JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for Revisionist and learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent, Mr. Umesh Kumar Tiwari at length. 2. This Civil Revision has been filed against the judgment and order dated 08.10.2020 passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No. 19, Lucknow in SCC No. 30 of 2017, 'Ajay Kumar Agarwal Vs. Ram Autar Khandelwal' with a delay of around one month. Although time was granted earlier to the counsel for the contesting respondents to file objections but he has not filed objections. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent no.2 says that he does not propose to file any objection and the matter be heard on merits. 4. Delay is condoned. 5. Office is directed to give a Regular number to this Revision. 6. It is the case of the Revisionist that the respondent landlord had given a shop on monthly rent of Rs.5,500/- to the Revisionist in 2008. Since then the Revisionist has been paying advance rent continuously either through cash or cheque on demand of the landlord as mutually and orally agreed upon by them. It has been alleged that the respondent’s son had asked the Revisionist for Rupees Two Lakhs for opening a new business, but the Revisionist could not furnish such a huge amount immediately. Becoming annoyed the respondent’s son persuaded his father to throw the Revisionist out from the premises and had many times illegally approached the Revisionist at his shop forcing him to vacate the premises. The Revisionist ultimately filed an Injunction Suit No. 821 of 2017 before the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Lucknow in May, 2017. After getting notice of such Injunction Suit the respondent landlord sent a legal notice on 27.05.2017 for arrears of rent amounting to Rs.78,000/-for the period between 15.04.2016 to 14.05.2017. Such demand was illegal as the Revisionist had already deposited rent w.e.f. March, 2016 to August, 2016 in the bank account of A. K. Enterprises, the transport firm of the respondent landlord, through cheque No. 405647 on 15.02.2016. The Revisionist on receipt of such legal notice had sent a reply on 27.06.2017 that he had already deposited cheque dated 15.02.2016 in the bank account of the firm for the period w.e.f. March, 2016 to August, 2016. The Revisionist on receipt of such legal notice had sent a reply on 27.06.2017 that he had already deposited cheque dated 15.02.2016 in the bank account of the firm for the period w.e.f. March, 2016 to August, 2016. Nevertheless cheque No. 488540 of Rs.78,000/-as demanded by the landlord was again being sent along with the reply through registered post to satisfy the demand for arrears of rent. Since reply had been sent along with a cheque of Rs.78,000/-to the respondent landlord, the Revisionist presumed that the matter had been settled satisfactorily. 7. It has been argued that the respondent landlord with malafide intent filed S.C.C. Suit No. 30 of 2017 on 01.07.2017 for arrears of rent and for eviction. On 07.09.2017, the respondent landlord returned the cheque of Rs.78,000/-to the Revisionist through registered post saying that the account of the Firm had been closed long back and the cheque, therefore, could not be accepted. The Revisionist did not accept this cheque, but approached the court for depositing rent where he was surprised to find out about the pendency of the aforesaid S.C.C. Suit No. 30 of 2017. The Revisionist moved an application under Order 15 Rule 5 read with Section 151 of the CPC on 19.03.2018 for depositing rent along with 9% interest and Advocate’s fee that is a total amount of Rs.2,29,220/-. Such arrears were deposited on 12.04.2019. Also, thereafter the Revisionist continued to deposit all rent continuously, as and when it fell due, in the court. However, the S.C.C. Suit has been decreed in favour of the respondent landlord, without appreciating the evidence on record including the application under Order 15 Rule 5 read with Section 151 CPC. 8. It has been argued by Sri Prashant Jaiswal, Advocate appearing for the Revisionist that the learned trial court failed to see that the S.C.C. Suit for arrears of rent was not maintainable as there was no default of rent by the Revisionist. The learned trial court failed to notice that neither the landlord had filed any rent agreement, registered or unregistered, along with the Suit nor he had filed any rent receipt issued by him for any period to show that he was the landlord. The learned trial court failed to notice that neither the landlord had filed any rent agreement, registered or unregistered, along with the Suit nor he had filed any rent receipt issued by him for any period to show that he was the landlord. The learned trial court could not have come to the conclusion that the Revisionist was a defaulter unless the relationship of landlord and tenant was established and it was also established that the arrears of rent fell due on a particular date. The Revisionist had filed his bank statement to show that all rent was transferred in the bank account of the landlord. The fact of default in payment of Arrears having not been established the very basis of the S.C.C. Suit fell through. In the Application under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, the Revisionist had specifically stated that advance rent of the period w.e.f. 15.03.2016 to 14.08.2016 had already been paid in the Landlord’s Firm’s Account i.e. A K & Company’s account on 15.02.2016 and the rest of the rent w.e.f. 15.08.2016 to 14.07.2017 had been paid through another cheque again made out in favour of A K & Company sent to the landlord along with this reply of notice dated 27.05.2017. It has also been argued that since the Revisionist had paid rent w.e.f. 15.03.2016 to 14.08.2016 through cheque dated 15.02.2016, the notice that was sent by the landlord in May 2017, was invalid. Even after receipt of notice the petitioner had deposited Rs.78,000/-through cheque in the account of A K & Company on 30.06.2017, therefore, there were no arrears of rent due from the Revisionist and the Suit was not maintainable. 9. It has also been argued that the Suit was not maintainable also for the reason that Ajay Kumar Agarwal had filed a Suit in his personal capacity whereas there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between Ajay Kumar Agarwal and the Revisionist. The Revisionist was running Vinayaka Agencies’ retail counter in the shop in question situated at Dubagga on Hardoi Road and the landlord was A K & company of which Ajay Kumar Agarwal was only the proprietor, just as the Revisionist was the proprietor of Vinayaka Agencies. The Revisionist was running Vinayaka Agencies’ retail counter in the shop in question situated at Dubagga on Hardoi Road and the landlord was A K & company of which Ajay Kumar Agarwal was only the proprietor, just as the Revisionist was the proprietor of Vinayaka Agencies. In the Original Suit No. 821 of 2017 filed by the Revisionist against Ajay Kumar Agarwal before the Civil Judge(Junior Division), Haveli, Lucknow, only notice could be served but no temporary injunction could be granted to the Revisionist as the court remained vacant. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent landlord has pointed out the issues framed by the learned trial court that the first issue was with regard to whether there existed any landlord and tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. The trial court had noted that it was the contention of the Revisionist that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between him and Ajay Kumar Agarwal and that he was the tenant of A K & Company of which Ajay Kumar Agarwal was only the proprietor and rent had been given through cheques to A K & Company. But in the written statement filed by the tenant, he had admitted that he used to give rent to Ajay Kumar Agarwal also in cash and there was no written agreement between the parties as the landlord and the tenant were good friends in the beginning and landlord Ajay Kumar Agarwal had orally agreed for renting out the shop in question. Also, the Suit for Permanent Injunction, namely Original Suit No. 821 of 2017, had been registered as ‘Ramavatar Khandelwal vs. Ajay Kumar Aggarwal’ and not as ‘Ramavtar Agarwal vs. A K & Company. The learned trial court came to the conclusion that admission is the best form of evidence. It had been admitted by the tenant that initially rent was giving either in cash to Ajay Kumar Aggarwal or through cheques since the beginning of the tenancy in 2008. Later on, cheques were deposited in the account of A K & Company. It had been admitted by the defendant that Ajay Kumar Agarwal was the only proprietor of the said Firm and no other person had been authorised to receive rent on behalf of the landlord. Later on, cheques were deposited in the account of A K & Company. It had been admitted by the defendant that Ajay Kumar Agarwal was the only proprietor of the said Firm and no other person had been authorised to receive rent on behalf of the landlord. Besides no documentary evidence was filed by the defendant that the shop in question and the land appurtenant thereto belonged to the Firm A K & Company and not to Ajay Kumar Agarwal. 11. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the Respondent landlord that with regard to the second issue framed by the learned trial court as to whether there was any default in payment of rent by the defendant, the learned trial court has found that the plaintiff had alleged that the defendant had not paid rent since March 2016, whereas the defendant had alleged that rent had been paid w.e.f. March, 2016 in the account of A K & Company. On the application moved by the defendant under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC, it had already been held on 10.05.2019 that arrears of rent along with interest and cost of litigation had not been deposited by the defendant in time despite permission being granted in this regard. It had been alleged by the tenant that all arrears of rent including interest and cost of litigation had been deposited through cheque in the name of A K & Company and not in the name of Ajay Kumar Agarwal, whereas there was an admission in the written statement that the shop in question had been taken on rent by the defendant from Ajay Kumar Agarwal and initially rent was also paid to him in cash by the defendant. After the order dated 10.05.2019, the defence of the tenant had been struck off. The learned trial court had also examined the bank statement filed by the tenant as documentary evidence of payment of rent. It was found that although there is a mention of withdrawal of an amount of Rs.79,588/-on 15.02.2016 through cheque, but there is no mention of the account in which such cheque has been paid. The plaintiff had categorically refused that such amount was ever transferred into the account of the landlord or even the firm A K & Company of which he was the proprietor. The plaintiff had categorically refused that such amount was ever transferred into the account of the landlord or even the firm A K & Company of which he was the proprietor. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, landlord, that it is evident from the reply to the legal notice sent by the Revisionist on Page 32 of the paper book that he had knowledge of the account of A K & Company having been closed on 27.06.2017 itself, but he issued a cheque dated 28.06.2017 in the name of A K & Company and sent it by post to the respondent landlord. 12. It has also been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that the company’s account was opened only on 23.12.2009, and the Revisionist had taken the premises in question on rent since July, 2008 and had been making payment to Ajay Kumar Agarwal in cash since July, 2008 onwards. Inexplicably, he stopped paying rent to Ajay Kumar Agarwal in 2016 and started depositing cheques in the name of A K & Company thereafter. Even if the tenant’s contention that he had paid rent into the account of A K & Company was taken to be correct, it would still not make such payment admissible as arrears of rent due to the plaintiff, Ajay Kumar Agarwal, who was admittedly the person from whom the Revisionist had taken the shop on rent. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that till date the Revisionist has refused to give any rent to Ajay Kumar Agarwal, insisting that his landlord is A K & Company and not Ajay Kumar Agarwal. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent landlord has also pointed out from Annexure 5, page 46 of the paper book that the application moved under Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC on 19.03.2018 had enumerated the heads under which money was proposed to be deposited. Such application was allowed conditionally, but no money was deposited in time prescribed, as a result the learned trial court rejected the application of the tenant on 22.05.2018. A recall application was filed by the tenant on 14.08.2018, which was allowed on 19.01.2019, but no rent was deposited even thereafter, as a result the learned trial court struck off the defence of the tenant on 10.05.2019. A recall application was filed by the tenant on 14.08.2018, which was allowed on 19.01.2019, but no rent was deposited even thereafter, as a result the learned trial court struck off the defence of the tenant on 10.05.2019. Against such an order the tenant filed Writ Petition No. 16426 (M/S) of 2019, where no interim order was granted and after decision of the trial court impugned in this Revision such petition has become infructuous. 14. The third issue framed by the learned trial court related to whether notice issued to the tenant through registered post on 27.05.2017 by the landlord was a valid notice and had been served upon him. The learned trial court on the basis of evidence on record found that not only the notice was served, it was duly replied to by the tenant. With regard to the relief admissible to the plaintiff then learned trial court found that all three issues having been decided in favour of the plaintiff he was entitled for decree of arrears of rent and for eviction. It therefore directed the defendant to pay arrears of twelve months of rent at the rate of Rs.6,500/-from the date of institution of the Suit as also damages pendente lite at the same rate, and to vacate the premises in question and deliver peaceful possession thereof within two months from the date of the order. 15. The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon judgement rendered by the Supreme Court in “Bal Gopal Maheshwari and Others Vs. Sanjeev Kumar Gupta 2013 (6) AWC 5823 (SC)”, where the Supreme Court has considered the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC and striking off of the defence of the defendant on failure to comply. After considering the language of the provision as added by way of amendment in 1972 in the CPC, the Supreme Court placed reliance upon “Bimal Chand Jain Vs. After considering the language of the provision as added by way of amendment in 1972 in the CPC, the Supreme Court placed reliance upon “Bimal Chand Jain Vs. Shri Gopal Agarwal 1981 (3) SCC 486 to say that :-“a comprehensive understanding of Rule 5 of Order 15 should be thus:-Sub-Rule(1) obliges the defendant to deposit, at or before the first hearing of the Suit, the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of 9% per annum and further, whether or not he admits any amount to be due, to deposit regularly throughout the continuation of the suit, the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual. In the event of any default in making any deposit, the court may, subject to the provisions of Sub-Rule (2) to strike off his defence. We shall presently come to what this means. Sub-Rule 2 obliges the court, before making an order for striking off the defence to consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf. In other words, the defendant has been vested with a statutory right to make a ‘representation’ to the court against the decision of his defence being struck off. If a representation is made the court must consider it on its merits, and then decide whether the defence should or should not be struck off. This is the right expressly vested in the defendant and enables him to show by bringing material on the record that he has not been guilty of default alleged or if the default has occurred, there is a good reason for it. Now, it is not impossible that the records may contain such material already. In that event, can it be said that Sub-Rule (1) obliges the court to strike out the defence? We must remember that an order under Sub-Rule (1) striking off defence is in the nature of a penalty. A serious responsibility rests on the court in the matter and the power is not to be exercised mechanically. There is a reserve of discretion vested in the court not to strike out the defence if on the facts and circumstances already existing on the record, it finds good reason for not doing so. A serious responsibility rests on the court in the matter and the power is not to be exercised mechanically. There is a reserve of discretion vested in the court not to strike out the defence if on the facts and circumstances already existing on the record, it finds good reason for not doing so. It will always be a matter for the judgement of the court to decide whether on the material before it, notwithstanding the absence of a representation under Sub-Rule (2) the defence should or should not be struck off. The word ‘may’ in Sub-Rule (1) merely vested the power in the court to strike out the defence. It does not oblige it to do so in every case of default. …..” 16. The Supreme Court in the judgement of Bal Gopal Maheshwari (Supra) went on to say that if such discretion is exercised by the learned trial court after looking into an application made by the plaintiff to strike off the defence of the defendant and its reply thereto is submitted by the defendant it would amount to considering the ‘representation’ in the light of Sub-Rule (2) and the High Court should not have interfered in a well considered order passed by the trial court in this regard. 17. The learned counsel for the respondent landlord, has also placed reliance upon a Constitution Bench judgement in the case of “Hari Shankar and others Vs. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury AIR 1963 Supreme Court 698”, and judgement rendered in “Rama Murti Devi Vs. Pushpa Devi and Others 2017 (15) SCC 230 ”, regarding the scope of Revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. Learned counsel for the respondent has pointed out paragraph 29 to 38 of the judgement rendered in Rama Murti Devi(Supra), wherein after considering the Constitution Bench judgement, as aforesaid , it has been observed that the object of Section 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. The Court placed reliance on observations made by Chief Justice Beaumont in “Bell and Co Ltd. v Waman Hemraj AIR 1938(Bombay) 223”, where he said :- “…..The section does not enumerate the cases in which the court may interfere in revision, as does, Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the court which made the order had no jurisdiction or in which the court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the court can interfere. But in my opinion, the court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived that….“. 18. The Supreme Court referred to another judgement rendered in “Mundri Lal Vs. Sushila Ram (2007) 8 SCC 609 ”; where it was held that a pure finding of fact based on appreciation of all the evidence although may not be interfered with but there are several circumstances in which the Revisional Court under Section 25 of the 1887 Act, can interfere with the finding of fact. It referred to the observations made by the court in paragraph 22 and 23 as follows : “22. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act is wider then Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the fact that Revision is provided for by the statute, and not an Appeal, itself is suggestive of the fact that ordinarily Revisional jurisdiction can be exercised only when a question of law arises. “23. We however do not mean to say that under no circumstances finding of fact cannot be interfered with. But the fact that Revision is provided for by the statute, and not an Appeal, itself is suggestive of the fact that ordinarily Revisional jurisdiction can be exercised only when a question of law arises. “23. We however do not mean to say that under no circumstances finding of fact cannot be interfered with. A pure finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence although may not be interfered, with but if such finding has been arrived at upon taking into consideration irrelevant factors or therefore, relevant fact has been ignored, the Revisional Court will have the requisite jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of fact. Applicability of provisions of Section 2 (2) of the Act may in that sense involve determination of mixed question of law and fact.” 19. Having heard the learned counsel for the Revisionist and the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent landlord, I have also carefully perused the order impugned. This is not a case where the trial court has considered any irrelevant fact or has ignored any relevant fact. There is also no perverse finding of fact against the record. The Revisionist may have been alleging that he had paid all arrears of rent due to the landlord, the burden was on him to prove such allegations. The learned trial court on the basis of documentary evidence and provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC has come to a conclusion that despite an application being made, the defendant had not made any payment at all during the pendency of the Suit in the account of the respondent landlord nor had deposited any sum in cash in the court concerned where the Suit for Arrears of Rent and Eviction was pending. This Court, therefore, finds no good ground to show interference in the order impugned. 20. The Revision stands Rejected. Since the order of the trial court stands affirmed it shall be complied with strictly by the Revisionist, who shall pay all arrears of rent and also damages pendente lite with interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum and vacate the premises in question within a period of two months.