JUDGMENT : Ajai Tyagi, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the claimants-appellants against the judgment & award dated 12.09.2007 passed by learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No.3, District Ghaziabad in Motor Accident Claim Petition No.232 of 2005 (Smt. Praveen Rawat and Others Vs. Anuroop Singh and another), whereby the learned Tribunal has denied the compensation for the death of Dinesh Kumar Singh Rawat in a road accident, holding the accident to be the result of ''Act of God', and awarded only Rs.50,000/- for no fault liability. 2. The claimants-appellants have preferred this appeal for enhancement of quantum of compensation. 3. The brief facts of the case are that claimants-appellants filed a Motor Accident Claim Petition before the Tribunal for seeking the compensation under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the death of Dinesh Kumar Singh Rawat (deceased) in a road accident with the averments that on 28.12.2004 at about 7:00 PM the deceased was traveling from Lucknow to Lakhimpurkhiri in car bearing no. U.P. 32 X 3366. The driver of the car was driving the vehicle very rashly and negligenlty and at a very high speed, all of sudden, a blue bull (Neelgay) came on the way. The driver tried to save the blue bull and in that process dashed the car into the tree. After dashing into the tree, the car overturned. In this accident, the deceased sustained serious injuries and died on way to the hospital for treatment. 4. It is also averred that the age of the deceased was 38 years and he was working as Senior Engineer (Technical) in a private company namely, Aircel (HUTCH). Owner and Insurance Company of the aforesaid vehicle filed their respective written statements. Learned Tribunal held that the accident had taken place due to coming a blue bull on the way suddenly, which was not the fault of the driver and accident had taken place due to Act of God. Consequently, the claim was denied and only Rs.50,000/- was awarded for no fault liability. 5. Aggrieved mainly with the non grant of compensation under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act awarded, the appellants have preferred this appeal. 6. Heard learned counsel for the appellants-claimants and learned counsel for the respondents. Perused the record. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants-claimants has submitted that impugned judgment and award is against the law. 5. Aggrieved mainly with the non grant of compensation under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act awarded, the appellants have preferred this appeal. 6. Heard learned counsel for the appellants-claimants and learned counsel for the respondents. Perused the record. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants-claimants has submitted that impugned judgment and award is against the law. Learned Tribunal has held that the driver of the car was not negligent but this finding is erroneous because if the vehicle would have been driven with proper care and caution, the accident could have been avoided. Learned Tribunal has adopted incorrect approach, because the vehicle was not being driven at a normal speed. In fact, the driver lost the control on staring and the vehicle dashed into the tree. 8. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the appellants-claimants that at the place of accident, the road was not plain and it was having pits, hence, in such a situation, the driver should have controlled the speed but he failed to do so, which reflects that car was being driven at an excessive speed. It is next submitted that two eye witnesses of the accident were produced, who were not relied upon by the learned Tribunal. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the Insurance Company has vehemently objected the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants-claimants and submitted that appellants brought the case before the learned Tribunal with the fact that on way to Lakhimpurkhiri, a blue bull came on the road suddenly and to save it, car dashed into the tree and overturned but the alleged eye witnesses have deposed that car was being driven at a very high speed and it tried to overtake a tempo and in this overtaking, the car dashed into the tree. Hence, these two contradictory versions put by the appellants before the learned Tribunal. 10. Learned counsel for the insurance company has pointed out that the owner of the vehicle informed the concerned police station on the same day of the accident. This information was entered in General Diary of the police station, in which it is mentioned that a blue bull came on the road and to save it, the car dashed into the tree. Learned Tribunal also held that the accident had taken place in order to save the blue bull. This information was entered in General Diary of the police station, in which it is mentioned that a blue bull came on the road and to save it, the car dashed into the tree. Learned Tribunal also held that the accident had taken place in order to save the blue bull. Blue bull came on the road all of sudden, which was not in control of the driver, it was Act of God and there was no negligent driving by the driver. It is also submitted that this finding is based on fact and evidence on record, which calls for no interference by this Court. 11. Learned Tribunal held that accident took place because a blue bull all of sudden came on the road which was beyond the control of the driver and in order to save the blue bull, the accident took place. Learned Tribunal held this accident, as a result of Act of God. First of all, we have to go into the question whether the accident was the result of Act of God or it was human negligence. While deciding the claim petition, learned Tribunal had not kept in mind the standard of proof in Motor Accident Claim Petition. 12. In Anita Sharma and Others Vs. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Another, (2021) 1 SCC 171 , the Full Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court narrated the view taken in Parmeshwari Vs. Amir Chand, (2011) 11 SCC 635 , that it is very difficult to trace the witnesses and collecting information for an accident which took place many hundreds of kilometers away and further it is held by Hon'ble Apex Court in Anita Sharma and Others (Supra) that in a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. 13. The Division Bench of Madras High Court also held in Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Subbulakshmi and Others, passed in C.MA. No. 1482 of 2017 [C.M.P. No. 7919 of 2017. (CMA Sr. No. 76893 of 2016)] has referred the case of Puspabai Purshottam Udeshi Vs. 13. The Division Bench of Madras High Court also held in Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Subbulakshmi and Others, passed in C.MA. No. 1482 of 2017 [C.M.P. No. 7919 of 2017. (CMA Sr. No. 76893 of 2016)] has referred the case of Puspabai Purshottam Udeshi Vs. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co., 1977 ACJ 343 (SC), in which it is observed that the normal rule is that it is for the plaintiff to prove negligence but as in some cases considerable hardship is caused to the plaintiff as the true cause of the accident is not known to him but is solely within the knowledge of the defendant who caused it, the plaintiff can prove the accident but cannot prove how it happened to establish negligence on the part of the defendant. This hardship is sought to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The general purport of the words res ipsa loquitur is that the accident 'speaks for itself or tells its own story. There are cases in which the accident speaks for itself so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the accident and nothing more. It will then be for the defendant to establish that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence. Where the maxim is applied the burden is on the defendant to show either that in fact he was not negligent or that the accident might more probably have happened in a manner which did not connote negligence on his part. For the application of the principle it must be shown that the car was under the management of the defendant and that the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who had the management used proper care. 14. In Bimla Devi and Others VS. Himachal RTC reported in 2009 (13) SCC 530 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular vehicle in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. 15. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. 15. In the case on hand the driver and the deceased only were travelling in the said vehicle at the time of accident. The deceased died due to the injuries sustained by him, hence, the real fact of the accident how and in what manner it had taken place lies only within the knowledge of the driver, who has not stepped into the witness-box. It is not disputed that accident had taken place due to coming of blue bull on the road. The G.D. entry of concerned police station also discloses the fact of accident in order to save the blue bull, which is first version of the accident just after three and half hours. 16. It is the version of appellants-claimants as well as respondents and learned Tribunal also reached to the conclusion that accident took place in order to save the vehicle from blue bull which came on the road all of sudden. Now here comes the question, if the blue bull came on the road before a vehicle whether it can be termed as "Act of God." 17. While considering the question of inevitable accident or an "Act of God", it will be useful to reproduce a passage from the Law of Torts, by Justice G.P. Singh. "All causes of inevitable accidents may be divided into two classes. (1) Those which are occasioned by the elementary forces of nature unconnected with the agency of man or other cause; and (2) Those which have their origin either in the whole or in part in the agency of man, whether in acts of commission or omission, non-feasance or mis-feasance or in any other causes independent of the agency of natural forces. The term 'act of God' is applicable to the former class." 18. Act of God is one arising from natural causes. Some of the well-known instances of "Act of God" are the storms, the tides and the volcanic eruptions. They are, in a sense, inevitable accidents beyond the control of man. What is urged in this case is that all inevitable accidents must be taken as acts of God. Act of God is one arising from natural causes. Some of the well-known instances of "Act of God" are the storms, the tides and the volcanic eruptions. They are, in a sense, inevitable accidents beyond the control of man. What is urged in this case is that all inevitable accidents must be taken as acts of God. Matters which are not within the power of any party to prevent are to be considered as acts of God as per the Insurance Company. We are unable to concur with the aforesaid argument of learned counsel for the Insurance Company. In our view, the accident may happen by reason of the play of natural forces or by intervention of human agency or by both. It may be that in either of these cases accidents may be inevitable. But it is only those acts which can be traced to natural forces and which have nothing to do with the intervention of human agency that could be said to be Acts of God. Cockburn C. J.. in the leading case in Nugent v. Smith. (1876-1 CPD 423) said. "It is at once obvious, as was pointed out by Lord Mansfield in Forward v. Pittard, that all causes of inevitable accident--" "fortuitus" -- may be divided into two classes -- those which are occasioned by the elementary forces of nature unconnected with the agency of man or other cause, and those which have their origin either in the whole or in part in the agency of man, whether in acts of commission or omission, of nonfeasance or of misfeasance, or in any other cause independent of the agency of natural forces. It is obvious that it would be altogether incongruous to apply the term "act of God" to the latter class of inevitable accident. It is equally clear that storm and tempest belong to the class to which the term "act of God" is properly applicable." 19. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 8, 3rd Edition, page 183, this question is dealt with as under: "An act of God. In the legal sense of the term, may be defined as an extraordinary occurrence or circumstance which could not have been foreseen and which could not have been guarded against; or. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 8, 3rd Edition, page 183, this question is dealt with as under: "An act of God. In the legal sense of the term, may be defined as an extraordinary occurrence or circumstance which could not have been foreseen and which could not have been guarded against; or. more accurately, as an accident due to natural causes, directly and exclusively without human intervention, and which could not have been avoided by any amount of foresight and pains and care reasonably to be expected of the person sought to be made liable for it or who seeks to excuse himself on the around of it. The occurrence need not be unique, nor need it be one that happens for the first time; it is enough that it is extraordinary, and such as could not reasonably be anticipated. The mere fact that a phenomenon has happened once, when it does not carry with it or import any probability of a recurrence (when, in other words, if does not imply any law from which its recurrence can be inferred) does not prevent that phenomenon from being an act of God. It must, however, be something overwhelming and not merely an ordinary accidental circumstance, and it must not arise from the act of man." 20. Coming of blue bull on the road before a vehicle, as in the case on hand, cannot be termed as Act of God. It is admitted fact that the car, in which, the deceased was traveling dashed into the tree even it if it is believed that it was while saving the blue bull and overturned in a big pit. This is not the case that vehicle dashed into blue bull but it dashed into tree, when the driver tried to save the blue bull from hitting the car, which goes to show that the car was being plied at a high speed. Had the car being driven at normal speed, the accident could have been avoided or its impact could be minimized. This fact itself shows the negligence of the driver, who was driving the vehicle at an excessive speed. The Rule propounded in Rylands Vs. Fletcher, 1868 Law Reports (3) HL 330, can apply in motor accident cases. 21. The above Rule eventually gained approval in a large number of decisions rendered by Courts in England and abroad. This fact itself shows the negligence of the driver, who was driving the vehicle at an excessive speed. The Rule propounded in Rylands Vs. Fletcher, 1868 Law Reports (3) HL 330, can apply in motor accident cases. 21. The above Rule eventually gained approval in a large number of decisions rendered by Courts in England and abroad. Winfield on Torts has brought out even a Chapter on the "Rule in Rylands Vs. Fletcher. At page 543 of the 15th Edn. Of the calibrated work the learned author has pointed out that "over the years Rylands Vs. Fletcher has been applied to a remarkable variety of things; fire gas, explosions, electricity, oil, noxious, fumes, colliery spoil, rusty wire from a decayed fence, vibrations, poisonous vegetation. 22. Act of God or vis major are the forces which no human foresight can provide most and of which human prudence is not bound to recognize the possibility. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even apart from Section 140 of Motor Vehicles Act, a victim in an accident which occurred while using motor vehicle is entitled to get compensation from the Tribunal, unless any exception applies. 23. We are of the considered opinion that if the driver of the vehicle would have taken care and caution while plying the vehicle at normal speed, the accident could have been avoided because it is the finding of learned Tribunal in the impugned judgment that the place where the accident had occurred was near Dudhwa National Park, having forest on both sides of the road and blue bulls are found there in large numbers and possibility of blue bulls coming on the road always remains high. Hence, in these peculiar situation and considering the place of accident, the driver of the vehicle was under extra ruts to show caution and was saddled with the duty to take extra care and caution. 24. The finding of learned Tribunal holding the accident to be the result of Act of God is not sustainable in the eye of law and we hold that the accident had taken place due to the negligence of the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident. 25. 24. The finding of learned Tribunal holding the accident to be the result of Act of God is not sustainable in the eye of law and we hold that the accident had taken place due to the negligence of the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident. 25. The policy being in vogue and though orally submitted by counsel for respondents that there is breach of policy and the insurance company did not challenge the award as the amount awarded was under Section 140 M.V. Act, if this Court decide not to relegate the appellants to Tribunal. The oral objection be heard. We have perused the record, there is no breach of policy proved which can either exonerate the Insurance Company or permit this Court to grant recovery rights to Insurance Company. The finding of fact that the driver of the vehicle had proper driving licence is concurred with us and, therefore, the Tribunal has held the Insurance Company liable, in which we concur the oral submissions of Mr. Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the respondent-Insurance company that the Insurance Company should be given recovery rights cannot be acceded. 26. Now, we have to decide the quantum of compensation payable to the appellants-claimants. We first thought that the matter can be relegated to the learned Tribunal for fixation of the quantum of compensation but we are mindful of the fact that this is a case in which the accident happened more than 17 years ago. Hence, we incline to fix the quantum of compensation here itself in view of the judgment of Bithika Mazumdar and another Vs. Sagar Pal and Others, (2017) 2 SCC 748 and of this Court in F.A.F.O. No. 1999 of 2007 (Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Ummida Begum and others) and also in F.A.F.O. No. 1404 of 1999 (Smt. Ragini Devi and others Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and another) decided on 17.04.2019 wherein it has been held that if the record is with the appellate Court, it can decide the compensation instead of relegating the parties to the Tribunal. 27. The deceased was serving as a Senior Engineer (Technical) in a private company namely, Aircel (HUTCH). Learned counsel for the appellants-claimants has submitted that deceased was getting the salary near about Rs.30,000/- per month at the time of death. 27. The deceased was serving as a Senior Engineer (Technical) in a private company namely, Aircel (HUTCH). Learned counsel for the appellants-claimants has submitted that deceased was getting the salary near about Rs.30,000/- per month at the time of death. The age of the deceased was 33 years and he is survived by his wife and three minor children. 28. Per contra, learned counsel for the Insurance Company has objected to it and submitted that the income of the deceased is not proved and the age of the deceased was 38 years. 29. Perusal of record confirms that the deceased was serving in private company namely, Aircel (HUTCH). The salary certificate of the deceased is also on record, which is well proved as the learned Tribunal has exhibited it as Ex. KA-1. It transpires from the salary certificate that monthly salary of the deceased is shown as Rs.25,881/-. 30. According to us, admissible component of salary would include the basic salary, management allowance, house rent allowance, conveyance allowance, pay for position and provident fund, rest of the components shown in the salary certificate are subject to the reimbursement, hence, are not part of the salary. Hence, computable salary would be Rs.21,632/- per month. 31. Since the age of the deceased was below 40 years i.e. 38 years as per the High School Certificate and he was in permanent job, 50% shall be added towards future loss of income as held by Hon'ble Apex Court in National Insurance Company vs. Pranay Sethi [2014 (4) TAC 637 (SC)]. Keeping in view the age of the deceased, multiplier of 15 will be applied in the light of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Smt. Sarla Verma vs. Delhi Transport Corporation [2009 (2) TAC 677 (SC)]. The deceased is survived by his wife and three minor children, 1/3rd would be deducted from the salary for personal expenses of the deceased. 32. In the light of judgment of Pranay Sethi (Supra), claimants shall be entitled to get Rs.15,000/- each for loss of estate and funeral expenses. Apart from it, the wife of the deceased shall also be entitled to get Rs.40,000/- for loss of consortium, which are subject to upward revision of 10% of every three years. In this way, the appellants-claimants shall be entitled to get Rs.1,00,000/- for non-pecuniary heads. 33. Apart from it, the wife of the deceased shall also be entitled to get Rs.40,000/- for loss of consortium, which are subject to upward revision of 10% of every three years. In this way, the appellants-claimants shall be entitled to get Rs.1,00,000/- for non-pecuniary heads. 33. Three minor children of the deceased, lost their father at a very tender age, hence, children of the deceased shall be entitled to get Rs.50,000/- each towards filial consortium in the light of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kurvan Ansari alias Kurvan Ali and another vs. Shyam Kishore Murmu and another [2021 (4) TAC (SC)]. 34. Hence, the total amount of compensation, in view of the above discussions, payable to the appellants-claimants is being computed herein below : 1. Annual income i.e. Rs.21,632/- per month X 12 Rs.2,59,584/- P/A 2. Percentage towards future prospect : 50% Rs.1,29,792/- 3. Total income : Rs.2,59,584/- + Rs.1,29,792/- Rs.3,89,376/- 4. Income after deduction of 1/3rd : Rs.3,89,376 - Rs.1,29,792/- Rs.2,59,584/- 5. Multiplier applicable : 15 :- Rs.2,59,584/- X 15 Rs.38.93,760/- 6. Amount under non pecuniary head : Rs.15,000 + Rs.15,000 + Rs.40,000/- + 10 % upward revision of every three years. Rs.1,00,000/- 7. Filial consortium : Rs.50,000/- X 3 Rs.1,50,000/- 8. Total compensation : Rs.38,93,760/- + Rs.1,00,000/- + Rs.1,50,000/- Rs.41,43,760/- 9. Amount after deduction of no fault liability : Rs.41,43,760/- - Rs.50,000/- Rs.40,93,760/-. 35. It is pointed out by learned counsel for the Insurance Company that the appeal is delayed by 308 days and the interest of the aforesaid period would not be paid to the appellants-claimants. 36. It is rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the Insurance Company that appeal is delayed by 308 days, hence, interest of one year should be deducted. As far as issue of rate of interest is concerned, it should be 7.5% in view of the latest decision of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mannat Johal and Others, 2019 (2) T.A.C. 705 (S.C.) wherein the Apex Court has held as under: "13. The aforesaid features equally apply to the contentions urged on behalf of the claimants as regards the rate of interest. The Tribunal had awarded interest at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same had been too high a rate in comparison to what is ordinarily envisaged in these matters. The aforesaid features equally apply to the contentions urged on behalf of the claimants as regards the rate of interest. The Tribunal had awarded interest at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same had been too high a rate in comparison to what is ordinarily envisaged in these matters. The High Court, after making a substantial enhancement in the award amount, modified the interest component at a reasonable rate of 7.5% p.a. and we find no reason to allow the interest in this matter at any rate higher than that allowed by High Court." 37. We fix the rate of interest as 7.5% per annum till the date of judgment by the learned Tribunal. No interest would be paid for one year after the judgment of learned Tribunal and 6% per annum rate of interest would be paid thereafter. 38. In view of the above, the appeal is partly allowed. Judgment and award passed by the Tribunal shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent. The respondent-Insurance Company shall deposit the amount within a period of 12 weeks from today with interest as discussed above from the date of filing of the claim petition till the amount is deposited. The amount already deposited be deducted from the amount to be deposited. 39. In view of the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, in the case of Smt. Hansagori P. Ladhani vs. The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., [ 2007(2) GLH 291 ] and this High Court in total amount of interest, accrued on the principal amount of compensation is to be apportioned on financial year to financial year basis and if the interest payable to claimant for any financial year exceeds Rs.50,000/-, insurance company/owner is/are entitled to deduct appropriate amount under the head of 'Tax Deducted at Source' as provided u/s 194A (3) (ix) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and if the amount of interest does not exceeds Rs.50,000/- in any financial year, registry of this Tribunal is directed to allow the claimants to withdraw the amount without producing the certificate from the concerned Income-Tax Authority. The aforesaid view has been reiterated by this High Court in Review Application No.1 of 2020 in First Appeal From Order No.23 of 2001 (Smt. Sudesna and others Vs. Hari Singh and another) and in First Appeal From Order No.2871 of 2016 (Tej Kumari Sharma v. Chola Mandlam M.S. General Insurance Co. The aforesaid view has been reiterated by this High Court in Review Application No.1 of 2020 in First Appeal From Order No.23 of 2001 (Smt. Sudesna and others Vs. Hari Singh and another) and in First Appeal From Order No.2871 of 2016 (Tej Kumari Sharma v. Chola Mandlam M.S. General Insurance Co. Ltd.) decided on 19.3.2021 while disbursing the amount. 40. The Tribunal shall follow the guidelines issued by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others, vide order dated 27.01.2022, as the purpose of keeping compensation is to safeguard the interest of the claimants. Since long time has elapsed, the amount be deposited in the Saving Bank Account of claimant(s) in a nationalized Bank without F.D.R.