate in their stand or indulge in falsehood, but all vacillations in a parties' stand in Court or some assertions that are contradictory or false, may not be relevant at all to the issue under inquiry. If they are not relevant, these are to be generally ignored. The central question involved is whether the demised shop is an old construction to which the Act applies, or is it a new one that is under the umbrella of a rent holiday. The Trial Court has been decisively swayed in its opinion by the fact that in the plaint giving rise to Suit No. 85 of 2004, the plaintiff has stated that the shop is an old construction. The Trial Court has regarded this averment in the plaint giving rise to the suit filed against the Development Authority as an admission on the plaintiff's part. The question is whether pleadings in an earlier suit, not inter partes, are at all admissible in a subsequent suit between one of the parties to the earlier suit and a third party. 18. The question is whether pleadings in an earlier suit, not inter partes, are at all admissible in a subsequent suit between one of the parties to the earlier suit and a third party. 18. This question did pose some challenge to judicial opinion at one point of time long ago, but has now come to be settled in terms of authority to the effect that admission made by a party in an earlier suit, not inter partes, is certainly admissible against it in a subsequent suit involving a different party under Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, but the admission is not conclusive. It is open to the party, who has made the admission in the plaint of an earlier suit, to demonstrate that it was not true. The most authoritative statement of the law on this point is to be found in the holding of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Basant Singh v. Janki Singh and others, AIR 1967 SC 341 , where it was observed: ''5. The High Court also observed that an admission in a pleading can be used only for the purpose of the suit in which the pleading was filed. The observations of Beaumont, C.J. in Ramabai Shriniwas v. Bombay Government [AIR 1941 Bom 144] lend some countenance to this view. But those observations were commented upon and explained by the Bombay High Court in D.S. Mohlte v. S.I. Mohile [ AIR 1960 Bom 153 ]. An admission by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him in a prior suit is an admission within the meaning of Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and may be proved against him in other litigations. The High Court also relied on the English law of evidence. In Phipson on Evidence, 10th Edn, Article 741, the English law is thus summarised: ''Pleadings, although admissible in other actions, to show the institution of the suit and the nature of the case put forward, are regarded merely as the suggestion of counsel, and are not receivable against a party as admissions, unless sworn, signed, or otherwise adopted by the party himself.'' Thus, even under the English law, a statement in a pleading sworn, signed or otherwise adopted by a party is admissible against him in other actions. In Marianski v. Cairns [1 Macq 212 (HL)] the House of Lords decided that an admission in a pleading signed by a party was evidence against him in another suit not only with regard to a different subject-matter but also against a different opponent. Moreover, we are not concerned with the technicalities of the English law. Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes no distinction between an admission made by a party in a pleading and other admissions. Under the Indian law, an admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him may be used as evidence against him in other suits. In other suits, this admission cannot be regarded as conclusive, and it is open to the party to show that it is not true.'' (Emphasis by Court) 19. The aforesaid position of law was noticed by this Court in Govindpal Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Meerut and others, 1988 SCC OnLine All 471, where A.P. Misra, J. (as His Lordship then was of the High Court) held: ''23. Apart from this, the argument that the statement is an admission and binding between the parties is unsustainable. Before drawing an admission all the circumstances under which admission was made has to be taken into consideration before reliance could be placed by a party in subsequent proceedings and an admission could be made in a given case to terminate a proceeding in order to avoid long litigation and enjoying fruits even by giving up the existing right, but that statement could only be confined to the suit in which it was made. Any statement made in the previous suit or proceeding if it is regarded by a party as an admission he must prove the circumstances under which it was made and to show that such an admission was not confined for the purpose of that suit then only in a subsequent proceeding reliance could be placed to bind such party not to resile from it. Normally, every person making a statement in the earlier proceeding has a right to explain away a statement in subsequent proceedings and merely making such statement cannot bind nor could it apply as an estoppel to explain away such statement. Normally, every person making a statement in the earlier proceeding has a right to explain away a statement in subsequent proceedings and merely making such statement cannot bind nor could it apply as an estoppel to explain away such statement. Thus, statement under O. X, R. 2, C.P.C. cannot be said to be such which is an admission on behalf of the petitioner on which reliance has been placed by the respondents to show that it constitutes an act of consent of co-option to admit Smt. Reoti Kunwar as a co-tenant Learned counsel for the petitioner very rightly relied on a passage in ''Sarkar on Evidence'' Vol. I, Thirteenth edition at page 198, which is quoted hereunder:- ''Statements in pleadings are not evidence against the party pleading in subsequent proceedings (Boileau v. Rutlin, 1848, 2 Ex 665; Hals. 3rd Ed. Vol. 15, para 540). 'Pleadings recorded in one cause are admissible in evidence in subsequent proceedings to prove the institution and subject-matter of such cause but are generally inadmissible even as against parties or privies as proof of the truth of the facts stated therein. (Hals. 3rd Ed Vol. 15, para 709). The rule rejecting the pleadings in prior causes as admissions is of considerable antiquity and was based on the theory that the statements were not those of the party, but were merely 'pleader's matter' and consisted largely of 'suggestions of counsel' and 'flourishes of the draftsmen'.'' 24. The case Basant Singh v. Janki Singh, AIR 1967 SC 341 , repelled the earlier views of the Court that admission by a party in plaint signed and verified by him may be used as evidence against him in other suits in terms of S. 17, Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Supreme Court repelling the earlier views held as follows:- ''Moreover, we are not concerned with the technicalities of the English Law. S. 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes no distinction between an admission made by a party in a pleading and other admissions. Under the Indian Law, an admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him may be used as evidence against him in other suits. In other suits, this admission cannot be regarded as conclusive, and it is open to the party to show that it is not true.'' 25. Under the Indian Law, an admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him may be used as evidence against him in other suits. In other suits, this admission cannot be regarded as conclusive, and it is open to the party to show that it is not true.'' 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on a case Kailash Chandra v. Ratan Prakash, AIR 1974 All 138 . In this case, this Court held that the statement of a counsel of a party can be recorded under R. 1 of O. X and not under R. 2. 26. Reliance was also placed on Muhammad Imam Ali Khan v. Husain Khan, (1899) ILR 26 Cal 81. In this case certain statement was made in 1878 which was sought to be relied on in subsequent proceedings. It was in this light that the Court held as follows:- ''Supposing that in 1978 he believed them to be true and made them spontaneously, why should he not assert the true state of the case after he has learned it? An Oudh talukh cannot be transferred like an ordinary estate under Mohomedan or Hindu law because the Oudh Estates Act requires special modes of transfer. It is not now contended that the mutation operated as a transfer. It would be absurd to suppose that the plaintiff made any misrepresentation to the defendant; neither was the situation of the defendant altered in any way to his prejudice. No consideration was given by the defendant, nor is there anything in the transaction to create a trust Possibly it might have given the defendant a possession on which time would run; but if so, time has not run long enough to create a bar.....'' 27. It was also held: ''.....a gratuitous admission may be withdrawn unless there is some obligation not to withdraw it; and there is not here any title on which such an admission can rest.....'' 20. The question also fell for consideration of the Patna High Court in Janki Ram and another v. Amir Chand Ram and others, 1983 SCC OnLine Pat 241, where it was observed: ''15. The question also fell for consideration of the Patna High Court in Janki Ram and another v. Amir Chand Ram and others, 1983 SCC OnLine Pat 241, where it was observed: ''15. Then remains the second submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants to be considered that is, whether the statements made by the plaintiff Janki in a duly sworn affidavit filed in a proceeding under S. 145 of the Criminal P.C. in the year 1963 could be used as a piece of evidence against the plaintiffs in the instant suit. It is well-settled that an admission on a question of fact made by a party in course of a proceeding can be regarded as a good piece of evidence relied upon, which the contesting party may contend that the claim made in the subsequent proceeding was unjustified The Court is entitled to consider the admission solemnly made by a party concerning the subject-matter in dispute (words have been underlined by me for emphasis) in course of a proceeding in adjudicating upon the truth or otherwise of a claim made by the parties in a subsequent proceeding concerning the subject-matter in dispute. The admission made by a party may be used as evidence against him in the other suit if it concerns the subject-matter in dispute. However, such an admission cannot be regarded as conclusive and the party can show that it was not (true). Reference be made to the case of Basant Singh v. Janki Singh ( AIR 1967 SC 341 ).'' 21. Here, no doubt the plaintiff has made an admission in the plaint giving rise to Suit No. 85 of 2004 filed by him against the Agra Development Authority, challenging their order of demolition to the effect that the demised shop was an old construction, but it cannot be regarded as conclusive proof of the fact or an estoppel by pleading against the plaintiff. It is open to the plaintiff to show that the admission was made under circumstances that proceed from misinformation or is the product of legal draftsmanship of pleadings that he did not understand; or still more, it was an incorrect stand in point of fact taken in his pleading to save the demised shop from demolition. It is open to the plaintiff to show that the admission was made under circumstances that proceed from misinformation or is the product of legal draftsmanship of pleadings that he did not understand; or still more, it was an incorrect stand in point of fact taken in his pleading to save the demised shop from demolition. What is important to be determined is not the morality or the probity of the plaintiff, but the fact whether the demised shop is a new construction, as the plaintiff alleges, or an old construction standing over a part of the plaintiff's residential premises. No doubt, the Trial Court has looked into some other evidence also, like the map attached to the plaintiff's sale-deed and some photographs placed on record, which have not been believed to hold that the demised shop is a new construction. 22. The overall inference that has been drawn to hold that the demised shop is not a new construction is primarily based on the plaintiff's admission made in the plaint of the earlier suit, that is to say, Suit No. 85 of 2004, which the Trial Court has lavishly and overwhelmingly relied upon. What the Trial Court, however, has missed from consideration is the evidence that in fact, there was a demolition order passed by the Agra Development Authority, that is on record as Paper No. 37 . This demolition order relates to the demised shop and proceeds on the premise that the demised shop is a new construction. The demolition matter later appears to have been compounded between the plaintiff and the Development Authority. This part of the evidence has not at all been considered by the Trial Judge while deciding the crucial question about the age of the demised shop that would determine whether the Act is applicable to it. 23. The Trial Judge seems to have been so fascinated and overwhelmed by the admission made in the plaint that he has bestowed no consideration to the fact that the foundation of the statutory demolition proceeding was a new construction done by the plaintiff in the year 2003. The demolition order was served upon the plaintiff, as he alleges, in the plaint giving rise to Suit No. 85 of 2004 on 4.12.2003. The demolition order was served upon the plaintiff, as he alleges, in the plaint giving rise to Suit No. 85 of 2004 on 4.12.2003. If the Trial Judge had taken into consideration the demolition order passed in the year 2003, he might have reached a different conclusion about the fact whether the demised shop was a new construction or not. There is nothing on record to show that the demolition order was set aside or revoked, holding the demised shop to be an older construction. Rather, the demolition proceedings appear to have been compounded, which would prima facie indicate that the demised shop, being a new construction, was a factual position that was acquiesced into by the plaintiff and established by the Development Authority. The finding of the Trial Court, therefore, on the issue that the demised shop is an old construction, an integral part of Premises No. 1/208, to which the Act is applicable, is vitiated for non-consideration of material evidence. Also, the finding is manifestly illegal, because it proceeds on a wrong notion of the law that an admission made in the plaint of an earlier suit inter se the plaintiff and the Development Authority is virtually to be regarded as conclusive proof of the fact or an estoppel by pleading against the plaintiff, as if it were. The correct legal position is that the admission made in the said plaint, though admissible, it is open to the plaintiff to explain it by other evidence that it did not represent the true state of facts. 24. In view of what has been said above, this Court is of opinion that the finding recorded by the Trial Court on point of determination No. (1) is not sustainable. The Trial Judge ought to reconsider the said finding, giving further opportunity to the plaintiff and the defendant to explain the admission about the age of the building. The Trial Judge also ought to look into the proceedings for demolition that were taken by the Development Authority, relating to the demised shop. The parties shall be permitted to lead evidence further about this fact in issue, as may be relevant and advised. 25. So far as the finding on point of determination No. (2) is concerned, this Court is of opinion that the Trial Court has rightly discarded the rent deed dated 20th August, 2003 as a bogus document. The parties shall be permitted to lead evidence further about this fact in issue, as may be relevant and advised. 25. So far as the finding on point of determination No. (2) is concerned, this Court is of opinion that the Trial Court has rightly discarded the rent deed dated 20th August, 2003 as a bogus document. A comparison of the defendant's signatures on the rent deed with those made elsewhere, such as the written statement or his testimony in Court, clearly show that the signatures on rent deed are not the defendant's. This conclusion is inevitable on a bare comparison of the defendant's admitted signatures with those on the rent deed. The report of the expert produced by the defendant, who too, for good reasons assigned, has opined against the genuineness of the defendant's signatures on the rent deed, appears to be correct. At the same time, the document Paper No. 66, which evidences payment of premium in the sum of Rs. 1,45,000/- by the defendant to the plaintiff, has also been rightly believed. The signatures on the said document made across the revenue stamp are unmistakably those of the plaintiff. The conclusion on this point also is based on expert opinion, which the Trial Court has accepted. There is no reason for this Court to disagree with this conclusion of the Trial Court either. The rate of rent mentioned in the document Paper No. 66 is Rs. 1000/-. The opinion of the Trial Court, therefore, that the rate of rent is Rs. 1000/-, is based on a very plausible view of the evidence on record, that does not warrant interference in the exercise of our revisional jurisdiction. 26. The findings of the Trial Court on point of determination No. (3) about default in the payment of rent also does not deserve to be disturbed. The Trial Court has carefully looked into documentary evidence showing tender of rent by money order and by deposit in Court under Section 30(1) of the Act relative to different periods of time vis-à-vis the figures of rent deposited. The record bears out with the findings of the Trial Court and does not lead to any inference about default in the payment of rent. The finding of the Trial Court, therefore, on point of determination No. (3) is also affirmed. 27. The record bears out with the findings of the Trial Court and does not lead to any inference about default in the payment of rent. The finding of the Trial Court, therefore, on point of determination No. (3) is also affirmed. 27. Since this Court is of opinion that the Trial Court is required to re-examine the issue about the construction of the building being a new one, dating to the year 2003, the decree passed by the Trial Judge would have to be set aside, with a remand to the Trial Court to determine the question afresh, whether the Act is applicable to the demised shop. In doing that, the Trial Court shall bear in mind the guidance in this judgment and will consider all relevant evidence on the point; not just the admission of the plaintiff in the plaint of Suit No. 85 of 2004. Any further evidence led by parties shall also be considered. If the finding is that the demised shop is indeed a construction raised in the year 2003, it goes without saying that the Act would not govern the tenancy. In that event, the rate of rent or default would all become irrelevant. 28. So far as the right of the plaintiff to evict the defendant is concerned, all that would then have to be seen by the Trial Court is whether a valid notice to quit in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 has been served upon the defendant. 29. In the result, this revision succeeds and is allowed in part. The impugned judgment and decree dated 18.1.2013 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 6, Agra in S.C.C. Suit No. 21 of 2005 is set aside. The suit shall stand restored to the file of the learned Trial Judge for trial and decision afresh, in accordance with the remarks in this judgment and on the point required to be re-determined. The Trial Court shall proceed to try and decide the suit, after affording necessary opportunity to both parties in accordance with law, within a period of six months of the receipt of a copy of this judgment. Since the matter is a small cause suit, that is one of the year 2004, the Trial Judge shall fix one date of effective hearing every week. Both parties shall appear before the Trial Court on 20th April, 2022. Since the matter is a small cause suit, that is one of the year 2004, the Trial Judge shall fix one date of effective hearing every week. Both parties shall appear before the Trial Court on 20th April, 2022. There shall be no order as to costs. 30. Let the lower Court records be sent down at once and shall be made available to the Trial Court positively before the date fixed for appearance of parties.