JUDGMENT 1. Case diary in connected case, M.Cr.C. No. 10610/2022, has been received. 2. This petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the FIR in Crime No. 741/2021 registered at Police Station City Kotwali, District Shivpuri for offence under Sections 498-A, 377, 506, 34 of IPC read with Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 3. According to the prosecution case, the respondent no.2 lodged an FIR against the applicants alleging inter alia that she got married to the applicant on 13/07/2013 and her father had given sufficient dowry as per his financial capability. After one year of her marriage, she gave birth to a child, who is mentally retarded and his treatment is going on. After the birth of his child, the applicant and her mother-in-law started passing taunts with regard to the disease of her son and they used to pass taunts that not only her father has not give anything to them but also the complainant has given birth to such a boy, for whose treatment they are required to spend money and accordingly, they started insisting that the complainant must bring Rs. 10,00,000/- from her father. When she refused to bring money, then she was assaulted by the applicant. When she informed her parents about the demand made by her in-laws, then her mother-in-law, Jeth Krishna Lal Bhargava, Alok Bhargava, sister-in-law Rekha Sharma and her husband Ashok Sharma started harassing her physically and mentally and they were continuously demanding dowry. 4. During her stay with the applicant, he had committed unnatural sex on various occasions and whenever she objected, then she was beaten by the applicant. The applicant used to threaten that in case if she narrates anything to her family members, then she would be killed and as she was afraid, therefore, she did not disclose anything to anybody. In the month of July, 2020 her husband left her in her parental home alongwith her son. When the complainant insisted that she would reside with her husband, then she was beaten and threatened that unless and until she brings money, she should not come. 5. Challenging the FIR, it is submitted by the counsel for the applicants that the police has registered the offence contrary to the directions given by the Supreme Court in the case of Preeti Gupta Vs. 5. Challenging the FIR, it is submitted by the counsel for the applicants that the police has registered the offence contrary to the directions given by the Supreme Court in the case of Preeti Gupta Vs. State of Jharkhand reported in AIR 2010 SC 3363 as well as contrary to the circular issued by the Director General of Police to the effect that before registration of an offence like 498-A of IPC, the police officer must go for reconciliation proceedings. It is further submitted that the applicants are residing separately from the family of the complainant and her husband. The respondent no.2 has suppressed this fact that her husband is presently residing in Puna and the husband of the respondent no.2 has filed a divorce petition against respondent no.2 before the Family Court, Dewas on 4/9/2020 and the respondent no.2 has appeared through her counsel and reply has been filed, whereas the FIR has been registered on 3/12/2021. It is submitted that since the respondent no.2 has lodged the FIR immediately after submitting her written statement in the divorce petition, therefore, it clearly indicates that the FIR has been lodged by way of counterblast. The applicants have nothing to do with the family affairs of the respondent no.2 and her husband. Since the husband of respondent no.2 himself has deposited certain amount in the bank account of respondent no.2, therefore, it is clear that there was no demand of dowry. 6. Per contra, the application is vehemently opposed by the counsel for the State as well as respondent no.2. It is submitted that it is well established principle of law that if the complaint discloses commission of a cognizable offence, then the police is left with no other option but to register the FIR. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 8. The first contention of the counsel for the applicants is that the FIR in question has been lodged by way of counterblast to the divorce petition filed by the husband of the respondent no.2 before the Family Court, Dewas. The said divorce petition was filed on 4/9/2020 and it is clear from the order-sheets of the Family Court that the respondent no.2 appeared on 21/9/2021 and engaged her counsel. 9. However, it is equally clear from the order-sheets of MJC No.3/2021 that the said petition for divorce was dismissed in default by order dated 9/11/2021. The said divorce petition was filed on 4/9/2020 and it is clear from the order-sheets of the Family Court that the respondent no.2 appeared on 21/9/2021 and engaged her counsel. 9. However, it is equally clear from the order-sheets of MJC No.3/2021 that the said petition for divorce was dismissed in default by order dated 9/11/2021. Therefore, it is clear that at present no petition for divorce is pending. Furthermore, merely because the FIR was lodged subsequent to the institution of divorce petition, it cannot be held that the FIR was lodged by way of counterblast. On the contrary, it clearly indicates that only after realizing that the husband/in-laws of the complainant have decided not to resolve the dispute and have decided to break the relationship by instituting a petition for divorce, if the wife lodges the FIR, then at the most it can be said that earlier she was waiting under the hope and belief that her married life would be saved and the dispute may be resolved and her in-laws may improve their behaviour. Such patience in order to save her married life cannot be taken to the discredit of the complainant/wife. Furthermore, any finding given in a civil proceeding is not binding in criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court in the case of Kamaladevi Agarwal Vs. State of W.B. and others reported in (2002) 1 SCC 555 has held as under:- '15. We have already noticed that the nature and scope of civil and criminal proceedings and the standard of proof required in both matters is different and distinct. Whereas in civil proceedings the matter can be decided on the basis of probabilities, the criminal case has to be decided by adopting the standard of proof of 'beyond reasonable doubt'. A Constitution Bench of this Court, dealing with similar circumstances, in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras [ AIR 1954 SC 397 : 1954 Cri LJ 1019] held that where civil and criminal cases are pending, precedence shall be given to criminal proceedings. Detailing the reasons for the conclusions, the Court held: (AIR p. 399, paras 15-16) '15. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. Detailing the reasons for the conclusions, the Court held: (AIR p. 399, paras 15-16) '15. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard and fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment. 16. Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust. This however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under Section 476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished.' 17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the appellant against the respondents. We are also not impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the basis of propriety. We are also not impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the basis of propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil action in a different court even though higher in status and authority, cannot be made a basis for quashing of the proceedings.' The Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha Vs. Rameshwari Devi and others reported in (2007) 12 SCC 369 has held as under:- '14. From a plain reading of the findings arrived at by the High Court while quashing the FIR, it is apparent that the High Court had relied on extraneous considerations and acted beyond the allegations made in the FIR for quashing the same in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. We have already noted the illustrations enumerated in Bhajan Lal's case and from a careful reading of these illustrations, we are of the view that the allegations emerging from the FIR are not covered by any of the illustrations as noted hereinabove. For example, we may take up one of the findings of the High Court as noted herein above. The High Court has drawn an adverse inference on account of the FIR being lodged on 31st December, 2001 while the appellant was forced out of the matrimonial home on 25th May, 2001. 15. In our view, in the facts and circumstance of the case, the High Court was not justified in drawing an adverse inference against the appellant wife for lodging the FIR on 31st December, 2001 on the ground that she had left the matrimonial home atleast six months before that. This is because, in our view, the High Court had failed to appreciate that the appellant and her family members were, during this period, making all possible efforts to enter into a settlement so that the respondent No.2-husband would take her back to the matrimonial home. If any complaint was made during this period, there was every possibility of not entering into any settlement with the respondent No.2-husband. 16. If any complaint was made during this period, there was every possibility of not entering into any settlement with the respondent No.2-husband. 16. It is pertinent to note that the complaint was filed only when all efforts to return to the matrimonial home had failed and the respondent No.2-husband had filed a divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. That apart, in our view, filing of a divorce petition in a Civil Court cannot be a ground to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code as it is well settled that criminal and civil proceedings are separate and independent and the pendency of a civil proceeding cannot bring to an end a criminal proceeding even if they arise out of the same set of facts. Such being the position, we are, therefore, of the view that the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code has gone beyond the allegations made in the FIR and has acted in excess of its jurisdiction and, therefore, the High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR by going beyond the allegations made in the FIR or by relying on extraneous considerations.' 10. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed merely on the ground that the same was lodged after the institution of divorce petition, specifically when the divorce petition itself has been dismissed for want of prosecution. 11. So far as the allegations against the present applicants are concerned, it has been specifically alleged in the FIR that the applicants were harassing her physically and mentally on account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. It is an unfortunate case where the complainant was blessed with a mentally retarded son and her in laws instead of helping her out to up bring her son, decided to demand money and ultimately she was turned out of her parental home. 12. It is not out of place to mention here that the husband of respondent no.2, namely, Suryakant Bhargawa had filed an application for grant of anticipatory bail, which was registered as M.Cr.C. No.10610/2022 and at the request of the counsel for the parties, the complainant and her husband were directed to sit on a reconciliation table in presence of their counsel on 15/3/2022. A statement was made by the counsel for respondent no.2 that although respondent no.2 was present, but her husband, namely, Suryakant Bhargawa did not attend the reconciliation proceedings. When he was contacted through video conferencing, then he refused to talk for reconciliation. The submissions made by the counsel for the parties have also been mentioned by this Court today itself in M.Cr.C. No.10610/2022, which read as under:- On 11/03/2022, at the request of the counsel for the parties the reconciliation proceedings were organized on 15/03/2022 in Mediation Center, High Court Gwalior Bench in the presence of respective counsels for parties. It is submitted Shri Shukla as well as Shri Dhengula that the applicant did not appear and he joined the proceedings only through video conferencing. However, it is submitted by Shri Dhengula that the applicant had specifically refused to keep the complainant with him and he was not ready for any reconciliation proceedings. Although, Shri Shukla did not accept the submissions made by the counsel for the complainant, but submitted that he will ensure that the applicant comes to reconciliation table. Thus, it prima facie appears that neither the applicant physically attended the reconciliation proceedings nor he was willing to resolve the disputes. 13. Thus, the applicants and Suryakant Bhargawa have left respondent no.2 all alone with her mentally retarded child and they have raised their hands from upbringing or helping respondent no.2 to up bring her mentally retarded child. Compelling a married woman to live in her parental home on account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry by itself is a cruelty. The Supreme Court in the case of Rupali Devi Vs. State of UP and others reported in (2019) 5 SCC 384 has held as under:- 14. 'Cruelty' which is the crux of the offence under Section 498-A IPC is defined in Black's Law Dictionary to mean 'the intentional and malicious infliction of mental or physical suffering on a living creature, esp. a human; abusive treatment; outrage (abuse, inhuman treatment, indignity)'. Cruelty can be both physical or mental cruelty. 'Cruelty' which is the crux of the offence under Section 498-A IPC is defined in Black's Law Dictionary to mean 'the intentional and malicious infliction of mental or physical suffering on a living creature, esp. a human; abusive treatment; outrage (abuse, inhuman treatment, indignity)'. Cruelty can be both physical or mental cruelty. The impact on the mental health of the wife by overt acts on the part of the husband or his relatives; the mental stress and trauma of being driven away from the matrimonial home and her helplessness to go back to the same home for fear of being ill-treated are aspects that cannot be ignored while understanding the meaning of the expression 'cruelty' appearing in Section 498-A of the Penal Code. The emotional distress or psychological effect on the wife, if not the physical injury, is bound to continue to traumatise the wife even after she leaves the matrimonial home and takes shelter at the parental home. Even if the acts of physical cruelty committed in the matrimonial house may have ceased and such acts do not occur at the parental home, there can be no doubt that the mental trauma and the psychological distress caused by the acts of the husband including verbal exchanges, if any, that had compelled the wife to leave the matrimonial home and take shelter with her parents would continue to persist at the parental home. Mental cruelty borne out of physical cruelty or abusive and humiliating verbal exchanges would continue in the parental home even though there may not be any overt act of physical cruelty at such place. 15. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, as the object behind its enactment would indicate, is to provide a civil remedy to victims of domestic violence as against the remedy in criminal law which is what is provided under Section 498-A of the Penal Code. The definition of "domestic violence" in the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 contemplates harm or injuries that endanger the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, as well as emotional abuse. The said definition would certainly, for reasons stated above, have a close connection with Explanations (a) & (b) to Section 498-A of the Penal Code which define "cruelty". The said definition would certainly, for reasons stated above, have a close connection with Explanations (a) & (b) to Section 498-A of the Penal Code which define "cruelty". The provisions contained in Section 498-A of the Penal Code, undoubtedly, encompass both mental as well as the physical well-being of the wife. Even the silence of the wife may have an underlying element of an emotional distress and mental agony. Her sufferings at the parental home e though may be directly attributable to commission of acts of cruelty by the husband at the matrimonial home would, undoubtedly, be the consequences of the acts committed at the matrimonial home. Such consequences, by itself, would amount to distinct offences committed at the parental home where she has taken shelter. The adverse effects on the mental health in the parental home though on account of the acts committed in the matrimonial home would, in our considered view, amount to commission of cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A at the parental home. The consequences of the cruelty committed at the matrimonial home results in repeated offences being committed at the parental home. This is the kind of offences contemplated under Section 179 CrPC which would squarely be applicable to the present case as an answer to the question raised. 14. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out for quashment of FIR, as there are specific allegations against the applicants. 15. Accordingly, the application fails and is hereby dismissed.