Mohammad Nayeem Khan S/o. Shri Mohammad Abdul Waheed Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh)
2022-10-11
NARENDRA KUMAR VYAS
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 28.02.1997 passed by the Vth Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge of CBI Jabalpur (MP) in Special Case No. 49/87 whereby the Appellant has been convicted under Section 420, 468, 471 read with Section 120-B IPC and sentenced him to undergo RI for 1 year and to pay fine of Rs. 5000/- for each sections, in default of payment of fine, RI for six months for each sections. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that accused Vinod Shah was posted as Branch Manager of Dena Bank in the year 1982-83, and at the same time co-accused Arun Waretwar was posted as clerk in the Oriental Beema Insurance Company, Raipur. It is alleged that the accused/appellants in connivance with co-accused Mohammad Nayeem Khan have prepared forged documents in the name of one Ashok Chandrakar and had taken loan of Rs. 24,000/- from Dena Bank, Branch Dhamtari for purchase of bore well machine and hatched the conspiracy for defrauding the Bank. It is alleged that accused Vinod Shah had issued draft (Ex.P-18) who abused their position as public servants prepared false draft and other co-accused Mohammad Nayeem Khan impersonated himself as Vimal Kumar Jain proprietor of Firm Vimal Engineering Works and had withdrawn the amount of Rs. 24,000/- from Punjab National Bank. The incident was reported by bank and on the basis of information, first information report was registered against the appellant on 03.09.1986 as (Ex.P-103) and on the basis of credible information received the then Superintendent of Police CBI, Jabalpur, registered Crime No. RC 39/86 and offence under Section 420, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC was registered also against him. 3. After completion of the investigation and all the formalities for filing charge sheet, the charge sheet was filed against the Appellant Mohammad Nayeem Khan was charged with offence under Section 120B, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC. The appellant denied the charges and prayed for trial. 4.
3. After completion of the investigation and all the formalities for filing charge sheet, the charge sheet was filed against the Appellant Mohammad Nayeem Khan was charged with offence under Section 120B, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC. The appellant denied the charges and prayed for trial. 4. To bring home the guilt of the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 14 witnesses namely Puneetram (PW-1) retired patwari, M. Sadanand Sharma (PW-2), R.P. Kanna (PW-3), Abdul Hussain (PW-4), Motilal Yadav (PW-5), M.P. Gupta (PW-6), Kholuram Sonkar (PW-7), Dilip Dosi (PW-8), N.K. Pratap (PW-9), L.N. Tiwari (PW-10), N.K. Sharma (PW- 11), Kuleshwar Prashad Sharma (PW-12), Hand writing expert K.K. Semwal (PW-13) and Jagjot Singh Ragada (PW-14). In order to prove the guilt of the accused persons, prosecution has examined Punitram (PW-1) wherein he has not stated anything against the appellant, but only made allegations against the appellant No. 1 and 2. Similarly S. Sadanand (PW-2) retired Dy. General Manager of the Bank, has also not stated anything against the appellant. Witness S.C. Gupta (PW-6) has exhibited the bank opening documents (Ex.P-6 to Ex.P-10) and categorically stated that in Ex.P-6 the signature of Vinod Shah is there and Ex.P.-10 has been filled up by Vinod Shah. But this witness has no where stated about the involvement of appellant in the commission of offence. N.K. Pratap (PW-9) has verified the signature of accused Namely Vinod Shah. In the cross-examination, this witness has clearly admitted that he has not sent any letter to verify whether Vimal Engineering has given the bore well machine to Ashok Chandrakar or not and he has also admitted that he has not verified whether the draft has been given to Vimal Engineering. The witness has not stated anything against appellant. M.L. Tiwari (PW-10) has exhibited the record related to registration form. This witness has not stated anything against the appellant. Kuleshwar Prashad Verma (PW-12) who was working as peon in the Insurance company has stated in his examination-in-chief that he has received payment of Rs. 24,000/- (Ex.P-31) and he has given to Arun Waretwar, but he has not stated anything about appellant. 5. The star witness of the prosecution is the handwriting expert J.K. Samwal (PW-13) who was working as Assistant Director National Institute of Criminology Forensic New Delhi.
24,000/- (Ex.P-31) and he has given to Arun Waretwar, but he has not stated anything about appellant. 5. The star witness of the prosecution is the handwriting expert J.K. Samwal (PW-13) who was working as Assistant Director National Institute of Criminology Forensic New Delhi. He has stated that he has stated he was working independently as hand-writing expert since 1976 and has examined 10,000/- documents and has given his opinion. He has stated that he is examining the documents scientifically for which he is utilizing various scientific instruments like micro scope, measuring micro scope and others. The witness in his examination-in-chief has stated that sample documents Ex.P-36,37,39 40 and 41 have been written by Mohammad Nayeem Khan. He has also stated that Ex.P-43 to Ex.P-54 and document Ex.P-66 to Ex.P-69 have been written by Arun Kumar Waratwar. The witness was cross-examined by Appellant, who in the cross-examination has stated that he has given the opinion on the sample documents which have been written at one or two places. He has also stated that if there is signature in the document or any other things are there that have been examined by him. He has also admitted that handwriting is changing if there is time gap in writing and due to change of age. He has also stated that if a person writs in small quantity then changes can take place after delay. He has also stated that after seeing the hand-writing it cannot be said that what would be the age. He has also stated that the document can be examined by honesty and scientific manner then different opinion cannot be given but there is no such examination that the opinion may be differed. 6. After conclusion of the prosecution evidence, the appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., in which they denied all the incriminating evidence against them, pleaded innocence and false implication. The appellant in their defences have examined R.C. Sahu (DW-1), Ramesh Chandra Jain (DW-2), Suresh Yadav (DW-3), appellant has examined Chandrashekar Sarvate (DW-4) hand writing and finger print expert in his defence. The appellant exhibited documents (Ex.D-1 to Ex.D-3) in his support.
The appellant in their defences have examined R.C. Sahu (DW-1), Ramesh Chandra Jain (DW-2), Suresh Yadav (DW-3), appellant has examined Chandrashekar Sarvate (DW-4) hand writing and finger print expert in his defence. The appellant exhibited documents (Ex.D-1 to Ex.D-3) in his support. The appellant to rebut the allegation of the prosecution has also examined one handwriting expert namely Chandrashekar Sarvate (DW- 4), who has stated that he is doing the job of handwriting expert and he has completed more than 45 years in his job and he has also verified more than 20 thousand cases. He has the document and it is not written by the present appellant. He has stated that in Ex.P-36 and 37 the appellant has not put his signature. This witness was cross-examined by the prosecution, he has nothing brought on record to rebut the evidence adduced on record. In light of the above evidence, material on record, this Court is required to ascertain whether on the basis of the report of handwriting expert, offence under Section 120-B, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC can be said to have been proved or not. 7. On completion of the trial, the impugned judgment has been passed in which the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as aforementioned. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that merely on the basis of handwriting expert the appellant cannot be convicted for commission of offence under Section 120-B IPC as none of the prosecution witnesses has adduced any cogent evidence against the appellant. He would further submit that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the commission of offence by the appellant for which he was charge sheeted. The prosecution witnesses nowhere stated that there is ingredient of criminal conspiracy as levelled against him and it has been proved as meeting of mind has been established by the prosecution which is essential ingredient for criminal conspiracy. He would further submit that there is no direct evidence or circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the charges levelled against the appellant, therefore, the conviction based on the basis of handwriting expert suffers from surmises and conjunctures and deserves to be set aside by this Court. He would further submit that if there is difference of opinion of two hand-writing experts then benefit of doubt should go to infavour of the accused.
He would further submit that if there is difference of opinion of two hand-writing experts then benefit of doubt should go to infavour of the accused. He would further submit that learned trial Court should have considered that there are two hand-writing expert opinions who have given contradictory opinions, therefore, the trial Court should have applied its judicial mind before convicting the appellant to rely upon the opinion of hand-writing expert examined by the prosecution. Even he has not assigned any reason to rely upon the opinion given by the expert appointed by the prosecution thus it is apparent mistake on the part of the trial Court to convict the appellant and would pray for allowing the appeal. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the matter of S.Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1996) 4 SCC 596 , Mahendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (1972) 4 SCC 715 , Kishan Chand vs. Sita Ram and others AIR 2005 P & H 156, Padum Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2020) 3 SCC 35 , Murarka Properties (P) Ltd. vs. Beharilal Murarka and others (1978) 1 SCC 109 , Sait Tarajee Khimchand and Ors vs. Yelamarti Satyam Alias Saeyya and Ors (1972)4 SCC 562 , M.S. Narayana Menon Alias Mani vs. State of Kerala and Anr. (2006) 6 SCC 39 , Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Daya Sapra (Smt) (2009) 13 SCC 729 , Anwar Ali and Anr. vs. State of Himanchal Pradesh (2020) 10 SCC 166 , Narendra Singh and Anr. vs. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699 , Wakkar and Anr. vs. State of U.P (2011) 3 SCC 306 , Anjlus Dungdung vs. State of Jharkhand (2005) 9 SCC 765 , Ram Das v. State of Maharashtra (1977) SCC 124, State of UP vs. Baburam (2000) 4 SCC 515 , Munshi Prasad and Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 351 . 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the CBI would submit that judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court against the appellant is legal and justified and does not warrant interference by this Court. He would further submit that the handwriting expert has given the opinion (Ex.P- 36 to Ex.P-41) relating to Appellant and he is the beneficiary, therefore, the offence u/s 120-B is clearly made out against the appellant.
He would further submit that the handwriting expert has given the opinion (Ex.P- 36 to Ex.P-41) relating to Appellant and he is the beneficiary, therefore, the offence u/s 120-B is clearly made out against the appellant. He would further submit that in the withdrawal form he has put his signature, therefore, the circumstances are against the appellant which clearly speaks about the involvement of the appellant in the commission of the offence. He would further submit that there is chain of circumstances which shows the involvement of the appellant in the alleged commission of offence, therefore, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court is legal and justified and does not call for interference by this Court. Learned counsel for the CBI would rely on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bai Hira Devi and others vs. Official Assignee of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 448 , Bilal Hajar Alias Abdul Hameed v. State Represented by Inspector of Police 2019 (17) SCC 451 , Central Bureasu of Investigation and Anr. vs. Mohd. Parvez abdul Kayuum and Ors. 2019(12) SCC 1 . 10. I have head learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. The issue involved in this case is whether the conviction of the appellant under Sections 120-B, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC on the basis of two different opinions of hand-writing experts available on record is justified or not? 12. For batter understanding the facts involved in the case it is expedient for this Court to extract Section 120-B IPC which is as under :- 120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.— (1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, [imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had ab etted such offence. (2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both. 13.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both. 13. Learned trial Court while convicting the appellant in paragraph 20 of its judgment has observed that J.K. Samual who was appointed as Assistant Examiner has given his report the said report, has been verified by Sr. Examiner Santosh Singh whereas the hand-writing expert engaged by the appellant namely Chandrashekar Sarwate has been engaged by him after paying the fee and the said documents were examined by him after getting photo through its subordinate person and then he has submitted his report, therefore, the report submitted by the prosecution is more reliable. On the basis of report examined by the prosecution the trial Court has recorded a finding that Ex.P-40 and Ex.P 41 have been written by accused/appellant, as such only on the basis of opinion of other expert the report cannot be ignored. No other material has been brought before the trial Court to convict the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 420,468,471 and 120-B IPC. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that this finding is contrary to the well settled position of law that merely on the basis of opinion of hand-writing expert appellant should not be convicted. He would further submit that from bare perusal of Section 120-B IPC it is necessary that the prosecution should prove three ingredients (i) an agreement between two or more persons; (ii) the agreement must relate to doing or causing to be done either (a) an illegal act; or (b) an act which is not illegal in itself but is done by illegal means. It is, therefore, plain that meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing or causing to be done an illegal act or an act by illegal means is sine-qua-non of criminal conspiracy. In absence of these three ingredients the offence under Section 120-B cannot be made out against the appellant. 15.
It is, therefore, plain that meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing or causing to be done an illegal act or an act by illegal means is sine-qua-non of criminal conspiracy. In absence of these three ingredients the offence under Section 120-B cannot be made out against the appellant. 15. Considering the submission and material on record, it is quite vivid that the persecution was unable to complete the chain as the judgment cited by learned counsel for the respondent/CBI in the matter of Bilal Hajar Alias Abdul Hameed (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has said that object for which it was hatched has to be gathered on the basis of circumstantial evidence, such as conduct of the conspirators, the chain of circumstances leading to holding of such meeting till the commission of offence by applying the principle applicable for appreciating the circumstantial evidence for holding the accused guilty for commission of an offence. These ingredients have to be seen from the present fact of the case. If we examin the entire evidence adduced by the prosecution that there was no such evidence adduced how the appellant was involved in the alleged criminal conspiracy, none of the witnesses has stated that there is any meeting of mind of the accused to commit an offence under Section 120-B, neither the chain of circumstance which is required to prove the guilt of the appellant has been established and even from the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court these are basis ingredients which have to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, no such evidence has been brought. No record by the prosecution, therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Sessions Judge was justified in convicting the accused/Appellant under Section 120-B IPC. 16. It is well settled legal position of law that opinion of handwriting expert is a very weak evidence and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy vs. Baddam Pratapa Reddy (dead) through Legal Representatives and Anr (2019) 14 SCC 220 has held in paragraph 10,11 and 12 as under:- 10.
16. It is well settled legal position of law that opinion of handwriting expert is a very weak evidence and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy vs. Baddam Pratapa Reddy (dead) through Legal Representatives and Anr (2019) 14 SCC 220 has held in paragraph 10,11 and 12 as under:- 10. In our considered opinion, the decisions in Murari Lal (supra) and Alamgir (supra) strengthen the proposition that it is the duty of the Court to approach opinion evidence cautiously while determining its reliability and that the Court may seek independent corroboration of such evidence as a general rule of prudence. Clearly, these observations in Murari Lal (supra) and Alamgir (supra) do not go against the proposition stated in Shashi Kumar Banerjee (supra) that the evidence of a handwriting expert should rarely be given precedence over substantive evidence. 11. In light of these principles, it is necessary to evaluate the correctness of the findings of the High Court as to the genuineness of the signature of the first defendant on Ext. A-1. 12. As mentioned earlier, Ext. A-1 is the agreement of sale entered into by the plaintiff and the first defendant. Ext. A-2 is the receipt evidencing the payment of earnest money of Rs. 61,200/- in pursuance of this agreement of sale. The receipt bears the signature of the first defendant on the revenue stamps affixed thereon. Curiously, Ext. A-2 was not sent for obtaining expert opinion. At the same time, no reliable material was brought on record that the first defendant has not received the amount under Ext. A-2. In the absence of any challenge to the first defendant’s signature on Ext. A-2 , and in the absence of any reliable material produced by the first defendant to deny the receipt of such earnest money, the High Court, in our considered opinion, should have relied upon this receipt. In fact, we find that the High Court has not considered Ext. A-2 in its entire judgment. As a matter of fact, Ext. A-1 and Ext. A-2 go hand in hand, and Ext. A-2 should not have been ignored by the High Court. Moreover, merely because the plaintiff’s signature was not present on the agreement of sale, this would not ipso facto nullify the agreement altogether.
A-2 in its entire judgment. As a matter of fact, Ext. A-1 and Ext. A-2 go hand in hand, and Ext. A-2 should not have been ignored by the High Court. Moreover, merely because the plaintiff’s signature was not present on the agreement of sale, this would not ipso facto nullify the agreement altogether. This is because the agreement was signed by the first defendant and clearly reveals that he had agreed to sell the property to the plaintiff for a due consideration of Rs. 1,20,000/- This agreement was followed by Ext. A-2, which shows the payment and receipt of the earnest money. In addition to the signature of the first defendant, this receipt bears the signature of the plaintiff on revenue stamps. As mentioned earlier, Ext. A-1 and Ext. A-2 are part of the same transaction. Thus, the contention that absence of the plaintiff’s signature on Ext. A-1 nullifies the agreement altogether, cannot be accepted. In addition to this, the evidence of DW-3 (the brother of the first defendant) belies the allegation of the first defendant that the signature found on Ext. A-1 is forged. DW-3 specifically admitted during his cross-examination that he could identify the signature of the first defendant, who is his elder brother. He has further admitted that Ext. A-1 and Ext. B-1 bears the signature of the first defendant. It may be noted here that a partition had taken place between the first defendant and DW-3 in the year 1980, and such partition was effected through Ext. B-1, an unregistered partition deed. Crucially, the first defendant has also admitted his signature on Ext. B-1 in his cross-examination. Thus, it is clear that such admitted signature and the disputed signature of the first defendant have been identified by his brother as those of the first defendant himself. 17. Again Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Padum Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2020) 3 SCC 35 ,(supra) has held in paragraph 14 to 16 which is as under:- Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that without independent and reliable corroboration, the opinion of the hand- writing experts cannot be relied upon to base the conviction. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1996) 4 SCC 596 , wherein the Supreme Court held as under:- “28.
In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1996) 4 SCC 596 , wherein the Supreme Court held as under:- “28. Thus, the evidence of PW 3 is not definite and cannot be said to be of a clinching nature to connect the appellant with the disputed letters. The evidence of an expert is a rather weak type of evidence and the courts do not generally consider it as offering ‘conclusive’ proof and therefore safe to rely upon the same without seeking independent and reliable corroboration. In Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab (1977) 2 SCC 210 , while dealing with the evidence of a handwriting expert, this Court opined 7…….. we think it would be extremely hazardous to condemn the appellant merely on the strength of opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. It is now well settled that expert opinion must always be received with great caution and perhaps none so with more caution than the opinion of a handwriting expert. There is a profusion of precedential authority which holds that it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This rule has been universally acted upon and it has almost become a rule of law.It was held by this Court in Ram Chandra v. State of UP AIR 1957 SC 381 that it is unsafe to treat expert handwriting opinion as sufficient basis for conviction, but it may be relied upon when supported by other items of internal and external evidence. This Court again pointed out in Ishwari Prasad v. Mohd. Isa AIR 1963 SC 1728 that expert evidence of handwriting can never be conclusive because it is, after all, opinion evidence, and this view was reiterated in Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee AIR 1964 SC 529 where it was pointed out by this Court that expert’s evidence as to handwriting being opinion evidence can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evidence and before acting on such evidence, it would be desirable to consider whether it is corroborated either by clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.
This Court had again occasion to consider the evidentiary value of expert opinion in regard to handwriting in Fakhruddin v. State of MP AIR 1967 SC 1326 and it uttered a note of caution pointing out that it would be risky to found a conviction solely on the evidence of a handwriting expert and before acting upon such evidence, the court must always try to see whether it is corroborated by other evidence, direct or circumstantial.” 18.15. Of course, it is not safe to base the conviction solely on the evidence of the hand-writing expert. As held by the Supreme Court in Magan Bihari Lal vs. State of Punjab (1977) 2 SCC 210 that “7……….expert opinion must always be received with great caution……..it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This rule has been universally acted upon and it has almost become a rule of law.” 19.16. It is fairly well settled that before acting upon the opinion of the hand-writing expert, prudence requires that the court must see that such evidence is corroborated by other evidence either direct or circumstantial evidence. In Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1980) 1 SCC 704 , the Supreme Court held as under:- 20.“4. …….True, it has occasionally been said on very high authority that it would be hazardous to base a conviction solely on the opinion of a handwriting expert. But, the hazard in accepting the opinion of any expert, handwriting expert or any other kind of expert, is not because experts, in general, are unreliable witnesses — the quality of credibility or incredibility being one which an expert shares with all other witnesses — but because all human judgment is fallible and an expert may go wrong because of some defect of observation, some error of premises or honest mistake of conclusion. The more developed and the more perfect a science, the less the chance of an incorrect opinion and the converse if the science is less developed and imperfect. The science of identification of finger-prints has attained near perfection and the risk of an incorrect opinion is practically non-existent. On the other hand, the science of identification of handwriting is not nearly so perfect and the risk is, therefore, higher.
The science of identification of finger-prints has attained near perfection and the risk of an incorrect opinion is practically non-existent. On the other hand, the science of identification of handwriting is not nearly so perfect and the risk is, therefore, higher. But that is a far cry from doubting the opinion of a handwriting expert as an invariable rule and insisting upon substantial corroboration in every case, howsoever the opinion may be backed by the soundest of reasons. It is hardly fair to an expert to view his opinion with an initial suspicion and to treat him as an inferior sort of witness. His opinion has to be tested by the acceptability of the reasons given by him. An expert deposes and not decides. His duty “is to furnish the Judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of his conclusion, so as to enable the Judge to form his own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence (Vide Lord President Cooper in Davis v. Edindurgh Magistrate, 1953 SC 34 quoted by Professor Cross in his evidence).” 21. 5. ……. 6. Expert testimony is made relevant by Section 45 of the Evidence Act and where the Court has to form an opinion upon a point as to identity of handwriting, the opinion of a person “specially skilled” “in questions as to identity of handwriting” is expressly made a relevant fact……… So, corroboration may not invariably be insisted upon before acting on the opinion of an handwriting expert and there need be no initial suspicion. But, on the facts of a particular case, a court may require corroboration of a varying degree. There can be no hard and fast rule, but nothing will justify the rejection of the opinion of an expert supported by unchallenged reasons on the sole ground that it is not corroborated. The approach of a court while dealing with the opinion of a handwriting expert should be to proceed cautiously, probe the reasons for the opinion, consider all other relevant evidence and decide finally to accept or reject it.” 22.
The approach of a court while dealing with the opinion of a handwriting expert should be to proceed cautiously, probe the reasons for the opinion, consider all other relevant evidence and decide finally to accept or reject it.” 22. In the present case, there are two opinions given by the handwriting experts one is examined by the prosecution and another by the appellant in his defense and both the experts have given different of opinions, as such it is incumbent upon the prosecution to examine the evidence to corroborate the opinion given by the handwriting expert. But no such evidence is adduced by the prosecution. The conviction of the appellant is based on the opinion of the hand-writing experts though two different conflicting experts opinions are available on record, therefore, it is incumbent on the part of the learned trial Court to use power of observation and compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing for coming to a conscientious conclusion as to which opinion evidence is acceptable and act upon the same. Hon’ble Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of State (Delhi Admn). v. Ramesh Chander Sharma, reported in 1980 Criminal Law Journal (NOC) 150 has considered this issue and has held “that rejection or acceptance of one or other opinion evidence by the Court without using its own power of observation and comparison under Section 73 of Evidence Act renders its decision invalid.” 23. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that if the two handwriting experts have been examined one by the prosecution and one by the appellant then the learned trial Court should have given weightage to both the reports but the learned trial Court has not given any iota of consideration to the opinion given by the handwriting expert examined by the appellant and disregarded the opinion of handwriting expert which is against the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mahendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (1972) 4 SCC 715 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held paragraph 15 and 16 which is as under:- 15. Nor are we satisfied with the evidence of B.M. Purl. He has stated that the writings in the endorsements are the writings of the appellant.
Nor are we satisfied with the evidence of B.M. Purl. He has stated that the writings in the endorsements are the writings of the appellant. It is quite clear from his evidence that he was hesitant in giving his opinion and we are far from satisfied that Puri had such ample opportunity to see the appellant's handwriting as to be quite conversant with it. We have tried hard to see if the experts shed any significant light on the problem before us. But on our own scrutiny of, the writings, we do not think that we can accept the reasoning of the learned Judge in this respect. The opinion of the expert examined by the appellant cannot also be excluded from consideration. 16. Since the conviction of the appellant is principally based on the finding that the disputed endorsements were in his handwriting, the same will have to be set aside on 'the view we have taken. 24. It is true that K.K. Semwal (PW-13) the handwriting expert, deposed that as per sample documents, the handwriting is of Mohammad Nayeem Khan and according to him Ex.P-36,37,39 40 and 41 have been written by Mohammad Nayeem Khan i.e. the appellant but this would be extremely hazardous to condemn the appellant merely on the strength of opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. It is now well settled that expert opinion must always be received with great caution and perhaps none so with more caution. There is a profusion of presidential authority which holds that it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. 25. On close scrutiny of evidence on record, I am of the considered view that prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The finding recorded by the Trial Court in convicting the appellant mainly on the ground that he was one of the conspirators for the crime in question, is erroneous and illegal. The trial Court has not considered the evidence on record in its proper perspective and erroneously convicted the appellant. 26. For the aforesaid reasons, appeal filed by appellant Mohammad Nayeem Khan is allowed. Conviction and sentenced imposed upon him is set aside and he is acquitted of the charge under Sections 420, 468 and 471 read with section 120-B IPC. He is reported to be on bail.
26. For the aforesaid reasons, appeal filed by appellant Mohammad Nayeem Khan is allowed. Conviction and sentenced imposed upon him is set aside and he is acquitted of the charge under Sections 420, 468 and 471 read with section 120-B IPC. He is reported to be on bail. His bail bonds shall continue for a further period of 6 months as per requirement of Section 437- A of the Code. Fine amount, if paid, be refunded to the appellant.