JUDGMENT : 1. These appeals are filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 18.01.2021. Since facts are similar in both the appeals we may record them from those arising in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1015/2021 which is connected with S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9703/2018. Petitioner Dr. Maina Raigar was selected and offered appointment as Senior Demonstrator (Pathology) by the State Government on 15.02.2017. At that time she was pursuing her higher studies of post-graduation. She had applied to the authorities for extension of joining time. The Government on its own granted extension of six months. Since she was not satisfied with this extension she approached the High Court. By an interim order dated 21.08.2017 the Single Judge had directed the respondents to maintain status quo with respect to the petitioner. This interim protection continued till final disposal of the writ petition. By the impugned order the learned Single Judge disposed of the petition in terms of the orders passed in cases of Dr. Chandar Prakash Gunawat vs. State of Rajasthan, 2014 (2) RLW (Raj.) 1730 and Dr. Reenu Choudhary vs. State of Rajasthan (SB Civil Writ Petition No. 19964/2017). The portion of the judgment in case of Dr. Reenu Choudhary was reproduced. Against this order the State has filed this appeal. Facts in connected appeal are substantially similar. 2. Having heard learned Government counsel in the facts of the present case we are not inclined to interfere. This is so because as noted after initial extension of joining time by the Government for six months in the writ petition the Single Judge had protected the petitioners by issuing order of status quo. This continued till the petitions were disposed of. At this late stage, it would serve no purpose in reversing the order of the learned Single Judge. Under substantially similar circumstances the Single Judge in case of Chandar Prakash Gunawat had issued necessary directions for not cancelling appointment of petitioner concerned. This was carried in appeal. The Division Bench had also upheld this judgment. In the appellate order dated 21.07.2014 the Division Bench had also noticed these peculiar facts. 3. Under substantially similar circumstances the Single Judge in case of Chandar Prakash Gunawat had issued necessary directions for not cancelling appointment of petitioner concerned. This was carried in appeal. The Division Bench had also upheld this judgment. In the appellate order dated 21.07.2014 the Division Bench had also noticed these peculiar facts. 3. Having said that we share the anxiety of the Government advocate that Court should not follow these orders and judgments and create a situation where after issuing interim protection, the final orders are passed on the ground that under interim protection the time for joining duty stands extended. We would examine these questions in an appropriate case. However prima-facie it does appear that a person who has been selected and appointed on a public post, has a duty to join such post within the time permitted or extended. It would be questionable whether such a person has a vested right to insist that the offer of appointment be kept in abeyance for an indefinite period of time of several years till he or she completes higher studies which he or she is pursuing. The requirement of administration to fill up the posts would have to be taken into consideration and essentially would be for the administration to exercise the discretion to extend or not the extended time for joining duty. 4. Learned Government advocate may also be correct in contending that such petitioners cannot be equated with regular Government servants who can subject to certain terms and conditions as provided in the service rules asked for study leave. No leave can be granted to a person who is yet to join Government duty. Even in case of the study leave to the newly engaged doctors to pursue their post graduation courses, the Division Bench of this Court in a recent judgment dated 09.12.2021 in D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 911/2020, State of Rajasthan and Others vs. Dr. Kamaldeep Khatri and Others connected matters has made following observations: “The right of the government servant to seek study leave therefore is hedged by several conditions. To begin with, as per Rule 59 all leaves and not just study leave is within the discretionary powers of the employer which discretion has to be exercised in the exigencies of the public service. To begin with, as per Rule 59 all leaves and not just study leave is within the discretionary powers of the employer which discretion has to be exercised in the exigencies of the public service. Coming to the study leave in particular, as per sub-rule (1) of Rule 110 the study leave would be granted only for pursuing course of study or investigation of a scientific or technical nature which in the opinion of the sanctioning authority is considered necessary in the public interest for the working of the department in which the person is employed. As per sub-rule (1) of Rule 112 such study leave shall be granted only when it is certified by the authority competent to sanction that the grant of study leave would be in the interest of the working of the department or the service to which the government servant belongs. While considering the question of grant or refusal of study leave the exigencies of public service is thus of paramount consideration. When it comes to grant of study leave, this requirement is taken to a further higher level of the sanctioning authority being of the opinion that it is necessary in public interest for working of the department in which the person is employed. That such higher study would augment the skills of the employee upon return is just one of the considerations before the administration while considering the request for study leave. The vacancy position in the cadre, the requirement of sufficient employees to look after the service to be provided and range of other factors shall have to be weighed by the administration as enabled by Rules 59, 110 and 112 of the said Rules of 1951 before the request for grant of study leave can be accepted. The decisions of the learned Single Judges in favour of the petitioners proceed only on the basis of interpretation of the Rules which do not; and we believe correctly; prohibit a probationer from seeking study leave. Right to apply for study leave is vastly different from claiming vested right to be granted the leave. The Rules recognize the right to apply, however before such an application is accepted, the administration has a right, power and the duty to assess relevant factors of interest of exigencies of the public service. Right to apply for study leave is vastly different from claiming vested right to be granted the leave. The Rules recognize the right to apply, however before such an application is accepted, the administration has a right, power and the duty to assess relevant factors of interest of exigencies of the public service. If in the opinion of the government, there is a severe shortage of the doctors particularly in the rural areas and due to which immediately after joining the service a doctor cannot be granted study leave, in our opinion such a policy cannot be stated to be unreasonable or ultra-vires to the government's powers under the Rules. As long as this policy is framed after conscious consideration taking into account all relevant aspects of the matter, as long as this policy is otherwise reasonable and as long as this policy is applied uniformly without instances of pick and choose, this Court would not mandate the government administration to compulsorily grant leave to probationer doctors to pursue higher studies. The right of the government servant to seek study leave therefore is hedged by several conditions. To begin with, as per Rule 59 all leaves and not just study leave is within the discretionary powers of the employer which discretion has to be exercised in the exigencies of the public service. Coming to the study leave in particular, as per sub-rule (1) of Rule 110 the study leave would be granted only for pursuing course of study or investigation of a scientific or technical nature which in the opinion of the sanctioning authority is considered necessary in the public interest for the working of the department in which the person is employed. As per sub-rule (1) of Rule 112 such study leave shall be granted only when it is certified by the authority competent to sanction that the grant of study leave would be in the interest of the working of the department or the service to which the government servant belongs. While considering the question of grant or refusal of study leave the exigencies of public service is thus of paramount consideration. When it comes to grant of study leave, this requirement is taken to a further higher level of the sanctioning authority being of the opinion that it is necessary in public interest for working of the department in which the person is employed. When it comes to grant of study leave, this requirement is taken to a further higher level of the sanctioning authority being of the opinion that it is necessary in public interest for working of the department in which the person is employed. That such higher study would augment the skills of the employee upon return is just one of the considerations before the administration while considering the request for study leave. The vacancy position in the cadre, the requirement of sufficient employees to look after the service to be provided and range of other factors shall have to be weighed by the administration as enabled by Rules 59, 110 and 112 of the said Rules of 1951 before the request for grant of study leave can be accepted. The decisions of the learned Single Judges in favour of the petitioners proceed only on the basis of interpretation of the Rules which do not; and we believe correctly; prohibit a probationer from seeking study leave. Right to apply for study leave is vastly different from claiming vested right to be granted the leave. The Rules recognize the right to apply, however before such an application is accepted, the administration has a right, power and the duty to assess relevant factors of interest of exigencies of the public service. If in the opinion of the government, there is a severe shortage of the doctors particularly in the rural areas and due to which immediately after joining the service a doctor cannot be granted study leave, in our opinion such a policy cannot be stated to be unreasonable or ultra-vires to the government's powers under the Rules. As long as this policy is framed after conscious consideration taking into account all relevant aspects of the matter, as long as this policy is otherwise reasonable and as long as this policy is applied uniformly without instances of pick and choose, this Court would not mandate the government administration to compulsorily grant leave to probationer doctors to pursue higher studies. We have noted that some of the courts have, while granting such permission either under the interim order or final orders imposed a condition of service for minimum five years after rejoining the active duty upon completion of the studies. We wonder what would happen if the government desires to terminate the service during probation on account of unsatisfactory service. We have noted that some of the courts have, while granting such permission either under the interim order or final orders imposed a condition of service for minimum five years after rejoining the active duty upon completion of the studies. We wonder what would happen if the government desires to terminate the service during probation on account of unsatisfactory service. A condition to serve a full length of a specified period would perhaps be incongruous with the right of the employer to terminate the services of a probationer before confirmation. Be that as it may, in our interpretation unless and until the government decisions suffer from irrationality, illegality or legal or factual mala-fides, we would not direct the government to grant study leave to a probationer contrary to the government policy.” 5. These are prima-facie observations and we would go into these issues in detail in appropriate proceedings. 6. With these observations both the appeals are disposed of. All pending applications stand disposed of.