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2022 DIGILAW 438 (MAD)

Krishnamurthy v. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police, Thiruvallur

2022-02-18

P.N.PRAKASH, R.HEMALATHA

body2022
JUDGMENT : P.N. PRAKASH, J. Prayer: Criminal Appeal filed under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 30.12.2011 passed in S.C. No. 90 of 2009 on the file of the Additional District and Sessions Court, (Fast Track Court No. III), Thiruvallur and to set aside the same. 1. This criminal appeal has been filed against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 30.12.2011 passed in S.C. No. 90 of 2009 on the file of the Additional District and Sessions Court, (Fast Track Court No. III), Thiruvallur and to set aside the same. 2. It is the case of the prosecution that on 17.08.2006, around 2.30 p.m. while the deceased Selvaraj along with Krishnamurthy (PW-1), Santhi (PW-2), Valliamma (PW-3), Chokkammal (PW-4) and Subramani (PW-6) were returning to the village, Kumaresan (A1), Parvathy (A2), Balaji (A3), Babu (A4), Rajkumar (A5), Malathy (A6), Rajeswari (A7), Kollapan (A8), Venkatesan (A9) and Venkatesan (A10), on account of previous enmity, waylaid them and attacked them indiscriminately with knives resulting in the death of Selvaraj. 3. On these allegations, Kumaresan (A1), Parvathy (A2), Balaji (A3), Babu (A4), Rajkumar (A5), Malathy (A6), Rajeswari (A7), Kollapan (A8), Venkatesan (A9) and Venkatesan (A10) faced a trial in S.C. No. 90 of 2009 in the Additional District and Sessions Court, (Fast Track Court No. III), Thiruvallur, for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 294(b), 302, 323, 324, 341 IPC in the Additional District and Sessions Court, (Fast Track Court No. III), Thiruvallur. 4. To prove the case, the prosecution examined eighteen witnesses and marked twenty one exhibits and eight material objects. 5. After considering the evidence on record and hearing either side, the trial Court, by judgment and order dated 30.12.2011, acquitted all the accused of all the charges, aggrieved by which, Krishnamurthy (PW-1), de facto complainant, filed Crl. R.C. No. 393 of 2012, which has been converted to a regular appeal in Crl. Appeal No. 140 of 2020. 6. Heard Mr. R. Sankarasubbu, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. R. Muniyapparaj, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the first respondent. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial Court has not given any cogent reasons for disbelieving the testimony of Krishnamurthy (PW-1), Santhi (PW-2), Valliamma (PW-3), Chokkammal (PW-4), Kuppammal (A5) and Subramani (PW-6). 6. Heard Mr. R. Sankarasubbu, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. R. Muniyapparaj, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the first respondent. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial Court has not given any cogent reasons for disbelieving the testimony of Krishnamurthy (PW-1), Santhi (PW-2), Valliamma (PW-3), Chokkammal (PW-4), Kuppammal (A5) and Subramani (PW-6). He further submitted that the trial Court ought to have believed the complaint (Ex-P1) and not disbelieved it. It is his further submission that the trial Court ought not to have disbelieved the recoveries of material objects viz. knife (M.O.1) and iron rod (M.O.2). 8. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor placed the facts of the case at hand. 9. This Court gave its anxious consideration to the rival submissions. 10. In our opinion, the trial Court has given a finding that the complaint (Ex-P1) in this case was lodged very belatedly even though the alleged incident had taken place in the afternoon, while Selvaraj and others were returning from the Court of Magistrate after attending a case. 11. In paragraph no. 22 of the impugned judgment and order, the trial Court has stated that the Kristi (PW-13) Sub-Inspector of Police, who registered the FIR, had stated that she received information at 10.00 p.m. about the attack and only thereafter, FIR was registered. 12. That apart, Krishnamurthy (PW-1), de facto complainant, has not even stated clearly about the place of occurrence. 13. Natarajan (PW-10), in his evidence, has stated that all the accused attacked not only Selvaraj, but the other witnesses viz. Krishnamurthy (PW-1), Santhi (PW-2), Valliamma (PW-3), Chokkammal (PW-4) and Subramani (PW-6), whereas, it is seen that none of these witnesses had stated that they were injured in the incident, but, they have stated that they have run away when the occurrence took place. 14. The trial Court has found that when Selvaraj was taken to the hospital, it was stated that eight known persons had attacked Selvaraj as could be seen from the Accident Register (Ex-P18). However in the Accident Register (Ex-P19) issued by the hospital, it is stated that three known persons had attacked Selvaraj with sticks and knife. 14. The trial Court has found that when Selvaraj was taken to the hospital, it was stated that eight known persons had attacked Selvaraj as could be seen from the Accident Register (Ex-P18). However in the Accident Register (Ex-P19) issued by the hospital, it is stated that three known persons had attacked Selvaraj with sticks and knife. It may be relevant to extract the following finding of the trial Court: “Though PW-1 deposed that number of witnesses PW-2, 3, 4, 6 were assaulted with hand, stone and stick, no injury was sustained by any of the witnesses and they have not spoken about it. PW-1 deposed that at Government General hospital he told the doctor that in a fight his brother was assaulted. PW-1 has not explained it as to what he had meant by it.” 15. Similarly in paragraph no. 31 of the impugned judgment and order, the trial Court has returned the following finding: “The overt acts of the accused is spoken by the witnesses though argued by the prosecution side, none of the witnesses had deposed about the attack on them and they had deposed only about the attack on the deceased and the evidence of PW-1 to 6 and 10 do not have corroboration with respect to the place of attack and the weapon used by them.” 16. On perusal of the records, we do not find the reasonings of the trial Judge for acquitting the accused to be perverse warranting interference in appeal. 17. Thus, when two views are possible on the evidence available on record, the view that favours the accused merits acceptance. In this context, it may be apposite to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in V. Sejappa vs. State (2016) 12 SCC 150 , wherein, the Supreme Court, has broadly catalogued the parameters to be borne in mind by the Court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal. The said parameters laid down by the Supreme Court are profitably extracted hereunder: “23.......Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court. (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal. (iii) Though, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified. (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.” 18. In the result, this criminal appeal stands dismissed as being devoid of merits.