JUDGMENT : A rather small issue, but with certain legal ramifications, has been impelled in this writ petition 2. The petitioner impugns Exts.P7 and P9 proceedings of the respondent – Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit, which has placed her in the cadre of Professor only on 28.09.2017, instead of in June 2015, when she asserts to have acquired all eligibility qualifications. 3. Sri. K. Abdul Jawad – learned counsel for the petitioner, pointed out that his client had applied for placement as a professor in the year 2014, but admits that, though she had acquired the minimum eligibility period for doing so, she had not published five publications, which was an imperative condition. He says that, however, the 5th publication was published by his client in June 2015, and therefore, that she ought have been given her placement as Professor with effect from that date. The learned counsel, therefore, prayed that Exts.P7 and P9 be quashed and the University be directed to place his client in the cadre of Professor with effect from the date on which the 5th publication was effected by her in June 2015 4. In response, Sri. Dinesh Mathew J. Muricken – learned Standing Counsel for the University, invited my attention to Clause 6.3.12 of Ext.P1, namely the “UGC Regulations on minimum qualifications for appointment of teachers and other academic staff in Universities and Colleges and measures for maintenance of standards in higher Education, 2010, (hereinafter referred to as UGC Regulations, 2010)”, to argue that, as per the interpretation of the said clause by the University, the petitioner will be entitled to be placed as a professor only from the date on which she made her application for that purpose. He explained that, even though she had made an initial application in the year 2014, it was found that the petitioner was not then eligible, because she had, admittedly, not achieved the minimum number of publications, leading to the Scrutiny Committee to resolve not to recommend her placement, as is evident from Ext.P4. He added that the petitioner, thereafter, made an application only through Ext.R1(a) on 28.09.2017 and therefore, that the Scrutiny Committee found her to be eligible from that date, thus resolving to place her in the cadre of Professor from then. He added that the petitioner, thereafter, made an application only through Ext.R1(a) on 28.09.2017 and therefore, that the Scrutiny Committee found her to be eligible from that date, thus resolving to place her in the cadre of Professor from then. The learned Standing Counsel predicated that this is the only manner in which the University could have acted, going by inviolable provisions of Clause 6.3.12 of Ext.P1 UGC Regulation 2010. 5. I have evaluated the afore submissions with great amount of care since, I am certain that anything that this Court now says will have an impact in other cases and in future. 6. The forensic response of this Court to the above focal issue in this case will certainly depend upon the manner in which Clause 6.3.12 of Ext.P1, namely the UGC Regulations, 2010, will obtain interpretation. For this purpose, it certainly has to read, and is hence extracted as under : (a) If a candidate applies for promotion on completion of the minimum eligibility period and is successful, the date of promotion will be from that of minimum period of eligibility. (b) If, however, the candidates find that he/she fulfills the eligibility conditions at a later date and applies on that date and is successful, his/her promotion will be effected from that date of application fulfilling the criteria. (c) If the candidate does not succeed in the first assessment, but succeeds in the eventful assessment, his/her promotion will be deemed to be from the later date of successful assessment. 7. The argument of the University is that, if a candidate applies, on completing the minimum eligibility period of three years and after having achieved the imperative qualifications including the minimum number of publications on that date, he or she will be offered promotion from the date of acquiring the minimum period of eligibility. They contend that, however, on the contrary, if a candidate does not obtain the minimum qualifications, even though he or she may have achieved the minimum eligibility period of three years, and then makes an application subsequent to such qualifications being acquired, his or her promotion will be effected from the date of the said application only. They assert that, this is the only manner in which the afore clauses can be interpreted. 8. They assert that, this is the only manner in which the afore clauses can be interpreted. 8. I must say that this Court cannot find favour with the afore interpretation offered by the University for the reasons I will presently state. 9. It is indubitable that Clause 6.3.12 of Ext.P1 provides for two different categories of candidates. The first is a person who obtains eligibility qualifications during the period of the minimum eligibility term of three years, in which event, sub Clause (a) thereof provides that he or she will be given promotion from the date of “minimum period of eligibility”. Thereafter, sub clause (b) of Clause 6.3.12 postulates that if a candidate, who has completed the minimum period of eligibility, does not obtain the minimum eligibility qualifications within that time, then he or she will be granted promotion from the date of application, made on attaining such qualification. 10. Obviously, the intent of sub clause (b) of Clause 6.3.12 of Ext.P1 was to enable a candidate to apply immediately on acquiring the essential qualification, which would be a date after he or she had completed the eligibility period; and in such scenario, it provides that the promotion shall be with effect from the date of application, which can only be construed to mean the date on which he or she acquired the eligibility condition. This is inevitable because the said sub clause provides that, on a candidate finding himself or herself to have acquired the eligibility condition, can apply on such date itself, (to mean the date on which it was acquired) so that his or her promotion will be effected from the date of application. 11. It is, therefore, apodictic that sub clause (b) of Clause 6.3.12 of Ext.P1 enables a candidate to apply on the same date on which he or she acquires the qualification, so that the promotion can be offered from that date. 12. In the case at hand, however, it is without dispute that the petitioner published her 5th publication in June 2015. Without doubt, she could have applied for promotion on the date on which she completed that publication, but she omitted to do so and made her application about two years later, through Ext.R1(a). 12. In the case at hand, however, it is without dispute that the petitioner published her 5th publication in June 2015. Without doubt, she could have applied for promotion on the date on which she completed that publication, but she omitted to do so and made her application about two years later, through Ext.R1(a). The question is whether this would deny her the benefit of being placed in the promotion cadre merely because she had not made an application on the date on which she became successful qua the eligibility criteria. 13. Before I answer this, I must certainly record the submissions of Sri. K. Abdul Jawad – learned counsel for the petitioner, that Ext.R1(a) cannot be construed to be a new application, but only a continuation of the earlier one, which had been preferred by his client in the year 2014. His argument is that the earlier application had not been rejected, as is manifest from Ext.P4 recommendations of the Scrutiny Committee, wherein, they had only refused to recommend her case because she had not completed her minimum required publications. He, therefore, predicates that Ext.R1(a) will have to be seem to be a continuation or adjunct to the earlier application and therefore, that promotion ought to have been granted to his client with effect from the date on which she had obtained the minimum required eligibility qualifications. 14. When one assess the afore submissions, as I have already said above, the acme question is whether sub clause (b) of Clause 6.3.12 of Ext.P1 would deny the benefit of promotion to a candidate merely because of an omission on his or her part to make an application on the very date on which he or she attains the minimum prescribed eligibility criteria. I cannot find so from the said Regulations, especially because it is never its intent to cause prejudice to a candidate solely because there is such an omission; but to enable and empower him or her to make an application on the very same date on which he or she acquires the qualifications. Sub clause (b) of Clause 6.3.12 of Ext.P1 is certainly an empowering one and not one which is designed to cause detriment on account of a minor omission. 15. Sub clause (b) of Clause 6.3.12 of Ext.P1 is certainly an empowering one and not one which is designed to cause detriment on account of a minor omission. 15. That apart, as argued by the petitioner, she had made her first application in the year 2014, which was not recommended by the Screening Committee since she had not then published her 5th publication, as is mandatorily required. However, it is without contest that she achieved her 5th publication in June 2015; and hence, had she made an application on that day, certainly, promotion would have been offered to her from that day itself. 16. In the afore context and perspective, it is rather inexplicable that merely because the petitioner had not applied on the same date on which she obtained the eligibility qualifications, she would have to be put to detriment and granted promotion from a subsequent date, because sub clause (b) of Clause 6.3.12 of Regulations can be literally interpreted to mean so. However, such an interpretation would rob the Regulations of its real purpose, since, as I have already held above, it is to empower and grant of benefit to candidates, rather than to cause an effect contrary to it. 17. My opinion as afore is fortified because, sub clause (a) of Clause 6.3.12 of the Regulations provide that a person who makes an application immediately on acquiring the minimum eligibility period – and if he or she had already obtained the eligibility criteria – will be granted promotion from the date of “minimum period of eligibility”. One certainly fails to understand why the same should not apply in the case of sub clause (b) of Clause 6.3.12, which enables a candidate to make an application on the same date on which he or she obtains the qualifications, further making it luculent that the promotion will be from that date. 18. There is another compelling reason for this Court to hold as afore, which is that, in Ext.P5, the Screening Committee, in fact, recommends the petitioner’s placement in the cadre of Professor from the date on which she acquired the minimum eligibility qualifications. One, therefore, fails to gather why the University should not have followed the same, but to have then issued Exts.P7 and P9, shifting the date to a subsequent one, namely 28.09.2017. 19. One, therefore, fails to gather why the University should not have followed the same, but to have then issued Exts.P7 and P9, shifting the date to a subsequent one, namely 28.09.2017. 19. On a parity reasoning, it can hence only be construed that the promotion, under sub clause (b) of Clause 6.3.12 of the Regulation, will be eligible to a candidate from the date on which the minimum qualifications are achieved and not from the date of application, because the prescription relating to the same has been made therein in conjunction with the date on which the candidate is successful; which is to say that the said date is relevant for the candidate and not for the University. 20. When this Court finds as afore, it is needless for me to answer the argument of Sri. Abdul Jawad that Ext.R1(a) must be construed to an application in continuation of her earlier application, because whether it is so, or otherwise, my view as above would hold firm and even a contrary answer would be of no relevance or consequence. 21. In the afore circumstances, I am left without any doubt that Exts.P6 and P9, to the extent to which it finds that the petitioner is entitled to be placed in the promoted cadre of Professor only from 28.09.2017 – being the date on which Ext.R1(a) application had been preferred by her – is incompetent. 22. Consequently, the University will issue appropriate orders, granting the benefit of promotion to the petitioner with effect from the date on which she had acquired her minimum eligibility qualification in June 2015, as expeditiously as is possible but not later than one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. This writ petition is thus ordered.