JUDGMENT : I.A. No. 1746 of 2021: 1. The matter has been taken up through video conferencing with the consent of the parties. They have no complaint whatsoever regarding audio and/or video quality. 2. The instant appeal is barred by limitation, as such, a delay condonation application by way of interlocutory application being I.A. No. 1746 of 2021 has been filed for condoning the delay of 214 days. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent-CCL is having no objection in condoning the delay rather submission has been made that the matter be decided on merit. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and found from the reason assigned in the instant interlocutory application to be sufficient for condoning the delay, accordingly, the delay of 214 days in filing the instant appeal is condoned and the instant interlocutory application stands disposed of. L.P.A. No. 450 of 2019: 5. The instant intra-court appeal preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 22.10.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 5332 of 2017, whereby and whereunder, the learned Single Judge has refused to interfere with the decision of the administrative authority of the order of dismissal passed against the appellant on conclusion of the departmental proceeding. 6. The brief facts of the lis as per the pleading which are required to be enumerated, read as hereunder: The appellant/writ-petitioner was appointed as a Trainee on compassionate ground vide order dated 22.04.1999 and while working as such, he faced charge sheet on 6/8th July, 2010 for unauthorized absence from duty from 24th July 2009 without prior sanction of leave and also for habitual absence in an unauthorized manner. The appellant did not participate in the departmental inquiry despite notice and did not respond to the second show-cause. The disciplinary authority has passed an order of dismissal from service against the appellant on 08/10th May, 2014. The aforesaid order of dismissal has been challenged by filing writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 5332 of 2017 wherein the learned Single Judge has refused to interfere with the order of dismissal by dismissing the writ petition against which present intra-court appeal has been preferred. 7. Mr. The aforesaid order of dismissal has been challenged by filing writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 5332 of 2017 wherein the learned Single Judge has refused to interfere with the order of dismissal by dismissing the writ petition against which present intra-court appeal has been preferred. 7. Mr. Mahesh Tewari, learned counsel for the appellant has raised the issue in assailing the impugned order that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the reason of unauthorized absence which was due to mental illness. The certificate about the mental illness has been produced, although after departmental proceeding, i.e. at the time of giving joining after recovery from the mental ailment but that has not been taken into consideration. It has been submitted that it is a case where the principles of natural justice has been violated because he was forced not to participate in the departmental inquiry, as such, the order of dismissal which is a major punishment since has been passed without providing opportunity of hearing, therefore, the order of dismissal is not sustainable in the eye of law but these aspects of the matter have not been properly considered by the learned Single Judge, therefore, the order of learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eye of law, hence, this intra-court appeal. Mr. Tewari, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of M.P. and Others vs. Sanjay Kumar Sharma, (2005) 11 SCC 513 , Krushnakant B. Parmar vs. Union of India and Another, (2012) 3 SCC 178 and Geetaben Ratilal Patel vs. District Primary Education Officer, (2013) 7 SCC 182 . 8. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the respondent-CCL has vehemently opposed the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant by defending the order passed by the learned Single Judge by taking the ground that there is no question of violation of principles of natural justice because the appellant has chosen not to appear even after service of notice in the departmental proceeding and it is settled that once a delinquent employee chooses not to participate in the departmental proceeding it is not available for such delinquent employee to raise the issue of violation of principles of natural justice. It has been submitted that the inquiry officer has proceeded ex-parte and found the charge proved as also the charge of habitual offender has been proved and thereafter the second show cause notice has been issued but the same has not been responded. The disciplinary authority having no option has accepted the finding recorded by the inquiry officer and thereafter inflicted the punishment of dismissal from service. It has further been submitted that the argument which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant about the certificate showing the appellant to be mentally ill, cannot be said to be a conclusive proof of mental illness because the same is only a certificate given by a psychiatrist without any supporting evidence to substantiate that the appellant was actually under his treatment for the mental ailment. Further submission has been made that the learned Single Judge has appreciated the fact in entirety as also the certificate produced by the appellant and taking into consideration the same, a conclusive finding has been arrived at by the learned Single Judge to the effect that the appellant being an outdoor patient, ought to have participated in the disciplinary proceeding but chosen not to do so, therefore, it is not available for the appellant to raise the issue of violation of principles of natural justice, as such, according to the learned counsel, there is no infirmity in the impugned order and the order passed by the learned Single Judge may not be interfered with. 9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. The fact which is not in dispute in this case is that the appellant while serving as a trainee under the respondent-CCL after being appointed on compassionate ground was proceeded with by issuance of memorandum of charge 06/08th July, 2010 alleging therein two fold allegations, i.e. unauthorized absence from duty from 24th July, 2009 without prior sanction of lave from the competent authority and secondly, has been found to be a habitual offender. The appellant, although has been noticed by the disciplinary authority and he appeared and filed reply to the memorandum of charge but the same having been found to be not satisfactory, decision was taken to initiate a departmental proceeding. The appellant, although has been noticed by the disciplinary authority and he appeared and filed reply to the memorandum of charge but the same having been found to be not satisfactory, decision was taken to initiate a departmental proceeding. The departmental proceeding was initiated by appointing inquiry officer and inquiry officer has issued notice upon the appellant on several occasions as would appear from the order of dismissal dated 08/10th May, 2014 but the appellant had chosen not to appear before the inquiry officer. The inquiry officer had found the charges proved against the appellant. The aforesaid report was forwarded before the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority accepted the finding recorded by the inquiry officer, and thereafter, issued second show cause notice to the appellant but even the second show cause notice was not responded. The disciplinary authority thereafter, came out with an order of dismissal from service vide order dated 08/10th May, 2014. The aforesaid order was challenged before this Court by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The aforesaid writ petition has been dismissed against which the instant appeal has been preferred. 10. Admittedly, herein, the appellant has been noticed by the inquiry officer as would appear from the order of dismissal and the said fact has also not been disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant. The issue has been raised on behalf of the appellant that even though the appellant has not appeared then too the principles of natural justice was required to be followed. The learned counsel for the appellant in support of his argument has relied upon the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of M.P. and Others vs. Sanjay Kumar Sharma (supra); Krushnakant B. Parmar vs. Union of India and Another (supra) and Geetaben Ratilal Patel vs. District Primary Education Officer (supra). While the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that since the appellant has chosen not to participate in the departmental proceeding, as such, it is not available for him to claim the opportunity of hearing after the order of dismissal having been passed by the disciplinary authority. It has further been submitted that the judgment referred as above are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 11. It has further been submitted that the judgment referred as above are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 11. We, after considering the rival submissions, are of the view that before proceeding with the legality and propriety of the impugned order it would be relevant to refer about the settled position of law that as to whether in case of non-participation of delinquent employee in the departmental proceeding after notice having been served, the principles of natural justice is required to be followed or not? 12. It is settled that if the opportunity to put forth the defence was given but not availed, it would not be available for the delinquent employee to raise such issue at a subsequent state. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bank of India vs. Apurba Kumar Saha, (1994) 2 SCC 615 wherein it has been held that an employee who had refused to avail the opportunities provided to him in a disciplinary proceeding to defend himself against the charges of misconduct involving his integrity and dishonesty, cannot be permitted to complain later that he had been denied a reasonable opportunity of defending himself of the charges levelled against him after the disciplinary proceeding conducted against him by the Bank-employer had resulted in punishment. In State Bank of India and Others vs. Narendra Kumar Pandey, (2013) 2 SCC 740 the Hon'ble Apex Court, by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Bank of India vs. Apurba Kumar Saha (supra) has reiterated the same view. 13. In the case in hand, admittedly, the appellant was issued with notice to participate in the departmental proceeding but he has chosen not to participate and as such, inquiry proceeded in which the charges levelled against the appellant have been found to be proved. The disciplinary authority, on its acceptance, has inflicted the punishment of dismissal from service. 13. In the case in hand, admittedly, the appellant was issued with notice to participate in the departmental proceeding but he has chosen not to participate and as such, inquiry proceeded in which the charges levelled against the appellant have been found to be proved. The disciplinary authority, on its acceptance, has inflicted the punishment of dismissal from service. Since herein, adequate opportunity was given to the appellant to participate in the departmental proceeding to put forth his defence but he had chosen not to appear, therefore, as per the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bank of India vs. Apurba Kumar Saha (supra) and State Bank of India and Others vs. Narendra Kumar Pandey (supra), the plea of violation of principles of natural justice cannot be allowed to be agitated on behalf of the appellant. Accordingly, the contention of non-observance of principles of natural justice is hereby, rejected. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken the plea by putting reliance upon the medical certificate issued by a Psychiatrist appended as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. It has been found that the said document is only a certificate given by a doctor without any supporting document like, day-to-day medical prescription or purchase of medicines from the medicines shops in order to show bona fide and therefore, in absence thereof, the certificate which has been shown to be a reason of absence as also of non-participation in the departmental proceeding, cannot be construed to be a valid document. 15. Further, the learned Single Judge has observed in the impugned order that the appellant was not an indoor patient rather an outdoor patient, as such, he could have appear before the disciplinary authority but having not done so, such plea cannot be allowed to be agitated. The learned Single Judge has further observed in the order that even the second show cause notice has not been responded by the appellant, therefore, according to our considered view, the finding recorded by the inquiry officer being conclusive and on its acceptance, the order of dismissal has been passed, as such, the same was refused to be interfered with. The learned Single Judge has further observed in the order that even the second show cause notice has not been responded by the appellant, therefore, according to our considered view, the finding recorded by the inquiry officer being conclusive and on its acceptance, the order of dismissal has been passed, as such, the same was refused to be interfered with. Position of law is very clear so far as interference by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned, regarding interference with the decision of the disciplinary authority inflicting punishment, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran, AIR 2015 SC 545 , particularly in paragraph-13 following guidelines have been laid down which are self explanatory: “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority. (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf. (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings. (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case. (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations. (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion. (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence. (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding. (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence. (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence. (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding. (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence. (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law. (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence. (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence. (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be. (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Another, (2017) 4 SCC 75 , has laid down that it is equally settled position of law that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can certainly interfere with the quantum of punishment, if it is found disproportionate to the gravity of offence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Central Industrial Security Force and Others vs. Abrar Ali, AIR 2017 SC 200 , has laid down following guidelines at paragraph 8 for interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, which is quoted herein-below: “8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 : AIR 2011 SC 1931 (Para 6), this Court held as follows: “7. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 : AIR 2011 SC 1931 (Para 6), this Court held as follows: “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala-fide or based on extraneous considerations. In Union of India and Others vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 this Court held as follows: “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the inquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the inquiry is held by a competent authority. (b) the inquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf. (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the inquiry is held by a competent authority. (b) the inquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf. (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings. (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case. (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations. (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion. (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence. (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding. (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence. (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the inquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law. (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence. (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence. (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be. (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” It is equally settled that in the departmental proceeding, the opportunity of hearing is required to be provided to the delinquent employee and if no such opportunity has been provided, certainly, the order of punishment will stand vitiated. 16. This Court, therefore, is of the view that as per the guideline stipulated by the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, none of the ground is available to show interference by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the order of dismissal. 17. Mr. Tewari, learned counsel for the appellant tried to impress upon the Court by putting reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of M.P. and Others vs. Sanjay Kumar Sharma (supra). 17. Mr. Tewari, learned counsel for the appellant tried to impress upon the Court by putting reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of M.P. and Others vs. Sanjay Kumar Sharma (supra). This Court has considered the factual aspect involved therein and found that in the said case without holding any departmental inquiry the concerned employee was terminated and in that pretext it has been held therein that without holding an inquiry termination from service cannot be said to be justified but here, in the facts of this case, a departmental inquiry had been initiated in which the appellant had not participated and thereafter, the order of dismissal was passed, in view thereof, on facts, the aforesaid judgment is not applicable in the facts of this case. So far as the reliance placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar vs. Union of India and Another (supra) is concerned, it is a case where the proposition has been laid down about the unauthorized absence to be wilful or not but herein the same is not the fact since the appellant had not participated before the disciplinary authority by showing the document in substance of his absence from service which he is claiming on the ground of medical illness, as such, on facts, this judgment is also not applicable. 18. So far as the third judgment, that has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is Geetaben Ratilal Patel vs. District Primary Education Officer (supra) is concerned, we have found that the judgment has been delivered on the pretext of mental disability based upon the report of the medical Board and after taking into consideration the provision of Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. It has been observed that on the ground of mental disability, there cannot be any removal from service since the right of the disabled person has been protected under the provision of Section 47(1) of the Act, 1995. However, in the case in hand, there is no applicability of the mental disability since there is no report of the medical board as also there is no protection which was the case in Geetaben Ratilal Patel vs. District Primary Education Officer (supra) about the provision of Section 47(1) of the Act, 1995. However, in the case in hand, there is no applicability of the mental disability since there is no report of the medical board as also there is no protection which was the case in Geetaben Ratilal Patel vs. District Primary Education Officer (supra) about the provision of Section 47(1) of the Act, 1995. Therefore, on facts, this judgment is also not applicable. 19. Learned Single Judge has considered the fact about non-participation of the delinquent employee in the disciplinary inquiry. Learned Single Judge has also considered the fact that the finding recorded by the inquiry officer as also its acceptance by the disciplinary authority which was not defended by the appellant even though due opportunity was provided. Therefore finally, the learned Single Bench came to a conclusive finding about the decision of the authority to be just and proper. 20. According to our considered view, the order of learned Single Judge suffers from no infirmity, accordingly the instant appeal fails and stands dismissed.