ORDER : Dated this the 7th day of June, 2022 This Crl.M.C. has been filed to quash Annexure A1 FIR in Crime No.482/2021 of Mukkom Police Station, Kozhikode Rural u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). 2. The petitioners are brothers. They have been arrayed as the accused in the crime mentioned above. The 4th respondent is the wife of the first petitioner. She is a member of a Scheduled Caste. The petitioners are not members of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 3. The offences alleged against the petitioners are punishable under Sections 376, 420, 506 r/w 34 of IPC and S.3(1) (w)(i) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short the SC/ST Act). The crime was registered pursuant to a private complaint filed by the 4th respondent at the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Thamarassery. Annexure A2 is the copy of the private complaint. 4. Admittedly, the first petitioner got acquainted with the 4 th respondent during 2020 and the said relationship developed into intimacy. Later, they got married on 28/4/2021 at Sreekrishna Temple according to customary rites. Annexure A3 is the true copy of the relevant page of the marriage register. 5. The prosecution allegations in short are as follows: The first petitioner is a contractor and does works of aluminium fabrication. He got acquainted with the 4th respondent while she was working in a chit company. On 7/1/2021, the 4th respondent met the first petitioner at Family Court, Kozhikode. He offered to do the fabrication works of her house at a minimum rate. Following this, he reached the house of the 4th respondent on 9/1/2021 morning, took measurements of the fabrication works and went out to purchase materials. The 4th respondent was alone at the house at that time. When the first petitioner returned with materials for work, he asked for some more amount as the amount given to him by her was insufficient. The 4th respondent went inside the house to take money from the shelf in the bedroom. Then, he followed her, caught her, threatened to kill her by showing a knife and raped her. The 4th respondent was afraid of the first petitioner and hence she did not disclose the matter to anybody. Thereafter, the first petitioner took her to various places and sexually exploited her several times. Then, he followed her, caught her, threatened to kill her by showing a knife and raped her. The 4th respondent was afraid of the first petitioner and hence she did not disclose the matter to anybody. Thereafter, the first petitioner took her to various places and sexually exploited her several times. When she became pregnant, she decided to file a complaint against him. In order to get over the legal action, the first petitioner married her on 28/4/2021 at Sreekrishna Temple. After the marriage, in the last week of May, the first petitioner absconded from the house, cutting off all communication with the 4th respondent deliberately and thereby cheated her. The second petitioner threatened to kill the 4th respondent when she tried to contact the first petitioner over the phone. It was thereafter the 4th respondent filed Annexure A2 private complaint at the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Thamarassery. The petitioners seek to quash Annexure A1 FIR, Annexure A2 complaint and all further proceedings pursuant to the same. 6. I have heard Sri. T.C.Govindaswamy, the learned counsel for the petitioners, Smt.M.K.Pushpalatha, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor and Smt. K.L. Sreekala, the learned counsel for the 4th respondent. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners Sri. C.Govindaswamy submitted that criminal proceeding in Annexures A1 and A2 has been initiated against the petitioners falsely and maliciously with an ulterior motive and not based on real facts. The counsel further submitted that the allegations made in the complaint even if taken at their face value, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out any case against the petitioners. All the allegations against the petitioners are malicious, made with ulterior intention for blackmailing, taking advantage of the innocence of the petitioners and helplessness of their parents, submitted the counsel. Per contra, Smt. K.L. Sreekala, the learned counsel for the 4th respondent submitted that Annexure A2 complaint discloses serious allegations of sexual assault against the petitioners and that it is impermissible to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code when there are serious triable allegations in the complaint. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor Smt.M.K.Pushpalatha submitted that the ingredients of the offences alleged are attracted and when a prima facie case is made out, the jurisdiction vested with this court u/s 482 of Cr.P.C cannot be invoked. 8. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor Smt.M.K.Pushpalatha submitted that the ingredients of the offences alleged are attracted and when a prima facie case is made out, the jurisdiction vested with this court u/s 482 of Cr.P.C cannot be invoked. 8. The scope and ambit of the power by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the FIR/investigation has been expounded by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana (1977 KHC 711), the Apex Court observed and held that inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice; that statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and Others [ (1977) 2 SCC 699 ], considering the scope of inherent power of quashing under S.482, the Apex Court held that in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that ends of justice so require. It was observed that in a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice and that the ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and Others v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and Others [ (1988) 1 SCC 692 ], it was held that while exercising inherent power of quashing under S.482, it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where in the opinion of the Court, chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings. Where in the opinion of the Court, chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings. In the celebrated decision State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 KHC 600), the Apex Court considered in detail the scope of the High Court’s powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the FIR and referred to several judicial precedents and held that the High Court should not embark upon an inquiry into the merits and demerits of the allegations and quash the proceedings without allowing the investigating agency to complete its task. At the same time, the Court identified the following cases in which FIR/complaint can be quashed: “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” In State of A.P v. Golconda Linga Swamy (2004 KHC 1342), after considering the decision in Bhajan Lal (supra) and other decisions on the exercise of inherent powers by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., it was held that exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code is the exception and not the rule. It was observed in paragraph 8 thus: “Exercise of power under S.482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the Section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the Section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alique concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the Section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercises of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto”. In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Sharaful Haque (2004 KHC 1204), in paragraph 11, it was observed and held thus: “11. … the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Sharaful Haque (2004 KHC 1204), in paragraph 11, it was observed and held thus: “11. … the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.” In State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005 KHC 17), it was held thus: '29. Regarding the argument of accused having to face the trial despite being in a position to produce material of unimpeachable character of sterling quality, the width of the powers of the High Court under S.482 of the Code and Art.226 of Constitution of India is unlimited whereunder in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal's case.' In Sanapareddy Maheedhar and Another v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008 (1) KHC 224), in paragraph 31, it was observed and held thus: “....The High Court should be extremely cautious and slow to interfere with the investigation and/or trial of criminal cases and should not stall the investigation and/or prosecution except when it is convinced beyond any manner of doubt that FIR does not disclose the commission of any offence or that allegations contained in FIR do not constitute any cognizable offence or that the prosecution is barred by law or the High Court is convinced that it is necessary to interfere to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.” In Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [ (1999) 8 SCC 728 ], after referring Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar [ (1985) 2 SCC 370 ], it was observed and held thus: “It is also settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 Cr.PC to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se; it has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations.” In Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar and Others (2009 KHC 240), it was observed that the width of the powers of the High Court under S.482 of the Cr.P.C and under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, was unlimited and that the High Court could make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It was further observed, that under S.482 of the Cr.P.C, the High Court was free to consider even material, that may be produced on behalf of the accused, to arrive at a decision. 9. Recently in M/s.Neeharika Infrastucture Pvt. Ltd v. State of Maharashtra & Others ( AIR 2021 SC 1918 ), it was held that when a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence or not. It was further observed that the court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR. In fact, Neeharika (supra) reiterates the parameters laid down in the celebrated decision in Bhajan Lal (supra). It was further observed that the court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR. In fact, Neeharika (supra) reiterates the parameters laid down in the celebrated decision in Bhajan Lal (supra). One of the cardinal principles evolved in Bhajan Lal (supra) found in paragraph 102 (7) reads as follows: “Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge” In paragraph 37 of the decision in Neeharika (supra), the above passage from Bhajan Lal (supra) is extracted. In fact Bhajan Lal (supra) took note of the view expressed by Bhagwati, C.J. in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1983 KHC 434) to the effect “that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of malafides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant.” Yet Bhajan Lal (supra) laid down seven principles in paragraph 102, the last one of which was extracted above. The seven principles enunciated in paragraph 102 of Bhajan Lal (supra) are actually quoted with approval in Neeharika (See A.P. Mahesh Cooperative Urban Bank Shareholders Welfare Association v. Ramesh Kumar Bung and Ors, MANU/SC/0459/2021). 10. A careful reading of the above-noted judgments makes it clear that the High Court should be extremely cautious and slow to interfere with the investigation and/or trial of criminal cases and should not stall the investigation and/or prosecution. However, when it is convinced beyond any manner of doubt that FIR does not disclose the commission of any offence or that the allegations contained in the FIR do not constitute any cognizable offence or that the prosecution is barred by law or where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafides or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance or that it is necessary to interfere to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, the High Court is entitled to quash the FIR/investigation under the exercise of its wholesome power u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. 11. A perusal of the case diary would show that the investigation has reached a fair stage. All the material witnesses were questioned and their statements were recorded. The statement of the 4th respondent u/s 164 of Cr.P.C. was also recorded. The mahazar of the places where the 4th respondent was allegedly sexually assaulted was prepared. The medical examination of the first petitioner and the 4th respondent is also over. Caste certificates were collected and material objects were seized. As per the report of the investigating officer dated 3/3/2022, what is remaining to be done in the investigation is to seize the motorcycle used by the first petitioner and also to collect scene plan and ownership certificate. 12. The statement of the mother of the 4th respondent would show that the 4th respondent was married to one Ramesh in the year 2017. In the same year itself, the said marriage was dissolved through the court. Thereafter, on 1/12/2019, she married one Sri.Anoop. A daughter was born in the said relationship. Now, she is aged 13 years. Soon thereafter, marital dispute arose between them which resulted in the institution of legal proceedings before various courts. The original petition for divorce was pending before the Family Court, Kozhikode. It was while the 4th respondent went to the Family Court on 7/1/2021 in connection with the said case, the first petitioner allegedly met her. It is pertinent to note that the alleged sexual acts between the first petitioner and the 4th respondent took place during the subsistence of the marriage of the 4th respondent with Sri.Anoop. It is also pertinent to note that the marriage between the first petitioner and the 4th respondent took place during the subsistence of the marriage between the 4th respondent and Sri.Anoop. According to the 4th respondent, the first sexual assault was committed on 9/1/2021 at her house in the manner described in paragraph No.5 above. The said story projected appears to be quite improbable and unbelievable. It is pertinent to note that after the said incident, she did not disclose the said incident to anybody. Rather the statement of CWs2, 3 and 5 would show that the first petitioner is a regular visitor at the house of the 4th respondent since January 2021. Even the daughter of the 4th respondent admitted that the first petitioner used to regularly visit their house and stay there. Rather the statement of CWs2, 3 and 5 would show that the first petitioner is a regular visitor at the house of the 4th respondent since January 2021. Even the daughter of the 4th respondent admitted that the first petitioner used to regularly visit their house and stay there. That apart, the statement of the 4th respondent would show that after the alleged incident on 9/1/2021, both of them stayed in a homestay at Ooty on 22/2/2021, at a resort at Vythiri on 18/2/2021 and in a lodge at Athirapally on 13/3/2021 and had consensual sex. She further admitted that after the incident on 9/1/2021, they had sex many times at her house itself. Eventually, they got married also. The marriage was on 28/4/2021. Admittedly, the first petitioner left the matrimonial home on 26/5/2021. On the next day itself, the 4th respondent preferred a complaint before the Mukkom Police Station alleging that the first petitioner was missing from 26/5/2021. An FIR was registered pursuant to the said complaint. Annexure A5 is the said FIR. Annexure A6 is the First Information Statement given by the 4th respondent. In Annexures A5 or A6, there is absolutely no allegation of sexual assault as stated in Annexure A2 complaint. The 4th respondent has also preferred Annexure A9, MC No. 24/2021 under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Thamarassery. In Annexure A9 also, there is absolutely no case that any sexual assault or any other offence was committed by the petitioners. Thereafter, after a lapse of five months, Annexure A2 complaint was filed. 13. Annexure A10 would show that the 4th respondent preferred original petition against her second husband Sri.Anoop for restitution of conjugal rights at the Family Court, Kozhikode on 15/12/2020 as OP No.1184/2020. It was during the subsistence of the said case; the 4th respondent married the first petitioner. According to the first petitioner, the factum of the earlier marriage of the 4th respondent was never disclosed to him. It is also pertinent to note that the 4th respondent has also filed MC No.80/2020 against Sri.Anoop before the Family Court, Kozhikode claiming maintenance. At the same time, she filed MC against the first petitioner as well claiming maintenance as evident from Annexure A8. It is also pertinent to note that the 4th respondent has also filed MC No.80/2020 against Sri.Anoop before the Family Court, Kozhikode claiming maintenance. At the same time, she filed MC against the first petitioner as well claiming maintenance as evident from Annexure A8. It is pertinent to note that the proceedings against the second husband including for maintenance have been initiated before the Family Court whereas the proceedings for maintenance against the first petitioner herein have been initiated before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Thamarassery under the DV Act. 14. The sequence of events mentioned above would clearly show that Annexure A1 crime registered at the instance of the 4th respondent pursuant to Annexure A2 complaint is maliciously and falsely instituted. It is true, ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising from special statutes such as SC/ST Act, the court will be circumspect in its approach to quash the proceedings invoking S.482 of Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, if there is a false and unsubstantiated FIR, the power u/s 482 of Cr.P.C could be invoked. [See Union of India v. State of Maharashtra and Others ( 2019 (5) KHC 57 )]. The Apex Court while examining the constitutionality of the provisions of the amending Act (Central Act No.27/2018), in Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India and Others ( 2020 (2) KHC 423 ) has held that the court can in exceptional cases exercise power u/s 482 of Cr.P.C for quashing the cases to prevent misuse of the provisions on settled parameters. Recently, in Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (LL 2021 SC 589), the Apex Court held that the criminal proceedings arising out of SC/ST Act can be quashed invoking powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India or S.482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed that the mere fact that the offence is covered under a special statute would not refrain the Supreme Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India or S.482 of the Cr.P.C. It was further held that in cases where it appears to the court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. As stated already in Bhajan Lal (supra), the Apex Court has held that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceedings is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, the power u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. could be invoked. For the reasons stated above, I am of the view that this case is one that falls in the said category. 15. There is no case in Annexure A2 complaint or in A1 FIR or in the statement of the 4th respondent recorded u/s 161 or 164 of Cr.P.C that the offences alleged were committed only for the reason that the 4th respondent belonged to the Scheduled Caste community. The offence under the SC/ST Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste [See Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand and Another ( AIR 2020 SC 5584 )]. In the entire private complaint filed by the 4th respondent, there is no case that the alleged offences were committed for the reason of the 4th respondent being a member of Scheduled Caste. In the entire private complaint filed by the 4th respondent, there is no case that the alleged offences were committed for the reason of the 4th respondent being a member of Scheduled Caste. Thus, the allegation of offences under the SC/ST Act would not lie even on the face of the complaint and the FIR. In the light of the above findings, I am of the firm view that no useful purpose will be served by allowing the criminal prosecution against the petitioners to continue. Hence, all further proceedings in Crime No.482/2021 of Mukkom Police Station, Kozhikode Rural stand hereby quashed. Crl.M.C. is allowed as above.