ORDER : Kunuru Lakshman, J. 1. The present arbitration application is filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter 'the Act, 1996') for appointment of a Sole Arbitrator to resolve the disputes between the parties. 2. Heard Mr. Srinivas Velagapudi, learned Counsel for the applicants and Mr. N. Bhujanga Rao, learned Counsel for the respondent. 3. The applicants are the owner of land admeasuring 1,266.3 Square yards, H. No. 13-17-85/A/NR situated at Sri Nagar Colony, Gaddiannaram Village, Saroornagar Mandal, R.R. District (hereinafter referred to as 'schedule property'). The applicants and the respondent entered into a lease deed dated 05.03.2020 whereby the schedule property was leased out to the respondent. 4. As per the terms of the lease deed, the period of lease was nine years with a lock-in period of two years. The monthly rent for the first three years was fixed as Rs. 22,00,000/-. The lease deed also provided that after handing over the physical possession, the first three months will be a rent-free period for completion of interior works by the respondent. If the respondent fails to complete the interior works within three months from the date of handing over of the possession, then they shall be liable to pay the rent after expiry of three months of the rent-free period. An amount of Rs. 1,32,00,000/- was deposited as security deposit by the respondent. 5. According to the applicants, the lease commenced from 17.03.2020 when the applicants addressed an email to the respondent requesting them to issue drawings of the civil works so that they can handover the physical possession to the respondent, after which the rent-free period of three months shall begin. No reply was received from the respondent. Another e-mail dated 18.04.2020 was sent to the respondents stating that the construction workers and materials are mobilized at the work place and the applicants can complete the civil works if drawings are provided by the respondent. Subsequently, e-mail dated 19.05.2020 and 22.05.2020 were issued to the respondent, but no reply was received. 6. On 24.06.2020, an e-mail was addressed by the respondent to the applicants terminating the lease deed dated 05.03.2020. In the said e-mail, the respondent stated that due to Covid-19, the lease deed was being terminated. The respondent also stated that the lease did not commence and demanded the return of an amount of Rs. 6. On 24.06.2020, an e-mail was addressed by the respondent to the applicants terminating the lease deed dated 05.03.2020. In the said e-mail, the respondent stated that due to Covid-19, the lease deed was being terminated. The respondent also stated that the lease did not commence and demanded the return of an amount of Rs. 1,32,00,000/- which was deposited as security deposit. 7. On 29.07.2020, the applicants replied to the termination notice dated 24.06.2020. The applicants stated that lease deed cannot be terminated unilaterally and security deposit cannot be released unless the rent for the lock-in period of two years is paid. On 08.09.2020, another letter was issued by the applicants to the respondents demanding Rs. 3,96,00,000/- towards rent due to the termination of lease deed. The respondent replied to the notice dated 08.09.2020 denying all the allegations and stating that the lease deed had not commenced and the same was never acted upon. Further, it also alleged that the applicants failed to handover the physical possession of the schedule property within two months from the date of execution of the lease deed. 8. On 29.09.2020, the applicants invoked Clause 26 of the lease deed and issued an arbitration notice and nominated one Mr. B. Satish Kumar as the Sole Arbitrator. The respondent replied on 27.10.2020 not accepting the appointment of Mr. B. Satish Kumar. Therefore, the present arbitration application is filed seeking to appoint an Arbitrator. 9. Clause 26 of the lease deed which incorporates the arbitration agreement is extracted below: "26. Jurisdiction.-This agreement shall be governed by the laws of India. All disputes between the parties arising out of this agreement or in relation thereto shall be referred to a Sole Arbitrator mutually appointed by the parties and the arbitration to be conducted alongwith the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Arbitrator shall be chosen by both the parties with mutual consent. The arbitration shall be conducted at Hyderabad. The Courts at Ranga Reddy Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction." 10. During the course of arguments, learned Counsel for the respondent raised preliminary objections regarding the arbitrability of disputes in the present case. Relying upon the decision in Penumalli Sulochana v. Harish Rawtani, 2013 (5) ALD 573 (DB), contended that tenancy disputes are not arbitrable. The Courts at Ranga Reddy Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction." 10. During the course of arguments, learned Counsel for the respondent raised preliminary objections regarding the arbitrability of disputes in the present case. Relying upon the decision in Penumalli Sulochana v. Harish Rawtani, 2013 (5) ALD 573 (DB), contended that tenancy disputes are not arbitrable. It was also contended that the applicants cannot allege fraud and seek appointment of an Arbitrator as disputes pertaining to fraud are not arbitrable. This Court cannot accept the contentions of the respondent. 11. It is relevant to note that in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, 2019 (5) ALD 210 (SC), the Supreme Court, inter alia, had dealt with the issue of arbitrability of landlord-tenant disputes. The Court therein held that landlord-tenant disputes covered by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 are arbitrable. "79. Landlord-tenant disputes governed by the Transfer of Property Act are arbitrable as they are not actions in rem but pertain to subordinate rights in personam that arise from rights in rem. Such actions normally would not affect third-party rights or have erga omnes effect or require centralised adjudication. An award passed deciding landlord-tenant disputes can be executed and enforced like a decree of the Civil Court, Landlord-tenant disputes do not relate to inalienable and sovereign functions of the State. The provisions of the Transfer of Property Act do not expressly or by necessary implication bar arbitration. The Transfer of Property Act, like all other Acts, has a public purpose, that is, to regulate landlord-tenant relationships and the Arbitrator would be bound by the provisions, including provisions which enure and protect the tenants. 80. In view of the aforesaid, we overrule the ratio laid down in Himangni Enterprises/Himangni Enterprises v. Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia, (2017) 10 SCC 706 : (2018) 1 SCC (Civ.) 82 and hold that landlord-tenant disputes are arbitrable as the Transfer of Property Act does not forbid or foreclose arbitration. However, Landlord-tenant disputes covered and governed by rent control Legislation would not be arbitrable when specific Court or forum has been given exclusive jurisdiction to apply and decide special rights and obligations. Such rights and obligations can only be adjudicated and enforced by the specified Court forum, and not through arbitration." Therefore, the argument of the respondent that tenancy disputes relating to lease agreements are not arbitrable cannot be accepted. Such rights and obligations can only be adjudicated and enforced by the specified Court forum, and not through arbitration." Therefore, the argument of the respondent that tenancy disputes relating to lease agreements are not arbitrable cannot be accepted. The decision in Penumalli Sulochana's case (supra), stands overruled in light of the decision in Vidya Drolia's case (supra). 12. The other argument advanced by the respondent was that the applicants allege fraud. Therefore, the disputes are not arbitrable. The said contention also cannot be accepted. In Vidya Drolia's case (supra), the Supreme Court also discussed the law on arbitrability of fraud. The Court has concluded by concurring with the decision in Rashid Raza v. Sadaf Akthar, (2019) 8 SCC 710 and Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd., (2021) 4 SCC 713 , held as follows: "73. A recent judgment of this Court in [Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd., (2021) 4 SCC 713 ], has examined the law on invocation of "fraud exception" in great detail and holds that N. Radhakrishnan v. Maestro Engineers, (2010) 1 SCC 72 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ.) 12, as a precedent has no legs to stand on. We respectfully concur with the said view and also the observations made in Para 34 of the judgment in Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. [Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd. (supra), which quotes observations in (Rashid Raza v. Sadaf Akhtar [Rashid Raza v. Sadaf Akhtar, (2019) 8 SCC 710 : (2019) 4 SCC (Civ.) 503], SCC P. 712 Para 4). "4. The principles of law laid down in this appeal make a distinction between serious allegations of forgery/fabrication in support of the plea of fraud as opposed to "simple allegations". Two working tests laid down in Para 25 are : (1) does this plea permeate the entire contract and above all, the agreement of arbitration, Rendering it void, or (2) whether the allegations of fraud touch upon the internal affairs of the parties inter se having no implication in the public domain." To observe in Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. [Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd. (supra) : (SCC Para 35) "35. ... it is clear that serious allegations of fraud arise only if either of the two test laid down are satisfied and not otherwise. ... it is clear that serious allegations of fraud arise only if either of the two test laid down are satisfied and not otherwise. The first test is satisfied only when it can be said that the arbitration clause or agreement itself cannot be said to exist in a clear case in which the Court finds that the party against whom breach is alleged cannot be said to have entered into the agreement relating to arbitration at all. The second test can be said to have been met in cases in which allegations are made against the State or its instrumentalities of arbitrary, fraudulent or mala fide conduct, thus, necessitating the hearing of the case by a writ Court in which questions are raised which are not predominantly questions arising from the contract itself or breach thereof but questions arising in the public law domain." 74. The judgment in Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. [Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. HSBC P1 Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd. (supra) interprets Section 17 of the Contract Act to hold that Section 17 would apply if the contract itself is obtained by fraud or cheating. Thereby, a distinction is made between a contract obtained by fraud and post-contract fraud and cheating. The latter would fall outside Section 17 of the Contract Act and therefore, the remedy for damages would be available and not the remedy for treating the contract itself as void." 13. From the above decision it is clear that where there are simple allegations of fraud which do not go to the root of the contract and the existence of arbitration agreement such disputes are arbitrable. In the present case, apart from merely stating that the termination is fraudulent, the applicants have not made any other allegations. Further, the applicants themselves do not dispute the existence of arbitration agreement. Therefore, this Court cannot accept the contention of the respondent that allegations of fraud in the present case are not arbitrable. 14. It is relevant to note that the applicant contends that the lease commenced on 17.03.2020 and they were ready and willing to handover the physical possession of the schedule property to the respondent. However, the respondent failed to act and did not comply with the terms of the lease deed. The applicant also contends that the unilateral termination of lease deed is impermissible and the actions of the respondent are fraudulent. However, the respondent failed to act and did not comply with the terms of the lease deed. The applicant also contends that the unilateral termination of lease deed is impermissible and the actions of the respondent are fraudulent. Even if the termination is allowed, the respondent is still liable to pay an amount of Rs. 3,96,00,000/- (after adjusting the security deposit) as rent towards lock-in period of two years. 15. On the other hand, the respondent contended that the lease deed was not acted upon and the same is a contingent contract. As the applicants failed to handover the physical possession of the property within two months of the execution of the lease deed, the respondent had an option of repudiating the contract. Further, the applicants were informed about the prevailing situation due to pandemic and how it cannot go ahead with the lease. 16. This Court cannot accept the contentions of the respondent. As stated above, the respondent contended that the lease deed was not acted upon and it was in the nature of a contingent contract. It is relevant to note that Section 31 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defined "Contingent contract" as "a contract to do or not to do something, if some event, collateral to such contract, does not happen". A contingent contract to do or not to do anything, if an unforeseen future event happens, cannot be enforced by law, under Section 32, unless and until that event has happened. If the event becomes impossible, such contract becomes void. 17. In the present case, according to the respondent the lease deed would have commenced only after the handing over of the physical possession of the schedule property. As the handing-over did not happen the lease deed was not acted upon by the parties. The applicant contended that it was ready and willing to hand-over the physical possession, but no response was received from the respondent. 18. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that the scope of interference by the Courts under Section 11 of the Act, 1996 is extremely limited. The Court cannot decide preliminary issues of jurisdiction which are to be decided by the Arbitrator. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vidya Drolia's case (supra), laid down the test to exercise power under Section 11 of the Act, 1996. In his separate opinion, the Hon'ble Sri Justice Ramana held as follows; "244. The Court cannot decide preliminary issues of jurisdiction which are to be decided by the Arbitrator. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vidya Drolia's case (supra), laid down the test to exercise power under Section 11 of the Act, 1996. In his separate opinion, the Hon'ble Sri Justice Ramana held as follows; "244. Before we part, the conclusions reached, with respect to Question 1 are: 244.1. Sections 8 and 11 of the Act have the same ambit with respect to judicial interference. 244.2. Usually, subject-matter arbitrability cannot be decided at the stage of Section 8 or 11 of the Act, unless it is a clear case of deadwood. 244.3. The Court, under Sections 8 and 11, has to refer a matter to arbitration or to appoint an Arbitrator, as the case may be, unless a party has established a prima facie (summary findings) case of non-existence of valid arbitration agreement, by summarily portraying a strong case that he is entitled to such a finding. 244.4. The Court should refer a matter if the validity of the arbitration agreement cannot be determined on a prime facie basis, as laid down above i.e., "when in doubt do refer". 244.5. The scope of the Court to examine the prime facie validity of an arbitration agreement includes only: 244.5.1. Whether the arbitration agreement was in writing? or 244.5.2. Whether the arbitration agreement was contained in exchange of letters, telecommunication, etc.? 244.5.3. Whether the core contractual ingredients qua the arbitration agreement were fulfilled? 244.5.4. On rare occasions, whether the subject-matter of dispute is arbitrable?" 19. In the present case, there is no dispute that the parties by incorporating Clause 26 had agreed to resolve their disputes through arbitration. Given the limited jurisdiction of this Court under Section 11 of the Act, 1996 the question whether the leaser deed was acted upon or not and whether the deed was in the nature of a contingent contract is to be decided by an Arbitrator. Therefore, it is appropriate to refer the dispute to arbitration. 20. In light of the aforesaid discussion and the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the present arbitration application is allowed. Accordingly, Sri Justice Challa Kodandaram, retired Judge, High Court, Hyderabad is appointed as the Sole Arbitrator to resolve the disputes between the parties. 21. As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in the Arbitration Application shall stand closed.