JUDGMENT 1. Today the case is listed for hearing on IA No.6938/2021 under Order 22 Rule 9 of CPC; IA No.6939/2021 under section 5 of the Limitation Act and also IA No.6937/2021 under Order 22 Rule 3/11 of CPC. All these applications have been fled by respondent No. 1 on 20.9.2021. 2. I.A. No.6938/2021 under Order 22 rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure fled seeking setting aside of the abatement is barred by time. It is fled accompanied by an application i.e. I.A. No.6939/2021 under section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. 3. On 20.9.2021 the application i.e. IA No.6938/2021 under Order 22 rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside of the abatement against the deceased appellant No. 1 has been fled by respondent No. 1 stating that during the pendency of the crossappeal, appellant No. 1 Ramua S/o. Devi Mehra died on 12.7.2018 and respondent no.1 came to the knowledge of death of appellant no. 1 in the month of September, 2021 frst time and thus, respondent no.1 was required for substitution of his legal representatives of the deceased appellant no. 1 in the memo of cross-appeal within a period of 90 days but the same was not done within the prescribed period of time and thus, the cross-appeal is abated against the deceased appellant No.1 on 10.10.2018. The limitation for fling the application was up to 9.12.2018 and this application was also not fled within a period of 60 days from the date of abatement. It is further contended that the counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants had not informed respondent No. 1 and even this Court regarding the death of appellant No. 1. Respondent No. 1 is residing in remote area and is a rustic villager and he belongs to rural folk, or is poverty stricken or illiterate and is mostly not aware of the necessity of taking steps for substitution on the death of a party. 4. On 20.9.2021 the accompanied application i.e. I.A. No.6939/2021 under section 5 of the Limitation Act has been fled stating that the cross-appeal is abated against the deceased appellant No.1 on 10.10.2018. The limitation for fling the application under Order 22 rule 9 of CPC was up to 9.12.2018 and this application was also not fled within a period of 60 days from the date of abatement. The limitation for fling the application under Order 22 rule 9 of CPC was up to 9.12.2018 and this application was also not fled within a period of 60 days from the date of abatement. Hence, this application is barred by 1016 days which requires to be condoned inter-alia on the grounds that respondent No. 1 is a 78 years old and sick person and is a very hopeless state of health. Due to Covid-19 corona virus (pandemic), respondent No. 1 could not establish connection between his relatives and close friends. The delay in fling the application is due to bona-fde and with sufficient cause. The approach has to be liberal and judicious guided by the paramount consideration of not depriving a litigant ordinarily of adjudication of rights on merits. Hyper technical, too strict, and pedantic approach as may cause injustice has to be avoided. Hence, prayer is made to condone the delay. 5. IA No.6937/2021 under Order 22 rule 3/11 of CPC for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased -appellant No. 1 Ramua S/o. Devi Mehra in the memo of cross-objection / appeal has been fled. The application is supported by an affidavit of respondent No. 1 / plaintiff Kodulal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants refuting the aforesaid contentions contended that the application (IA No.6938/21) under Order 22 rule 9 of CPC has not been fled within the prescribed time period and there is inordinate delay of 1016 days for which day to day explanation has not been given even no satisfactory explanation and sufficient cause has been shown. Moreover, the appellants / defendants fled the present second appeal on 20.11.2008 against the judgment and decree dated 22.8.2008 passed by Additional Judge to the Court of Third Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court) Shahdol in C. A. No.140-A/2007, whereby the said appeal preferred by respondent no. 1 / plaintiff Kodulal was partly allowed and passed the decree that possession of the plaintiff shall not be removed except in accordance with law. This appeal was listed for hearing on 18.3.2009 and on the same day, the appellants / defendants had withdrawn the appeal. 1 / plaintiff Kodulal was partly allowed and passed the decree that possession of the plaintiff shall not be removed except in accordance with law. This appeal was listed for hearing on 18.3.2009 and on the same day, the appellants / defendants had withdrawn the appeal. During the pendency of this second appeal, on 6.2.2009 respondent No. 1 / plaintiff fled the cross appeal / objection under Order 41 rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is pending and is barred by 525 days and on 16.7.2010 the application i.e. IA No.7941/2010 under section 5 of the Limitation Act was fled seeking condonation of delay in fling the cross-appeal / objection. This Court vide order dated 14.12.2009 called for record of the Courts below and directed to list the case for cross-objection / appeal fled by respondent No. 1 immediately after receipt of the record. Vide order dated 21.6.2010 the case was fxed for 24.6.2020 for consideration the question 6 SA No.1558/08 regarding maintainability of the cross objection in the disposed of second appeal. However, on 24.6.2010 the case was adjourned for admission of cross objection and on 30.6.2010 before making any submission on merits of cross objection for admission, counsel for respondent no. 1 prayed for time to fle an appropriate application on the question of limitation. IA No.7941/2010 under section 5 of the Limitation Act fled seeking condonation of delay occurred in fling the cross-appeal / objection was barred by 525 days in which day to day delay has not been explained by respondent No.1 in fling the cross objection so also the delay of fling an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Further contended that no cause, much less sufficient, has been shown for setting aside the abatement. Due to non-availability of explanation of day to day delay and also due to vague and general application, the same is liable to be rejected. Resultantly, on the ground of delay alone, cross -objection / appeal is not sustainable. Further contended that no cause, much less sufficient, has been shown for setting aside the abatement. Due to non-availability of explanation of day to day delay and also due to vague and general application, the same is liable to be rejected. Resultantly, on the ground of delay alone, cross -objection / appeal is not sustainable. Further contended that respondent No. 1 / plaintiff has no right, title or any kind of owner on the land dispute in question has already been held initially by learned both the Courts below and thus, the cross objection is sans merit and it is liable to be dismissed in motion stage and the second appeal fled by the appellants has been dismissed as not pressed and now, there is no substantial question of law to entertain the cross objection after dismissal of the second appeal. 7. Further contended that respondent No. 1 has suppressed very important fact of the case regarding getting information about the death of appellant No. 1. While, respondent No.1 is the real brother of deceased -appellant No. 1 Ramua; resident of the same village. According to the particular of record of Courts below and the particular of memo of cross appeal and even from the particular of address of affidavits of Kodulal Mehra fled presently in support of all aforesaid applications showing himself as a resident of the same village i.e. Dindori, PS Chandia, District Umaria and how can one assume that a sibling has no knowledge about his brother’s death. Further submitted that no reasonable and plausible explanation has been given in the aforesaid applications by respondent no.1 about the particular date of time of knowledge of death of Ramua and about the particular of source of information from anyone; either from relatives or friends of respondent no.1 or the deceased Ramua and in fact, vague and general explanation has been given to set aside the abatement of cross appeal against appellant no. 1 and condoning the delay of fling the application for bringing the LR’s on record and thus in absence of “sufficient cause” delay need not be condoned. 1 and condoning the delay of fling the application for bringing the LR’s on record and thus in absence of “sufficient cause” delay need not be condoned. On behalf of appellant no.2, the learned counsel invited the attention of this Court that admittedly the appeal fled by the appellants Ramua and Smt. Janki Dvei was dismissed as not pressed on very frst hearing of admission stage without any notice to any respondents on dated 18.3.2009 i.e. much before the date of death of Ramua who died on 12.7.2018. But, only because of the fling of cross objection it is surviving, in which since the date 21.6.2010 it was not argued on maintainability of cross objection being not fled within the prescribed limitation for fling the second appeal and now the aforesaid applications have been fled after about more than 3 years from the date of death of Ramua and not fled within the prescribed limitation of 90 days. The respondent No.1 in the said two applications admitted the delay of about 1016 days but the said delay has not been explained properly and submitted that if he did not take any steps to bring the same on record in this appeal within limitation, resultantly the appeal has become abated automatically under the law. Thus, there is no sufficient cause to condone such delay and setting aside the aforesaid abatement and prayer for dismissal of such applications was made. 8. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and on a bare perusal of the aforesaid applications, it is found that admittedly there is a delay of 1016 days according to respondent No. 1 in fling the application for bringing the legal representatives on record and for setting aside of the abatement. To explain this delay, respondent No. 1 has fled application mentioning general cause, and no sufficient cause and reasonable cause has been shown for condoning the delay. Respondent No. 1 has taken grounds that respondent No. 1 is an old and infrm person and resides in a remote area and there is no connection between the deceased - appellant No. 1, because of which, respondent No. 1 could not get information regarding the death of appellant No. 1 and for the frst time in September, 2021 respondent No. 1 came to know about the death of appellant No. 1. Mere allegations about belated knowledge of death of the opposite party would not be sufficient. 9. It is clear from a bare reading of the applications (IA No.6938/21 & 6939/21) that respondent No. 1 was totally callous about pursuing his appeal. He has acted irresponsibly and even with negligence. Besides this, he has not approached the Court with clean hands. Respondent No. 1, who seeks aid of the Court for exercising its discretionary power for condoning the delay, is expected to state correct facts and not state lies before the Court. Approaching the Court with unclean hands itself is a ground for rejection of such applications. 10. On the reason mentioned in the application U/O 22 rule 9 read with application U/s. 5 of the Limitation Act and on submission raised by the learned counsel, it is evident from the above narrated facts that appellant no.1 died on 12.7.2018, while the present applications have been fled on or about 23.9.2021. Thus, there is delay of about 1080 in fling these applications and very vague and general explanation has been given that respondent No.1 came to know about Ramua’s death in September, 2021 and what was the explanation in between 12.7.2018 to September 2021, no sufficient cause or reason has been assigned about such huge delay despite the fact that respondent No.1 is real brother of Ramua and no one can assume that a sibling wasn’t aware of his brother’s death. And even no reasonable cause has been shown for condoning the delay of more than 3 years and the appeal has already abated. 11. The apex Court in the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh and others [(2010) 8 SCC 684] has held that “even if “sufficient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of party concerned. Liberal construction cannot be equated with doing injustice to the other party. There is no straitjacket formula uniformly applicable to all the cases. 12. It is a settled position of law that a suit or an appeal abates automatically if the legal representatives, particularly of the sole appellant, are not brought on record within the stipulated period. Relevant paragraphs 37 and 38 are reproduced here as under:- 37. “We feel that it would be useful to make a reference to the judgment of this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom (supra). Relevant paragraphs 37 and 38 are reproduced here as under:- 37. “We feel that it would be useful to make a reference to the judgment of this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom (supra). In this case, the Court, after discussing a number of judgments of this Court as well as that of the High Courts, enunciated the principles which need to be kept in mind while dealing with applications fled under the provisions of Order 22, CPC along with an application under section 5, Limitation Act for condonation of delay in fling the application for bringing the legal representatives on record. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held as under :-- “13 (i) The words “sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation” should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words ‘sufficient cause’ in section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fdes, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.” (ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of delay, the Courts are more liberal with reference to applications for setting aside abatement, than other cases. While the Court will have to keep in view that a valuable right accrues to the legal representatives of the deceased respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an appellant with foreclosure of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The Courts tend to set aside abatement and decided the matter on merits. The Courts tend to set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement. (iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. (iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a Court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For example, Courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The Courts view applications relating to lawyer’s lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant’s lapses. For example, Courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The Courts view applications relating to lawyer’s lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant’s lapses. The classic example is the difference in approach of Courts to applications for condonation of delay in fling an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in re-fling the appeal after rectifcation of defects. (v) Want of “diligence” or “inaction” can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, Courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent. Where an appeal is admitted by the High Court and is not expected to be listed for fnal hearing for a few years, an appellant is not expected to visit the Court or his lawyer every few weeks to ascertain the position nor keep checking whether the contesting respondent is alive. He merely awaits the call or information from his counsel about the listing of the appeal. We may also notice here that this judgment had been followed with approval by an equi-bench of this Court in the case of Katari Suryanarayana (supra) . 38. Above are the principles which should control the exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court under these provisions. The explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fde reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly fled beyond the prescribed period of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi-benches of this Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in fling such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. The larger benches as well as equi-benches of this Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in fling such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay in the fling of such applications. 13. Same was the view of the Hon’ble apex Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Nripen Sarma, reported in 2013 (3) MPLJ 5 and this Court in the case of Anoop Choudhary v. Smt. Usha Bhargawa, ILR (2008) MP 1763 has also dismissed the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act on ground of “insufficient cause”. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussion and taking into consideration the aforesaid case laws, this Court fnds that respondent No. 1 has totally failed to show “sufficient cause” to condone the delay and has also failed to show why immediate steps were not taken by respondent No.1. Thus, this Court has no hesitation to reject the applications being IA No.6939/21 under section 5 of the Limitation Act and consequently, IA No.6938/21 under Order 22 rule 9 of CPC and IA No.6937/21 under Order 22 rule 3/11 of CPC. 15. Heard on IA No.7941/2010 under section 5 of the Limitation Act which is barred by 525 days in fling the cross -objection / appeal fled by respondent No. 1. 16. Learned counsel for appellant No. 2 has also fled reply to the aforesaid application being IA No.3535/2017 in detail and prayed for dismissal of the same as well as cross-appeal / objection in preliminary stage on admission. 17. This application (IA No.7941/2010) also deserves to be dismissed as not maintainable due to barred by time and also in absence of satisfactory & reasonable explanation of day to day delay in fling the cross objection (cross appeal). 17. This application (IA No.7941/2010) also deserves to be dismissed as not maintainable due to barred by time and also in absence of satisfactory & reasonable explanation of day to day delay in fling the cross objection (cross appeal). Further, this application has also been fled by misrepresenting the facts and vague and general cause has been shown for condoning the delay which are not under the purview of “Sufficient cause” and moreover, respondent No. 1 has not come before this Court with clean hands and tried to misguide and mislead the Court by putting wrong facts regarding getting information about the death of appellant No. 1. The deceased appellant No. 1 Ramua was the real brother of respondent No. 1 / plaintiff Kodulal as it is axiomatic from the cause title of memo of appeal, cross-appeal/ objection and from the records of the Courts below. The apex Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Nripen Sarma reported in 2013 (3) MPLJ 5 and this Court also in the case of State of M.P. and others v. Virendra Shankar and another reported in 2013 (1) MPLJ 662 , had not condoned the delay in fling the appeal holding that no satisfactory explanation exist for condoning inordinate delay and the Court expressed deep anguish and distress. 18. This Court also expresses deep cogitation about the conduct of respondent No. 1 regarding not getting information about his real brother in time. It is unbelievable that how one person like respondent No.1 can say that he could not get information about the death of his real brother on time. Even in the cause title of cross-objection itself, address of appellant No. 1 and respondent No. 1 are same. Apart from it, respondent No. 1 has mentioned in his application that appellant no.1 was residing in Ranjhi, Jabalpur but no document has been fled regarding address proof of appellant No. 1. 19. Considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter, this application does not survive for consideration and is hereby dismissed. Consequently, the cross–objection / appeal also stands dismissed. 20. Records of both the Courts below be sent back along with a copy of this order to the trial Court for information and necessary action. There shall be no orders as to costs.