Umesh Ram v. Central Coalfields Ltd. through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director
2022-04-11
S.N.PATHAK
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing the letter No. 6075 dated 23/25.09.2014 and letter No. 478 dated 30.01.2016, whereby the claim of the petitioner for compassionate appointment in place of his deceased father namely, Nand Kishore Dom, who died in harness, has been denied. 3. The facts of the case lies in a narrow compass. The father of the petitioner while working under respondent-CCL died on 18.12.2011 and her mother namely, Chamela Devi died on 16.12.2011 i.e. two days’ prior to the death of his father. It is the case of the petitioner that he and his entire family members were fully dependent upon the earnings of his father and after the death of his father, they are facing financial hardship. Hence, the petitioner submitted application before the concerned authority for his appointment on compassionate ground in place of his father, who died in harness. Upon receipt of the application of the petitioner, the concerned authority had asked the petitioner to deposit the educational certificate, in response to which he submitted his 8th pass certificate as at the relevant time matriculation certificate was not available with him. However, as soon as the petitioner got the matriculation certificate, he submitted the same before the respondent-authorities. Thereafter, on 21.07.2014, again the petitioner submitted representation before the General Manager of the respondent-CCL requesting therein to take necessary steps with regard to appointment of the petitioner on compassionate ground. Thereafter vide letter dated 23/25.09.2014 issued by respondent No. 4, it was informed to the petitioner that his application for compassionate appointment under Clause 9.3.0 of NCWA has been regretted by the competent authority. Aggrieved by the said rejection order, the petitioner preferred appeal on 03.06.2015 before the General Manager, CCL, Ranchi, requesting therein to reconsider his case for compassionate appointment. Subsequently, vide letter dated 10.02.2016, it was informed to the petitioner that his case for compassionate appointment cannot be considered for the following reasons: (I) The applicant did not disclose the factum of his qualification as matriculate and produced matriculation certificate in the initial appointment form for compassionate appointment. (II) There is variance in the applicant’s date of birth in his school leaving certificate vis-à-vis matriculation certificate. (III) Earlier at no stage the applicant disclosed his qualification as matriculate till 10.03.2014 i.e. the date when he submitted the matriculation certificate at the area level.
(II) There is variance in the applicant’s date of birth in his school leaving certificate vis-à-vis matriculation certificate. (III) Earlier at no stage the applicant disclosed his qualification as matriculate till 10.03.2014 i.e. the date when he submitted the matriculation certificate at the area level. 4. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted several representations before the respondent-authority stating therein that he passed Matriculation Examination in the year 2010 from Hindi Shikshapith, Patna (Bihar) and in his matriculation certificate, his date of birth is mentioned as 26.06.1987 and as such, his case may be considered for compassionate appointment on sympathetic ground. However, when nothing was done by the respondent-authorities, the petitioner has been constrained to knock the door of this Court for redressal of his grievances. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the date of birth of petitioner is 26.06.1987 as mentioned in his matriculation certificate, he was not over aged at the time of making application for compassionate appointment and as such, he is entitled to get the reliefs as prayed in the instant writ application. Learned counsel further argues that his father was the sole bread-earner of his family and after his death the entire family is facing financial hardship and hence, on sympathetic ground his case for compassionate appointment may be considered. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argues that while regretting his claim for compassionate appointment, the respondents have not mentioned the specific reasons and as such, the said order is not tenable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel further argues that the act of the respondents in rejecting the claim of the petitioner for compassionate appointment, is arbitrary, illegal, malafide and is in complete violation of principles of natural justice. Learned counsel accordingly submits that a direction be given to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for his appointment on compassionate ground in place of his father, who died in harness. 6. Per contra counter-affidavit has been filed.
Learned counsel accordingly submits that a direction be given to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for his appointment on compassionate ground in place of his father, who died in harness. 6. Per contra counter-affidavit has been filed. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-CCL vehemently opposes the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and argues that upon receipt of the application from the petitioner, the available service records of the deceased employee was verified and it was found that the age of the petitioner was mentioned in Service Excerpt as 14 years as on 01.04.1987, whereas in LTC Option Form of deceased employee, Nand Kishore, the same was mentioned as 18 years as on 01.04.1991. Hence, as per service excerpts and LTC form, on the date of application for compassionate appointment i.e. on 25.02.2012, the age of the petitioner was 38 years 10 months 24 days and as per Clause 9.3.4 of NCWA, the maximum age of a male dependent for consideration of his case for compassionate appointment is 35 years, hence, being over aged rightly the case of the petitioner was not considered by the respondent-authorities. Learned counsel further argues that petitioner also submitted a representation dated 10.03.2014 along with the Provisional Certificate of Hindi Sikshapith, Patna (Bihar), stating therein that he has passed matriculation examination and claimed that on the basis of said certificate his age is 32 years on the date of submitting application for compassionate appointment. His case was again re-examined and it was found that he being over age did not disclose the factum of his qualification at the time of submitting his initial application, he is not entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground. 7. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that the case of the petitioner needs consideration for the following facts and reasons: (I) Admittedly, the petitioner is matriculate and in support of his claim, he had produced the matriculation certificate duly issued by the competent Authority. (II) The Matriculation Certificate submitted by the petitioner was never disbelieved at any point of time neither it was held to be forged or issued by an incompetent Authority.
(II) The Matriculation Certificate submitted by the petitioner was never disbelieved at any point of time neither it was held to be forged or issued by an incompetent Authority. (III) The date of birth mentioned in the matriculation certificate was 26.06.1987 and as per the said date of birth, petitioner was less than 35 years of age on the date of submitting application for compassionate appointment. (IV) It is not a case that petitioner has passed matriculation examination after submission of application for compassionate appointment, rather, he had obtained the matriculation certificate in the year 2012 itself. (V) It is settled principle of law that matriculation certificate is a conclusive proof of date of birth even though there are other documents showing different date of birth. 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Shah Nawaz Vs. State of U.P. & Arn., [ (2011) 13 SCC 751 ] has held as under: “20) We are satisfied that the entry relating to date of birth entered in the mark sheet is one of the valid proof of evidence for determination of age of an accused person. The School Leaving Certificate is also a valid proof in determining the age of the accused person. Further, the date of birth mentioned in the High School mark sheet produced by the appellant has duly been corroborated by the School Leaving Certificate of the appellant of Class X and has also been proved by the statement of the clerk of Nehru High School, Dadheru, Khurd-O-Kalan and recorded by the Board. The date of birth of the appellant has also been recorded as 18.06.1989 in School Leaving Certificate issued by the Principal of Nehru Preparatory School, Dadheru, Khurd-O-Kalan, Muzaffarnagar as well as the said date of birth mentioned in the school register of the said school at S. No. 1382 which have been proved by the statement of the Principal of that school recorded before the Board. Apart from the clerk and the Principal of the school, the mother of the appellant has categorically stated on oath that the appellant was born on 18.06.1989 and his date of birth in his academic records from preparatory to Class X is the same, namely, 18.06.1989, hence her statement corroborated his academic records which clearly depose his date of birth as 18.06.1989.
Accordingly, the appellant was a juvenile on the date of occurrence that is 04.06.2007 as alleged in the FIR dated 04.06.2007.” Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of M.P., [ (2012) 9 SCC 750 ] has held as under: “32. Age determination inquiry” contemplated under Section 7-A of the Act read with Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules enables the court to seek evidence and in that process, the court can obtain the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available. Only in the absence of any matriculation or equivalent certificates, the court needs to obtain the date of birth certificate from the school first attended other than a play school. Only in the absence of matriculation or equivalent certificate or the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, the court needs to obtain the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat (not an affidavit but certificates or documents). The question of obtaining medical opinion from a duly constituted Medical Board arises only if the abovementioned documents are unavailable. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, then the court, for reasons to be recorded, may, if considered necessary, give the benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his or her age on lower side within the margin of one year. 34. Age determination inquiry contemplated under the JJ Act and the 2007 Rules has nothing to do with an enquiry under other legislations, like entry in service, retirement, promotion, etc. There may be situations where the entry made in the matriculation or equivalent certificates, date of birth certificate from the school first attended and even the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat may not be correct. But court, Juvenile Justice Board or a committee functioning under the JJ Act is not expected to conduct such a roving enquiry and to go behind those certificates to examine the correctness of those documents, kept during the normal course of business. Only in cases where those documents or certificates are found to be fabricated or manipulated, the court, the Juvenile Justice Board or the committee need to go for medical report for age determination.” Further, the Full Bench of this Court reiterated the same view in case of Kamta Pandey Vs.
Only in cases where those documents or certificates are found to be fabricated or manipulated, the court, the Juvenile Justice Board or the committee need to go for medical report for age determination.” Further, the Full Bench of this Court reiterated the same view in case of Kamta Pandey Vs. BCCL & Ors., reported in 2007 (3) JLJR 726 , has held as under: “27. In these decisions, though it is observed that the employee will not normally be permitted to apply for change of his date of birth at the fag end of his service career, the Supreme Court clearly held that if the Court is fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed and when a clear case, relating to the date of birth, is made out on the basis of clinching materials, then necessary direction to make a declaration of the said date of birth can be given. 28. In this case, as indicated above, it cannot be said that the claim has been made only at the fag end of the service. On the other hand, some of the records of the Company, like Identity Card and Seva Ab-hilekh, which have been issued immediately after appointment, would indicate that his date of birth had been mentioned as 1.7.1951 as reflected in the Matriculation Certificate. Therefore, above decisions cited by the counsel for the respondents dealing with claim at the fag end would not be of any help to the respondents. 29. In view of the above discussion, our answer to the question raised in this case is as follows: The date of birth recorded in the Matriculation Certificate duly authenticated by the Education Board is a conclusive proof of age and no other records, including service records as both the parties are governed by Implementation Instruction No. 76 of National Coal Wage Agreement-III. 30. In the light of the above answer, we think it fit to give a direction to Bharat Coking Coal Limited to make necessary correction in the date of birth in the petitioner's service records as 1.7.1951 as per the Matriculation Certificate and pass consequential orders.” 9. The rejection order dated 23/25.09.2014 and 30.01.2016 are not tenable in the eyes of law, as the same are cryptic, capricious and non-speaking.
The rejection order dated 23/25.09.2014 and 30.01.2016 are not tenable in the eyes of law, as the same are cryptic, capricious and non-speaking. No reason has been assigned as to why the case of the petitioner has been regretted by the competent Authority. Later on the reasons have been assigned in the counter-affidavit, which cannot improve the impugned order in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 10. The Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Police, Bombay Vs. Gordhandas Bhanji, reported in AIR 1952 SC 16 and further in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 , has clearly held that no reasons can be supplied in the counter affidavit to justify a thoroughly non-speaking order otherwise all the non-speaking and arbitrary orders will be converted into well-reasoned and speaking orders by the passage of time, by way of counter affidavits filed in the Court. It has been clearly held that no reasons can be supplied subsequently in the counter affidavit filed in the Court. It has also been held that the statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons as mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. Para-9 of the Judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Police, Bombay Vs. Gordhandas Bhanji (supra), reads as under: "9. An attempt was made by referring to the Commissioner's affidavit to show that this was really an order of cancellation made by him and that the order was his order and not that of Government. We are clear that public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority, cannot be construed in the light of the explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind or what he intended to do.
We are clear that public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority, cannot be construed in the light of the explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting’s and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." The aforesaid proposition has been followed in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill (Supra). Para-8 of the said Judgment is relevant to be quoted hereunder: "8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji: Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority can not be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting’s and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older." 11. Even taking into consideration the variation in date of birth mentioned in the School Leaving Certificate and Matriculation Certificate, the date of birth mentioned in the Matriculation Certificate has to be considered as valid one. The reason assigned by the respondents is not acceptable to this Court that it was not submitted at the time of initial appointment. Admittedly, the matriculation certificate was submitted before the final order was passed for compassionate appointment.
The reason assigned by the respondents is not acceptable to this Court that it was not submitted at the time of initial appointment. Admittedly, the matriculation certificate was submitted before the final order was passed for compassionate appointment. Final order has been passed only in the year 2016, prior to which petitioner was already in possession of the matriculation certification and submitted the same before the competent Authority. 12. From the documents brought on record, it appears that on the date of making application for compassionate appointment, the petitioner was less than 35 years of age and as such, fit for appointment on compassionate ground. The reasons assigned by the respondent-authorities is not tenable in the eyes of law and the action of the respondents in not considering the case of the petitioner for compassionate appointment is illegal, arbitrary and fit to be set aside. 13. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, the letter No. 6075 dated 23/25.09.2014 and letter No. 478 dated 30.01.2016 are hereby quashed and set aside. As a result of quashment of the order/ rejection letters, I hereby direct the respondents to reconsider the case of the petitioner for compassionate appointment and if there is no other legal impediment, issue letter of appointment in favour of the petitioner. 14. Let the entire exercise be completed within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt/ production of a copy of this order. 15. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition stands allowed.