Research › Search › Judgment

Uttarakhand High Court · body

2022 DIGILAW 45 (UTT)

Mohd. Sahid @ Kallu v. State of Uttarakhand

2022-03-15

R.C.KHULBE, S.K.MISHRA

body2022
JUDGMENT : S.K.Mishra, J. This is a case of uxoricide. 2. In this jail appeal, the convict/appellant has assailed his conviction under Section 302 and 458 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, (hereinafter referred to as Penal Code for brevity) and sentence of imprisonment of life and fine of Rs. 5000/- under Section 302 of the Penal Code and ten years rigorous imprisonment under Section 458 of the Penal Code and fine of Rs. 3000/- in default of which he has to undergo additional three months imprisonment. 2. The case of the prosecution in short is that the deceased was the wife of the convict/ appellant. However, because of some differences and because of the fact that the appellant has performed second marriage, the deceased was residing in a separate house and the appellant was residing in a separate house. The occurrence took place in the night of 26-27.03.2010. The deceased was residing with her sister Rani, wife of Sanjay. In the night of occurrence, the appellant, in the absence of the informant Rani, came to the house and knocked the door stating that the health of their son is not good, hence, he has brought him to meet his mother. The deceased opened the door, then the appellant trespassed in the house, assaulted the deceased also had sexual intercourse with her by tying her legs and hands and later on had poured the kerosene oil and set her on fire. He stood there till the informant’s sister become unconscious and fell on the ground. Thereafter, he left the place thinking that the deceased had died. Though, the deceased had raised the alarm and shout but none of the neighbours came to help her. She herself went to the Doctor and Doctor called the ambulance and sent the deceased to the Doon Hospital, Dehradun for treatment. On next day, the informant went to the hospital where her sister told the entire incident. An FIR was lodged on 28.03.20210 at about 6:15 p.m., before the concerned police station and criminal investigation was initiated. (In the meantime, dying declaration was recorded by PW2 Laxmi Raj Chauhan, Tehsildar in the presence of PW3 Dr. S.K. Jha, who was attending the patient). After five days of the occurrence deceased died, therefore, the case was converted one under Section 302 of the Penal Code, though, initially offence of murder was not involved in the FIR. (In the meantime, dying declaration was recorded by PW2 Laxmi Raj Chauhan, Tehsildar in the presence of PW3 Dr. S.K. Jha, who was attending the patient). After five days of the occurrence deceased died, therefore, the case was converted one under Section 302 of the Penal Code, though, initially offence of murder was not involved in the FIR. In course of investigation, the I.O. held inquest on the dead body of the deceased, despatched it by issuing command certificate etc., for post mortem examination. He seized material objects and other relevant materials and upon completion of investigation submitted charge sheet against the convict/appellant under Section 458 and 302 of the Penal Code. 3. The defence took a plea of simple denial and false implication by the prosecution witnesses. In order to prove its case, prosecution has examined as many as nine witnesses viz., PW1 Smt. Rani (informant), PW2 Laxmi Raj Chauhan, Tehsildar, PW3 Dr. S.K. Jha, PW4 Smt. Maya Devi, PW5 Sachidanand Petwal, PW6 Bhagwati Prasad Purohit, PW7 Dr. Jyoti Vohra (Orthopaedic Surgeon) PW8 CP Anil Kumar, PW9 S.I. Yogendra Singh Gusain. Important among them is PW2 Laxmi Raj Chauhan, Tehsildar who has recorded the dying declaration of the deceased i.e. Ex. A3, in the presence of PW3 Dr. S.K. Jha who was attending the patient. PW1 Rani is the informant in this case. PW7 Dr. Jyoti Vohra has conducted the post mortem on the dead body of the deceased. PW5 Sachidanand Petwal and PW6 Bhagwati Prasad Purohit who reside nearby, have not supported the case of the prosecution. PW9 is the Investigating Officer. One witness i.e. DW1 Jeenat was examined in defence of the prosecution case. One witness has been examined on behalf of the court i.e. CW1 Dr. Iqbal. Relying mainly on the dying declaration recorded by PW2, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dehradun has come to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, and, therefore, proceeded to convict the appellant under Sections 458 and 302 of the Penal Code and sentenced him as stated above. 4. Mr. Abhishek Verma, the learned Amicus Curiae, appearing on behalf of the convict/appellant would submit that the investigation of the case is faulty in the sense that they have not examined Dr. Iqbal, who as per the statement of the deceased was the person who sent her to the hospital by calling an ambulance. 4. Mr. Abhishek Verma, the learned Amicus Curiae, appearing on behalf of the convict/appellant would submit that the investigation of the case is faulty in the sense that they have not examined Dr. Iqbal, who as per the statement of the deceased was the person who sent her to the hospital by calling an ambulance. He would also argue that PW5 and PW6 i.e. Sachidanand Petwal and Bhagwati Prasad Purohit should have been arrayed as accused in this case, as they have allegedly instigated the present appellant to commit the murder. Such a submission is made by interpreting the dying declaration of the deceased. He would further argue that investigation of the case is quite faulty, and therefore, benefit should go to the appellant. Furthermore, it is submitted that statement made by Dr. Iqbal that the deceased herself told before the Doctor that out of anger she poured kerosene on her and set herself on fire makes this case multiple dying declarations and, therefore, dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate should be disbelieved and the appellant should be acquitted of the offence. 5. Learned Deputy Advocate General Shri J.S. Virk, on the other hand would submit that this is a clear case of voluntarily and truthful declaration made by the deceased and PW3 Dr. S.K. Jha has duly certified at the beginning of the recording of dying declaration that the deceased was in a condition to give her statement and that at the end of the recording of the declaration he has given certificate that she is in a good mental condition and give the statement properly. Therefore, it is very emphatically argued by the learned Deputy Advocate General that dying declaration has been recorded by the Executive Magistrate, who has no interest in the case, in the presence of the Doctor, who has certified about the mental condition of the deceased at the time of declaration cannot be brush aside lightly, therefore, he submits that conviction should be upheld. Moreover, the learned Deputy Advocate General further submits that the finding of kerosene cane and few burned matches at the spot and, the prior estranged relationship between the parties which is evident from their residing separately, and the opinion of the Doctor, who conducted post mortem examination that the deceased died due to septicaemia arising out of burn injuries corroborates the dying declaration made by the deceased before the Executive Magistrate. 6. Admittedly, in this case, the defence do not dispute the medical evidence as far as the cause of death is concerned. Neither the identity of the dead body nor the medical evidence has been disputed in this case. The learned Sessions Judge come to the conclusion that the dead body was put to post mortem examination and upon post mortem examination, the Doctor opined that she died due to septicaemia arising out of the burn injuries. The finding that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature has never been disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant before this Court. So, we do not consider it expedient to dwell upon this aspect of the case as it is not disputed at this stage. 7. Coming to the first and important component of evidence, it is seen that Tehsildar has been examined as PW2. PW3 Dr. S.K. Jha has stated on oath that he was posted in Doon Hospital, Dehradun as emergency medical officer. This incident relates to ward no. 7. At about 9:20, the Magistrate came to take the statement of the victim Ishrana. The said Ishrana was being treated in burn ward. The Magistrate enquired about her, and therefore, Doctor has stated that she is in a fit condition to give a statement then the Doctor asked the Magistrate to write the statement, as per declaration made by the victim; and that during the statement she was in a good condition and in a fit mental condition to give statement. This witness has also stated that after recording of the statement he put his signature and gave a certificate and also victim’s thumb impression was taken in his presence. The Doctor further stated that the victim died on 02.04.2010. In the cross-examination he has stated that the time of the Magistrate visiting the Doon Hospital has not been reflected in any register. The Magistrate was not accompanied by any police officer. The Doctor further stated that the victim died on 02.04.2010. In the cross-examination he has stated that the time of the Magistrate visiting the Doon Hospital has not been reflected in any register. The Magistrate was not accompanied by any police officer. When the Magistrate came, the witness accompanied him to ward no. 7. At that time, no other Doctor was present at ward no. 7. He admitted that after recording of her statement he did not make any entry in the register of the ward to the effect that Magistrate has recorded declaration of the deceased. He has further stated before recording the statement, he checked the blood pressure but it did not reflect on any paper. He also stated that in the certificate he did not mention the percentage of burn injury sustained by the victim. At that time no female Doctor or female attendant was present. 8. PW2 Laxmi Raj Chauhan, Tehsildar, has stated that about a year prior to the occurrence he was posted at Dehradun. On 28.03.2010, at about 9:20 a.m., he went to Doon Hospital and started recording the statement of the victim. He further stated that the name of the victim was Ishrana, wife of Shahid. He further stated that before writing declaration, he took certification from the Doctor that the victim was in a fit state for giving a statement. He proved dying declaration which is exhibited in this case as Ex. A3 and his signature on the same. He further stated that after writing down the declaration he also took another endorsement from Dr. S.K. Jha regarding mental capacity of the victim to make dying declaration then he has reproduced the dying declaration in the court. It is not necessary to go into reproduction by the Magistrate before the court. So if we take evidence of PW2 and PW3 and read it jointly, a manifest corroboration to each other is coming from these witnesses. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant very emphatically argued that CW1 has been examined and has stated that the deceased stated before him that out of anger she poured kerosene on her and set herself on fire. Such statement cannot be given much weightage, as this witness has never been examined by the Investigating Officer during investigation nor any suggestion has been given to any of the prosecution witness by the defence, regarding such a plea. 10. Such statement cannot be given much weightage, as this witness has never been examined by the Investigating Officer during investigation nor any suggestion has been given to any of the prosecution witness by the defence, regarding such a plea. 10. Even for the sake of consideration, there are multiple dying declaration in the sense that deceased made declaration before CW1 much prior to the declaration she made before the Magistrate, then also the dying declaration made before the Revenue official cannot be disbelieved. Moreover, the dying declaration is also corroborated in this case by attending circumstances. A dying declaration if it is true and voluntary can be held sufficient to come to the conclusion that prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the dying declaration is also corroborated in this case by attending circumstances. A dying declaration if it is true and voluntary can be held sufficient to come to the conclusion that prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. In the case Khusal Rao vs. State of Bombay [1958] S.C.R. 552, AIR 1958 SC 22 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- “On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, (Guruswami Tevar, I.L.R. (1940) MAD 158), (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence;(4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it-; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties. Hence, in order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination. But once the court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was the truthful version as to the circumstances of the, death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration. If, on the other hand, the court, after examining the dying declaration in all its aspects, and testing its veracity has come to the conclusion that it is not reliable by itself, and that it suffers from an infirmity, then, without corroboration it cannot form the basis of a conviction. Thus, the -necessity for corroboration arises not from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, as held in some of the re- ported cases, but from the fact that the court, in a given case, has come to the conclusion that that particular dying declaration was not free from the infirmities referred to above or from such other infirmities as may be disclosed in evidence in that case. 11. In the case of Paniben (Smt) v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474 , the Supreme Court has also laid down the principles of protection of evidence and the cautions the Court has to take in such evidence. We find it appropriate to quote the exact words of the Hon’ble Supreme Court “Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under: (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (Mannu Raja v. State of M.P., 1976 (3) SCC 104 ) (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. State of M. P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar, 1985 (1) SCC 552 (iii) This Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. Ram Chandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 S.C. 1994 . (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. Rasheed Beg v. Sate of Madhya Pradesh, [1974] 4 S.C.C. 264. (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P., 1981 (Supp) SCC 25) (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. 1981 (2) SCC 654 ) (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, 1980 (Supp) SCC 455) (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, 1980 (Supp) SCC 455) (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar, 1980 (Supp) SCC 769) (ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye witness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (Nanahau Ram and another v. State, AIR 1988 SC 912 ) (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (State U.P. v. Madan Mohan, 1989 (3) SCC 390 ) 12. Thus, on the analysis of the aforesaid judgments, the following principles emerge:- (i) It cannot be laid down as absolute rule of law that dying declaration cannot form sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (ii) That each case must be determines on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; (iii) That it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence that other pieces of evidence; (iv) That a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (v) That a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character and; (vi) That in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observing the features of the appellant. 13. 13. On top of this, while assessing a dying declaration or probability to value of it, the Court should always keep in mind the following:- (i) That dying declaration is true and voluntary; (ii) That it has not been made as a result of tutoring, prompting or imagination and, (iii) That the deceased had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to give the declaration. 14. In this case, it is apparent from the record that the dying declaration was made before two State Government functionaries one being Tehsilder-cum-Executive Magistrate and other being responsible Doctor in Doon Hospital. There is no reason on their part, to implicate the appellant without any motive. In the case of State of U.P. vs. Veerpal & anr., 2022 SCC Online SC 129, the Hon’ble Apex Court relying upon the judgment of Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 , in paragraph 20 has observed as follows:- “20. In the case of Laxman (Supra) after referring to and considering the earlier decisions on the credibility of the dying declaration recoded by the Magistrate, it was observed that the Magistrate being a disinterested witness and a responsible officer and there being no circumstances or material to suspect that the Magistrate had any animus against the accused or was in any way interested for fabricating a dying declaration, question of doubt on the declaration, recorded by the Magistrate does not arise. 15. In this case, we have carefully examined the dying declaration. The dying declaration has been recorded by PW3 in verbatim. Not only he stated on oath he recorded the statement in the shape of a dying declaration of the victim in verbatim but it is also apparent from the evidence of PW2 Dr. Jha that he asked the Magistrate to record the Statement or declaration as per the version of the victim and that it was done. So, at the appellate stage we do not find any real infirmity in recording of the dying declaration by the Magistrate and duly corroborated by the Doctor. 16. Jha that he asked the Magistrate to record the Statement or declaration as per the version of the victim and that it was done. So, at the appellate stage we do not find any real infirmity in recording of the dying declaration by the Magistrate and duly corroborated by the Doctor. 16. As far as the question of multiple declaration is concerned, taking into consideration the judgment of Jagbir Singh vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 8 SCC 779 the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Veerpal (supra) has held that merely because there are two dying declarations, all the dying declaration are not to be rejected. It was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and held that where there are multiple dying declarations the case must be decided on the facts of each case and the court will not be relieved of its duty to carefully examine the entirety of the material on record as also the circumstances surrounding the making of the different dying declarations. Ultimately in Jagbir Singh (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down conclusion of the supreme Court on multiple dying declarations:- “32. We would think that on a conspectus of the law as laid down by this court, when there are more than one dying declaration, and in the earlier dying declaration, the accused is not sought to be roped in but in the later dying declaration, a summersault is made by the deceased, the case must be decided on the facts of each case. The court will not be relived of its duty to carefully examine the entirety of materials as also the circumstances surrounding the making of the different dying declarations. If the court finds that the incriminatory dying declaration brings out the truthful position particularly in conjunction with the capacity of the deceased to make such declaration, the voluntariness with which it was made which involves, no doubt, ruling out tutoring and prompting and also the other evidence which support the contents of the incriminatory dying declaration, it can be acted upon. Equally, the circumstances which render the earlier dying declaration, worthy or unworthy of acceptance, can be considered.” 17. Equally, the circumstances which render the earlier dying declaration, worthy or unworthy of acceptance, can be considered.” 17. In this case, the defence has never given any suggestion to any of the witnesses who have proved the dying declaration that there was a tutoring and prompting to the declarant at the time of making the dying declaration and as per the cross-examination it is apparent from the record that at the time of recording of dying declaration neither any police officer nor any relations were present near the victim. So, this is not a case where defence has come out with a case that declarant was tutored and prompted by anybody to make a statement, implicating the appellant. In that view of the matter we hold that dying declaration as recorded by PW2 in the presence of PW3 is voluntary and truthful dying declaration sans any tutoring or prompting. Moreover, the alleged dying declaration before CW1 cannot be believed for the reasons stated above in the preceding paragraphs. 18. In that view of the matter, we come to the conclusion that prosecution has established that the dying declaration has been made voluntarily and truthfully by the deceased. This component of dying declaration which stands as a higher pedestal then oral dying declaration, is also corroborated by the attending circumstances that the relation between the appellant and the deceased was estranged and admittedly they were staying separately. Moreover, the evidence of PW6 Bhagwati Prasad Purohit has also supported the case of the prosecution in the sense that though he has been turned hostile by the prosecution as per the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sat Pal vs. Delhi Administration, 1976 AIR 294, those portion of the evidence, which is not challenged by the prosecution can be looked into. Therefore, evidence of PW6 shows that at the relevant time he saw the two-wheeler vehicle of the accused standing before his house, which is next to the house of the deceased. The other attending circumstances are the medical evidence which shows that death of the deceased was due to the burn injuries. Furthermore, kerosene cane and matchbox were also found in the spot. Thus, this Court is of the view that in this case the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. 19. The other attending circumstances are the medical evidence which shows that death of the deceased was due to the burn injuries. Furthermore, kerosene cane and matchbox were also found in the spot. Thus, this Court is of the view that in this case the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. 19. The learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant further argued that there are so many laches in the investigation like non examination of Doctor Iqbal, not arraying PW5 and PW6 as accused which shows that the investigation of the case is defective and the appellant is entitled for acquittal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of C. Muniappan and Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567 has held that defect in the investigation by itself cannot be a ground for acquittal. Investigation is not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial. Where there has been negligence on the part of the investigating agency or omissions, etc, which resulted in defective investigation, there is a legal obligation on the part of the court to examined the prosecution evidence, de hors, such lapses carefully to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not and to what extent it is reliable and as to whether such lapses affected the objects of finding out the truth. The conclusion of the trial in the case cannot be allowed to depend solely on the probity of investigation. There may be highly defective investigation in a case. However, it is to be examined as to whether there is any lapse by the investigating officer and whether due to such lapse any benefit should be given to the accused. If primacy is given to such designed or negligent investigations or to the omissions or lapses by perfunctory investigation, the faith and confidence of the people in the criminal justice administration would be eroded. Similar view has been taken in the several cases viz., Chandrakant Luxman vs. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 3 SCC 626 , State of Karnataka vs. K. Yarappa Reddy, (1999) 8 SCC 715 and Allarakha K. Mansuri vs. State of Gujarat, (2002) 3 SCC 57 . 20. Similar view has been taken in the several cases viz., Chandrakant Luxman vs. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 3 SCC 626 , State of Karnataka vs. K. Yarappa Reddy, (1999) 8 SCC 715 and Allarakha K. Mansuri vs. State of Gujarat, (2002) 3 SCC 57 . 20. Thus, in this case, we are of the opinion that there are certainly some laches on the part of the investigating officer in not examining some witnesses, however, that itself will not vitiate the prosecution case and the conviction. If such a view is taken by the court, then the determination in the criminal cases shall plummet to such a level where the investigating agency shall rule the roost. Therefore, we are not in agreement with the learned Amicus Curiae that for defective investigation, the appeal should be allowed and the appellant should be set at liberty. In the ultimate analysis, therefore, we are of the opinion that the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dehradun has a clear and precautious view of evidence on record and has come to the correct conclusion which requires no interference of this Court. 21. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. 22. Let TCRs be sent back forthwith.